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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
FOREIGN POLICY EVALUATION AND THE UTILITY OF INTERVENTION 
by 
Graham Slater 
Florida International University, 2017 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Félix E. Martín, Major Professor  
 This dissertation identifies and explains the factors contributing to the 
presence and severity of U.S. foreign-policy blunders, or gross errors in strategic 
judgment resulting in significant harm to the national interest, since the Second 
World War. It hypothesizes that the grand strategy of preponderance and the 
overestimation of military power to transform the politics of other states have 
precipitated U.S. foreign-policy blunders since 1945. Examining the Vietnam War 
and Iraq War as case studies, it focuses on underlying conditions in the 
American national identity and the problematic foreign policy decision-making 
(FPDM) that corresponds to this bifurcated hypothesis, termed the 
overestimation/preponderance theoretical model (OPM). Four indicators 
operationalize the OPM: (1) how U.S. foreign policymakers estimated the 
capacity of military power to transform the political dynamics of the target state 
through intervention; (2) and (3) how U.S. actors and institutions affected the 
capacity of the partner state and hostile state and nonstate actors; and (4) how 
the foreign policy was justified and rationalized within the leadership of 
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government and to the general public as it encountered disconfirming 
information.   
 In each case, the grand strategy of preponderance instituted a bounded 
rationality of mission in the FPDM stage and the operationalization stage that 
precluded the inclusion of an unfavorable outcome. In each case, U.S. foreign 
policymakers greatly overestimated the capacity of the partner state to establish 
security and legitimacy and underestimated the capacity of hostile actors to 
mobilize and threaten the partner state. However, these preference-confirmation 
biases diametrically contradicted the assessment that victory would be easy to 
achieve; U.S. foreign policymakers promulgated this corresponding 
overestimation/underestimation even while inflating the threat far beyond what 
the actual threat to the national-security element of the national interest 
represented. The subsequent implementing of this inverted calculation created a 
national-security national interest where none was extant, then significantly 
harmed that new interest via intervention. This tactical application of the grand 
strategy of preponderance facilitated the strategic-tactical gap in U.S. foreign 
policy by creating monsters in order to have monsters to slay, consistent with the 
ideological tradition of the imperative of crusade in the modern history of 
American foreign relations. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The Strategic-Tactical Gap in U.S. Grand Strategy  
 
 
In Italy for 30 years under the Borgias they had warfare, terror, 
murder, and bloodshed, but they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo 
da Vinci, and the Renaissance. In Switzerland they had brotherly 
love—they had 500 years of democracy and peace, and what did 
that produce? The cuckoo clock.  
 
Harry Lime, The Third Man 
 
 
 Imagine a student of international relations were to have fallen asleep in 
1945 only to awaken in 2015, and were given only two facts during their 
debriefing on the happenings of the previous seven decades: that the United 
States chose to maintain its global military and political presence even after the 
cessation of the hostilities of the Second World War, and that the United States 
remained the preeminent power in the international system at the end of the 
seven decades. How would we suppose the student would respond to the 
question, "How would you expect the United States to have fared in its most 
ambitious foreign entanglements?" Even the most cognizant sleepwalker would 
be dumbfounded to learn that the United States never achieved victory in any of 
its most notable conflicts: Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan, among others.1 
The student might respond to this counterintuitive scenario by presupposing one 
of either of two trains of thought: that the outcomes of the conflicts to which the 
state dedicated its most substantial financial and human foreign-policy resources 
were not as inextricably linked to the fate of the U.S. position in the international                                                         
1 What constitutes "victory" is one of the key questions the dissertation addresses. In none of 
these conflicts did U.S. foreign policymakers achieve the objectives that would have been 
considered "victory" at the outset of hostilities.  
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system as policymakers had assumed, or that the state managed to excel so 
tremendously in other areas that this excellence rendered faltering in many of its 
most costly military engagements relatively superfluous.  
 Either response would be correct, and both lead to the same two 
conclusions: the United States maintained its privileged position in the 
international system in spite of its most costly foreign entanglements rather than 
because of them, and U.S. foreign policymakers could stand to improve their 
choice and/or prosecution of their most significant foreign policies. The tragic, 
and perhaps ironic, character of modern U.S. foreign-policy history is that it has 
managed to maintain its systemic dominance even while faltering in every major 
war since the Second World War. This confounding puzzle embodies the 
enigmatic research question of this dissertation: how and why has the most 
powerful nation in the history of the world managed to perpetuate this 
paradoxical series of blunders even while maintaining its preeminent position in 
the international system?  
 The common adage in the social sciences that the most germane 
research asks big questions and gives simple answers informs the fundamental 
objective of this dissertation. It poses a big question: why have many of the most 
ambitious and costly US foreign policies fallen far short of their objectives since 
the Second World War? It offers a simple, bifurcated hypothesis: U.S. 
policymakers overestimate the capacity of the overwhelming material power of 
the United States to transform the politics of other states, an error 
operationalized via the grand strategy of preponderance. Implicit in this approach 
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is the dismissal of 'American declinists' that view the United States as a waning 
power as China and others overtake its preeminence in the international system.2 
The approach is at once in denial of American declinism and in opposition to 
some of the most fundamental foreign-policy assumptions and impulses of the 
American foreign-policy establishment during the previous seven decades. Just 
as on an individual basis a faulty set of logical assertions can lead a state into a 
problematic foreign-policy endeavor that results in success, so too can a grand 
strategy reliant on problematic assertions create great harm to the national 
interest without significantly altering the overwhelming power endowment of that 
same state.  
 In order to evaluate a particular foreign policy or grand strategy as a 
whole, the researcher must take into account the motivations for action, the 
foreign policy decision-making (FPDM) process, and the outcome; omission of 
any of these three fulcra risks evaluative distortion and, subsequently, permits 
the repeat of like errors in future foreign affairs. If the first lesson of history is that 
we do not learn from history, such is only given in the absence of effective, 
progressive historical analysis. The case studies presented are examined not to 
present new research on what happened, the subject of each having been 
examined ad nauseum in innumerable scholarly and popular volumes. Rather, 
they are invoked and dissected through the lens of the overarching research 
question and the assertions of the hypothesis. While there is always some new                                                         
2 For a discussion of trends in the balance of power, see Robert Wade, “Emerging World Order? 
From Multipolarity to Multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank, and the IMF,” Politics & Society 
Vol. 39, No. 3 (September 2011): 347-378.  
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piece of empirical evidence even for a thousand-year-old case study, and thus 
further research can always reveal a better understanding of it, the primary 
objective here is not to reinvent the understanding of either case, but instead to 
situate them in relation to the overall research context and to better understand 
the process of the FPDM that led to each resulting in blunder. Within IR literature, 
the dissertation contributes primarily to the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis 
(FPA), particularly FPDM. Although it addresses policy first and grand theory only 
occasionally, it relies on some of the basic realist assumptions in international 
affairs, especially in relation to the concept of intervention. While the focus is on 
the United States, the lessons learned from the volume will provide insight into 
international affairs more broadly.  
 The overall purpose of the dissertation is to explore foreign policy blunders 
as a dependent variable and present and test the hypothesis, further delineated 
in Chapter 3. Chapter 2 presents a framework for foreign policy evaluation (FPE), 
an endeavor largely ignored by both the academic and policymaking 
communities in spite of its perennial relevance to the scholarly field of IR and to 
policy practitioners. Chapter 4 details the methodological approach, primarily 
made up of the case study, of which there are two. The following two chapters 
examine the case studies, and the concluding chapter lays out the findings of the 
study. This introductory chapter acquaints the reader, in a general sense, to the 
research agenda and the justification for its intended significance within IR 
literature, to which the dissertation makes four original contributions.  
  5 
 First, it formulates a sui generis FPE framework. Second, it presents an 
archetypal definition of the concept of the foreign policy blunder. Third, it 
presents a hypothesis to the central research question of what factors have 
contributed to the prevalence and severity of U.S. foreign policy blunders since 
the Second World War. Fourth, it empirically explores two blunder case studies 
designed to answer that question. Each of the four original contributions to the 
literature builds from the foundation of the others; they are thus designed to 
function as more than the sum of their parts. No policy can be assessed in a 
vacuum, neither methodologically nor in the absence of correlated decisions, 
objectives, and outcomes. Nevertheless, foreign policies tend to be judged in an 
ad-hoc manner by policymakers, in popular discourse, and, most surprisingly, by 
IR scholarship.  
 Despite the plethora of literature on the subject of foreign policy, there 
exists no scientific framework for FPE that even remotely approaches a 
comprehensive consensus. Instead, studies involving FPE remain plagued by 
"analytical and conceptual anarchy," as described by David Baldwin.3 Indeed, 
publications directly addressing the difficulties involved in FPE often exert more 
energy lamenting the virtual impossibility of it than attempting to build a 
foundation on which to develop a fungible set of metrics. A framework for FPE 
will be presented in Chapter 2 to help fill this gap in the literature, to provide an 
invaluable analytical tool to policy practitioners, and to construct the theoretical 
                                                        
3 David Baldwin, “Success and Failure in Foreign Policy," Annual Review of Political Science No. 
3, 2000, 167. 
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and applicable foundation for the subsequent examination of foreign-policy 
blunders. 
 The foreign-policy blunder represents one of four general categories into 
which any given foreign policy's outcome can be classified, along with success, 
failure, and mixed-result (presumably the most common outcome). While 
success, failure, and mixed-result outcomes all deal directly with the result of the 
policy, the blunder represents a type of failure in which the FPDM process suffers 
from significant biases, oversights, or other decision-making shortcomings. The 
purpose of establishing criteria by which to assess foreign policy is simple: 
scholars and policymakers alike will forever find it problematic to understand 
previous policies, improve upon current policies, and plan for future policies 
without agreed upon metrics for assessing the utility of different aspects of 
different policies. Efficacious design and implementation of current and future 
foreign policies requires recognition of the costs and benefits of current and 
previous policies, across policies, rather than simply on an ad-hoc, individual 
basis.  
 To assess the policy of Containment as successful based solely on the 
fact that the Berlin Wall eventually fell tells us little about the intricacies of the 
policy that might have made it more or less effective (or efficient—a nontrivial 
distinction). The public invocation of President Ronald Reagan as the champion 
of victory in the Cold War is a regular fixture of the discourse of Republican 
lawmakers, yet hardly acknowledges the full picture of that enduring conflict. 
Likewise, the utility of establishing FPE metrics is not to reduce the import of 
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foreign-policy outcomes into Manichean classifications, but rather to dissolve 
every aspect of the policy down into criteria that can provide analytical tools for 
understanding the utility and efficacy of the policy in question.  
 In the case of the foreign-policy blunder, the investigation focuses heavily 
on the FPDM process and less so on the outcome, given that we know by default 
at the outset of our retrospective analysis that the policy was a failure. Beyond 
providing an essential practical tool to policymakers and theoretical tool to 
scholars, an FPE framework also permits a conceptual introduction to the idea of 
the foreign-policy blunder, defined here as a gross error in strategic judgment 
resulting in significant harm to the national interest. This definition, as well as the 
corresponding two case studies, incorporate problematic foreign-policy impulses 
(the pursuit of preponderance), faulty strategic decision-making (imprudent 
estimations of the politically transformative utility of military power), and 
unfavorable outcomes that significantly harm the national interest (blunder). The 
dissertation will explore the correlation between these three components.  
 Since the Second World War, U.S. foreign policy has revolved around an 
axis of key assumptions that define and perpetuate American exceptionalism by 
way of the entrenchment and proliferation of U.S. power and interests abroad. 
For better or worse, the global engenderment of U.S. power has unsurprisingly 
ensconced these assumptions as the source of that engenderment. More 
surprising, however, has been the myopic impulse to link grand strategy with the 
relative position of the state in the international system with seeming disregard 
for the media through which these assumptions might be most effectively 
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employed. Whether or not the prevailing grand strategy of American 
preponderance will best facilitate the maintenance of American power remains 
an open question, and will remain so as long as the United States can claim the 
mantle of the preeminent great power in the international system.  
 Given that the United States appears poised to remain the world's 
preeminent, if not hegemonic, state for the foreseeable future, the more relevant 
questions now address not the subtleties of how the overall balance of power will 
shift in the coming decades, but how to employ whatever American power exists 
in relation to the problems and opportunities abroad in advance of the national 
interest. In fact, this should always be any state's paramount preoccupation, from 
the mightiest Leviathan to the tiniest Lilliputian. For even if the U.S. share of 
world material and ideational power alters dramatically over the course of the 
next few presidential administrations, a seemingly unlikely development, the 
thoroughgoing foreign-policy conundrum will nonetheless remain how to apply 
whatever power endowed to it. This distinction is far from superficial: the case will 
be made throughout the course of these chapters that power itself as a tool for 
affecting the internal dynamics of other states has been greatly overestimated by 
U.S. policymakers since 1945.  
 The most intractable foreign-policy outputs tend to be those most 
associated with the elements of a state's foreign-policy objectives considered by 
foreign policymakers to be most necessary to advance the grand strategy of the 
state. A foreign policy assumption, or an element of grand strategy that is taken 
as given, therefore holds an inherently fundamental position in the foreign policy 
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of a state to the extent that it can be defined as a necessity. The unquestionable 
assumptions embedded in the FPDM process thus form the conduit for any 
desired foreign-policy outcome. Many of the predominant assumptions taken for 
granted in U.S. foreign policy distinguish it from that of any other state.  
 This somewhat self-induced exceptionalism can only be partially attributed 
to material factors such as the uniqueness of American history or the prevalence 
of relative American power during the previous two centuries. Much of it, perhaps 
an immeasurable amount but significant nonetheless, can be attributed to 
enduring ideational characteristics and preferences. In other words, the United 
States can be understood as an exceptional state to the extent that it considers 
itself an exceptional state. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared on 
television in 1998, "We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see 
further than other countries."4 Although every state considers itself exceptional, 
and thus justifies its legitimacy to rule over its citizenry, the United States is the 
only state since the virtual demise of National Socialism in 1945 to promote its 
own exceptionalism with such obstinately pervasive intent. This intent can be 
defined most consummately as manifesting through the grand strategy of 
American preponderance. 
 The assumptions inherent in the prevailing grand strategy of American 
preponderance form an amalgam that fixes the United States in an exceptional 
position in the minds of U.S. foreign policymakers. Several of the most ascendant 
                                                        
4 Micah Zenko, "The Myth of the Indispensible Nation," Foreign Policy, November 6, 2014, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/06/the-myth-of-the-indispensable-nation/ 
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of these assumptions collectively construct the point of departure for the 
hypothesis delineated in Chapter 3: 1) The cultural, geographical (resource 
endowment; distance from competing powers), and historical traditions of 
American exceptionalism demand an exceptional foreign policy most expediently 
operationalized via a grand strategy of American preponderance; 2) the 
persistence of American preeminence signifies the success of the pursuit of 
American preponderance; 3) the extension of the U.S. security perimeter to a 
global ambit promotes U.S. interests overseas and defends the nation from 
attack, 4) maintaining overwhelming military force discourages revisionist powers 
from attempting to challenge U.S. authority; and 5) this overwhelming military 
force permits the transformation of the political landscape of other states. The 
first four assumptions form the bedrock of the hypothesis; the fifth operationalizes 
the research question. As will come to light, the hypothesis contends that many 
of the implications of these assumptions precipitate the presence and severity of 
U.S. foreign-policy blunders.  
 Foreign-policy blunders are not unique to post-WWII United States. Until 
the future-perfect global liberal utopia is achieved in consummate totality, the 
international system shall remain in a sort of adolescence, in which every state 
will occasionally find blunder seeking glory. However, the case of the modern 
United States is in fact exceptional in several distinguishing ways. Its salience, if 
we wish to examine foreign-policy blunders as a dependent variable, draws from 
several significant hallmarks. First, it has dominated the international system 
since 1945, challenged only by a Soviet Union that we now know was destined 
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for political-economic catastrophe. Its unrivaled prominence on the world stage 
thus finds a parallel in its unrivaled relevance to international relations, at least 
for the foreseeable future. Second, the postwar international order established by 
the United States, its allies, and its institutions and imposed by the full force of its 
globally deployed military ordained the most peaceful global environment in 
modern history, at least in terms of major-power militarized interstate disputes 
(MIDs). Third, U.S. foreign policy since WWII, in relative-power terms, finds no 
equal in the history of the world in terms of the rapid rise of its share of the 
world's power. Fourth, this unprecedented rise came in spite of every major 
conflict in which the United States has been militarily employed resulting in a 
stalemate or an outright failure. Contrasted with the unmitigated success of the 
"total surrender" by the empires of the Third Reich and Imperial Japan, the 
unmitigated stalemates and failures of subsequent wars since that epic 
achievement boggle the mind of the IR scholar. What accounts for the 
discrepancy between the rise of the United States as the unrivaled power in the 
international system and its recurring foreign-policy blunders constitutes the 
subject matter of this dissertation? 
 How can a state maintain such a dramatic disparity of power even while 
faltering in its most expensive, ambitious foreign conflicts? To address this 
question, the two case studies focus on the two most costly—in financial, military, 
and political terms—American wars since the Second World War, the Vietnam 
War and the Iraq War. The purpose is not to compare the two, but rather as an 
autopsy on the strategic failure of the FPDM that led to these interventions. The 
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following chapter situates FPE within IR literature and presents a formula for its 
functionality. It explores the what, or what the blunder consists of and why it 
should be classified as such. The subsequent chapter presents the OPM, a 
theoretical model of why U.S. foreign policy has consistently produced blunders 
of such magnitude since the Second World War. The OPM addresses the why 
and how; the theory of what factors contribute to the presence and severity of 
blunders in U.S. foreign policy since the Second World War.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Toward a Process for Foreign Policy Evaluation  
  
 
Every foreign policy decision is meant to achieve its aims; however, 
complete success is extremely rare, and there is a spectrum of 
achievement ranging from mostly successful to unintentionally 
provoking the precise opposite reaction to what was anticipated or 
intended.5 
 
 Valerie Hudson  
 
The alternative to the status quo is the prospect of repeating the 
whole anguishing process of arriving at decisions. This explains to 
some extent the curious phenomenon that decisions taken with 
enormous doubt and perhaps with a close division become 
practically sacrosanct once adopted. The whole administrative 
machinery swings behind their implementation as if activity could 
still all doubts. Moreover, the reputation, indeed the political 
survival, of most leaders depends on their ability to realize their 
goals, however these may have been arrived at. Whether these 
goals are desirable is relatively less crucial. The time span by which 
administrative success is measured is considerably shorter than 
that by which historical achievement is determined. In heavily 
bureaucratized societies all pressures emphasize the first of these 
accomplishments.6 
 
 Henry Kissinger  
 
 
 Valerie Hudson states simply that "every foreign policy is meant to achieve 
its aims," while acknowledging that the potential of "unintentionally provoking the 
precise opposite reaction" is a perpetual possibility in the opaque disorder of 
                                                        
5 Valerie Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory (Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2014), 44. 
 
6 Henry Kissinger, “Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy,” Daedalus Vol. 95, No. 2 (Spring 
1966), 503-529. 
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international relations. In spite of her simplistic characterization that policies are 
supposedly intended to rationally pursue objectives, Hudson understands as well 
as anyone that the opposite can just as often be true: "Whether these goals are 
desirable is relatively less crucial" than the process that produces the goals and 
the manifold media employed to achieve them, in the words of realpolitik abettor 
Henry Kissinger, perhaps the most central figure in the modern history of U.S. 
foreign policy. It goes without saying that foreign-policy tools are employed to 
achieve foreign-policy objectives. But just as discernible to any observer is the 
phenomenon that the outputs of the sausage-making factory of FPDM 
sometimes bear little resemblance to the inputs used in the process. In a state as 
large and powerful as the United States, in which power is substantially diffused 
into geographical, corporate, interest-group, and ideological factions, this 
phenomenon is as evident as in virtually any other state. Kissinger is correct in 
pointing out that the United States is "heavily bureaucratized," and thus its 
foreign policymakers are beholden to a multiverse of foreign-policy inputs.   
 What constitutes the national interest—a subject tackled in more detail in 
Chapter 4—can therefore be far more muddled than our state-for-granted-taking 
indoctrination into realist intuition would suggest. While this dissertation scarcely 
cites constructivist literature, instead mostly relying on a tradition of intransigent 
realist doctrine in its interpretation of international relations, the constructivist 
creed recurs as often in the ideational battlefield of the pliant conception of the 
national interest as in any other. Furthermore, compounding the malleable nature 
of the national interest in the enormous, power-diffused United States is the 
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inherently ideological nature of the American self-conception and the 
transnational idea of what constitutes Americanism. This subject will be taken up 
in earnest in Chapter 3. What follows in this chapter is a description of the FPE 
literature gap in general terms and a prescription for its reinforcement. This 
bulwark will later inform the evaluation process with particular respect to the 
United States in the case study chapters.  
 What Hudson's encyclopedic primer Foreign Policy Analysis illuminates is 
the necessity of the disambiguation of the FPDM sausage-making factory for any 
analysis concerned with the understanding of any foreign policy, regardless of 
the approach taken or the methodological path desired. In other words, to 
understand how FPDM operates in any scenario, we must apply the "kitchen 
sink" philosophy to the problem we wish to understand, dissecting it along as 
many lines of examination as possible. Hudson thus expands the traditional three 
levels of analysis of the individual, the state, and the international system into 
more than ten levels of analysis, advocating an FPA that is multidisciplinary, 
multifactorial, multilevel, and agent-oriented rather than structurally determined. 
The justification for this dissemination of lenses of analysis is simple: "The single 
most important contribution of FPA to IR is to identify the point of theoretical 
intersection between the most important determinants of state behavior: material 
and ideational factors. The point of intersection is not the state, it is human 
decisionmakers."7 FPA does not deny that states are important actors in the 
international system, but rather seeks to investigate further into the human                                                         
7 Hudson 2014, 8. 
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decision-makers states are made of, who follow a whole host of motivations, be 
they informed by cognitive, bureaucratic, ideological, interest-group, or any other 
of a long series of input factors. While this dissertation borrows heavily from 
particular realist tenets, especially in skepticism of attempts at liberalizing other 
states militarily, it promotes a method of FPA investigation that avoids the 
theoretically abridged parsimony of realism in favor of multifactor, agent-oriented 
explanation. As will be further detailed in the methodology section, the research 
design will not adhere strictly to any one approach or theoretical bent, instead 
attempting to use useful tools where applicable, whatever paradigm they derive 
from.  
 The agent at the center of our inquiry is, of course, the statesman, whom 
we often view with idolatry, in the case that we admire them, or villainy, in the 
case that we do not. But attempting to understand leaders as if they were gods or 
demons all but prohibits prudent scrutiny of FPDM. The point of intersection 
between material and ideational factors is the human decision-maker, rather than 
a god, demon, or rational-choice automaton—this goes for tyrants in other states 
as well as our sometimes-adored and sometimes-abhorred elected leaders in 
democracies. To this end, Philip Tetlock demonstrates that 20 years of 
commentary and forecasting by the supposed 'expert political judgment' of the 
punditry and public-intellectual class of leaders and statesmen reveals that those 
charged with prognosticating future sociopolitical events are no better than the 
ordinary layperson. Tetlock poses the same question offered in this chapter: 
"Why should political observers be insulated from the standards of accuracy and 
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rigor that we demand of professionals in other lines of work?" Just as scholars 
tend to view with disdain the supposedly subjective nature of FPE, Tetlock was 
discouraged by academicians who thought he "showed suspect scientific 
judgment in choosing good political judgment" as his subject of inquiry. In setting 
out to "objectify good political judgment by identifying standards for judging 
judgment that would command assent across the spectrum of reasonable 
opinion," he reaches a paradoxical conclusion: "The net result is a double irony: 
a perversely inverse relationship between my prime exhibit indicators of good 
judgment and the qualities the media prizes in pundits—the tenacity required to 
prevail in ideological combat—and the qualities science prizes in scientists—the 
tenacity required to reduce superficial complexity to underlying simplicity."8 
 We do well to remember that human beings run states, and human beings 
are inherently fallible, irrational creatures driven by myriad cognitive and social 
impulses and cues far beyond the capacity of any one mind or group of minds to 
control. Are statesmen hedgehogs, foxes, tyrants, or dunces? Do leaders of a 
democracy consistently, rationally pursue a defined national interest in their 
interactions with other states and statesmen? Thousands of years of empirical 
evidence provide four affirmative, somewhat contradictory answers to the first 
question—they come in all shapes and sizes, and can quickly morph from one to 
the other under the intense stresses of statecraft. The answer to the second 
question seems to be either sometimes or most of the time. Most democratic 
                                                        
8 Philip Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princeton 
University Press, 2005), 4. 
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leaders appear to pursue a (somewhat/relatively) clear national interest most of 
the time. When they veer from this barometer, they invite the possibility of a 
blunder. Among the multitudinous reasons for this deviation (assuming it is 
intentional) include domestic political considerations, selfish personal reasons, 
refusal to incorporate disconfirming information, refusal to admit defeat, or 
adherence to ideational doctrines, assumptions, or preferences that supersede 
the reality of the policy. If the deviation is entirely unintentional, the policy can of 
course still result in blunder, for many of the same reasons. Whether poor 
judgment results from negligence, ideology, hubris, obstinacy, oligarchical 
loyalties, domestic political exigencies, or outright despotism is one of the critical 
questions of understanding foreign policy blunders.  
 The other, related question is whether the relevant statesmen act wittingly 
or unwittingly in pursuing a policy that is known to have a low likelihood of 
success. If leaders lack sufficient information to produce a prudent decision, or if 
the alternatives available grant them no viable prudence, the decision itself 
cannot be assessed to be blunder-inducing, and thus the failed policy cannot be 
assessed to be a blunder. A blunder requires an imprudent decision, or a gross 
error in strategic judgment, whether brought about by ulterior motives, willful 
ignorance, or the short-term denigration of the national interest as the state is 
reduced into the most common denominator of political expedience, the currency 
most valuable to any policymaker, without which they can gain no purchase on 
any policy, foreign or domestic. Before beginning to explore the hallmarks of 
foreign-policy blunders, why they occur, and how to predict and avoid them, we 
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must first assemble an introductory set of guidelines and metrics for how to 
evaluate foreign policy in general, and thus build a foundation from which to 
extrapolate the characteristics and processes that lead to their manifestation and 
define their place in international relations.  
  
The case for foreign policy evaluation  
 The complications implicit in evaluating foreign policy defy quantification. 
FPE has therefore been largely avoided in scholarly analysis. In fact, much of the 
literature on FPE tends to focus on those complications in a manner so as to 
dismiss the plausibility of the endeavor altogether. In short, the commensurate 
perspective on the subject seems to be a resignation to the ineluctable fact that 
the difficulties involved in FPE render it a profligate pursuit and perhaps even 
anathema to scholarship due to its assumed normative and/or counterfactual 
tendencies. Among the countless apprehensions discouraging scholars from 
taking up the task exist several legitimate, fundamental hurdles. First, FPE has 
been approached with skepticism because few policies fall clearly into one 
category or another, instead tending to exhibit both successful and unsuccessful 
characteristics. Second, the unpredictable, anarchical global environment in 
which international relations play out renders decision-making an imperfect 
science, even when provided with perfect information and an unambiguous 
understanding of the national interest, which is rarely, if ever, the case. There are 
sometimes no viable alternatives available to the foreign policymaker, and even 
the most sagacious decisions may end in utter catastrophe depending on how 
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circumstances or objectives change, as they invariably do. Third, foreign 
policymakers may be motivated to distort or conceal the true motivations for a 
given foreign policy, especially in a democratic society in which the citizenry can 
vote leaders out of office from the confines of the ballot box, complicating the 
efforts of the investigator to meander through the rhetoric to unveil veritable 
motivations for foreign-policy choices.  
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the dynamics of international 
relations are so fluid and interconnected that an optimal outcome at one moment 
in time may transform into a suboptimal or even significantly harmful outcome 
days, months, or years into the future. Supplying missiles and small arms to the 
Mujahedeen in Afghanistan was an unmitigated success: the Red Army tucked 
its tail and withered away into the Soviet Union from the mountains of 
Afghanistan with nothing to show for it but thousands of combat deaths, a 
stagnant economy, and a bruised reputation from which the Russian Federation 
has yet to recover even decades later. That celebrated event precipitated the 
unmitigated disaster to detect and prevent the most catastrophic terrorist attack 
in U.S. history, perpetrated by the same Mujahedeen from their same cavernous 
stronghold. While extreme in its consequences, this example sometimes appears 
more illustrative of the rule than the exception. The United States allied with 
China during World War II only to “lose China” (as well as 'Indochina') into 
Communist hands in its aftermath, resisted colonialism only to assume its guise 
in the Middle East and elsewhere as the sun began to set on the British Empire 
and Pax Britannica gave way to Pax Americana, and allied with Saddam Hussein 
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against Iran only to fight two wars to contain and then remove the defiant dictator 
from power. The historical evidence supports the unpredictability factor.  
 Given these sticking points, the avoidance of focusing on policy evaluation 
may be understandable. Nevertheless, none of these reasons for trepidation 
excuse the scholarly community from formulating an adequate framework for 
FPE. On the contrary, promulgating a unified approach to FPE would take 
advantage of one of the most perennial opportunities to help bridge the 'theory-
policy gap' so many in academia and policy hasten to regret. Policy-related 
theory can only claim value to the extent that it claims relevance to policy, a 
prerequisite often lacking in scholarship focused on building theory for the sake 
of theory building. Disputing Stephen Walt’s declaration that “evaluating foreign 
policy is hard,” a contention he found sufficiently revelatory as to merit publishing 
an essay on the subject with the same phrase as its title, may be an onerous 
task.9 But more onerous still would be the acquiescence that no such endeavor is 
possible, an omission in the literature that continues to obfuscate the 
understanding of foreign policy.  
 Many scholars have danced around the dearth of literature on FPE, 
problematizing it rather than attempting to de-problematize it. Indeed, the most 
popular angle from which to breach the subject seems to be a focus on its virtual 
impossibility to breach. John Clark, while acknowledging FPE's complications, 
suggests three stages in evaluating the effectiveness of foreign policy: setting 
                                                        
9 Stephen M. Walt, “Evaluating Foreign Policy Is Hard,” Foreign Policy, June 20, 2011, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/20/evaluating-foreign-policy-is-hard/ 
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standards by which to judge, understanding the impact of policies as they are 
implemented, and comparing outcomes to standards. Focusing on creating 
standards, Clark laments the difficulty of overcoming the complexity of even 
identifying foreign policy goals, let alone judging the efficacy of their 
implementation and the outcomes, intended or unintended, that result from the 
interaction between the policy as constructed and its implementation in the target 
environment. Compounding the difficulty in identifying the intricacies of foreign 
policies and the convolution of attempting to evaluate them in a standardized 
fashion is the dilemma of how to assess whether a foreign policy has served the 
national interest when even that concept proves slippery: “Even traditional 
realists would have to agree with this position, since they sometimes 
acknowledge that national leaders do not in fact always adopt policies which they 
find to be in the national interest.” 10  If this is the case, it precludes the 
acceptance of the national interest as given, and thus complicates the evaluation 
of foreign policies as they support or hinder the national interest. While 
acknowledging that what exactly constitutes the national interest is difficult to 
ascertain, Chapter 4 examines the concept of the national interest in detail, 
offering a definition of the term based on a conglomeration of commonly utilized 
definitions.  
 David Baldwin takes the baton from Clark’s analysis, regretting that 
although “specifying conditions for success or failure of foreign policy behavior is 
                                                        
10 John F. Clark, “Evaluating the Efficacy of Foreign Policy: An Essay on the Complexity of 
Foreign Policy Goals,” Southeastern Political Review Vol. 23, No. 4 (December 1995), 571. 
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arguably one of the most, if not the most, important topic to be studied,” scholarly 
attention to it “is not commensurate with its importance.” 11  Baldwin exposes 
shortcomings in some of the common assumptions about statecraft, such as the 
assumption that military force tends to be effective, and proposes a preliminary 
set of FPE criteria. Featured most prominently among them are costs to the user, 
which are often overlooked in evaluative analysis; costs to the target; stakes for 
the user; stakes for the target; the question of "adequacy," or whether the cost 
incurred relates optimally to whatever is achieved; inclusion of a scaled approach 
to degrees of success or failure as opposed to a dichotomous (success/failure) 
approach; and the magnitude of stakes in question, from the most obscure policy 
initiative to an existential total war to guard against the destruction of the nation-
state. Like Clark, one of Baldwin's main preoccupations is how to set standards 
for what exactly constitutes an "effective" foreign policy. Clark’s and Baldwin’s 
analyses construct a fruitful foundation from which to begin a more optimistic 
vision for FPE. Delineating the difficulties of the task provides a helpful point of 
departure for an examination of how to limit these difficulties and develop 
corresponding solutions.  
 John Vasquez proposes a few points of axis around which FPE can 
revolve, envisioning common social-science techniques as a conduit for 
understanding and evaluating foreign policy in two ways: producing general 
knowledge of how international relations function with respect to the foreign 
                                                        
11 David A. Baldwin, “Success and Failure in Foreign Policy,” Annual Review of Political Science 
3: 2000, 167. 
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polices of states and analyzing the consequences of foreign policies once they 
are decided upon and carried out. The former informs how an analyst might 
extract from the conduct of international relations which foreign policies can be 
viable, while the latter facilitates evaluating the efficacy of any given foreign 
policy.12 Like others, Vazquez has difficulty transcending the temporal factor: a 
good decision may lead to a bad outcome, and even a good outcome can 
become bad with time. Although useful as another step on the path toward FPE, 
the reader volume edited by Vazquez focuses only on one administration, 
President Reagan’s, limiting its scope. Furthermore, the various authors 
presenting chapters in the book do not follow consistent criteria, precluding the 
utility of the volume as more than the sum of its parts. The disparate 
investigations thus result in a series of disconnected studies that are useful in 
evaluating particular policies of the era, but not in establishing an overarching 
vision of how to evaluate foreign policy with a coherent formula. This 
individualistic approach to FPE is characteristic of the literature on the topic. The 
first objective of the dissertation is to address that gap in the literature. The 
following section offers a basic framework for FPE. This framework will be 
utilized to evaluate each case study.  
 The two case studies, the Vietnam War and the Iraq War, evaluate the 
decision and execution of an extensive military intervention. While there is no 
limit to the amount of evaluations available to the researcher on military conflicts, 
the evaluation of the utility of military conflict is an underdeveloped science.                                                         
12 John Vazquez, Evaluating U.S. Foreign Policy (Praeger, 1986). 
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Baldwin describes the scarcity of literature on the varying applications of military 
power and coercion: While "many studies address the question of whether 
economic sanctions work, very few address such questions as the following: 
Does military force work? Does diplomacy work? Does propaganda work? 
Despite the paucity of such studies, conventional wisdom holds that military force 
usually works." Despite this perception, "the literature on military force contains 
few discussions of the meaning of success."13 If there is a shortage of literature 
on the efficacy of military force, why does conventional wisdom hold that it 
usually works? This seems a surprising conclusion given that there must be a 
loser in every war, and sometimes (perhaps often) even two losers, in the case 
that neither party achieves its aims and the conflict ends in stalemate.  
 By the same token, if there is not even an adequate literature on what 
success in a military engagement consists of, how can the scholarly community 
come to any conclusion as to its general efficacy, much less the definitive 
conclusion that it is decidedly efficacious most of the time? This sort of scholarly 
lacuna goes beyond the hypocritical to the irresponsible. Especially in the nuclear 
age, determining what success is made of becomes even more problematic. If 
both the United States and the Soviet Union can reduce the enemy into the 
apocalyptic rubble of nuclear Armageddon in a number of hours, what would 
success look like? If the United States had five functioning cities left at the end, 
and the Soviets one, would that constitute victory? In more current terms, if the 
United States were to go to war with China, and remain more or less intact while                                                         
13 Baldwin 2000, 177. 
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destroying every major Chinese city, and thus its largest import market, could the 
United States be considered victorious? Can you win a conflict and yet be far 
worse off at the end of it? Baldwin's tongue-in-cheek quip, "The operation was 
successful, but the patient died," rings true here. As soon as a conflict 
commences, the standards for success immediately change. The new set of 
interactions resulting from "the fog of war" presents challenges and opportunities 
that can only be completely known in the presence of war. Even a strike against 
an enemy, designed specifically to be limited in scope, will likely provoke some 
type of response by the enemy. Thus, any act of conflict almost automatically 
entails an immediate upping of the ante, even if designed to be easily diffusible. 
Many wars have begun in such fashion. Look no further than the Gulf of Tonkin. 
Robert Jervis describes the illogical mentality involved in the mutually assured 
destruction (MAD) of Cold War calculations: 
 
First, it is zero-sum. One side must come out ahead of the other; 
one or the other must retain more military power and be less slow 
to recover. Thus every war must have a winner. Second, the 
judgment involved is a relative one—the position of each side is 
being compared with that of the other. This stress on relative 
advantage fits nicely with the normal conception of power in 
international politics. Starting with Thucydides, scholars have 
argued that power makes no sense when viewed in absolute terms 
because the outcome of the conflict, especially military conflict, will 
be determined not by the absolute size of the armies involved but 
by their relative capabilities. When deterrence by punishment is 
crucial however, it is the absolute level of destruction that a state 
faces and can inflict that controls its behavior. While the conclusion 
that military victory is possible follows from the definition employed, 
such a conclusion is remarkably apolitical. It does not relate the 
costs of the war to the objectives and thus ignores the question of 
whether the destruction would be so great that the winner, as well 
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as the loser, would regret having fought it. Holders of this view, 
then, fall into the trap that Clausewitz warned about of seeing war 
as an end in itself instead of as a means to national goals.14 
 
 When Hans Morgenthau published an essay in 1976 entitled "The Fallacy 
of Thinking Conventionally About Nuclear Weapons," he was unwittingly making 
a case for FPE by suggesting that a) metrics for success are unclear and often 
change and thus b) scientific discussion about what metrics ought to consist of 
and where their confines ought to be parsed is needed.15 Jervis performs the 
same task. If a way of thinking about conflict "does not relate the costs of the war 
to the objectives and thus ignores the question of whether the destruction would 
be so great that the winner, as well as the loser, would regret having fought it," 
then that way of thinking will find little value in praxis, condemned forever to the 
frivolity of theoretical abstraction. Though IR literature has long been concerned 
with whether and to what extent nuclear weapons turn traditional balance-of-
power calculations inside-out, similar theoretical problems would also arise from 
a discussion of other weapons that question traditional power calculations, such 
as the modern (globally oriented) application of the ancient weapon of terrorism, 
which can rely on globalization's vulnerabilities and technology's (including the 
potential use of nuclear weapons) opportunities. If we are to accept Clausewitz's 
contention that war is but "the continuation of policy by other means," then it 
                                                        
14 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of 
Armageddon (Cornell University Press, 1989), 18. 
 
15 Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Fallacy of Thinking Conventionally About Nuclear Weapons," in 
David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, eds., Arms Control and Technological Innovation (New York: 
Wiley, 1976), 256-264. 
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follows that it must be held to standardized interpretations of successful and 
unsuccessful policies, whatever the means used to achieve foreign-policy ends 
may be, military or otherwise.   
 In the same way that there exist countless studies on particular military 
engagements but not enough on the efficacy of military power in general, many 
studies examine a particular event, time period, administration, institution, or any 
other single line of analysis without taking into account the broader picture or 
utilizing consistent criteria of evaluation. There is no shortage of examples to 
illustrate this deficiency. Some revolve around a particular time period or branch 
of government. U.S. Presidents and Foreign Policy Mistakes, for example, 
examines “mistakes, in the form of bad decisions” made by presidents. Although 
it covers the literature from the past 50 years, it admits that “this research has not 
explicitly identified a vantage point around which the answers to these questions 
revolve.” 16  This observation confirms one of the main purposes of the 
dissertation, pursuing a vantage point for exploring the causation of blunders 
across time in U.S. foreign policy. Tim Weiner’s Legacy of Ashes, though 
somewhat biased and non-scholarly, exemplifies some of the popular vitriol 
against U.S. intervention overseas by looking at overzealous OSS and CIA 
operations. 17  Willard Matthias takes a similar line in America’s Strategic 
Blunders, surveying flawed or absent intelligence and its impact on strategic 
                                                        
16 Stephen Walker and Akan Malici, U.S. Presidents and Foreign Policy Mistakes (Stanford 
University Press, 2011). 
 
17 Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Random House, 2007). 
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blunders from 1936-1991.18 Many books focus on the normative, institutional, or 
utilitarian motives for hegemony, or whether or not the United States is indeed 
imperialistic.  
 Some analyses attempt to position poor decisions made by leaders on 
particular dependent variables, such as groupthink, financial considerations, 
domestic political pressures, regions, or ideology. Some focus on two particular 
variables, such as Michael Grow’s presidential/regional U.S. Presidents and Latin 
American Interventions.19 The same literature gap applies to blunders in foreign 
policy. The strategic-tactical gap cuts both ways: sometimes, tactical moxie 
becomes entirely undermined by strategic ineptitude, as with Thomas Ricks’ 
characterization of the Iraq War: “Unsurpassed tactical success combined with 
unsurpassed strategic failure.”20 Tactical failures can just as easily accompany 
strategic success.  The broader problem has been compounded by the fact that 
even individual assessment operations have achieved neither general adequacy 
nor coherence across missions. The military’s ability to assess ongoing 
operations is so poor that in 2010, nine years into the Afghanistan War, the head 
of the International Security Assistance Force Afghan Assessments Group simply 
                                                        
18 Willard Matthias, America’s Strategic Blunders: Intelligence Analysis and National Security 
Policy (Pennsylvania State University, 2001). 
 
19 Michael Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions (University Press of Kansas, 
2008). 
 
20 Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 
2006). 
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stated “our metrics suck.”21 In the interest of better metrics, the following section 
presents a rubric for FPE. This rubric will be operationalized in the two case 
studies to follow.  
 
Criteria for evaluating foreign policy   
Criterion I. Degree of fruition of primary and secondary objectives 
 The degree to which objectives are met should be the point of departure 
for any FPE metrics. As previously stated, what constitutes the national interest 
defies consensus, problematizing whether it even exists ontologically, and 
whether it is even knowable epistemologically if it does in fact exist ontologically. 
If states, at least in their intention, act rationally to maximize their utility function, 
then the objectives of any foreign policy can be said to be employed to pursue 
the national interest, at least in theory, and the attainment of a given set of 
objectives can be evaluated in conjunction with that national interest. The fact 
that not all foreign policies further the national interest—and there is no doubt 
that they do not—does not dictate the assertion that policymakers are not at least 
attempting to pursue the national interest, at least a majority of the time.  
 This is not to suggest that foreign policymakers invariably pursue the 
national interest. Decisions are often arrived at via parochial, bureaucratic, 
interest-group, or personal/groupthink pressures that circumvent or otherwise 
trammel the national interest. In short, objectives will be evaluated according to 
                                                        
21 Jonathan Schroden, “Why Operations Assessments Fail: It’s Not Just the Metrics,” Naval 
College War Review Vol. 64, No. 4 (Autumn 2011), 90. 
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their fulfillment and their correlation to the promotion of a relatively knowable, 
stable, and clearly enunciated national interest, in addition to being evaluated 
according to their official stated goals. This distinction is important because it is 
assumed that there sometimes exist goals beyond what the official stated goals 
enunciate. Likewise, it will be assumed that the objectives of a given foreign 
policy are knowable, even if they carry the potential to change according to the 
needs of the state, the political preferences of statesmen, or complications in the 
target environment.  
 Quite often the objectives of a given foreign policy and how they correlate 
to the grand strategy of the state are clearly pronounced in policy documents 
such as a National Security Statement, which tends to deal with grand strategy 
more broadly, or more specific foreign-policy documents, such as foreign-policy 
bills sponsored by an administration and authorized by Congress with regard to a 
particular problem (for example, terrorism and the Patriot Act) or state (for 
example, Iraq and other AUMFs). Sometimes, however, the genuine thinking in 
the minds of foreign policymakers proves mercurial to the researcher, and 
documents such as declassified transcripts of presidential cabinet or advisor 
meetings must be employed where possible. Even assuming perfect information 
for the researcher, which is impossible, President John F. Kennedy's quote on 
the confusion of statecraft illustrates how even the policymaker can get lost in his 
own thoughts: "The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the 
observer—often, indeed, to the decider himself... There will always be the dark 
and tangled stretches in the decision-making process—mysterious even to those 
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who may be most intimately involved."22 If the esteemed decision-maker finds 
difficulty explaining his own thoughts to himself, imagine the complications 
involved in the bumbling scholar pouring through fields of documents whose 
content the theory-practice gap renders alien absent any real-world experience in 
high-stakes policymaking.  
 
Criterion II. Corollary strategic consequences 
 Unforeseen, unintended, ignored, or neglected consequences are 
distinguished from objectives in order to differentiate the achievements a policy 
seeks to fulfill from the ramifications the implementation of that policy can effect. 
The Criterion of consequences takes a broader perspective than the Criterion of 
objective fulfillment. Although it is unlikely that a policy can achieve none of its 
objectives and still positively affect the national interest, it is quite feasible that a 
policy can achieve all of its objectives and still be harmful to the national interest. 
For example, support for Saddam Hussein against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War 
accomplished the objective of draining resources from the Iranian state, but by 
default strengthened a dangerous dictator that would eventually turn his Soviet 
tanks on American ally Kuwait. Likewise, in both the Gulf War and the Iraq War 
the primary military objectives were achieved swiftly and comprehensively, but 
far-reaching complications leading to further entanglements arose in the form of 
first leaving the Saddam Hussein regime in power and later the development of 
                                                        
22 Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1971), iv.  
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the insurgency and influx of jihadists after March 2003. These examples illustrate 
that this Criterion not only paints with a broader brush in scope, but also in time: 
today’s foreign-policy success may prove to be the harbinger of foreign-policy 
disaster in later years. The consequences of a given foreign-policy action, be 
they positive, negative, or neutral, provide context to the evaluation of how 
effective a given foreign policy is in terms of objective fulfillment and impact on 
the national interest.  
 
Criterion III. Political, financial, and military cost 
 Political cost in this analysis specifically refers to political capital as it 
relates to a state’s reputation and position of prestige in the international system, 
distinct from a strategic consequence that may be inherently political. For 
example, one of the undesired consequences of the decision by the Bush 
administration and the U.S. Congress to remove Saddam Hussein from power by 
force in 2003 was the eventual enablement of Iran to take the helm of Iraq’s 
security infrastructure and leadership in the battle to expel ISIS from Mosul, Tikrit 
and other Iraqi cities and towns, itself a product of the Shia solidarity between the 
countries the invasion reinforced, even despite the recent brutal war between 
them on the interstate level. This effect was compounded by the fact that 
invading Iraq in the first place and disbanding the army left no force capable of 
protecting the country from itself or its neighbors.  
 The damage done to the U.S. reputation in the Gulf region and 
internationally can be assessed as part of the political cost of the campaign, as 
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can the empowerment of Iran and other political adversaries that would benefit 
from the action. The utility of distinguishing cost from consequences is the ability 
to measure political resources, such as leverage with partnering actors and 
favorability among the public in the region, expended from the actual policy 
events and processes that result, either directly or indirectly, from the foreign 
policy. The key distinction is that cost is intended to measure a fungible resource, 
in this case political capital, while consequences intend to measure the actual 
strategic results of an action. The former largely addresses perception, while the 
latter functionally addresses actual policy events and processes that can be 
heavily influenced by perception.  
 The first step in measuring financial cost is the level of resources and 
assets expended in terms of implementing the policy. This could include the 
operating cost of sending an army to invade and occupy a foreign country in the 
case of a military intervention or the cost foregone in terms of reduced trade or 
exports due to sanctions on a target state. The second step is to account for the 
economic effect of the results of the action. For example, the first step carried 
astronomical costs for the United States during the Second World War, while the 
second step resulted in pulling the country out of depression and forming the 
political and military foundation for an institutional framework that would establish 
it as the world’s foremost industrial and military power, perhaps even to the point 
of hegemony. In other words, the economic benefits of the Second World War far 
outweighed even the enormous cost of the conflict for the United States. The 
same could not be said of the Vietnam War, which damaged the U.S. economy 
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and brought about virtually no economic benefit, other than to U.S. defense 
contractors, the interests of whom clearly did not overlap with the national 
interest in that particular case. The financial burden to the taxpayer of the Iraq 
War is staggering and still being incurred more than a decade later.  
 Military cost refers specifically to the cost of military operations in terms of 
military capabilities. Soldiers, tanks, aircraft carriers, fighter jets, and so forth 
require enormous financial resources to equip, maintain, and replenish. Contrary 
to strict economic or financial resources, military resources cannot always be 
replaced. When the armies, navies, and air forces of Nazi Germany and Imperial 
Japan were all but destroyed by the Allies in the Second World War, they were 
never replaced, as both countries were occupied by the victors and pursued a 
pacific, non-military (corporate) path to restoration of their former glory. However, 
both countries rebuilt and eventually surpassed prewar economic productivity, 
illustrating the fungibility of financial resources as opposed to military hardware. 
Another example with a different result that illustrates the same principle was the 
U.S. ability to rebuild its armed forces after the Vietnam War due to its robust 
economic capabilities, the location of the war at a great distance from the 
homeland, and the continued desire (after a brief respite) on the part of citizens 
and policymakers to maintain the nation's global military presence. Great military 
resources come at great financial expense for every nation, but financial 
resources can sometimes be replenished where there exists economic 
productivity, as they are a necessary but insufficient condition for the creation or 
replenishment of military resources.  
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Criterion IV. Availability and consideration of alternatives 
 Even during the most instantaneous threat developments, policy 
alternatives are always considered. Just as no individual policy can be evaluated 
with total disregard for other related polices, an alternative cannot be evaluated 
without taking into consideration the attractiveness of other alternatives. 
Policymakers must confront a staggering array of dynamic threats to national 
security, making up policy as they go along while attempting to follow a unified 
grand strategy, itself a difficult task even assuming that a unified grand strategy 
indeed exists. Although alternatives that were never chosen are counterfactual, 
this does not prevent us from estimating what the consequences of a different 
alternative may have been. Economists make a steady habit of this and there is 
little reason to think the same procedure would be useless in terms of foreign 
policymaking. Colin Dueck's Reluctant Crusaders describes the utility of 
counterfactual analysis: 
 
Each case study will be framed in terms of broad strategic options 
or alternatives: not only those that were in fact chosen, but also 
those that could have been. For example, after 1945 the United 
States adopted a strategy of containment, and most of the literature 
on the period has tried to explain why that alternative was chosen. 
But any attempt to explain the adoption of containment is at least 
implicitly a claim as to why another alternative—such as 
neoisolationism—was rejected. Counterfactuals simply make 
explicit the causal claims that are already implicit in any such study. 
There is, of course, good reason to be skeptical of farfetched 
counterfactuals; this is a method that must be used with care and 
precision. One way to ensure such precision is to refer only to 
policy alternatives that were credible or plausible at the time. 
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Another is to apply generalizable theories to the historical case, and 
then deduce what sort of outcomes each theory would predict. 
These two restrictions bring both historical plausibility and 
theoretical rigor to our investigation. With these restrictions, the 
careful and theoretically informed use of counterfactuals actually 
adds to our search for a generalizable theory, and to the effective 
number of observations in a given case study.23 
 
 Nevertheless, when policymakers shuffle through different options in their 
search for the foreign policy most likely to induce an optimal outcome, they must 
do so without knowing with certainty what its ramifications will be, just as the 
scholar cannot produce with absolute certainty a picture of what another 
alternative would have resulted in. Even as some scholars specifically concerned 
with the limitations of FPE characterize retroactive FPE as anathema to rigorous 
social-scientific procedure, countless others engage in exactly that endeavor with 
regard to specific policies. That there is no consensus on how to address the 
problem holistically signifies neither that it has not already been done in 
innumerable essays nor that no such consensus can be developed. It merely 
represents yet another oversight in the literature characteristic of the 'theory-
policy gap.' 
 We can safely assume that Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons program 
would not have posed a threat to the United States had the dictator not been 
overthrown, since we now know with absolute certainty that no such program 
existed. Although the intelligence presented to the Bush Administration on the 
subject turned out to be faulty, this may have had as much to do with preference                                                         
23 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy 
(Princeton University Press, 2006), 55. 
  38 
biases in cherry-picking intelligence as with the actual intelligence gathered. 
Indeed, these biases have now been well documented, and are highlighted 
throughout the chapter on the Iraq War. Thus the argument that this factor ought 
not be incorporated into an analysis of the efficacy of the decision to invade Iraq 
falls flat. In retrospect, as before the ill-fated decision, the policy failed, and was 
destined for failure given that the war was launched on false pretenses, 
rendering any cost-benefit analysis on that aspect of the policy superfluous. That 
the prosecution of the war was riddled with tactical deficiencies does little to veil 
its strategic ineptitude. Thus, using this particular example, an analysis of the 
policy informs its evaluation in such a way as to obviate its assessment as a 
failure and, more specifically, a blunder. The cost—estimated by Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to be neutral or negative due to Iraqi oil 
revenue—as well as the consequences of empowering Iran, inciting Islamist 
fundamentalism in a country in which it had been wholly suppressed, and stoking 
national and regional sectarian tensions were far from impossible to predict. 
FPDM cannot be imagined as an exact science, nor can its evaluation. But this 
does not justify its evasion in the foreign policy literature.   
 
Criterion V. Context, scope, and stakes  
 No foreign policy is ever pursued in a vacuum. Thus every policy, even to 
the extent that it is distinguishable from another, must be evaluated in the context 
of other polices. 'Inter-subjectivity,' to borrow a constructivist term, is one of the 
fundamental underpinnings of international relations. U.S. interventions in Latin 
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America and Africa during the Cold War were not so much geared to affect local 
political battles per se as they were to affect the broader ideological and political 
war against Communism and balance-of-power competition with the Soviet 
Union (whether they actually performed this function is a matter of conjecture). 
The extent to which a particular policy, such as support for the removal of 
Salvador Allende from power in Chile, can be thought to have been efficacious 
directly relates to how that particular political battle affected the overall Cold War 
landscape.  
 Scope can be delineated along three main levels: the grand-strategic 
level, with an axis point of the overarching national interest of the state vis-à-vis 
other states in the international system; the intermediary level, through which a 
policy toward a given state or region is developed and applied; and the tactical 
level, whose lens focuses on the particularities of the implementation of the 
intermediary policy. For example, the decision to escalate the Vietnam War, 
initiated during the JFK Administration and indoctrinated during the LBJ 
Administration, addressed an intermediary problem contextualized by the grand 
strategy of Containment Policy, settled upon years earlier by the Truman 
Administration. The tactical pitfalls of the war, such as the alliance with an 
unpopular government, a war plan innocuous in its pursuit of a determined, well-
trained, well-equipped, and experienced guerilla fighting force, the pollution and 
manipulation of battlefield information up the chain of command, and the myopic 
application of traditional military weaponry to an insurgent battlefield laden with 
canopy jungle, represented the impotence of the strategy’s viability.  
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 Though the grand-strategic, intermediary, and tactical levels of analysis 
intertwine, their delineation permits the disambiguation of a foreign policy by 
stipulating its context relative to its target environment. The Vietnam case 
demonstrates the relevance of stakes: although the United States dropped more 
ordnance on Vietnam than during the entire Second World War, there was very 
little at stake in the country in terms of strategic value. In other words, the nation 
paid an enormous price for a war with relatively insignificant stakes, illustrating a 
mad logic that incentivized a way of thinking about the conflict that only scarcely 
utilized percipience. Strategy and tactics can transcend various levels of scope: 
the latter is by definition the means to the ends of the former, regardless of the 
scope involved. The grand strategy of Containment, for example, employed the 
tactic of intervention; intervention itself was a strategy that employed the tactics 
of attrition and pacification in Vietnam.  
 
The foreign-policy blunder  
 What constitutes a blunder in foreign policy? Dictionaries define the word 
"blunder" to signify a careless mistake often caused by confusion or lack of 
sufficient forethought. 24  As mentioned in the previous section, a blunder is 
defined here as a gross error in strategic judgment resulting in significant harm to 
the national interest. It implies both an unfavorable outcome for the state in 
question and poor decision-making on the part of the foreign policymakers 
involved. This definition is predicated on four foundational necessary but                                                         
24 Collins English Dictionary, for example, defines a "blunder" as "a stupid or clumsy mistake." 
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singularly insufficient conditions: (1) failure to meet objectives; (2) significant 
harm to the national interest; (3) cost; and (4) predictable fallacy (based on the 
available alternatives and extant information at the time of the decision). These 
correspond to four of the five criteria for FPE, omitting context, which is relevant 
but not essential to the classification of a blunder. In the dangerous and 
unpredictable bedlam of international relations, even the most astute, cautious, 
prudent, and isolationist statesmen invariably encounter foreign-policy failures at 
some point during their tenure as caretaker of the national interest at the 
international level. The kaleidoscopic potential hindrances to a state achieving its 
international objectives defy quantification. 
 Nonetheless, these can be divided into dichotomous categories: 
miscalculation or other misuse of state capabilities by foreign policymakers, and 
surprises or resistance from foreign states or nonstate actors in the application of 
those capabilities abroad. In the former case, even the most well intended 
statesmen may fall victim to the urge to ostentatiously assert the objectives of the 
state and imprudently pursue the national interest in such a fashion as to invite 
misfortune. Some of the most obvious and commonplace pitfalls in the latter case 
include unforeseen challenges such as foreign alliance formation, sudden shifts 
in the objectives of other states, hostile regimes assuming power in newly 
antagonistic states, and either incremental or rapid disturbances in the 
distribution of power in the international system. All instances of the latter case 
relate to an overarching theme in the study of interstate relations: that of change 
in the international system. This is a phenomenon that has unfortunately been 
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largely ignored by realism and only haphazardly explained, if enthusiastically 
embraced, by liberal theory.25 
 Foreign-policy failures of the first order can be further divided into two 
types: an invention or distortion of the foreign threat confronted, and a 
miscalculation of the capabilities of the state to carry out its objectives. Perhaps 
the most catastrophic foreign-policy failures of a state combine both mistakes 
into a compounded chain of decision-making errors that maximize the response 
of hostile actors in the target environment while minimizing the influence the 
originator state may have on them. For example, Operation Barbarossa 
overestimated Nazi capability to overtake the whole of Russia, mighty though the 
war machine of the Third Reich had proven to be up to that point in hostilities. At 
the same time, it underestimated the will of the Soviet soldier to fight and, once it 
found its momentum, the ingenuity of Soviet industry to produce military 
technology that would challenge Nazi experimentation in modern weaponry, as 
the Soviet T-34 tank did to the German Panzer. During the same conflict, 
Imperial Japan overestimated the capability of the Japanese Navy and Air Force 
to rule the Pacific, even while emulating Nazi hubris in underestimating the will of 
the “decadent” American populace to withstand hardship and the eventually 
overwhelming juggernaut that U.S. military industry became once it hit full stride. 
Though Nazi war planners were aware of the existential threat opening a second 
front would undoubtedly invite, just as Japanese war planners knew that they 
                                                        
25 K.J. Holsti, “The Problem of Change in International Relations Theory,” Institute of International 
Relations (University of British Columbia, 1998), 2. 
  43 
would probably not be able to dominate the United States in the Pacific on a 
long-term basis, foreign policymakers in each state coalesced around the 
impetus to proceed disregarding these known admonitions.  
 The fact that careful calculations as to the capabilities of the originator 
state and the target environment were made, many of them accurate, does not 
absolve war planners from the folly of their strategy. In fact, the wisdom of 
knowing the substantial potential for failure clearly provided little foil against 
which to counterbalance the strategic hubris involved in these two particular 
cases. Knowing that failure of state objectives was a likely outcome and lacking 
the judgment to pursue other policy alternatives formed the inept bedrock of 
botched decision-making that allows us to now consider these miscalculated 
actions as quintessential foreign-policy blunders, as opposed to simple mistakes 
or sound policies that unpredictably failed. In developing a sui generis conceptual 
framework of blunders, subsequent analysis will use the preordainment of extant 
knowledge as to the high probability of foreign-policy fallacy as an essential tool 
in blunder classification.  
 Those of the “hindsight is 20-20" camp who would characterize utilizing 
the predictability factor in defining blunders as normative and/or irresponsibly 
counterfactual omit a key factor in its operationalization: many instances of 
foreign policy exist in which the primary protagonists fully grasp the high 
probability of consequences detrimental to the national interest and pursue the 
preponderant course of action in spite of this awareness. Empirical evidence 
abounds as to the existence of policymakers consciously formulating and 
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subsequently implementing a foreign policy known to have a high probability of 
failure, for a variety of reasons, in both democracies and totalitarian regimes 
alike. The dissertation seeks out those reasons, but before launching into a quest 
to understand why blunders occur, we must first agree upon a rubric for what 
blunders consist of. We can characterize the aforementioned awareness of a 
high probability of failure in the pursuit of a foreign policy as the first of four 
necessary but insufficient conditions of a blunder. The phenomenon of why 
policymakers continue policies already proven to fall short of objectives permits 
an especially intriguing line of research. 
 Foreign-policy outcomes therefore define both the extent to which a 
foreign policy achieves its objectives and the consequences to the national 
interest, as even the most obtuse decisions can result in a favorable outcome, 
and even the most prudent decisions can land a state in disastrous 
circumstances. To this end, the “hindsight is 20-20” school has quite rightly 
instituted the necessity to account for the decision, the outcome, and the relation 
between the two. To be classified as a blunder, a foreign-policy decision must 
produce an outcome in which both a) the majority of the primary objectives are 
never met and b) the action clearly leads to a chain of events that undermine the 
national interest as it relates to the policy chosen.  
 The outcome must be in discordance with the objectives decision-makers 
sought, not only those sold to the public (especially in a democracy) or those 
commonly or popularly accepted as the policy’s muse. Second, as with the case 
of most of the chief protagonists of the Iraq War insisting to this day that it was 
  45 
the right decision, we should take neither the rallying cries nor the post facto 
public words of policymakers as synonymous with their analysis. Instead, public 
justifications for the policy should be used as one of a number of determinants in 
qualifying what exactly the objectives of the protagonists were, some of which will 
inevitably contradict their own justifying words, a schism sometimes detectable 
through psychoanalytic and discursive techniques promoted by the FPA literature 
that attempt to split through public rhetoric.  
 Obstacles to implementation can also come from the home state. For 
example, in pursuing the League of Nations, President Woodrow Wilson 
presented his case to the world and to his nation that only an international 
community of interdependent, pacific states could ensure the peace and 
prosperity of every individual state. It took another generation and more than 
50,000,000 lives lost for that dream to take one step closer toward becoming a 
reality. Whether the ineptitude of the formation of the League of Nations was a 
failure or not depends on whom you ask and whether you attribute it to the 
president who promoted it or the Congress that prevented it, but it certainly was 
not a blunder. Even in some blatant cases of policy failure, such as the U.S. 
embargo on Cuba over the last several decades, if we are to assume that regime 
change in Havana was the overarching objective, we find the classification of 
blunder evasive given the low cost on the part of the home state. Although costs 
were incurred in prestige, inter-American relations, and loss from trade, few U.S. 
dollars and lives were expended.  
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 The third necessary but insufficient condition for the classification of a 
blunder is therefore substantial cost involved in implementing the policy as well 
as the results of the policy. As stated in the previous section, costs can be 
divided into political, military, and financial. Political cost refers to political capital 
as it relates to a state’s reputation and position in the world. In general terms, for 
example, the Vietnam War displayed to the world that the American military, 
even when fully applied, could be defeated by a peasantry of insurgents in a 
peripheral state, and the Iraq War provoked a strongly negative reaction among 
U.S. allies and among most citizens of the region. As mentioned in the previous 
section, financial cost can be measured in terms of the financial resources 
expended to implement a policy, i.e. the operating cost of sending an army to 
invade and occupy a foreign country in the case of military intervention. An 
expensive policy can still be cost-effective if it provides access to markets or 
other economic opportunities to the state, just as a less expensive policy that 
induces limited economic growth can be cost-ineffective.  
 The fourth necessary but insufficient condition for the classification of a 
blunder is predictable fallacy, based on the available alternatives and extant 
information at the time of the decision. The mettle and judiciousness of any given 
statesman are forged by their ability to select the sagest in a series of inevitably 
imperfect alternatives. While it is easy to denounce a decision once it has failed, 
it is equally easy to absolve policymakers of any wrongdoing as a result of the 
decision having been difficult. In any other profession other than statecraft, be it 
corporate, professional sports, or otherwise, leaders are evaluated based on their 
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performance, not based on their intent. Far too often in the social sciences we 
exculpate leaders from their blunders because we assume that they create 
decisions based on a desire to serve the national interest and an exhaustive, 
objective examination of the facts. However, this is a dramatic oversimplification 
of how leaders behave.  
 Chapter 3, which offers a model for a way of thinking that precipitates and 
exacerbates U.S. foreign policy blunders since the Second World War, contends 
that U.S. leaders often stray from the national interest, either because of an 
unwitting distorted understanding of it or because of an intentional manipulation 
of it. A description of what constitutes the national interest is found in the 
methodology chapter. The OPM model and the discussion of the national interest 
further address the problem of how to evaluate the selection of alternatives in 
FPDM. Let us hope that our elected officials, who ostensibly often resemble the 
parsimonious hedgehog rather than the adaptable fox, can be trained from their 
own errors with increasing adroitness. Until then, however, we must develop a 
variety of approaches for evaluating their decisions and the subsequent 
outcomes of those decisions.  
 The scarcity of literature on FPE and the avoidance and skepticism of its 
merits is not an isolated occurrence in the IR literature. Dismissal of practical 
scholarship and adherence to paradigmatic zealotry represent a way of thinking 
in the social sciences that deviates from its supposed purpose of bettering 
society through a more complete understanding of how social processes tend to 
work and thus how they can be improved upon through self-reflection and social 
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progression. Miles Kahler repined in a 1997 article that "the environment of 
postwar professionalization and demand for research from government 
consumers virtually eliminated any search for an audience beyond one’s 
colleagues and the modern prince and dampened normative inquiry," chastising 
a 1953 academic conference which promoted the elitist perspective that “the 
primary tasks of the institutes must be to influence the minority that shapes public 
opinion."26 Similarly, Paul H. Nitze rues that "most of what has been written and 
taught" on political science since WWII has been "of limited value if not 
counterproductive."27 
 Ask any realist to defend their austere interpretation of international 
relations, and the inevitable refrain echoes, “I do not pretend to suggest that this 
is the way it ought to be. I only claim to accurately describe how it is." While this 
is indeed a fair description of realist theory, and this dissertation relies heavily 
upon many of its assertions, this adulatory capitulation to the indefatigable 
confines of reality as it has been absolves the researcher of any obligation to 
contribute to society by taking part in it. Furthermore, adherence to non-
normative academic doctrine has not prevented policy practitioners from 
incorporating realist philosophy, if there is such a thing, into their political 
calculations. Richard Ned Lebow, for example, asserts that, “realism is not just 
another arcane academic doctrine,” but rather has been used by American 
                                                        
26 Miles Kahler, "Inventing International Relations: International Relations Theory After 1945," in 
Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds., New Thinking in International Relations Theory 
(Westview, 1997). 
 
27 Jonathan Rosen, The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (SUNY, 2014), 6. 
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policymakers of all sorts “to defend their least palatable polices: coups, 
bombings, interventions, and support of oppressive dictatorships,” even while 
admitting that, "international relations theory is ignored by most policymakers."28 
 The perception of academics as sycophants of esoteric circularism has 
been painstakingly earned at every juncture over the previous seven decades: a 
full 80% of IR literature is paradigmatic, regardless of whether it falls into realism, 
liberalism, constructivism, Marxism or other of the 'critical' perspectives.29 During 
the Cold War, dozens of schools and paradigmatic approaches resulted from the 
thermonuclear explosion of scholarship that characterized the postwar years. 
Parochial terms in academe the laity would never recognize began to blossom. 
Behavioralism, neofunctionalism, the English School, game theory and rational-
choice modeling, structuralism and historical materialism, the neorealist 
synthesis, phenomenalism, transfactualism; the list of paradigms grew to become 
virtually infinite, one theoretical scion sprouting from the other, but one thing 
remained constant: they spoke mostly unto themselves. Patrick Thaddeus 
Jackson's separation of the mind-world dualism of neopositivism and critical 
realism from the mind-world monism of analyticism and reflexivity illustrate the 
mind-bending complications involved in IR social-scientific simplification.30  
                                                        
28 Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 16. 
 
29 Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World 
Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 40. 
 
30 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of 
Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics (New York: Routledge, 2011), 37.  
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 This convoluted parochialism leads many to the conclusion that “the Ivory 
Tower exists for a good reason,” but “the separation from the world of decisions 
and consequences has gone too far in international relations," in the words of 
Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic. The "good reason" they cite is the creation 
of knowledge for knowledge's sake, objectively and without bias; the "too far" is 
the aloof detachment of that knowledge to practitioners and the laity. As an 
alternative, they propose four lines of "policy-relevant research:" general theory, 
most commonly appearing in the annals of International Organization, World 
Politics, International Studies Quarterly, and American Political Science Review; 
empirically focused theoretical analysis, broken further into area studies and 
theory-driven empirical puzzles; case-specific analysis; and direct policy analysis 
and advice. Noting that few theories of significant value have arisen since the 
Cold War, with the notable exception of Democratic Peace Theory, Lepgold and 
Nincic echo others in eschewing "deep, often ritualized rivalry among theoretical 
schools" in favor of embracing the concept that "relevant scholarship implies no 
necessary compromise of professional scholarly standards."31 
 To be clear, there must be a 'theory-policy gap.' Without one, honest 
scholarship proves impossible as its links to governments, think tanks, corporate 
interests, or other interest groups preclude its objectivity. Joseph Nye, invoking 
Machiavelli’s remembrance that "it is risky to try to speak truth to power when 
you are in the midst of the struggle for power," states simply: "There is much to 
                                                        
31 Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory 
and the Issue of Policy Relevance (Columbia University Press, 2001), 4. 
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be said for the view that universities are unique institutions, but the imagined 
trade-off between corruption and relevance need not be so acute."32 Stephen 
Walt calls this the "rigor-relevance trade-off," cautioning specifically against the 
wholesale embrace of rational-choice modeling, noting that, "rational choice 
theory has yet to produce a substantial number of important new hypotheses or 
well-verified empirical predictions."33 It seems a fair conclusion that many of the 
old paradigmatic debates simply resurface in new formulations, as advocates of 
particular schools and viewpoints attempt to attach their approach to the 
definition of the term "scientific" as concomitantly as others will believe and 
accept. Pedantic didacticism, from this pint of view, consists of the potpourri of 
epistemological regionalism that blurs the parameters of the ontological frontiers 
we rely upon to formulate a coherent language currency, without which we are 
left bankrupt to grasp at straws.  
 In reality, no approach holds a monopoly on what we define as scientific, 
and as with most intellectual inquiries, adding them all up and dividing them by 
the number of inputs can reliably produce something as near as possible to the 
truth. Many a dissertation has been published on the philosophy of science and 
the metatheoretical developments of IR literature, and this is not one of them; 
however, this truncated foray into the doctrinaire is required in order to situate the 
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research agenda into the IR literature and justify the policy-driven advent of its 
accession. Little theory is engaged in this work, although it is relied upon 
implicitly; likewise, it intends to inform IR theory by presenting secondary 
empirical evidence in the light of original analysis. This omission of course 
excludes the argumentation herein, which is described as a model and a theory 
in its own right, and constitutes the subject of the subsequent chapter.   
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CHAPTER 3 
Historical Progenitors of Preponderance and the OPM Model  
 
 
It is better to be alone than in bad company.34 
 
George Washington  
 
 
He who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does 
not become a monster... for when you gaze long into the abyss, the 
abyss also gazes into you.35 
 
Nietzsche 
 
 
 
Grand strategy and American preponderance 
 
 Since the Second World War, U.S. foreign policy has revolved around an 
axis of key assumptions that define and perpetuate American exceptionalism by 
way of the entrenchment and proliferation of U.S. power and interests abroad. 
The engenderment of U.S. power has unsurprisingly ensconced these 
assumptions as the source of that engenderment. If the United States has 
continued to dominate the international system, so the thinking goes, then 
whatever strategy has been employed during that time must be succeeding. 
More surprising, however, has been the myopic impulse to link grand strategy 
with the relative position of the United States in the international system with 
seeming disregard for the media through which these assumptions might be 
most effectively employed. To what extent a great power should exert itself on an                                                         
34 Mark Chidester, George Washington's Rules for Civility and Decent Behavior in Company and 
Conversation (Silverwing, 2014), 25.  
 
35 Harvey Kline, Fighting Monsters in the Abyss: The Second Administration of Colombian 
President Álvaro Uribe Vélez (University of Alabama Press, 2015), x.  
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international level remains an open question, and will remain so as long as the 
United States can claim the mantle of the preeminent state in the international 
system. Indeed, one of the great debates in IR literature is where exactly the 
point of utility maximization falls on the isolationism-imperialism spectrum. A 
superpower's downfall in overextension can just as easily come about by way of 
isolationism, especially in the era of globalization. Given that the United States 
appears poised to remain the world's preeminent, if not hegemonic, state for the 
foreseeable future, the more compelling question is not whether but how to 
employ and deploy American power.36  
 This research makes no claim as to the merits or demerits of offensive or 
defensive realism, nor does it take serious interest in the debate over how U.S. 
power has changed relative to other international powers in the last seven 
decades. It accepts that international relations are still largely nested within the 
basic realist principles of the zero-sum game and the quest to maximize the utility 
function in order to pursue a relatively fixed national interest, and it asserts that 
the national interest has been pursued imprudently by U.S. policymakers since 
the Second World War due to the continued adherence to the grand strategy of 
American preponderance after 1945. The methodological implications of the term 
'American preponderance' are detailed in the next chapter, which addresses the 
research design. The term is here defined as the grand strategy that assumes a 
global scale for the U.S. national interest, considers potential threats anywhere in 
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World Bank, and the IMF,” Politics & Society Vol. 39, No. 3 (September 2011), 347-378. 
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the world as potential existential threats to U.S. national security, and attempts to 
proliferate American interests, security, and institutions globally so as to 
engender U.S. power and prevent the engenderment of potentially hostile 
powers. Inherent in the hypotheses of this dissertation is the implication that this 
grand strategy negatively affects the national interest, in simplistic terms because 
it pursues trouble rather than avoiding it. The term shares much in common with 
the grand strategy referred to as American primacy, which focuses primarily on 
maintaining the privileged relative power position of the U.S. state in the 
international system. "American preponderance" explicitly avoids the problematic 
terms "empire" and "hegemony," the former too vague and its literature often too 
vitriolic; the latter describing a slightly more aggressive (perhaps imperialistic) 
foreign policy than that which American preponderance means to presuppose.  
 The most intractable foreign-policy outputs tend to be those most 
associated with the elements of a state's foreign-policy objectives considered by 
foreign policymakers to be most necessary to advance the grand strategy of the 
state. A foreign policy assumption, or an element of grand strategy that is taken 
as given, therefore holds an inherently fundamental position in the foreign policy 
of a state to the extent that it can be defined as a necessity. The unquestionable 
assumptions embedded in the FPDM process thus form the conduit of any 
desired foreign-policy outcome. In a state as large, powerful, and decentralized 
as the United States, these assumptions become even more significant, because 
the state's foreign-policy institutions cannot easily be reversed by a sudden 
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change in leadership or public opinion.37 Further compounding the significance of 
U.S. foreign-policy assumptions is the phenomenon that many of the paramount 
assumptions taken for granted in U.S. foreign policy distinguish it from that of any 
other state. The United States can therefore be understood as an exceptional 
state to the extent that it considers itself an exceptional state in that a state is 
what its citizenry and leaders believe it is, at least to the extent that it is powerful 
enough to exert those beliefs on the international system.  
 The idea of innate American exceptionalism, proliferated throughout the 
American zeitgeist since the inception of the U.S. nation-state in the 18th 
century, represents a notion common among policymakers and the citizenry 
alike. Throughout the centuries, but particularly since the Second World War, 
innumerable quotes by statesmen similar to that of Albright's "indispensible 
nation" declaration have solidified the concept in the collective American milieu. 
Although every state considers itself exceptional in some fashion or another, and 
thus justifies its legitimacy to rule over its citizenry and sometimes even the 
citizenry of other states, the United States is the only state since the virtual 
demise of National Socialism in 1945 to promote its own exceptionalism with 
such obstinately pervasive intent. The galvanization of this intent has been 
manifested by way of the grand strategy of American preponderance since the                                                         
37 The United States is a 'weak state' due to its republican decentralization of power relative to 
more authoritarian or otherwise centralized states. Although the executive branch has exerted 
itself more forcefully in recent decades, especially in foreign policy, the power of the purse still 
resides in the Congress, a branch whose members must answer directly to their local (parochial) 
constituencies. For example, Congress regularly forces the military to purchase products and 
services it does not want, largely because of the entrenched local interests of the military-
industrial complex (military bases and hardware-production facilities that benefit local 
economies).  
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Second World War. This research contends that American preponderance has 
served as the grand-strategic fulcrum around which all other grand-strategic 
options have been considered since the Second World War.  
 We can begin to extrapolate the key facets of this particular grand strategy 
by defining it in terms of the definition of grand strategy itself, which some have 
disambiguated to the point of arguing that no grand strategy exists in the United 
States, if in any state at all. This research assumes that an identifiable grand 
strategy exists in every prominent state, and takes the commonly utilized 
definition of the term put forth by Barry Posen: "A political-military, means-end 
chain, a state’s theory about how it can best ‘cause’ security for itself.”38 This 
security can be military or economic, material or ideational, but is always related 
to the perception of the citizenry that its material interests and ideational 
ambitions are being pursued by their leaders in concert with the national interest 
(a citizen must feel secure in order to achieve security, a feeling pervasively 
mercurial in the heart and mind of the modern American). Christopher Layne 
provides a slightly more detailed definition, defining it as "a three-step process: 
determining a state's vital security interests; identifying the threats to those 
interests; and deciding how best to employ the state's political, military, and 
economic resources to protect those interests."39  
                                                        
38 Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the 
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39 Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand 
Strategy, International Security Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997): 86-124. 
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 A third definition by John Lewis Gaddis envisions "the process by which a 
state relates long-term strategic ends to means under the rubric of an 
overarching and enduring vision to advance the national interest." 40 
Distinguishing between the prewar origins of American preponderance and its 
postwar evolution permits an understanding of the ideational motivations for its 
ossification in American political-military doctrine during the Second World War 
and its perpetuation through the cessation of hostilities in 1945, the Fall of the 
Berlin Wall, and the post-9/11 world. Each of these landmarks signifies the 
beginning of an era in which U.S. foreign policymakers might have pulled back 
from a hyper-vigilant foreign policy, but instead decided to remain entrenched in 
its monistically preponderant commitments and ambitions overseas.  
 
 
The origins and evolution of American preponderance  
 
 The territory and idea of America and what it means to be American has 
been proliferating since long before the forces of human civilization managed to 
combine the two into a nation-state. From their outset, the American colonies had 
no choice but to expand into the frontier in search of land to conquer and 
resources to exploit if they aspired to establish a foothold on the North American 
continent. This instilled a spirit of expansionism into the American soul by linking 
survival with territorial and material enlargement. This phenomenon strengthened 
rather than withered as the eventual United States prospered and defended its 
                                                        
40 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro et. al., The Challenge of Grand Strategy: The Great Powers and the 
Broken Balance between the Wars (Cambridge University Press: 2012), 14. 
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national claim against the theretofore-impenetrable British Empire. Between the 
Civil War and the First World War, U.S. grand strategy evolved and shifted 
between differing objectives and various levels of intervention in foreign affairs. 
Constituencies began to emerge in the Democratic and Republican bases, 
separated initially between northeastern manufacturers that favored selective 
interventionism in the periphery to protect markets, primarily represented by 
Republicans, and southern farmers who traded with core countries and were 
disinterested in expansionism, primarily represented by Democrats. While late 
18th century Democrats did not pursue expansionism to the same extent as their 
Republican counterparts, they did not oppose it enough to provide a sufficient 
political fissure that would have precluded it.41 In the last three decades of the 
19th century, even as domestic territorial and industrial expansion took place an 
at unprecedented rate, the state began consolidating its bureaucratic institutions 
for expansion abroad. The civil services, Foreign Service, and military were all 
professionalized and strengthened. While Europeans carved up colonies in Africa 
and Asia, America participated to a degree but was reluctant to take such an 
exuberant role in colonial plunder, an American-European discrepancy that 
would cause tensions between the allies during both World Wars (as well as 
within American identity itself). ‘Imperial isolationism’ balanced against ‘collective 
                                                        
41 Kevin Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 2007). 
 
  60 
internationalism’ in American politics, and ultimately melded into a continual tug-
of-war between expansionism and isolationism.42  
 Attempting to corral both the impulse to expand abroad and the reluctance 
to become mired in the troubles of the world, the United States at the turn of the 
20th century developed what has been described as ‘reticent expansionism,’ by 
which the nation would delve into foreign entanglements and markets 
discriminately and wherever an opportunity seemed politically and economically 
viable. 43  As material expansion moved westward and ultimately overseas, 
ideological expansion inevitably accompanied it, most demonstrably in the 
conceptualization of “Manifest Destiny.” This idea, perhaps the most defining of 
late 19th century America, planted the seeds of global expansionism in the 
American mind: “It meant expansion, prearranged by Heaven, over an area not 
clearly defined,” and consolidated previously disparate ideological 
predispositions into an enlarging America, advocated to some degree by every 
early prominent American leader by nature of the frontier borders of the country, 
into a neatly packaged justification to proliferate the nation and thus the state.44  
 Still in the lull of a relatively isolationist stance in the interwar period after 
an (albeit successful) intervention in Europe that many Americans nonetheless 
came to regret, the American public was unwittingly stirred into a global conflict                                                         
42 Charles Beard, The Rise of American Civilization: America in Midpassage, vol. 3 (New York: 
Macmillan, 1939), 442-458. 
 
43 John Dobson, Reticent Expansionism: The Foreign Policy of William McKinley (Duquesne 
University Press, 1988). 
 
44 Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History (Harvard University Press, 
1963). 
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once again with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The ‘sleeping giant’ that 
awoke on December 7, 1941 has yet to go back to sleep. A relatively small and 
outdated standing army was hurriedly whipped into service and enlarged, 
accompanied by an immediate and truly transformative astronomical increase in 
industrial military hardware production. As a result of the unprecedented rise of 
American power overseas in the destruction and subsequent occupation of 
Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany, US leaders decided that the need to remain 
in fixed positions abroad to preclude another foreign attack was paramount, 
especially in order to counterbalance against the Soviet Union’s impending rival 
expansion.  
 While the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Second World War more broadly 
provided the catalyst for militarization and the formation of a global defense 
system, the threat from wartime ally Soviet Union cemented the need to employ 
a more active role in international politics. According to Melvyn Leffler, postwar 
planning “always presupposed American hegemony over the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans,” and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted that “the further 
away from our own vital areas we can hold our enemy through the possession of 
advanced bases,” the greater the opportunity to prevent it from violating 
American sovereignty. 45  Leffler further explicates that the standard postwar 
attitude among U.S. foreign policymakers was one in which "given their country's 
overwhelming power, they now expected to refashion the world in America's                                                         
45 Melvyn Leffler, “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginning of the Cold 
War, 1945-48,” The American Historical Review Vol. 89, No. 2 (April 1984), 346-381. 
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image and create the American century."46 The roots of American preponderance 
began to bear trunks.  
 By the time the United States entered hostilities in earnest in the aftermath 
of the attack at Pearl Harbor, the historical, political, ideational, economic, 
bureaucratic, institutional, interest-group, and military-industrial seeds of 
American preponderance had been sufficiently sewn so as to permit the 
flourishing of an American superpower. Though ideology, “much like imperialism 
and liberalism, other protean concepts frequently bandied about in serious 
historical and political discourse, is hard to pin down,” it is nevertheless too 
important to be ignored; the same must be said of culture, a distinct concept with 
some similar traits.47 One ambitious attempt at literary conglomeration of the 
panoply of discordant factors colluding to formulate the overarching objective of 
American preponderance takes form in Louis Hartz’s The Liberal Tradition in 
America.48 This sociological approach to Americanness and Americanism pieces 
together causes and consequences of what Hartz describes as an American 
faith, a liberal tradition so ingrained that it formed “one of the most powerful 
absolutisms in the world.” According to Hartz, the “American way” consolidated a 
political homogeneity that led to “a messianism in the traditional American 
liberal,” depicting foreign cultures as apostasy and consistently begging for 
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47 Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (Yale University Press, 1987), xi. 
 
48 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955).  
 
  63 
Americanization: “Americanism, when it does not retreat, goes abroad.” The 
United States, “governed by an irrational Lockianism,” alienates outsiders and 
non-conformists so much as to “transform eccentricity into sin.” Tocqueville 
likewise observed that “the main value of political democracy is that it generates 
restless activity and superabundant energy in society and thereby makes it more 
prosperous.”49 This “superabundant energy” can perhaps become problematic 
when applied internationally to an anarchical environment. Exuberance in oneself 
carries with it an inherent impulse to project it onto others so that they also may 
revel in that zealous rapture.  
 The significance of Hartz’s book rests within its description of a distinct 
Americanism that interacts with trepidation and often hostility with contending 
ways of life. His discussion of an American absolutism, based though it may be 
on liberal principles, segues into other works that have taken the baton in a 
different direction. If there is a ‘liberal tradition’ or ‘liberal absolutism’ in America, 
what Ikenberry describes as a 'liberal Leviathan,' one of the media for carrying 
that tradition through differing historical circumstances, popular preferences, and 
presidential and Congressional regimes inevitably becomes ideology, the ever-
fungible most common denominator in the construction of the national self-image 
and the institutional preferences through which that image is advanced in foreign 
affairs. Although many consider the 'national interest' the most fungible variable 
in delineating foreign policy, opportunities to mold the perception of what 
                                                        
49 Tocqueville is being paraphrased here by Jon Elster in Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 24.  
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constitutes the national interest abound, especially in a nation with a gargantuan 
international presence, and that malleability is where ideology takes flight, as 
evasive as its measurability may be. Christopher Layne argues that ideology 
creates an aggressive U.S. foreign policy more than any other factor, dictating an 
inward-outward imposition of American will internationally rather than waiting to 
respond to events as they form and affect the national interest, quoting officials 
such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who believed that the country could only 
be safe “to the extent that its total environment is safe.” But rather than 
expediting American security and prosperity, this ideology actually invites danger. 
In Layne's words, “Each new defensive perimeter is menaced by turmoil on the 
other side of the line.”50  
 
 
The change-continuity debate and grand strategy in the postwar years 
 
 Two overarching questions on U.S. grand strategy have lingered among 
scholars since 1945. First, did the United States build the postwar order on 
standard national-interest grounds or ideational liberal grounds? And second, to 
what extent has U.S. grand strategy shifted and evolved in response to the global 
environment between 1945 and the present day? The answer to the former is 
both, and the answer to the latter is very little. Even if the United States indeed 
erred on the side of isolationism up until 1941, it abandoned that prescription for 
foreign-policy ailment almost entirely after the Second World War. And even if 
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that event did permanently transform U.S. foreign policy in a substantially more 
outward trajectory, it nonetheless did so with all the trappings of preponderance 
having been already extant in the solipsistic American identity, if mostly in a 
dormant sense, for at least a century. Regardless, what emerged in 1945 was a 
nation eager to exert its power on a scale never before seen in history; that is to 
say, a truly global scale. Although more has been written about U.S. foreign 
policy than any other topic in the history of IR literature, the postwar consensus 
of the grand strategy of preponderance has remained relatively consistent 
throughout the previous seven decades. The debate over U.S. grand strategy 
has therefore devolved into the particularities of that settlement  (when and under 
what circumstances policy tools such as 'regime change' should be pursued, 
rather than if) and whether the United States built the postwar order on standard 
national-interest grounds or ideational liberal grounds. In some ways, both 
arguments descend to semantics. Fortunately, IR scholarship excels in that 
endeavor.  
 John Ikenberry propounds the viewpoint that although the United States of 
course never drifted too far away from its national interests when constructing the 
postwar liberal order, it indeed built that order on the liberal principles of 
democracy, free markets, and adherence to international laws, rules, and norms 
that protected the weak and legitimized the strong. Citing enduring features of 
American political culture that provided a foundation for the multilateral liberal 
world order, such as a universalist creed, a strong belief in institutions and the 
rule of law, the multiculturalism of American society, and a nationalism built upon 
  66 
civic rather than ethnic foundations, Ikenberry envisions a United States that got 
less than it bargained for and offered more leadership than it wanted in the 
postwar years.51 Having done so, it still managed to successfully employ both 
Containment policy and the creation of a "democratic club" that alienated 
outsiders and provided incentives to its members.52 Ikenberry recognizes that the 
Cold War reinforced the solidarity of the Western world order, but denies that it 
was entirely dependent on it. The United States simply offered inclusion into its 
'club' of security alliances, open markets, multilateral institutions, capitalism, and 
democracy, and in exchange for relinquishing dominance to the United States 
other powers gained access, partnerships, and legitimacy. As such, the Fall of 
the Berlin Wall did little to change that international institutional bargain, and the 
post-Cold War global environment should therefore have been just as receptive 
to the liberal hegemon as it had been for the previous five decades. 
 Those with a more critical perspective on the postwar order, such as 
David Skidmore, offer a contending train of thought that accepts many of the 
pretenses of Ikenberry's analysis but takes issue with "the depth of America's 
postwar commitment to multilateralism, the role that the Cold War and its passing 
played in shaping U.S. attitudes toward international institutions, and the sources 
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and prospects for America's recent unilateralist turn." 53  Some observers, 
including Ikenberry, link the "unilateralist turn" of the Bush Administration to the 
neoconservative progenitors of the Bush Doctrine, calling it a "radical" shift away 
from the traditional constraints of the multilateral postwar order, eventually 
heralding "the end of the neoconservative movement" when the Iraq War 
descended into chaos in 2004.54 Timothy Lynch and Robert Singh, in defending 
the Bush Doctrine, present it as in line with decades of U.S. foreign policy rather 
than a momentary aberration in it.55  
 In contrast to Ikenberry, Skidmore contends that without the strategic 
necessities of the Cold War, the 'institutional bargain' that held the postwar order 
together evaporated, leaving the United States "less willing to provide collective 
goods through strong international institutions" and other states "less likely to 
defer to U.S. demands for special privileges that exempt the U.S. from normal 
multilateral constraints." 56  Bruce Cronin summarizes the inherent paradox of 
balancing the national interest with facilitating global order: "The leading state 
serves to insure systemic stability by creating universal rules and institutions and 
by providing collective goods. Yet, the hegemon is also concerned with its 
narrower, self-regarding interests that may require the exercise of power outside                                                         
53 David Skidmore, “Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy 
Analysis Vol. 1 No. 2 (July 2005), 207-228. 
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of multilateral constraints."57 Joseph Nye envisions this paradox as the existential 
manifestation of the stalemate occurring when a hegemon is too powerful to be 
challenged by others, yet not powerful enough to achieve its objectives alone.58 
 Others focus on the extent to which unilateralism has shifted over the 
course of subsequent administrations in the latter years of the Cold War and the 
years following its end. Robert Kagan, for example, describes changes in the 
overall balance of power to explain the rift in the lead-up to the Iraq War between 
the United States and Europe. 59  Alternatively, Samuel Huntington highlights 
unilateralist tendencies in the Clinton Administration. 60  David Lake likewise 
argues that U.S. policymakers have never given more than modest weight to 
European dissent. 61  While these arguments are relevant, they address the 
particularities of U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy, rather than the nature of 
U.S. foreign relations more broadly. Regardless of what aspect of U.S. diplomatic 
history one might wish to focus on, Arthur Schlesinger reminds us that "there is 
no older American tradition in the conduct of foreign affairs than unilateralism."62                                                         
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Curiously, he invokes Ikenberry in questioning why this is the case, given that 
most Americans remain multilateralist about many individual foreign-policy 
preferences. This discrepancy becomes somewhat less curious when we 
acknowledge that there are many catchall policies the public tends to disagree 
with despite agreeing with many of the tenets found within them, as is the case 
with, for example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010.63  
 Those who associate U.S. hegemony during and after the Cold War with 
the more liberal tenets of its reign, rather than more self-interested ambitions, 
tend to portray the Cold War and its aftermath as a relatively peaceful struggle 
that eventually triumphed in Francis Fukuyama's "end of history," or final 
enshrinement of liberal democratic capitalism as the only accepted form of 
governance. However, this imagination of the postwar liberal order, partly based 
on the decrease in direct militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) between great 
powers (there were virtually none) ignores a gigantic thorn in the side of that 
order: it witnessed "the greatest accumulation of armaments the world has ever 
known, a whole series of prolonged and devastating limited wars, an abundance 
of revolutionary, ethnic, religious, and civil violence, as well as some of the 
deepest and most intractable ideological rivalries in human experience," in the 
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words of John Lewis Gaddis.64  
 The "stability of the bipolar world" Kenneth Waltz referenced was anything 
but stable for citizens of the developing world, caught between the forces of 
Communism, capitalism, and neutrality, none of which guaranteed safety or 
precluded meddling from one side or the other.65 For the "empire of liberty," as 
Odd Arne Westad termed the United States (in the tradition of Thomas 
Jefferson), the Cold War was part of a continuity stretching from George 
Washington to George W. Bush: "From its inception the United States was an 
interventionist power that based its foreign policy on territorial expansion."66 It 
was only logical therefore that it do everything within its power to withstand its 
bipolar competitor by any and all means necessary. Gaddis, in contrast, 
characterizes the Cold War as a one-off for international relations from which 
little can be gleaned in the larger picture. This contention mirrors the contention 
between Ikenberry and those of his ilk and Skidmore and those of his. The case 
for continuity is more compelling. Robert Litwak juxtaposes the Cold War policy 
of Containment with the containment of 'rogue states' such as Iran, Iraq, North 
Korea, and Libya after the Cold War, further highlighting the transcendence of 
U.S. foreign policy through major historical landmarks in international relations                                                         
64 John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International 
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that might have otherwise offered the chance to reexamine the status quo.67 This 
is but one example; one could also point to military spending, interventions, the 
expansion of NATO, and the Iraq War, among other policies, that signify 
continuity since 1945 rather than evolution.  
 Jack Snyder examines realist, cognitive, and domestic-political 
explanations for why the United States charted the course of preponderance in 
the postwar years even when it often seemed contrary to the national interest. 
Although realism is wary of foreign entanglements, in large part due to the 
balancing blowback that often forms a counterweight to aggressive foreign 
ventures, some see expansionism as producing more fecundity than tribulation. 
However, the author rightly points out that expansion invariably encounters 
diminishing returns at some unidentified point, as neutrals and/or foes balance 
against expansion and administrative costs of conquered territories and peoples 
rise. In the cognitive explanation, policymakers codify expansionist maxims that 
transcend disconfirming experiences, and in the domestic-political explanation 
expansionism harms the overall national interest while benefitting certain 
segments of the political economy that exercise influence over Congress and the 
presidency. Snyder proposes an alternative explanation that spins off of the 
domestic-political approach, whereby "logrolling" or backscratching by interest 
groups coalesces around an expansionist policy as a compromise whose 
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benefits outweigh its costs for particular constituencies. 68  His approach falls 
within the purview of the body of literature that conceives of the national interest 
as malleable rather than fixed.  
 While the true motivations for a state's behavior can never be known with 
absolute precision, the United States has been remarkably consistent in its 
reservation of the right (or perhaps the privilege) to intervene anywhere in the 
world it perceives its interests to be at stake. The development that tips the 
balance toward the perspective that preponderance drives U.S. foreign policy 
first, engaging in veritable liberal foreign relations only selectively, is the simple 
fact that it has never capitalized on its favorable position at particular moments 
(at the end of the Cold War, for example) to facilitate a truly liberal world order in 
which it behaves only as the protagonist and never as the antagonist. At every 
watershed moment, U.S. leaders have instead redoubled efforts to assert 
Americanism to a further extent than ever before. As early as 1944, decisions 
were made that welcomed the oncoming Cold War by characterizing the Soviets 
as dangerous aggressors (which they quite well may have been); after the Cold 
War the decision was made to enlarge NATO rather than incorporate a fractured 
Russia; after 9/11 the Bush Administration aggressively pursued unilateralism in 
its prosecution of the war against terrorism and the Iraq War. At every critical 
historical juncture since 1945, the vantage point of U.S. leaders has been to 
consolidate and expand relative power, rather than solicit cooperation from 
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potential adversaries. The irony of this perspective is that the United States has 
done so via the imposition of a quintessentially liberal world order. The 'arsenal of 
democracy' lives up to its name.  
 
 
Preponderance after the Cold War  
 
 The end of the Cold War presented the United States with an 
embarrassment of riches and a corresponding question of impending 
significance: given that it had successfully emerged from the bipolar world as the 
sole superpower in the international system, what position should it now take with 
regard to the former Soviet Union and other powerful states? What do you do in 
international relations when you have achieved global dominance? Continue on 
with business as usual? Or capitalize on the 'unipolar moment' to inculcate global 
beneficence and establish a lasting liberal order once and for all? In keeping with 
its time-honored traditions, the United States did both. In a sense, this was the 
same question the nation asked itself at the triumphant conclusion of the Second 
World War (the notable difference being the imminent threat of Communism and 
the expanding sphere of influence of the Soviet Union). The answer to that 
question was as unambiguous as it was consistent with postwar grand strategy: 
continue to do what works. Even foreign policies that end in failure are usually 
justified by their progenitors, and those that end in success render the policies 
that supposedly ushered in that success even more immutable than they would 
otherwise be given the gravitational persistence of institutional resistance to 
vicissitude.  
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 In 1990, Charles Krauthammer characterized the new balance of power 
with the Soviet Union flailing thusly: "The immediate post-Cold War world is not 
multipolar. It is unipolar," as "the center of world power is the unchallenged 
superpower, attended by its Western allies."69 He argued for an international 
activism to exploit the unique opportunity, labeling neoliberal institutionalists 
"utopian" and conservative isolationists "naive."70 Paul Kennedy described this 
'unipolar moment' as unique in all of history: "Nothing has ever existed like this 
disparity of power."71 Despite that exaltation, he warned that this unprecedented 
power did not render imperial overstretch innocuous, as well as questioning 
whether that power discrepancy in fact represented a new unipolar world. 72 
 Somewhat curiously, some of the same scholars rejoicing in the enormous 
resource endowment of the United States have also been those cautioning 
against arriving at the assumption that this either gives that power free will in the 
international system or that this endowment will last forever. Leffler, for example, 
describes American power in 1945 as totally unrivaled in history: "At the end of 
the war the United States had two-thirds of the world's gold reserves and three-
fourths of its invested capital. More than half of the entire world's manufacturing 
capacity was located in the United States, and the nation was turning out more                                                         
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than a third of all goods produced around the world. It owned half of the world's 
supply of shipping and was the world's largest exporter of goods and services. 
The gross national product of the United States was three times Soviet Russia's 
and more than five times Great Britain's."73 His argument is nonetheless one of 
prudence.  
 With this newly disproportionate share of world power, what were the ideal 
grand-strategic preferences of the leader of the 'new world order?' John Kohout 
consolidates grand strategy options at the end of the Cold War into three general 
categories: noninterventionism, unipolarism (that most closely related to 
preponderance in his typology) and multilateralism, conceptualizing each in 
terms of "the international system, characterization of security interests, 
evaluation of strategic assets, and specification of a strategic approach."74 On a 
more time-expansive level, Paul Miller delineates five enduring "pillars" of U.S. 
grand strategy dating back to the early 20th century: “Defending the American 
homeland from attack, maintaining a favorable balance of power among the great 
powers, punishing rogue actors, and investing in good governance and allied 
capabilities abroad,” in addition to pursuing the democratic peace through 
economic interdependence and concomitant alienation of nondemocratic 
states.75 Miller attributes several foreign-policy errors, such as the Vietnam War, 
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alliances with dictatorships in developing countries, and failing to understand the 
jihadist threat to ignorance of most issues other than those dealing with great-
power politics and the overall balance of power. This attribution is particularly 
relevant to the case studies.  
 As we will see in later chapters, this overreliance on the balance of power 
leaves the United States vulnerable to 'hot' threats as U.S. leaders choose 
instead to focus on 'cold' threats. Max Boot, for example, has documented the 
rise of American power in conjunction with U.S. participation in small peripheral 
wars and questioned why the U.S. military continues to place overwhelming 
concentration on high-intensity conflicts, even after experiences in Bosnia, 
Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.76 Miller's work singles out 
three principle threats to U.S. grand strategy: autocratic states, failed states and 
the rogue occupiers operating in their space, and what David Kilcullen terms the 
"global Islamist insurgency."77   
 Although U.S. foreign policymakers do pay some attention to these 
threats, the United States often employs the same tools against them that were 
designed to fight interstate conflicts, as U.S. foreign policymaking institutions 
never fully evolved beyond the Cold War or, for that matter, the Second World 
War. On the one hand, great-power politics remain a threat to U.S. interests in 
the form of a resurgent (in ambition, if not in capabilities) Russia, a rising (in both 
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ambition and capabilities) China, and the emergence of domestically oriented 
populism. On the other hand, the 'hot' wars the U.S. is now fighting, primarily the 
war against Islamist fundamentalism, can take little from the policies and 
institutions oriented toward addressing issues of great-power politics. The 
discrepancy between the strategies and tools needed to address great-power 
politics and those required to combat terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental 
degradation, and other non-traditional security problems continues to present 
challenges to foreign policymakers. The Iraq War is the prime example of 
erroneously responding to a low-intensity nonstate security problem via state-
state conflict.  
 Posen offers the following typology, as shown in Table 1:78 
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Posen has characterized U.S. grand strategy since the Cold War as "Liberal 
Hegemony," chiding it as "unnecessary, counterproductive, costly, and wasteful" 
in lamenting that "the United States has grown incapable of moderating its 
ambitions in international politics," proposing instead the alternative that he terms 
"a grand strategy of restraint." He explains what led to settling upon this form of 
'Liberal Hegemony:' 
Four factors helped make Liberal Hegemony the victor. First, with 
the collapse of Soviet power the United States became the most 
capable global power in history. Nothing stood in the way. Second, 
the Western liberal model was triumphant. History vindicated the 
rightness of our system and made it in our eyes the appropriate 
model for others. Third, the Cold War ended with U.S. forces 
“manning the ramparts” around the world. Insecurity and disorder 
beyond the ramparts quickly created demands from within and 
without to move them outward. Fourth, the United States had built 
giant organizations to wage the Cold War and squadrons of 
national security experts to manage them. Most organization 
theorists will tell you that organizations never want to go out of 
business; if they succeed at their first task, they will try to find 
another. For these reasons, a more rather than a less ambitious 
strategy emerged after the Cold War, even before the September 
11, 2001, terrorist attack on the United States, which supercharged 
the whole effort.79 
 
Posen's description of U.S. national security expanding to a global scale, 
"Insecurity and disorder beyond the ramparts quickly created demands from 
within and without to move them outward," closely resembles that of Layne's, 
“Each new defensive perimeter is menaced by turmoil on the other side of the 
line," whereby the national-security boundaries of the state are expanded beyond                                                         
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the state itself. In promoting his grand strategy of "Restraint," Posen offers a 
thorough case against the status quo of 'Liberal Hegemony.' This 
characterization embodies a substantial subsection of U.S. grand-strategy 
scholarship that varies in terminology but finds concordance in substance. In true 
academic fashion, this terminology differs according to the author, and use of the 
term 'preponderance,' though displaying conceptual overlap with grand-strategic 
terms such as 'primacy' as it does with many others, is nonetheless nontrivial. 
The following chapter further disambiguates 'preponderance,' 'primacy,' 
'hegemony,' and other similar terms, but here the concept is introduced in 
relation to the established context.  
 Leffler was the first scholar to explore the idea of a U.S. grand strategy of 
'preponderance' in his 1992 book, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, 
The Truman Administration, and The Cold War. His exhaustive survey of postwar 
declassified internal government documents illustrates in great detail the grand-
strategic thinking of U.S. foreign policymakers in the early years of the Cold War. 
It was Paul Nitze, a high-level foreign-policy official who served in various 
capacities under multiple administrations that declared: "To seek less than 
preponderant power would be to opt for defeat." This quote is the ancestral 
provenance of the term. Nitze's absolute view on total global victory was mirrored 
by his unambiguous view on the Soviet threat. In a speech in Milwaukee he 
stated simply: "By the Spring of 1947 all but the most blind could see what the 
Russians were up to and that the policy of attempting to continue into the 
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postwar world the wartime collaboration with the Soviet Union was bankrupt."80 
Robert Worley compares preponderance with primacy, contrasting the two 
similar means-oriented approaches with the strict intention-oriented balance-of-
power Containment approach, which ceded more territory to the enemy and 
aligned more with defensive realism than offensive realism.81 Leffler describes 
what the word "preponderance" meant to postwar strategic planners:  
 
Preponderance did not mean domination. It meant creating a world 
environment hospitable to U.S. interests and values; it meant 
developing the capabilities to overcome threats and challenges; it 
meant mobilizing the strength to reduce Soviet influence on its own 
periphery; it meant undermining the appeal of communism; it meant 
fashioning the institutional techniques and mechanisms to manage 
the free world; and it meant establishing a configuration of power 
and a military posture so that if war erupted, the United States 
would prevail. If adversaries saw the handwriting on the wall, they 
would defer to American wishes.82 
 
 
 Leffler largely looks favorably upon the 'Wise Men' that built postwar grand 
strategy, but does chastise them for overemphasizing the importance of the 
periphery in the emerging bipolar world.83 Given that the Cold War's "long peace" 
among the great powers collaterally littered the developing world with widespread 
violence and civil disarray as the two superpowers hashed it out for control of the                                                         
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hinterlands, this rebuke seems fitting. 84 In "From Preponderance to Offshore 
Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," Layne further investigates the 
grand strategy of preponderance, echoing others in illustrating the lack of policy 
change at the end of the Cold War: "The Soviet Union's collapse transformed the 
international system dramatically, but there has been no corresponding change 
in U.S. grand strategy." He explicates the exegesis of the grand strategy of 
preponderance: 
 
The United States has pursued the same grand strategy, 
preponderance, since the late 1940s. The key elements of this 
strategy are creation and maintenance of a U.S.-led world order 
based on preeminent U.S. political, military, and economic power, 
and on American values; maximization of U.S. control over the 
international system by preventing the emergence of rival great 
powers in Europe and East Asia; and maintenance of economic 
interdependence as a vital U.S. security interest. The logic of the 
strategy is that interdependence is the paramount interest the 
strategy promotes; instability is the threat to interdependence; and 
extended deterrence is the means by which the strategy deals with 
this threat.85 
 
 
Layne, borrowing from Leffler, argues convincingly that this is the most accurate 
way to consolidate decades of polysemic U.S. grand strategy into one definitive 
term. His verbiage is more explicit and comprehensive than Leffler's because his 
research is more ambitious with specific respect to the term "preponderance:" 
Layne's central purpose is discerning the particularities of modern U.S. grand 
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strategy, while Leffler's approach is more ecumenical in nature. Layne 
subsequently propounds his theory of "Extraregional Hegemony," by which the 
United States pursues hegemony in Europe, Asia, and the Persian Gulf, 
attempting to dominate each of these regions for ideological (rather than 
objective-security) motivations.86  
 Within the broader literature on U.S. preponderance, his characterization 
of U.S. grand strategy uses neoclassical realism as a point of departure but 
describes it as more expansive than John J. Mearsheimer's, which sees the 
United States as hegemonic only in the Western Hemisphere; more intentional 
than Posen's, which sees it as somewhat ephemeral; and ideologically motivated 
by the 'Open Door' tradition rather than being structurally determined or given by 
default objective-realist parameters. The definition of "preponderance" given 
earlier in the chapter, while borrowing heavily from Layne and Leffler, specifies a 
sui generis meaning, given the distinct research agenda of this dissertation and 
its evolution of the term beyond what others have described.  This meaning is 
further specified in the following chapter on methodology.  
 Layne also acknowledges the successes of U.S. grand strategy, 
continuing as it has to dominate the international system up to the present day, 
as well as recognizing that there is little reason to believe any other great power 
would behave differently under the same conditions.87 Indeed, this dissertation, 
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while arguing for the existence of both imagined and real exceptionalism in U.S. 
foreign relations, makes no counterfactual claim as to the preclusion or 
inevitability of how a state with a different culture might behave under similar 
conditions (as mentioned, it does argue that U.S. foreign relations are 
ideationally and culturally determined to a large degree). Rather than focusing on 
the failure of grand strategy since 1945 (which on the whole would be a 
precarious assertion), Layne's argument rests on the notion that preponderance 
is unsustainable.  
 While this dissertation embraces the unsustainability argument, it further 
argues that the United States has enjoyed preeminence since 1945 in spite of its 
more ambitious foreign policies, rather than because of them. The failure of the 
two case studies, two of the most ambitious foreign policies in modern history, 
brings this contention to the fore. In light of the success of the U.S. state on the 
whole since 1945, whether measured by demographics, GDP, or international 
appeal, it would be overly simplistic to characterize U.S. grand strategy since 
1945 as a failure, even while many of the most ambitious foreign entanglements 
have been. For in spite of the fact that the Chinese economy is steadily creeping 
up to the size of the American economy, the refrain "Someday I want to be an 
American" still rings truer to the aspiring developing-country emigrant than that of 
"Someday I want to be Chinese." The subsequent chapters seek to gain 
purchase on why the most prominent U.S. foreign policies keep failing, even                                                                                                                                                                      
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while the U.S. state flourishes. In the words of Richard Haas: "Given its 
considerable endowments and advantages, this country is clearly 
underperforming." 88  The interaction between the grand strategy of 
preponderance and the individual failed policies examined in the case studies is 
the central interchange of the dissertation.  
 The dissertation thus largely evades the Marxist and historical-materialist 
literature that predicts the demise of the 'American Empire' and assumes that 
'elites' have somehow hijacked the national interest to serve the material 
interests of the 'transnational capitalist class.' This is not the case: the ideational 
impulses described herein are not 'elite'-driven, but rather inherent in the self-
image of the American and thus the self-image of the American state. Some 
have attempted to compare or differentiate the dominance the United States 
wielded after the Second World War and after the Cold War to historical empires, 
previous pursuits of hegemony, imperialism, or prior world orders such as the 
Pax Britannica. Use of the term 'imperialism,' a somewhat subjective concept that 
tends to fall into too-often-normative literature that aims to label U.S. foreign 
policy as imperial in order to subsequently brand it immoral, provides some use 
here in terms of empirical research but little in the way of conclusions. For 
example, Kelly Denton-Borhaug examines in U.S. War-Culture, Sacrifice, and 
Salvation the "ineradicable link between sacrifice and war culture solidified in the 
rise of the nation state:" 
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Such a definition of religion connects with the thinking not only of 
ancient poets and statesmen (Juvenal wrote, 'Now we suffer the 
evils of a long peace. Luxury hatches terrors worse than wars'), but 
also modern philosophers and social scientists who have proposed 
that war is a positive way to maintain national health and communal 
purpose. Thus, Hegel: 'War has the higher meaning that through 
it... the ethical health of nations is maintained.' Likewise, Max 
Weber proposed that caritas and true loyalty to the nation-state 
requires the shedding of blood as a seal of the sanctity of this 
relationship. The death of the warrior achieves a 'consecrated 
meaning,' and confers dignity upon the coercive power of the state. 
The murky, yet deep-seated ties between war and religion are 
strong, enduring and as a result, largely invisible and outside the 
awareness of many, perhaps even most people.89 
 
 
The author investigates the nexus between the adoration of military service, 
sacrifice, and leadership and the development of national identity, a nexus 
perhaps more evident in the United States than any other industrialized nation on 
Earth—indeed, it is a common complaint among today's military members that 
civilians blindly "support the troops" while evading the responsibility to truly 
understand what it means to serve, as well as that of taking the time to learn 
about foreign policy in such a way as to vote with the balance of informed 
opinion.  
 American militarism is not only a perception but an empirical reality: 
Richard Ned Lebow notes that the United States has been the most aggressive 
state since 1945 when measured by war initiation.90 The subject of the ideational 
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discordance between the civilian's perception of American militarism and the 
soldier's experience in war has received increasing attention in the years since 
9/11, an era which has included America's longest-ever war in Afghanistan, a 
seemingly endless war in the war against terrorism, and the full 
professionalization of an active-duty military for the first time in American 
history—no draft now tempers the war enthusiasm of the civilian population 
absolved from the hardships of deployment. The civilian-soldier experience-
perception gap is compounded by the lack of politicians with a personal stake in 
the wars in which the nation is now engaged. At the height of the Iraq War, for 
example, there were a grand total of two children of U.S. Senators and House 
Representatives serving as enlisted soldiers.91  
 While the total amount of soldiers to have served in the wars since 9/11 
now numbers in the millions, the vast majority of Americans do not serve. This 
leaves civilians and Congressmen unable to conceive of the wars they 
perpetuate in real terms, relegated instead to imagining the war on terrorism and 
other conflicts in purely abstract terms. Retired Lieutenant Colonel William Astore 
describes what remains as "'Support our troops' as a substitute for thought," an 
oft-embraced characterization of the desultory nature of civilian understanding of 
war's purpose and drudgery in military literature.92 Astore attributes never-ending 
war as the "new normal" to this phenomenon, along with "defining the world as a 
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global battlefield," "threat inflation," and "the embrace of the national-security 
state by both major parties," all themes the case studies examine in detail. While 
the voice of the war-weary colonel or general (usually retired) has found 
increasing attention in scholarly and popular literature since 9/11, it also 
represents a rift in civil-military relations that dates back decades. In spite of the 
common perception that military leaders constantly push civilian leaders into war, 
quite the opposite is often the case, given that those who have experienced war 
understand its complexities and tragedies far better than the ordinary civilian or 
politician. Indeed, the story of Colin Powell's purpose in the Bush Administration, 
as well as the rift within the military over how many troops to send into Iraq, 
transcend this perception gap. Common sense did not prevail in 2003 because 
military and intelligence leaders were politicized, in contrast to their respective 
stated purposes as institutions.  
 While the model presented in this chapter indeed recognizes significant 
cultural influences as determining factors in the establishment of preponderance 
as the prevailing grand strategy alternative since 1945, it also concedes that 
culture cannot be measured in totality, but only in its particular recognizable 
manifestations as they codetermine national identity, national purpose, and thus 
grand-strategic preferences, along with many other factors. While the imperialist 
literature is not without some use, the more compelling arguments have been 
those that accept the unique traits of the American self-image and position in the 
world while acknowledging their similarities with the behavior of other great 
powers. For even if the voices of Kennedy, Krauthammer, and Schlesinger are 
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correct in assessing that U.S. postwar power, especially after the demise of the 
Soviet Union, was at least for a time unrivaled in history, so too are the voices 
(Kennedy still among them) that warn against assuming that such power can last 
forever. Layne's premise for shifting from preponderance to his preferred grand 
strategy of offshore balancing rests partially upon the impending decline in U.S. 
share of relative world GDP. Even those who are not 'declinists' must agree that 
share will diminish, if not relinquish preeminence, at some indefinite time in this 
century. And while there is no perfect consensus on the particularities of exactly 
how U.S. power has been deployed since 1945, the historical record and 
scholarly literature placing U.S. grand strategy in the sphere of preponderance is 
undeniable.  
  
The enduring American paradox  
 At the precipice of the American encounter with the world is an enduring 
paradox.  William Appleman Williams wrote in 1959, that "America's 
humanitarian urge to assist other people is undercut—perhaps even subverted—
by the way it goes about helping them."93 Williams described the 'Open Door' 
theme in the history of U.S. foreign relations as "America's version of the liberal 
policy of informal empire or free-trade imperialism."94 Part of his argument lay in 
the fact that Secretary of State John Hay's 'Open Door Notes' demanded free 
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access to China among the great powers just as the American frontier began to 
run out of room, providing fodder for the contention that the American way of life 
is codependent on expansion. According to the official history of the State 
Department, this "became the official U.S. policy toward the Far East in the first 
half of the 20th century."95 What Williams termed "imperial anticolonialism" was 
later expounded by Gaddis, who describes "the gap Americans had allowed to 
develop between aspirations and accomplishments. We had preached self-
determination but objected when others sought to practice it; we had proclaimed 
the virtues of economic freedom even as we sought to impose economic 
control."96 In the same essay, Gaddis also notes that "few historians would deny, 
today, that the United States did expect to dominate the international scene after 
World War II, and that it did so well before the Soviet Union emerged as a clear 
and present antagonist." 97  It likewise had no intention of capitulating that 
dominance when the Berlin Wall fell and it still has yet to do so. 
 Although cultural characteristics and ideational traditions are indeed "hard 
to pin down," in the words of Michael Hunt, to ignore them is to leave a seismic 
chasm in the space between grand strategy and our understanding of how it is 
settled upon with regard to the national interest, processed, and operationalized. 
Hunt makes his case for this lens of investigation:                                                         
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At the end I am no less aware of those difficulties and am 
thoroughly convinced of the truth of Gordon Craig’s observation of 
over a decade ago: ‘To establish the relationship between ideas 
and foreign policy is always a difficult task, and it is no accident that 
it has attracted so few historians.’ But the subject is too important to 
be left in a state of neglect like a surly invalid relative whose 
justified claims to attention we honor only infrequently and even 
then perfunctorily. [U.S. foreign-policy ideology] gained coherence 
and appeal in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and by the 
beginning of our century its elements had coalesced into a 
powerful, mutually reinforcing body of thought that had gone far 
toward dominating the thinking of those most concerned with 
foreign-policy issues. This strengthened since WWII. In accounting 
for the supposedly novel situation the United States has come to 
occupy, historians have focused their attention—almost invariably 
in narrowly drawn studies—on changes in strategic thinking, the 
needs of the economic system, elite interests and influence, the 
role of the presidency, the workings of bureaucratic politics, and the 
interaction of foreign policy with domestic politics. It is time that 
ideology, construed in broad historical terms, received its due.98 
 
 
Hunt's characterization of U.S. foreign-policy studies as appearing "almost 
invariably in narrowly drawn studies" that focus on singular, insular levels of 
analysis supports the direction and purpose of the dissertation. Furthermore, 
there is perhaps no state in the international system whose foreign relations are 
so inextricably tied to ideology than that of the United States. For regardless of 
the fact that it is often the common perception that the United States pursues 
aggressive foreign policies in the interest of the "bottom line," or oil, or for 
practical security considerations, the impact of ideology on the most ambitious 
foreign engagements since 1945 has been unmistakable. While it is far from 
singular in the creation of preponderance, the influence of militant liberalism has 
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been the most obvious ideational contributor to this grand strategy in the modern 
history of the United States. Paradoxically, the impulse to expand and the 
impulse to spread liberalism by punishing nonliberal states and welcoming liberal 
ones have contrasted with pervasive isolationist tendencies over the course of 
the previous two centuries. Colin Dueck has cleverly termed the statesmen 
perpetuating this paradox "reluctant crusaders:" 
 
Americans have often been “crusaders”—crusaders in the 
promotion of a more liberal international order. But Americans have 
also frequently been “reluctant”—reluctant to admit the full costs of 
promoting this liberal international vision. These two strains within 
the American foreign policy tradition have not only operated 
cyclically; they have operated simultaneously. In this sense, the 
history of American grand strategy is a history of “reluctant 
crusaders.” The Bush administration’s present difficulties in Iraq are 
therefore not an isolated event. Nor are they really the result of the 
president’s supposed preference for unilateralism. On the contrary, 
the administration’s difficulties in Iraq are actually the result of an 
excessive reliance on classically liberal or Wilsonian assumptions 
regarding foreign affairs.99  
 
What much of the relevant literature omits, and what Dueck astutely recognizes, 
is that the tug-of-war between militant liberalism and isolationism is not just 
manifested temporally, but in fact the two function "simultaneously." To be sure, 
there have been fits and starts of expansionism and isolation according to 
particular circumstances, events, and leaders, but never has either been wholly 
absent from the proceedings of U.S. foreign relations, even if the pendulum has 
been swinging far to the militant liberalism side since the total victories achieved 
in the Second World War. Dueck describes how the incorporation of "idealistic,                                                         
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expansive" components in American grand strategy interact with international 
conditions: 
 
Liberal assumptions encourage American officials to define 
American goals in unusually idealistic, expansive, and global terms. 
At the same time, the tradition of limited liability discourages 
Americans from making concrete sacrifices toward that liberal 
vision. The result tends to be that expansive goals are pursued by 
quite limited means. These twin cultural legacies also incline 
American grand strategy in opposite directions from international 
pressures. Whereas domestic cultural forces tend to constrain U.S. 
strategic behavior abroad, and pull it in a more “liberal” direction, 
international conditions tend to stimulate American involvement 
overseas, while forcing unwanted compromise on liberal principles. 
The result is a persistent tug of war between international 
pressures and U.S. strategic culture: a cyclical tension that drives 
the story of American strategic adjustment over time.100  
 
 While his point is that international conditions pull American liberalism in a 
nonliberal direction, he unwittingly exposes the dichotomy of American foreign 
relations. The paradox of militant liberalism also plays out on the international 
level: state-endogenous liberalism must by default engage in militancy because it 
is incapable of peaceful relations with nonliberal societies. At the same time, 
ideational national-security considerations often supersede liberal ones, as with 
the case of support for dictators that disavowed Communism during the Cold 
War. Thus international conditions can pull American foreign policy toward liberal 
or anti-liberal interventionism depending on the dictations of domestic political 
mandates. In other words, the "second image" works in forward and when 
"reversed," and neither American domestic politics nor American foreign relations                                                         
100 Dueck 2006, 5.  
 
  93 
can be understood in a vacuum. 101  The United States is, at its core, an 
international state. Nevertheless, it is also at its core ideationally self-contained. 
Thus, the ultimate grand-strategy paradox: Americans define themselves by what 
makes them American, yet define their purpose in the world by the extent to 
which they can engender that Americanism abroad. There can be no static 
perfection within this paradox; hence the plethora of scholarly terms attempting to 
define and describe this "liberal leviathan," or "benevolent hegemon," or "empire 
by invitation," or "reluctant crusader..." 
 Dueck identifies "nationalist, realist, progressive, and internationalist 
subcultures" that also operate in U.S. grand strategy, and in hypothesizing that 
the grand strategy of preponderance precipitates the recurrence of foreign-policy 
blunders, this dissertation does not mean to suggest that no contending 
approaches are present in U.S. grand strategy. But when the most powerful state 
in the international system makes slight adjustments, the impact on international 
relations is profound: the preeminence of American power means that even a 
foray into interventionism carries great consequences for itself, the target state, 
and international relations more broadly—the two case studies in question were 
monumental foreign-policy undertakings by any standard IR measure; yet, they 
hardly registered at home for those who were not directly affected by the conflict 
in comparison to what civilians directly caught in a war zone experience. The 
battle at home was always ideational—only the soldiers involved in the Vietnam 
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War and Iraq War experienced the conflict first-hand. But for the state intervened 
in, the stakes are always existential. When the Leviathan’s wake approaches the 
boat of the Lilliputian, its ripples will be felt long and wide.  
 In his study examining "the pathological beliefs of fear, honor, glory and 
hubris," Christopher Fettweis attributes the self-imposed responsibility to assert 
Americanism globally to "an inflated sense of the possible, overestimation of 
possibilities, and underestimation of cost."102 He describes the paradox of power: 
"A set of particular perils accompanies great strength that make blunders more 
likely as well as more consequential. The stronger a country gets, the more 
mistakes it seems to make. Great power also exacerbates the conditions that 
contribute to misperception." Thus he finds it unsurprising that "foreign policy 
blunders, both large and small, have been a constant feature of the modern 
presidency, from the Bay of Pigs through Vietnam to Iraq." 
 
Finally, observers of international politics have long understood that 
a paradox exists concerning threats and danger. While growing 
strength should make states feel safer and more secure, the 
opposite often occurs. The perception of threat tends to expand 
alongside power, leading strong states to recognize new dangers 
that they had not seen before. The stronger a country is, the more it 
fears, whether there is reason to or not. This paradox certainly 
affects the modern United States, which since the end of the 
Second World War has adopted the role of both the world’s premier 
power and its supreme worrier. It has consistently detected more 
danger in faraway corners of the world than any other country, 
including its closest allies. Washington could find little support for its 
contention that the vital interests of the West were at stake in 
Southeast Asia in the 1960s, for example, or in Central America                                                         
102 Christopher Fettweis, The Pathologies of Power: Fear, Honor, Glory, and Hubris in U.S. 
Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 187. 
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two decades later. The threat from international communism went 
away, but that heightened perception of threat lingered on: Since 
the end of the Cold War, fear has inspired a belief that the world is 
a fundamentally dangerous place, which led to the tragically 
unnecessary invasion of Iraq. Today, despite the fact that the 
United States faces no serious threats (a counterintuitive point that 
will be explained in the pages to come), post-Cold War US 
policymakers tend to see danger everywhere and are quick to act 
first and think—if at all— later.103 
 
After all, only one letter separates "worrier" from "warrior." In Promised Land, 
Crusader State, Walter McDougall divides U.S. grand strategy temporally 
between an "Old Testament" and a "New Testament." The Old Testament 
consisted of 1) liberty at home; 2) unilateralism abroad; 3) an American system of 
states; and 4) expansionism, while the New Testament consists of 1) progressive 
imperialism; 2) Wilsonianism; 3) containment; and 4) global meliorism, "or the 
belief that America has a responsibility to nurture democracy and economic 
growth around the world." 104 The initial set of guidelines were engineered to 
shape America domestically while preventing outside influence, while the new set 
of guidelines are designed to shape the rest of the world either in an American 
image or for America's benefit.  
 A distinction must be made here between shaping the world in an 
American image, which implies the spread of American values and institutions, 
and shaping it for American benefit, which implies no more than the pursuit of the 
national interest, which would not distinguish it from any other state pursuing its                                                         
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respective national interest. The objective of expanding Americanism and the 
objective of disproportionately affecting the international system to the point of 
domination must be considered as separate ambitions in U.S. grand strategy; 
that said, each features prominently in the history of U.S. foreign relations, and 
there is of course significant overlap between them. In giving his own take on the 
multitude of differing, often contradictory shifts in U.S. grand strategy over the 
centuries, McDougall offers a brief synopsis of the challenges in summarizing 
and characterizing in scholarly terms its tendencies and directions: 
 
Instead, historians invariably frame several categories in hopes of 
containing the mélange of words and deeds of our forebears. 
Thomas A. Bailey listed six "fundamental foreign policies," including 
isolation, freedom of the seas, the Monroe Doctrine, Pan-
Americanism, the Open Door, and peaceful settlement of disputes. 
Bradford Perkins thought material self-interest, republicanism, 
individualism, and popular sovereignty shaped our young nation's 
diplomacy. To Robert Ferrell, its three basic principles were 
independence, free trade, and continental expansion. To Cushing 
Stout, they were isolationism, republican expansion, and the setting 
of an example of freedom for others. Paul Varg identified two 
competing frameworks, one economic and the other ideological, but 
observed that in practice neither impulse blinded the Founding 
Fathers to the need for "a hard headed pragmatic approach." Felix 
Gilbert likewise traced the realist and idealist strains in U.S. 
diplomacy to the incentives that attracted colonists to America in 
the first place: the desire for economic betterment and the utopian 
dream of a better society. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., detected cycles in 
American history traced by the "warfare between realism and 
messianism, between experiment and destiny." Henry Kissinger 
saw abiding dualities between isolationism and globalism, idealism 
and power politics, while Michael Kammen called us a "people of 
paradox" who (at least "at our best") pursue "a politics of 'utopian 
pragmatism.'" Edward Weisbrand saw the U.S. foreign policy norms 
as self-determination, a feisty us-versus-them attitude toward the 
world, and a belief that war is justified only in self-defense. Finally 
(but the list could go on), Michael Hunt thought that three "core 
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ideas" shaped our foreign affairs: the quest for national greatness 
and liberty, belief in a strict racial hierarchy, and suspicion of 
revolutions in spite of our own revolutionary heritage. For an 
allegedly isolationist people, Americans seem to have a hearty 
appetite for foreign policy doctrines! As Eugene V. Rostow summed 
us up: "We embrace contradictory principles with equal fervor and 
cling to them with equal tenacity. Should our foreign policy be 
based on power or morality? Realism or idealism? Pragmatism or 
principle? Should its goals be the protection of interests or the 
promotion of values? Should we be nationalists or internationalists? 
Liberals or conservatives? We blithely answer, 'All of the above.'"105 
  
 
While over the course of the previous four centuries, "all of the above" seems an 
apt depiction, a certain set of assumptions, contentions, and objectives have 
solidified since 1945 that carry with them a potential to deleteriously affect the 
national interest; in fact, they seem to have done so. Reinhold Niebuhr observes 
in The Irony of American History, “If virtue becomes vice through some hidden 
defect in the virtue; if strength becomes weakness because of the vanity to which 
strength may prompt the mighty man or nation; if security is transmuted into 
insecurity because too much reliance is placed upon it; if wisdom becomes folly 
because it does not know its own limits—in all such cases the situation is 
ironic.”106 Niebuhr further delineates four distinct contradictions in the American 
personality: “The persistent sin of American Exceptionalism; the indecipherability 
of history; the false allure of simple solutions; and, finally, the imperative of 
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appreciating the limits of power." 107  The irony of American preponderance 
continues an age-old struggle for identity in the self-image of the American mind.  
 To summarize, the seven decades succeeding the most monumental 
foreign-policy accomplishment in U.S. history have produced a set of problematic 
foreign-policy assumptions uniquely emblematic of U.S. grand strategy: 1) The 
ideational, geographical (resource endowment), and historical traditions of 
American exceptionalism demand an exceptional foreign policy most expediently 
operationalized via a grand strategy of American preponderance; 2) the 
persistence of American preeminence signifies the success of the pursuit of 
American preponderance; 3) the extension of the U.S. security perimeter 
throughout the globe promotes U.S. interests overseas and defends the nation 
from attack, 4) maintaining overwhelming military force discourages revisionist 
powers from attempting to challenge U.S. authority; and 5) this overwhelming 
military force permits the discouragement or removal of hostile regimes and 
stability or installment of friendly regimes. The first four assumptions form the 
bedrock of the hypothesis; the fifth operationalizes the research question.  
 
The OPM 
 
 This dissertation asks why many of the most important U.S. foreign-policy 
campaigns have fallen short of their objectives or failed altogether since the 
Second World War. It hypothesizes that the pursuit of preponderance and the 
assumption that hard (coercive military) power can transform the politics of other 
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states precipitate and exacerbate U.S. foreign-policy blunders. The hypothesis 
posits that when policymakers overestimate the capacity of American power to 
transform the politics of other states, the likelihood of a foreign policy resulting in 
a blunder increases. It concomitantly hypothesizes that the prevailing grand 
strategy of American preponderance since the Second World War, despite 
sustained resistance from those advocating a more guarded foreign policy, 
precipitates the frequency and severity of foreign-policy blunders. (This two-part 
hypothesis is at times referred to individually and at times in plural; this signifies 
the same thing). As mentioned, the theoretical model is referred to as the OPM. 
To test the two hypotheses, the dissertation will contrast data collected 
illustrating what effect U.S. policymakers expected from the application of U.S. 
power in the preparation for a particular foreign-policy mission and the actual 
results of those interventions. The phrase transformation of foreign politics 
implies an effort by U.S. foreign policymakers to redesign the infrastructure of the 
political leadership and alliance distribution in the target state in a manner 
thought to be more favorable to U.S. interests.  
 The OPM is composed of four primary contentions. These contentions 
constitute the corresponding data Indicators attempting to establish inferences 
connecting U.S. foreign-policy blunders to the OPM. First, it presupposes that the 
modern thrust of American preponderance, beginning with the Second World 
War and continuing to the present, continues a cultural and ideological tradition 
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dating back to the founding of the nation.108 The budding postwar indoctrination 
of American preponderance perpetuated a foreign policy that justifies the pursuit 
of "monsters" via American exceptionalism and justifies American exceptionalism 
through the need to pursue those monsters. The prevailing status quo is an 
American military presence in virtually every corner of the globe that seeks to 
prevent the emergence of threats before they materialize, rather than responding 
to threats as they emerge. This produces an imperative of action in the mind of 
the U.S. foreign policymaker that assumes that with great power comes the 
capacity to transform the politics of other states via intervention.  
 Second, the OPM asserts that the eagerness on the part of U.S. foreign 
policymakers to dictate the conditions of the political leadership infrastructure of 
other states facilitates a corresponding overestimation of the capabilities of 
partner states and nonstate actors. As intervening foreign policies are paired with 
the domestic policies of local state or nonstate actors, an assumption of the 
applicable agency of U.S. power corresponds to an assumption of agency on the 
part of local partners. Eagerness to "have a dog in the fight" in areas of instability 
can lead to dismissal of concerns over the viability, popular support, and 
capabilities of available state and/or nonstate partners. This deficiency is 
prominently evident in the case studies. A state endowed with enormous relative 
power such as the United States is afforded the luxury of creating a grand 
strategy and imposing it, or attempting to impose it, on other states in the system. 
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However, the implementation of this grand strategy can find significant obstacles 
when interference in another state is part of the means to achieve these grand-
strategic ends. Furthermore, the emphasis on the holistic view of the international 
system and its balance of power, a view paralleled by IR scholarship, neglects 
tactical considerations relating to the implementation of grand strategy with 
regard to the capabilities of the partner state and the capabilities of hostile state 
or nonstate actors in the target state. Traditional IR's reluctance to look "within 
states" omits cultural differences between states that intervening militaries 
inevitably encounter. Each of the case studies exhibits many of the hallmarks of 
a great power employing the assumption that power innately contains the ability 
to rearrange and control the political composition of other states, as well as an 
inability to accurately detect and respond to micro-level, culturally sensitive 
issues during the course of intervention.  
 Third, the tendency to inflate the capabilities of partner governments and 
nonstate partners corresponds to an underestimation of the capabilities of 
adversaries in target states. Analyzing contentious politics in relative terms, an 
increase in the power of adversarial actors correlates directly with a decrease in 
the power of friendly actors, just as the inverse is true. Numerous scholars and 
policymakers point to "ungoverned spaces" as one of the primary threats to U.S. 
and allied national security. However, Anne Clunan and Harold Trinkunas 
contend that the term “ungoverned” is a misnomer, given that there is no 
populated area anywhere in the world that has no sense of hierarchy and no 
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sense of governance.109 For example, Afghanistan under the Taliban was not 
ungoverned; on the contrary, the Taliban imposed a strict set of laws and 
regulations over the population. In Vietnam and Iraq, while U.S. foreign 
policymakers did eventually recognize the persistence of hostile actors, they did 
so greatly underestimating their capacity to control and affect the local 
population, en exercise pivotal in the outcome of the conflict. Describing an area 
governed by a hostile actor as "ungoverned" misrepresents the nature of the 
threat by dismissing the roots of the hostile actor's regulatory imposition over the 
alternatively governed area.  
 Fourth, the OPM contends that U.S. foreign-policy blunders suffer from a 
scarcity of operational learning facilitated by substantial information biases in the 
collection of mission intelligence both in the decision-making stage and in the 
operational stage. This obstacle to efficacious decision-making reveals a 
discrepancy between strategic objectives, be they grand-strategic, theater-wide, 
or mission-specific, and tactical expedience. Many standard operating 
procedures are so maladaptive that updated versions of doctrinal manuals make 
few adjustments based on realities on the ground. For example, according to 
multiple military commanders, the 2014 version of the Army's counterinsurgency 
manual contained many of the same shortcomings and faulty assumptions as the 
2006 version.110  
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 The impulse to invent, inflate, or otherwise distort threats correlates to the 
impulse to dictate the terms of international relations by imagining a constant 
production of threats to the American way of life that only the United States can 
confront. This constant drive to crusade against the evils of the world develops 
into a bounded rationality of mission, in which the emphasis on crusading against 
threats transcends the nature of the threat itself, whereby the act of pursuing 
monsters becomes preeminent in the minds of policymakers and the actual 
threats facing the nation become diluted even as others are inflated. Threats are 
codified as existential even when they are not, and the response to them is 
therefore more comprehensive and militant than it would otherwise be. One is 
more reluctant to capitulate to an enemy that one has already labeled as 'evil.' In 
the words of George Kennan, "There seems to be a curious American tendency 
to search, at all times, for a single external center of evil, to which all our troubles 
can be attributed, rather than to recognize that there might be multiple sources of 
resistance to our purposes and undertakings, and that these sources might be 
relatively independent of each other.” 111  This bounded rationality of mission 
encapsulates misperceptions into policies in a way that prevents the accurate 
assessment of a foreign policy both before and after implementation.  
 One of the most prominent features of U.S. grand strategy over the course 
of the last seven decades has been the reliance on the outward projection of 
power rather than the utilization of power to respond to threats as they                                                         
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materialize. For U.S. foreign policymakers, this was the paramount lesson of the 
Second World War: we cannot wait for threats to reach our shores; we must 
confront them before that moment can arrive. From President Eisenhower to 
President Bush, this has remained unchanged for seven decades.112 While many 
assessed the 'Bush Doctrine' as a fundamental realignment of U.S. foreign 
policy, this is not an accurate assessment of American foreign relations. When 
President Bush warned, "The United States can no longer solely rely on a 
reactive foreign posture as we have in the past... We cannot let our enemies 
strike first," he mischaracterized the modern history of U.S. foreign policy.113 The 
'Bush doctrine' of 'preemptive strike' was merely a more explicit version of a long-
implicit grand strategy.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Methodology 
 
 
Eclectic scholarship is marked by three general features. First, it is 
consistent with an ethos of pragmatism in seeking engagement with 
the world of policy and practice, downplaying unresolvable 
metaphysical divides and presumptions of incommensurability and 
encouraging a conception of inquiry marked by practical 
engagement, inclusive dialogue, and a spirit of fallibilism. Second, it 
formulates problems that are wider in scope than the more narrowly 
delimited problems posed by adherents of research traditions; as 
such, eclectic inquiry takes on problems that more closely 
approximate the messiness and complexity of concrete dilemmas 
facing “real world” actors. Third, in exploring these problems, 
eclectic approaches offer complex causal stories that extricate, 
translate, and selectively recombine analytic components—most 
notably, causal mechanisms—from explanatory theories, models, 
and narratives embedded in competing research traditions.114 
 
Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil  
 
 
 This dissertation contains several distinct components, each representing 
a separate yet correlated section. Each section addresses in its own way the 
central research question of what factors have contributed to the presence and 
severity of U.S. foreign-policy blunders since the Second World War. This 
chapter forms a bridge between the first three chapters and the subsequent three 
chapters. Chapter 1 introduced the general problem of reoccurring blunders in 
U.S. foreign policy since the Second World War. Its corresponding 
methodological section here briefly discusses its significance to the research. 
Chapter 2 presented a sui generis framework for FPE. Its corresponding 
methodological section here frames the conceptual underpinnings of that                                                         
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World Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 40. 
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framework, enabling the case studies to be operationalized along conceptual-
data lines. Chapter 3 presented a theoretical model on why and how U.S. 
foreign-policy blunders have continued to reoccur since the Second World War. 
Its corresponding methodological section here operationalizes its assertions in 
order to set up the case studies in a hypothesis-testing format. The fourth and 
final section of this chapter relates that hypothesis-testing with what conclusions 
might be drawn from the collection of chapters in the dissertation as whole.  
 The FPE framework presented in Chapter 2 offers comprehensive, 
fungible standards for the evaluation of foreign policy, detailing the techniques 
and metrics involved in this process. This framework is designed to test the 
outcome, or what, of any given case study. Its primary purpose is to evaluate the 
effect of the case study on the national interest of any given state (in these cases 
the United States). The OPM presents assertions relating to factors it argues 
have contributed to the presence and severity of U.S. foreign-policy blunders 
since the Second World War. This theoretical model is designed to test the 
factors behind a case study's outcome, or the why and how of what caused the 
case study to end in blunder. The two case studies offer both the justification for 
the classification of blunder and an examination of its causes based on the OPM. 
Each case study chapter is thus divided into two parts: Part I processes the case 
study through the FPE framework; Part II processes the case study through the 
OPM. The following sections operationalize the research questions, assertions, 
and key terms presented in the first three chapters in order to define the research 
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agenda and construct a point of departure for the subsequent case study 
chapters.   
 
Methodological approach  
 
 The above quote by Katzenstein and Sil informs the basic philosophy of 
the research approach as one of "analytic eclecticism" in that it will value 
pragmatic functionality over paradigmatic parochialism. Arthur Stinchcombe 
asserts that one can effectively “borrow whatever works to build a theory for 
wherever one needs it” and that “the same advice can be applied to methods.”115 
In their metaphorical discussion of “Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics,” 
Gabriel Almond and Stephen Genco argue that “to progress scientifically, the 
social disciplines require their own philosophy of science trained on explanatory 
strategies, possibilities, and obligations appropriate to human and social 
reality.”116 In other words, human problems require a multidimensional approach 
that hard-scientific or excessively positivistic paradigms lack. As Valerie 
Hudson's research demonstrates, the human decision-maker is the interlocutor of 
the material/ideational intersection. Though this dissertation does not address 
comparative politics literature, as the research question examines U.S. foreign 
policy specifically, it will draw on the comparative method, defined by Lijphart as 
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“a method of discovering empirical relationships among variables,” a useful 
method given the multidimensional approach used.117  
 The case studies will employ a qualitative research design relying on 
primary and secondary sources. Archival research of official U.S. documents, 
such as national security statements, speeches, public transcripts, and memoirs 
of foreign policymaking officials, offers an accounting of what policymakers were 
thinking in terms of objectives, how they estimated the capacity of American 
power to transform foreign politics, and why they intended to intervene in each 
case. The case studies transcend temporal eras, thereby accounting for changes 
in public opinion, leadership, and other more transient variables. The general 
approach to data analysis will follow a process-tracing model that seeks to 
diagnose the course of a blunder from the origins of a decision through its 
incremental evolution and implementation. Process tracing, defined by Collier as 
“the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light 
of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator,”118 provides the 
most salient archetypal medium for examining how faulty decisions come to be 
made and implemented.  
 The dissertation will lightly incorporate IR (primarily realist) grand theory 
and policy precedents into the analysis of the impact of the assertions of the 
hypothesis on blunders in a way as to provide a harmony of consciousness, 
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neither “unconscious” nor “overconscious” in the classification of Giovanni Sartori 
in his dichotomous evasion of positivism and embrace of the researcher as “a 
man at work and aware of the assumptions and implications of whatever he is 
about.” 119  As a qualitative research design constructed to better understand 
human decision-makers, the approach will require substantial interpretation and 
data contextualization on the part of the researcher, whose job is to triangulate 
and situate the data in reference to the hypothesis and the overarching research 
objectives.  
 While there is some debate in IR over whether to focus on variables or 
cases in comparative analysis, as “variable-oriented studies mainly aim at 
establishing generalized relationships between variables, while case-oriented 
research seeks to understand complex units,” the approach here follows the 
assumption by Della Porta and Keating that “both approaches are legitimate.”120 
The aim is to understand both “complex units” and the correlation between 
variables. According to Luker, the purpose of social science methods is to 
develop “a set of guidelines about how to conceptualize and execute a 
systematic and rigorous intellectual inquiry into something that lets you get as 
close to the ‘truth’ as possible.”121 The ‘truth’ is best pursued not through the 
methodological myopia of “mastering esoteric facts or techniques, but in making                                                         
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connections across traditional boundaries—going wide rather than deep.”122 In 
selecting a number of methods and factors that crisscross various pieces of the 
foreign-policymaking puzzle, this research aims to go wide rather than deep. In 
doing so, it values an intuitive research process over paradigmatic formality, 
consistent with the general suggestion put forth by W. Phillips Shively. 123 In 
seeking richness, however, it does not attempt to evade the responsibility of 
rigor; each case study indeed requires a substantial direction of data and 
investigatory resources.   
 Elster reminds us that “the social sciences, like other empirical sciences, 
try to explain two sorts of phenomena, events and facts,” with a fact being merely 
“a temporal snapshot of a stream of events,” and an event representing a 
protracted course of action symbolic of widespread social phenomena.124 This 
dissertation seeks to explain a particular type of event, the foreign-policy blunder, 
by way of gathering a series of essential facts. The ultimate goal of this research 
is to establish causal mechanisms between the decision-making process of 
policymakers and U.S. foreign-policy blunders. While causal mechanisms “make 
no claim to generality” and are explanatory rather than invariably predictive, they 
nevertheless hold value in predicting the increased likelihood of an event given 
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certain conditions and circumstances, if not the occurrence of the event itself.125 
The difficulty and value in any description, explanation, or prediction vary 
depending on the question posed, and all three will be examined in this study. 
King, Keohane and Verba link the value of empirical research to the ability to 
extrapolate general inferences about a series of events or processes, thereby 
producing some amount of probabilistic explanatory power.126 By attempting to 
define and describe the conditions and grand-strategy assumptions that may 
lead to blunders in foreign policy, the dissertation thus means to produce an 
explanation of what factors increase the likelihood and severity of blunder in any 
given U.S. foreign policy. 
 The hypothesis posits that where American power to transform the politics 
of other states is overestimated, U.S. foreign policymakers will be more likely to 
overplay their hand and invite the possibility of a blunder. It concomitantly 
hypothesizes that the prevailing grand strategy of American preponderance since 
the Second World War, despite sustained resistance from those advocating a 
more guarded foreign policy, precipitates the frequency and severity of foreign-
policy blunders. The argument is therefore more geared toward descriptive 
probability than direct causation. The research design has been formulated with 
the purpose of understanding and explaining the conditions, calculations, and 
decision-making processes that increase the probability of the outcome of a 
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blunder. Blunders in U.S. foreign policy since WWII will constitute the dependent 
variable, with the Vietnam War and the Iraq War representing the case studies. 
The OPM will be operationalized based on four Indicators, assessed qualitatively, 
to examine the interaction between U.S. foreign-policy objectives and 
contentious local politics in the area of intervention. 
 The four OPM Indicators will be the following: first, in order to assess how 
U.S. foreign policymakers estimated the capacity of U.S. power to affect the 
politics of other states, secondary sources, doctrinal codes, policy statements, 
other official documents, and declassified materials will be examined in order to 
establish a picture of what that capacity was estimated to be. Second, the U.S. 
ability to control, bolster, and refine the partner/host state (the South Vietnamese 
government and the reconstituted Iraqi government after the invasion) will be 
assessed through an examination of process-tracing accounts. Third, the ability 
to limit the power and influence of local adversaries will be assessed through the 
evaluation of their capabilities throughout the course of the conflict. Fourth, policy 
rationalization and operational learning will be evaluated throughout the timespan 
of the foreign policy in question, offering a picture of how U.S. policies adapt to 
changing circumstances and new information, with the expectation that the 
pursuit of preponderance fueled the dismissal of relevant disconfirming feedback 
and the corresponding perpetuation of strategic blunder. 
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Discussion of the national interest 
 
 Chapters 2 and 3 refer to both the objective-realist interpretation of the 
national interest as relatively fixed and knowable and a more subjective 
interpretation of the national interest as somewhat more volatile and, to a certain 
degree, pliable. This dissertation accepts both perspectives; both have merit and 
both are operative in terms of this research design. The FPE framework 
presented in Chapter 2 presents metrics for objectively identifying the value of 
any given foreign policy. This value measures the cost and outcome of the policy 
with the objectives according to the national interest of the state. While the 
concept of the national interest has been molded, questioned, manipulated, and 
discarded ad nauseum according to the tendencies of any individual scholar, this 
research aims to utilize as objective a definition of the term as possible, which is 
not to say entirely objective; indeed, part of the OPM contends that it has been 
manipulated (by statesman and citizen alike) to fit the grand strategy of 
preponderance, which deviates from the actual national interest. At the same 
time, the actual national interest depends in part on the perceived national 
interest, and can therefore be determined by it to a certain extent. However, this 
determination has limits, and cannot completely break free from the confines of 
objective and/or enduring assumptions as to what the national interest consists of 
in terms of defining national identity and the purpose of a given state as it 
clashes with the international system. To lose our barometer in totality would 
preclude even a rudimentary understanding of how objectives in foreign policy 
interact with the process of their pursuit.  
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 Thus, it is incumbent upon the researcher in this case to not only 
distinguish between the perceived national interest and the more enduring, 
objective components of it, but also to investigate, describe, and interpret the 
interaction between one and the other. This task is positioned at a pivotal point in 
the research design. Without it, juxtaposing particular objectives nested within a 
specific foreign policy against the umbrella of grand-strategic objectives at the 
higher level of foreign-relations abstraction is rendered null. Because of this 
fundamental imperative, we take the time here to engage in what the term 
signifies. Nevertheless, while it occupies a position as an essential subject in the 
FPE process and the OPM model, the nuances of the term are not the subject of 
this dissertation, nor is this research in any way attempting to reinterpret or even 
interpret it for constructivist or otherwise 'subjectivist' ends.  
 Therefore, in order to circumvent the controversy surrounding the term's 
multifarious assimilations into divergent parochial hideouts of IR scholarship, this 
research uses the standard realist assumptions inherent in its implied 
significance in the process of evaluating it in relation to the three case studies as 
a point of departure. However, even accepting an obsessively standard definition 
of such a contentious term would require a circumstantiation of its connotations, 
a truncated iteration of which we turn to now. As Benjamin Frankel astutely 
summarizes, "The debate over what constitutes the national interest is as old as 
the nation-state itself.”127 This quite accurate assertion could be interpreted along                                                         
127 Benjamin Frankel, “Sans Exubérance: Pursuing the National Interest in the 1990s,” in In the 
National Interest: A National Interest Reader, ed. Benjamin Frankel (London, England: The 
National Interest, 1990), xi.  
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two axis points: what it does consist of, from an objective point of view, and what 
it ought to consist of, from a normative or evaluative point of view. One half 
cannot wander far from the other: realist and constructivist must meet 
somewhere in order to find enough common ground to inform the other of their 
fatuity. Their battleground is the policymaking sphere, even if that sphere ignores 
them both.  
 What is traditionally thought of to be the irreducible factor in comprising 
the national interest is the physical security of the nation-state, without which all 
matters of the state seem peripheral by comparison. When the enemy is at the 
gates, other internal exigencies of the state can wait. If there can be a corollary to 
accompany the existential security of the territorial nation-state at the most 
irreducible level, it would be the material capabilities in men, money, and 
munitions that can defend, purchase, or otherwise secure the borders from 
attack, in addition to expanding them whenever possible. If state security is the 
irreducible objective, then material capabilities represent the irreducible currency 
generally thought to be capable of facilitating that objective. For the typically 
parsimonious realist, then, the national interest can be determined in terms of 
strict power dynamics measured in the material capabilities of the state, the most 
common denominator in securing its borders and maintaining or expanding its 
power.  
 Hans J. Morgenthau, for example, describes the national interest as he 
described international relations in general, as a conduit through which relative 
power is to be pursued in international politics, employed in international conflict, 
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and perceived in international prestige. Morgenthau, Kissinger, and others of the 
realist IR canon chastise the liberal school of thought that attaches moral virtue 
and its dissemination to the development of an international society of states in 
favor of the realpolitik necessary in estimating and pursuing the existential 
necessities of national security, labeling Wilsonianism or liberalism or meliorism 
or other perceived trivial misadventures into the fantastical adolescent and 
providing a reminder to make choices based on thousands of years of empirical 
reality rather than a future-perfect chimerical imagination.128 
 In National Interest (1970), Joseph Frankel bifurcates the national interest 
literature between whom he terms 'objectivists' who focus on a relatively fixed 
national interest as an explanatory variable, assuming its traditional definition in 
understanding how it affects FPDM, and 'subjectivists' who imagine a malleable 
national interest that constantly fluctuates as it is molded by policymakers and 
altered by shifting public preferences.129 Constructivists unsurprisingly fall into 
the latter category, problematizing the abbreviated realist definition of the 
national interest just as they would other theoretical maxims of the paradigm. 
While a more objective picture of the national interest would rely on quantifiable 
measurements such as land mass, population size and demographics, weaponry 
(particularly nuclear weaponry after the advent of the nuclear age), geography, 
economic productivity, and financial reserves, subjective factors include regime 
type and stability, ideology, nationalism, alliance formation, cultural preferences,                                                         
128 Peter Pham, “What is the National Interest? Hans Morgenthau’s Realist Vision and American 
Foreign Policy,” American Foreign Policy Interests, No. 30: 256-265, 2008. 
 
129 Joseph Frankel, National Interest (Macmillan, 1970), 15-17. 
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religion, and national identity. Though the subjective factors might be thought of 
as more of a modern or critical interpretation, both categories have been 
examined by policymakers and scholars for centuries: consider Clausewitz and 
his admiration for armies abundant in morale, a quality whose measure eludes 
quantifiable exactitude. 
 Even at the latter stage of 1970 in the trajectory of IR as a scholarly field, 
Joseph Frankel stated simply, “Unfortunately the theories of international 
relations supply no clues for our search of the meaning of the national interest as 
a whole.”130 In much the same fashion as scholars have forsworn attempts at 
delineating what constitutes success and failure in foreign policy, IR has 
remained provincial on the subject of defining the national interest, limiting the 
development of the applicability of the term beyond the paradigm level. In calling 
for unification of a more sophisticated understanding of the concept across the 
field as a whole, Frankel implied that the problems preventing it up to the point of 
his publication could be surmounted by more precise scholarly phronesis.  
 The inevitability of this task has since been called into question. Scott 
Burchill shifts the focus from a unifying vision of the national interest to a survey 
of how each respective conventional (realism, liberalism), progressive (English 
School, constructivism) and critical (Marxism, feminism) approach conceptualizes 
the term. He concludes via a thorough investigation that the disambiguation of 
the term can only exist at the paradigm level or below, as the distinctions each 
makes in its ontological assumptions cannot transcend the epistemological on an                                                         
130 Frankel 1970, 27.  
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IR-wide scale.131 This and other works problematize the term to a reduction that 
can only serve parochially paradigmatic endeavors.  
 The purpose of discussing the fits and starts of the disambiguation of what 
it means when the national interest is applied to the analysis of foreign policy is 
not to show that an understanding of it is impossible—indeed, this dissertation 
assumes that it is possible—but rather to demonstrate that its most concrete 
definition may omit important variables that relate to what it is and how it can be 
changed by circumstances, events, leaders, and public preferences, as well as to 
acknowledge the extensive literature on the subject that challenges its generic 
definition. Taking these contributions into consideration produces the, heretofore 
mentioned, definition of the national interest: the collection of primary policy 
objectives commonly held to advance the relative power and prestige of the 
nation-state vis-à-vis other nation-states in the international system. The 
advancement of the national interest relies on the state constructing and 
pursuing achievable objectives by utilizing scarce foreign-policy resources to 
enhance the security and prosperity of the state. Power is conceptualized here 
as the military and political ability to achieve policy goals in foreign affairs, via 
coercion or otherwise (the common adage that 'power' signifies the ability to 
convince or coerce others to do what they would not otherwise do is relevant 
here).  
                                                        
131 Scott Burchill, The National Interest in International Relations Theory (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005).  
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 The evolution or devolution of that military and political power relates 
directly to the decisions foreign policymakers arrive at in the pursuit of the 
national interest. The term prestige is delineated concurrently with power to 
recognize and incorporate the significance of perception among other states in 
the system that strictly material political and military power definitions neglect. 
While military force and political coercion capabilities may be the point of 
departure for any discussion and estimation of one state’s power relative to 
another, the utility of military and political power cannot be defined in strictly 
quantitative terms in a globalized world containing far more liberal democracies 
than previous centuries. The extent to which states perceive another’s intentions 
must be integrated into the definition of power in order to account for balancing, 
threat perception, and other factors that relate to interstate relations, since they 
can enhance or restrict the utility of material capabilities. Indeed, Democratic 
Peace Theory comes as close to any theory as a law with IR; it relies heavily on 
the power of perception.  
 Thus the disambiguation of the term 'national interest' necessitates 
several questions: a) what does it consist of in general state terms; b) how is the 
national interest defined by the leaders of any given state; c) are states capable 
of pursuing a standard set of grand-strategic national-interest objectives over a 
period of decades and administrations; d) if so, do they in fact do so? The 
dissertation accepts the realist assumption that the national interest is, for the 
most part, knowable and relatively fixed, but rejects the assumption that it is 
given by default in material terms. It is generally knowable in the sense that it can 
  120 
be clearly defined (or clearly enough to study it scientifically), and relatively fixed 
in that what is beneficial to a state is unlikely to change drastically (or quickly) 
over the course of time and across varying administrations.  
 However, the extent to which the national interest can be manipulated is 
generally underestimated by realist doctrine. Indeed, the OPM presupposes that 
leaders either unwittingly or knowingly pursuing policies detrimental to the 
national interest much more often than is commonly assumed. This 
phenomenon, which problematizes the rational-choice approach to FPDM, 
suggests that ideological preferences, interest groups, sudden or slowly 
developing fits of national rage (9/11-Iraq War), or the tendencies of individual 
leaders can potentially mollify some of the more tangible foreign-policy inputs. 
This is not to suggest that realism advocates policies that harm the national 
interest—indeed, many realists opposed the Vietnam War, the Iraq War, and 
other blunders simply because of the perception that they violated realist doctrine 
and thus the national interest—but it does begin to disestablish the indefatigable 
fixation of what constitutes the national interest.  
 
Grand strategy  
  
 Grand strategy and the foreign policies it implements form a medium for 
the pursuit of the national interest. It envisions the national interest on the largest 
possible scale and codifies specific objectives thought to employ that national 
interest in the most effective (if not efficient) means possible. Conjuring up the 
particularities of grand strategy, a favorite novelty exercised by every presidential 
  121 
administration in the first months of office, is a relatively painless process. Grand 
strategy details lofty objectives, generalized threats, and simplified media for 
addressing threats and propounding the national interest. Along with specific 
foreign policies, it is for the most part presidential-driven. While Congress 
ultimately must sign off on the most costly foreign-policy programs, presidential 
direction has increasingly become the standard-bearer for foreign policy, 
especially given that the country has not declared war a single time since 
December 8, 1941. In the words of Christopher Fettweis: "Presidents are more 
than merely the most important actor in that process— they essentially run it 
single-handedly, making the most important decisions virtually free of 
interference from pesky outsiders such as the public or Congress. Although the 
founders of this country envisioned an active, perhaps even leading role for the 
legislative branch, over time the executive has essentially taken over the foreign 
affairs of the United States."132 While establishing the rhetoric to delineate grand 
strategy is a relatively painless process, its implementation rarely is, and the 
yawning fissure that can come about between the ideals of grand strategy and 
the muck of foreign policy invite blunder in many forms.  
 Documents describing grandiose grand-strategic ambitions thus tend to 
utilize magisterial elocution and idealized framing in the expression of defining 
the American purpose in the world. In practice, international relations play out in 
an extremely complex web of interconnected and constantly turbulent alliances, 
                                                        
132 Christopher Fettweis, Making Foreign Policy Decisions (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 2015), Kindle Edition, Kindle Locations 123-131. 
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rivalries, and unpredictable conditions. The picture-frame discourse that the 
average American is exposed to through the State of the Union Address, sound-
bite electoral campaigns, truncated press briefings, and simplified media reports 
present a Manichean worldview that mirrors both theory and policy in what 
Thomas Schelling has aptly described as "the retarded science of international 
strategy." Schelling's reminder that "pure conflict, in which the interests of two 
antagonists are completely opposed, is a special case" and therefore most 
strategic considerations are "not concerned with the efficient application of force, 
but with the exploitation of potential force" (emphasis in the original) calls into 
question the manner in which statesman and citizen alike tend to understand 
international conflict.133  
 Although Schelling's analysis addressed international conditions at the 
height of the Cold War, they remain as relevant today, as not much has changed 
in terms of the simplified nature of foreign-policy discourse, at least in the public 
arena. In reality, totalitarian conflicts in which the victor state utterly dominates a 
loser state, as was the case with the annihilation of regimes in Germany and 
Japan and the construction of new democratic states in their stead, disappeared 
from international conflict almost entirely (at least among the great powers) at the 
close of those hostilities. However, U.S. grand strategy remains focused on 
conflict in these terms and has shifted only partially in applying force against 
Islamist fundamentalism, continuing as it does to rely on the terms of conflict 
similar to those of the Second World War. Conceiving of conflict in these terms                                                         
133 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1960), 4. 
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has severely stunted the ability to confront adversaries that do not fit that mold, 
Vietnamese guerillas and Islamist fundamentalists chief among them.  
 A more realistic objective in international relations is represented by what 
Herbert Simon has termed 'satisficing,' a portmanteau of 'satisfying' and 
'sufficing,' in which the frailty of human cognition limits its capacity to process 
even a rudimentary series of interconnected events and conditions, thereby 
devolving cognitive decision-making duties to the pursuit of satisficing in place of 
satisfaction.134 If the ultimate goal of any state is 'maximizing the utility function' 
of its relative power and capacity vis-à-vis other states, recognizing this bounded 
rationality is essential in constructing and employing theories and policies that 
accept the presupposition of this satisficing. This cognitive limitation parallels the 
practical limitations of attempting to implement policies in search of grand-
strategic objectives in the chaotic bedlam of international relations—even the 
most adept statesmen are subject to the anarchy of the international chessboard. 
Human frailty and international anarchy are two phenomena often cited by realist 
theory to constrain the extent to which a state should be willing to become 
embroiled in international conflict. However, this admonition has been largely 
ignored by U.S. policymakers for seven decades. The assumption that power 
equates to the capacity to control the politics of other states comes about at the 
expense of an accurate understanding of the fungibility of international power 
itself.  
                                                        
134 Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon, "The Logic Theory Machine: A Complex Information 
Processing System," IRE Transactions on Information Theory, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1956), 61-79. 
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 The work of Simon and Schelling illustrates the mercurial nature of the 
outcome of the national interest and its classification as successful, unsuccessful 
or, more than likely, mixed-outcome, as they relate to the objectives of the state. 
But before the national interest is ever pursued, a state must capture, define, and 
disseminate its meaning, and this is a process unto itself, especially in a large, 
power-decentralized state such as the United States. The process of defining the 
national interest is beholden to a number of bureaucratic, interest-group, 
groupthink, and political pressures. When Kissinger says of pursuing the goals of 
the national interest that "whether these goals are desirable is relatively less 
crucial" than leaders' "ability to realize their goals," he describes a FPDM 
environment in which the arts of consensus and implementation often take 
precedent over the science of what the national interest actually consists of. 
Research by Daniel Drezner suggests a differentiation between bureaucratic 
institutions that are insulated from others and those that are embedded in larger 
institutions.135 Those that are embedded have less of a chance of influencing 
foreign policymaking through the maintenance of their original mission, while 
more insulated institutions can stand a better chance of holding onto their original 
mission purpose, but are less able to wield influence in the formulation of foreign 
policy. 
 Not only are domestic-institutional and international-structural constraints 
ubiquitous in the chambers of power, but once a particular policy problem 
                                                        
135 Daniel Drezner, “Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy,” American 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 4 (October 2000), 733-749.  
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reaches the upper-echelon decision-making group, which typically consists of 
only a dozen or fewer leaders, there still remains a great deal of decision-making 
to hash out. 136  A number of studies examine this most intimate of conflict 
definition and response processes, Irving Janis' concept "groupthink" chief 
among them.137 Janis' 1972 classic describes a process whereby members of 
policymaking leadership circles value membership in the group over the purpose 
of the group to the extent that group members undermine personal doubts to 
avoid dissention and demonize both internal dissenters and external 
adversaries. 138  Graham Allison’s 1971 Essence of Decision: Explaining the 
Cuban Missile Crisis presciently explores the complexity of FPDM, a work whose 
title takes inspiration from President John F. Kennedy’s quote, “The essence of 
ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer—often, indeed, to the 
decider himself.” Allison contrasts the “rational actor” model alongside his 
alternative “organizational behavior” and “governmental politics” models, given 
that the rationalist model by default relies on an omission of key facts.139 Rather 
than normatively assessing varying approaches, Allison demonstrates that 
different analytical lenses inevitably transpose differing facts according to their 
                                                        
136 Valerie Hudson describes a high-level decision-making circle in which there are fewer than a 
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own theoretical assumptions, thereby ambiguating the process of studying FPDM 
depending on the approach utilized.  
 These studies highlight that even at the late stage of high-level FPDM, 
foreign-policy outputs can still be affected to a substantial degree by FPDM 
leaders and the dynamics of their small groups. Even considering the domestic-
institutional and international-structural confines of their area of decision-making 
operation, there is still much to be formulated in terms of the national interest as 
it relates to a particular policy issue. Furthermore, foreign policymakers 
sometimes do stray from those institutional and structural confines, for a whole 
variety of reasons. Taken together, the pressures of defining the national interest, 
developing a consensus, and implementing a particular policy leaves a number 
of vulnerable decision-making fulcra that may fall victim to any number of highly 
unpredictable problems.  
 The OPM contends that U.S. foreign-policy blunders exhibit predictable 
signs of vulnerability and decision-making error at each of these fulcra. By 
pursuing a grand strategy of preponderance, U.S. foreign policymakers seek out 
conflict rather than avoiding it, thereby exposing the state to a host of threats that 
are not existential to the national security of the state. By assuming that power 
inherently contains the ability to dictate the politics of other states, they 
miscalculate the utility and applicable limits of power. And by focusing on the 
ideational motivations for conflict, they conflate hard power and political power as 
well as conflating universal human (liberal) assumptions and the cultural 
dynamics of individual conflicts in areas of intervention. By incorporating 
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simplified platitudes into grand strategy and projecting them in the process of 
intervention, foreign policymakers by default muddle the preferences of local 
citizens and political actors in the target area. When the Vice President proclaims 
that American invaders of a Muslim country "will be greeted as liberators," he 
falls victim to this exact blunder-inducing assumption.   
 The extent to which the intervening state can affect and control local 
political dynamics is operationalized via the phrase transformation of the politics 
of other states through intervention by way of either a) destruction of the existing 
political power structure through regime change and replacement with a new 
regime or b) bolstering the extant regime to render it capable of protecting its 
citizens, maintain support of its population through legitimate rule, and advance 
the national interests of the intervening state. The phrase implies an effort by 
U.S. foreign policymakers to redesign the infrastructure of the political leadership 
and alliance distribution in the target state in a manner thought to be more 
favorable to U.S. interests. This dissertation seeks to assess how U.S. foreign 
policymakers estimated the ability of the United States to transform the politics of 
other states against what that ability was in reality in the case of the two foreign-
policy blunder case studies. This phrase signifies a number of specific 
implications in relation to the OPM.  
 First, the OPM contends that the United States has been hypersensitive in 
the perception of overseas threats to the point of gross exaggeration of those 
threats. This perception correlates with an impulse to act decisively to disable the 
threat before it can metastasize into American allies or onto American shores. 
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One of the media for this phenomenon is the manifestation of disapproved states 
as threatening states in the discourse of U.S. foreign policy. The bridge from 
characterizing a state or its regime as unfortunate to characterizing it as a threat 
seems to be more accessible in the United States than in any other state in the 
international system. While this may be partially determined by the enormous 
resource endowment of the United States as the world's greatest power, the 
OPM makes no contention that the hyper-aggression of the United States is due 
entirely to its disproportionate share of the international balance of power. It does 
contend that this enables an aggressive foreign policy, but does not accept that it 
is its primary driver. Instead, U.S. foreign policymakers have displayed an 
eagerness to characterize an unfavorable regime as a threat and subsequently 
characterize the United States as the only state with the will and ability to initiate 
a resolution to the threat via intervention. In some cases, this cannot be done 
through a negotiation or simply partnering with a faction within the country, but 
requires a destruction and reconstruction of the state itself.   
 This necessity of action is thereby judged by U.S. policymakers to require 
a rearrangement of local power dynamics that cannot be achieved through the 
extant institutions of the state. This is either because a) there may be a friendly 
state but that state is insufficient to achieve U.S. objectives or b) hostile actors 
are either threatening the state or in control of the state. It is the policy of every 
state to support friendly states and oppose threatening ones. But the United 
States has taken on a preponderant role as the caretaker of Western liberal 
capitalism and opposer of states unwilling to yield to that "new world order." By 
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virtue of the classification of regime type as inherently threatening when 
nondemocratic, the United States has precluded the ability to partner with 
nondemocratic governments even when it is in the national interest of the United 
States to do so.  
 By the same token, it has also disobeyed this self-imposed dictation by 
also partnering with tyrants when it is perceived to be in the national interest. The 
Cold War witnessed this hypocrisy on a monumental scale, as the United States 
eschewed both democracy and human rights with respect to regimes and leaders 
willing to oppose Communism. The U.S. decision to abide by Democratic Peace 
Theory only selectively not only signals to potential democracies that they may in 
fact not enjoy the support of the United States in the future but also signifies to 
nondemocratic adversaries that this schizophrenic application of foreign policy 
undermines the basic tenets of rational-choice theory and therefore the 
foundations of deterrence, that most sacred of implied international safeguards.  
 Second, U.S. foreign policymakers assume that the United States wields 
the power, whether military or political or a combination of both, to control the 
state or area in question in such a way as to effectively dominate its political and 
military institutions and other institutions and duties of the state, either through 
proxy or by invasion. This implication directly addresses the central research 
question. Can one state, especially if granted an abundance of power, control the 
political dynamics of another through intervention? U.S. foreign policymakers 
have foreseen the possibility to transform other states in an American likeness 
since successfully accomplishing that task during the immediate aftermath of the 
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Second World War. But the success of reconstructing postwar Germany and 
Japan has not been met in other places, specifically states without the same 
traditions of a robust, functional, democratic state, reverence toward state 
institutions, a commanding sense of solidarity among citizens, virtually no 
language, religious, or sectarian fault lines, and an extraordinary level of 
productivity, education, health, and standard of living.   
 If the 'greatest generation' found glory in conquering Imperial Japan and 
Nazi Germany, the two subsequent generations it spawned have spearheaded a 
new American adventurism that has been met with mixed results. A further 
discrepancy between the Second World War and the Korean, Vietnam, Persian 
Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Wars is that they were simply enacted in policy and 
enshrined in memory as policing actions against hostile actors in protection of the 
friendly populations of each state. The United States has not declared war on 
another state since the last time its people were physically threatened at Pearl 
Harbor (with the exception of the 9/11 attacks, which provoked two U.S. wars but 
no declaration). This is partly due to the fact that the Executive Branch has 
sequestered much of the FPDM involved in initiating foreign conflict, but also to 
the way in which Americans have come to accept war as an everlasting feature 
of American foreign relations. The isolationist United States of the interwar period 
metamorphosed in the trial by fire of the Second World War into a permanent 
monster-slaying crusader whose dyspathetic tentacles detect danger at every 
corner of the globe. The assumption that the United States can transform other 
states to induce its own security continues to inform its grand strategy.  
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 It is further assumed that with the support of the United States, the local 
partner state, whether extant or created via intervention, can sufficiently perform 
its domestic duties of statehood in addition to advancing the national interests of 
the United States, and that the national-security considerations of the policy 
problem are such that the need to act is absolute and the risks of inaction are too 
great for it to be considered a viable alternative. To reiterate, the OPM presents 
assertions relating to factors it argues have contributed to the presence and 
severity of U.S. foreign-policy blunders since the Second World War. This 
theoretical model is designed to test the factors behind a case study's FPDM 
development and outcome, or the why and how of what caused the case study to 
end in blunder. It hypothesizes that when U.S. policymakers overestimate the 
capacity of American power to transform the politics of other states, the likelihood 
of a foreign policy resulting in a blunder increases. It concomitantly hypothesizes 
that the prevailing grand strategy of American preponderance since the Second 
World War precipitates the frequency and severity of foreign policy blunders.  
 
Indicators  
 
Indicator I. How U.S. foreign policymakers estimated U.S. power to affect the  
 politics of other states 
  
 This Indicator tests to what degree U.S. policymakers believed they could 
affect the politics of the state in question. It can begin to be ascertained through 
public and internal statements made by policymakers at the highest levels of 
government, most notably the president and his upper-echelon administration 
officials and advisors. If U.S. foreign policymakers are exaggerating the ability of 
  132 
U.S. political and military power to transform the politics of other states, that 
estimation will contrast with the local effects of intervention. High-level FPDM 
figures are especially important in understanding the larger picture in foreign 
policy because they set the tone for the discussion of a particular issue, wield the 
largest television audiences, receive the most attention in the press, and are 
charged with setting foreign affairs and leadership of the military institutions of 
the state. Statements by Congressmen, transcripts from Congressional hearings, 
and public speeches and declarations of policies by members of the Senate and 
House of Representatives offer a further glimpse into the zeitgeist of the 
American public, as these individuals are constantly campaigning and tend to 
rely on their seat for well-being, unlike the president and his officials who tend to 
find wealth and fortune through books, speeches, and other similar avenues. 
Public opinion polls offer a picture of how the average person views a particular 
issue, but are sometimes subject to dramatic change over short periods of time, 
and are thus more useful in charting that change rather than providing a 
snapshot at an exact moment in time.  
 Gauging the confidence level of the political and military leaders of the 
state can best be understood by an examination of the statements and 
documents involved with a particular issue. For example, if policymakers spend a 
majority of their time discussing what ought to be done with respect to a given 
country or a particular issue, rather than if anything ought to be done at all, this 
type of language implies that the state does indeed wield the power to affect that 
particular issue in a transformative fashion. Correspondingly, if policymakers 
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spend much of the time discussing an issue in terms of how to implement an 
intervention rather than observing and estimating the perceived power and 
tangible capabilities of adversaries in the area of intervention, we can assume 
that the potential threat from local adversaries is estimated to be quite low. 
Furthermore, policymakers often make such statements outright, such as 
characterizing the military or political threat of a foreign adversary as minimal 
(this oft-invoked tool for mitigating the concerns of war-wary citizens ironically 
contrasts with the inflation of the threat of the adversary, a phenomenon evident 
in each of the two case studies—if the enemy can be so easily defeated, why 
should the citizen be concerned about the threat it poses?) Officials often find a 
clear explanation for this paradox evasive, and thus their explanations can often 
confound the public, especially in the aftermath of the conflict, when the "rally 
around the flag" effect subsides.  
 
Indicators II and III. The U.S. ability to control, bolster, and refine the partner/host 
 state; the ability to limit the power and influence of local adversaries 
  
 Successful intervention requires either an infusion of resources to a 
friendly extant state or removal of a hostile extant state and installation of a new 
state. Therefore, the success of an intervention is inextricably tied to the ability of 
the new or bolstered state to perform its duties in two critical areas: the 
monopolization of violence, by way of protecting its citizens, and maintenance of 
support among the population, through which it claims its legitimate mandate to 
govern. Indeed, these are the two most fundamental functions of any state. 
These two Indicators will be assessed through an examination of the strength 
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and legitimacy of the partner state throughout the course of the intervention. If 
the intervention succeeds in sufficiently propping up the partner state to the 
extent that it can protect its people and establish legitimacy, the objectives of the 
intervention as related to the national interest of the intervening state are more 
likely to be met. Without a functioning state, the intervening state is unlikely to 
achieve its objectives, since there is no medium through which to advance its 
national interests. Likewise, the extent to which the power and influence of local 
adversaries can be reduced or eliminated corresponds to the ability to prop up 
the allied regime.  
 
Indicator IV. Operational learning and policy justification 
 
 This Indicator will be examined along two dimensions. Vertically (in terms 
of the FPDM hierarchy), it examines feedback integrity from the lowest tactical-
operational environment up through the highest levels of FPDM. Horizontally (on 
the FPDM-implementation-feedback-messaging spectrum), it examines 
rationalization/justification integrity as intervention policy is debated and settled 
upon internally and then framed and messaged first privately within government 
and then publicly to the American people. Feedback integrity and 
rationalization/justification integrity are evaluated across the timespan of the 
conflict in order to gauge the coherence and transparency of the policy and the 
justification for its investment in political, financial, and military resources. Jervis 
reminds us that "decision makers are faced with a large number of competing 
values, highly complex situations, and very ambiguous information, and therefore 
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the possibilities and reasons for misperceptions and disagreements are 
legion."140 This is true even in the absence of information-processing biases. 
When these biases are present because of already extant ideational preferences, 
they become compounded as the reality, the policy as it relates to the national 
interest, and the message are processed through the FPDM chain. Stephen 
Walt’s tweak on neorealist theory to juxtapose balance of threat with balance of 
power yields utility here as well in presenting perception as a crucial medium of 
interaction that complements the speed and timing of the hard power 
pendulum.141 
 
Case studies  
 
 Each case study chapter is divided into two parts. Part I processes the 
case study through the FPE framework. Part II processes the case study through 
the OPM. The case studies were chosen because they are all considered 
quintessential blunders by the definition given in Chapter 2. This does not excuse 
the researcher from presenting the codification behind that classification, which is 
delineated in Part I in each of the case studies. The central research question 
poses an inquiry about the problem of recurrent blunders in U.S. foreign policy 
since the Second World War. Virtually every one of the largest foreign-policy 
campaigns it has pursued since that event has fallen short of its objectives. It 
thus follows that the most grandiose in ambition and severe in result should                                                         
140 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton University 
Press, 1976), 31. 
 
141 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 
Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring 1985), 3-43. 
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constitute the case studies of that research question. While the potential criticism 
that pursuing such a mountain of data across two gargantuan events in U.S. 
foreign-policy history may leave the research a mile wide but an inch thin is 
understandable, the justification for the research design is clear. Every research 
agenda depends on the nature of the research question. The research question 
posed here addresses a holistic problem in U.S. foreign policy over the course of 
seven decades. It must, therefore, cover the most significant foreign-policy 
events over that time period. It is far from coincidental that these events are 
classified as blunders. This is precisely the purpose of the research.   
 While many a dissertation can claim to conjure up mastery of obscure 
subject matter unlikely to ever reach the audience of the layperson, this research 
purposively explores a holistic topic relevant to the average citizen and presents 
it in a clear and concise manner that the average person can understand. This is 
not to argue that an erudite exploration detailing the ancient mating rituals of the 
extinct peoples of the central Amazon basin has no epistemological significance 
for the general public. But it is a fundamental objective of this research to 
address the 'theory-policy gap' by 'asking big questions and giving simple 
answers.' It is the hope and expectation of this research that it will not only 
facilitate future research on FPE and FPDM but also engender a better 
understanding of why U.S. foreign-policy blunders have continued to occur in 
such magnitude since the Second World War and why virtually every major 
campaign since that event has fallen short of its objectives. As this is a qualitative 
research design, its vehicle for success relies on a triangulation of a multitude of 
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documents in concert with one another. It is not enough to understand each 
research question, chapter, section, or document ad hoc. The rigor of the 
research design will be measured by the ability of the researcher to organize and 
interpret the substantial data of each case study in line with the research 
questions, hypotheses, and Indicators.   
 
Data collection and interpretation  
 
 The research follows a qualitative research design that is designed to 
establish a correlation between foreign-policy inputs and foreign-policy 
outcomes. It seeks to establish links between the presence of positively identified 
OPM Indicators and the presence and severity of U.S. foreign-policy blunders. It 
is not meant to demonstrate direct causation, but rather to establish that blunders 
may be more probable and possibly severe the more heavily U.S. foreign policy 
is influenced by the OPM. The OPM may be present in interventions that end 
successfully, and if this were shown, it would not necessarily disprove the model. 
The primary method of inquiry will be the examination of secondary sources. The 
case studies are expansive and their sources of reference ample. Given that 
there are many years of research having already been conducted for each of the 
case studies, there is an enormous amount of data available for each of them. 
This dissertation's purpose is therefore not to produce new data, but to detect, 
compile, organize, triangulate, and interpret extant data in a new way to answer 
new questions. Secondary sources will be comprised primarily of scholarly 
origination but will also include some works by journalists and other nonscholarly 
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researchers with intimate knowledge of and/or extensive data collection on a 
particular subject.  
 While innumerable works have been published that relate to the subject 
matter, there is sometimes no substitute for the original words of the FPDM 
source. Documents related to the exact words of internal discussions among 
high-level foreign policymakers can fall into two categories: transcripts or audio 
files of informal conversations between foreign policymakers, which offer a 
glimpse into the development of how a particular policy problem is detected, 
interpreted, and understood, and formal memos and meetings drafted and 
conducted in a formal setting in which foreign policymakers are being briefed, 
informed, or advised on a particular topic. This raw record of FPDM thought 
processes, unfiltered by speechwriters, journalists, or scholars, provides an 
unadulterated account of a policy problem before it ever reaches the public 
arena. Declassified documents number in the thousands for the Vietnam War 
and are too many to examine individually. In the case of the Iraq War, there are 
fewer documents of this kind available, but still many of essential value. This data 
will therefore be utilized on an individual basis in order to substantiate the data 
from secondary sources. It is also particularly useful for testing Indicator IV, 
which charts the course of a conflict's justification and how information from the 
target environment is processed up the chain of command.  
 Despite the fact that these original sources of FPDM can shed substantial 
light on how a policy problem is detected, processed, an responded to, the 
argument will be made throughout the two case studies that the true motivations 
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for foreign policy are not hidden away in some secret government closet, but are 
very much available to the average citizen, whether that citizen be policy-
attentive or policy-oscitant, through the proliferation of public statements with 
regard to a particular issue. In other words, preponderance is an open secret, it is 
fundamentally national in nature, and there is no need to conceal its tenets from 
the public because the public generally accepts them. What is expected to be 
uncovered in the case studies is the intricacy with which subterfuge is employed 
against the public because FPDM leaders are aware of the fallacy of a given 
foreign policy but neither wish to be blamed for its failure nor possess more 
favorable alternatives and thus harbor the facts with which the public might more 
quickly come to the realization that a blunder is in fact occurring (which it 
inevitably will, if indeed a blunder is occurring—but for the foreign policymaker, 
they would ideally come to this conclusion upon termination of their time in 
office).  
 An array of declassified data centers provide the researcher with 
countless media for understanding how foreign policymakers operate and how 
decisions are made. Among the largest collections of declassified documents on 
U.S. foreign policy are the following: The Foreign Relations of the United States 
(FRUS) series, publishing an assortment of documents from 1861 to the late 
1970's relating to multiple agencies overseen by the Office of the Historian of the 
U.S. State Department; the Digital National Security Archives maintained by 
George Washington University, which secures and stores declassified materials 
in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act; the National Archives, much 
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of which is now digitized; the Declassified Documents Reference System, 
providing declassified documents from 1941 onward; the Center for the Study of 
Intelligence releases, published by the Central Intelligence Agency; and the Cold 
War International History Project digital archive, which houses declassified 
documents from the former Soviet Union.142 These data reserves are in addition 
to publicly available Congressional hearing transcripts, leaked documents such 
as the Pentagon Papers, leaking websites such as Wikileaks, the Public Papers 
of the Presidents series, which contains many speeches, press conferences, and 
other official statements of U.S. policy, and memoirs of presidents and other 
high-ranking officials. The CIA also fully released its official history in digital 
format in January 2016. In short, given that each of the three case studies began 
many years ago, a plethora of sources are available documenting primary 
sources of foreign policymaking. Nevertheless, secondary sources will constitute 
the primary medium of investigation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
142 David Gibbs, "Guide to Using Declassified Documents," University of Arizona, 
http://dgibbs.faculty.arizona.edu/guide_using_declassified_documents 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Strategic-Tactical Blunder of the Vietnam War  
 
 
It became necessary to destroy the town in order to save it.143 
 
U.S. Army Major to reporter Peter Arnett regarding the town of Ben 
Tre, February 7, 1968 
 
 
Criteria by which to measure the war have been hard to come 
by.144 
 
Henry Kissinger 
 
 
 
Part I. FPE 
 
 The Vietnam War is the classic example of the foreign-policy blunder in 
U.S. history. Its development therefore offers a unique set of FPDM tensions, 
events, and circumstances with which to evaluate the policy in relation to U.S. 
grand strategy more broadly, in addition to offering a large data set from which to 
examine the errors that led to problematic FPDM and an unfavorable foreign-
policy outcome. As we are four decades removed from the unsuccessful 
termination of the conflict, we can draw upon a number of elongated studies, 
historical accounts, military transcripts, and declassified documents to gain a full 
                                                        
143 A U.S. Army Major made this comment to reporter Peter Arnett as they surveyed the 
destruction of Ben Tre after the Tet Offensive on February 7, 1968. 1,000 civilians died in the 
fighting in the town that now claims a population of 114,000. A large billboard there now 
proclaims, "10,000 years to the glorious Communist Party of Vietnam," accompanied by a 
memorial to Viet Cong "martyrs" that died in the battle. Quote and statistics from James Pringle, 
"Meanwhile: The Quiet Town Where the Vietnam War Began," The New York Times, March 23, 
2004. 
 
144 Henry Kissinger, "The Viet Nam Negotiations," Foreign Affairs Vol. 47, No. 2 (January 1969) in 
The United States and the Vietnam War Series: Leadership and Diplomacy in the Vietnam War, 
ed. Walter Hixson (New York: Garland Publishing, 2000), 309. 
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picture of the process of the blunder's proceedings. How and why did U.S. 
foreign policymakers initiate, escalate, and perpetuate the war in Vietnam? Why 
did the status quo policy continue even after policymakers became aware of a 
steady flow of disconfirming information rendering the policy fruitless, and how 
did they rationalize this failed policy unto themselves and to the general public 
over such a long period of time? What did U.S. policymakers estimate the 
capacity of American power to transform Vietnamese political and security 
conditions to be, and how did this play out over the course of the war? How did 
the American presence in the country affect the ability of local partners (the 
governmental leadership of South Vietnam) and adversaries (North Vietnam and 
the National Liberation Front or Viet Cong)? This chapter addresses these and 
other questions in the first of three case studies. It first evaluates the blunder 
through the five criteria of the FPE metrics presented in Chapter 2. It then 
analyzes it through the four Indicators of the OPM presented in Chapter 3.  
 The Vietnam War exemplifies the strategic-tactical gap in U.S. grand 
strategy in the most lucid terms: in a country with little strategic value, great 
human, financial, political, and military resources were expended in a failed 
campaign to prevent the country from "falling," or being "lost," in official U.S. 
foreign-policy terminology, to Communism. U.S. foreign policymakers never fully 
recognized the cultural conditions in the country that united to complicate the war 
effort, relying instead on superior technical capability and firepower to eliminate 
the individuals involved in the South's insurgency rather than adequately 
addressing or relinquishing to the political conditions that problematized 
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intervention at every stage. As more U.S. troops poured into the country, more 
North Vietnam Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) cadres mobilized; as the war 
enlarged in scope, the galvanization against it strengthened. The wider the 
military campaign became, the less effective it was. The longer it continued, the 
less support it could rely on in the United States. Except for a token contingent of 
"Free World" (this term was actually used on occasion in internal U.S. foreign-
policy discourse) allies, it was never anywhere near a multilateral effort.  
 As the war dragged on, more and more Americans could draw no 
connection between the Vietnamese insurgents and civilians their army 
destroyed by the thousands and the ideals for which the war was supposedly 
being fought. The war over that justification thus assumed monumental 
proportions, as everyday Americans for the first time witnessed the horrors of war 
from the comfort of their living rooms over the airwaves of their set-top box. While 
the strategy of Containment ultimately succeeded, in much the same fashion as 
U.S. dominance of the international system, it did so in spite of total failure in 
Containment's piece de résistance. In the words of George Herring, 
"Containment was misapplied in Vietnam." 145  Why did the policy fail so 
miserably, what led to the strategic-tactical gap in this case, and why did the 
United States continue to pursue a failed policy so long?   
 The overarching strategic objective of the American effort in Vietnam was 
to stem the flow of Communism and prevent the feared "domino effect" from 
                                                        
145 George Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New 
York: John Wiley, 1979). 
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taking hold in Southeast Asia. This required the subsequent tactical objectives of 
supporting the fledgling, repressive state of South Vietnam, combatting NVA and 
VC forces wherever they materialized in South Vietnam, and breaking the will of 
hostile North and South Vietnamese to continue to fight.146 In addition to denying 
the Communist enemy an expansion of territory, the effort concomitantly sought 
to expand the sphere of influence of liberal democratic capitalism that 
policymakers envisioned would protect the United States and the American way 
of life the larger it became (this piece of U.S. grand strategy was abandoned ad 
hoc in Latin America, Africa, and Asia wherever it conflicted with anti-
Communism; anti-Communist sentiment therefore transcended pro-democratic 
sentiment under the imperatives of the Cold War, including in South Vietnam). 
This zero-sum game in the larger picture found its way all the way down the 
chain of command to the tactical picture. Every VC cadre killed was one fewer 
individual that could threaten the United States and the American way of life.  
 Thus, in this quintessential proxy war, the country was to be used as an 
example that the United States would defend its allies and man the perimeters of 
the "Free World" wherever Communism sought to expand. Therefore, in 
simplified form, the objectives were (a) to prop up and support the state of South 
Vietnam; (b) to prevent North Vietnamese incursions into the South and suppress 
the VC; (c) to thereby stunt the material spread of Communism; and (d) to                                                         
146 Throughout this dissertation, this phrase is invoked in correlation to its presentation in the 
previous chapters. Please take note that the terms 'strategy' and 'tactics' are used in relation to 
one another in accordance with different levels of abstraction. For example, the 'strategy' of the 
Containment of the Cold War employed the 'tactic' of the Vietnam War; likewise, the 'strategy' of 
the Vietnam War employed the 'tactics' of pacification and attrition. The strategic-tactical gap in 
U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy transcends various levels of abstraction. 
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display to adversaries and allies alike that adversaries would be confronted and 
allies would be supported, and, in so doing, restrain the ideational appeal of 
Communism. Despite the tradition of mission in U.S. history, never before or 
since has a U.S. military conflict been so united with an ideational struggle. 
Americans could not see Vietnam for what it was because their lens of analysis 
was blinded by anti-Communist fervor; by the time this lens became partially 
removed as hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops confronted a skilled, 
resourceful, and determined enemy, the conflict had been lost.  
 None of these objectives were met. The only silver lining of the failed 
American effort in Vietnam, if one in fact exists, would be the fact that the 
invasion and occupation of South Vietnam by NVA forces in 1975 preceded the 
fall of the Berlin Wall by a mere fourteen years. One of the enduring tragic ironies 
of this classic strategic blunder is that the whole raison d'etre for fighting the war 
in the first place—that Communism had to be stopped everywhere to be stopped 
anywhere—never materialized. The logical fallacy that each individual country 
was somehow inexorably linked to an international Communism that found its 
strength in global unification fell flat on November 9, 1989. This inaccurate 
assumption on the part of U.S. foreign policymakers imagined a link between 
international Communism and individual countries that never existed to the 
extent imagined. That there was some level of cooperation between Moscow, 
Beijing, and their supposed satellite states did little to defy the basic tenets of 
realism; states look inward before looking outward. The American intervention in 
Vietnam bore this out to a fastidious degree: the fall of Saigon did not usher in a 
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new era of international Communism. The domino theory and two millennia of 
realist doctrine quickly proved incompatible. Though Vietnam, as Beijing, remains 
technically Communist, Communism as an idea has been all but purged from the 
Earth in any practical sense of the word. The ideational link between Vietnam 
and the American imperative to purge the world of Communism was largely a 
figment of the American imagination.  
 In The Limits of Intervention, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Affairs Townsend Hoopes describes the strategic-tactical gap in 
U.S. foreign policy: 
 
I felt the absence of an explicit framework of policy for both global 
and inter-regional issues. With respect to particular regions and 
countries, small interdepartmental groups of flexible membership 
conducted day-to-day operations with ability and zeal. But the 
bridging mechanisms needed to relate policy in one region to policy 
in another, and to link them to general problems of global 
implication—like the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or the 
progressive withdrawal of British military forces from East of 
Suez—seemed weak. Moreover, there appeared to be a serious 
lack of the kind of comprehensive assessment and long-range 
planning that was a remembered feature of those days during the 
Truman years when George Kennan and later Paul Nitze headed 
an elite Policy Planning Staff at the State Department. Closer 
examination confirmed the impression of no central guiding 
philosophy in foreign policy, as well as of slackness in coordinating 
the disparate elements. An important cause lay in the fact that 
President Johnson, a man of little background and much 
uncertainty in foreign affairs, had inherited an organization for their 
conduct that had been made deliberately loose and flexible by 
President Kennedy, a man of broad knowledge, intuitive grasp, and 
determined initiative in that field. This inheritance, which adversely 
affected both the scope of deliberations on Vietnam policy and the 
quality of President Johnson's decisions from the fall of 1964 
onwards, showed itself in the structural weakness of the National 
Security Council and in inadequate attention to longer-range policy 
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planning. The principal results were fragmented debate, loose 
coordination, and an excessive concentration on the problems of 
the moment.147 
 
 
Hoopes' nostalgia for the immediate postwar days of the 'Wise Men' may indeed 
be warranted, but it is also revelatory of another development in U.S foreign 
policy over the subsequent decades. During the early postwar years, the United 
States was still forging and asserting its new identity as the singular arbiter of 
international affairs. This burgeoning quest to remain the 'indispensable nation' 
even after the cessation of the hostilities of the Second World War necessitated 
conceiving of the nation in ideational terms. This new purpose first had to be 
envisioned in order to then be articulated in artfully ambitious terms, in addition to 
specifying what that purpose intended to achieve in the international system. It 
would then be necessary to construct some kind of theoretical policy for how best 
to attach means to end in grand strategy; that theoretical policy emerged in the 
form of Containment, the temporary standard-bearer of the grand strategy of 
preponderance. The grand-strategic objective to become the world's singular 
international arbiter of international affairs thus employed the mid-level strategy 
of Containment. That mid-level strategy subsequently needed application at the 
tactical level. The most significant tactical application of it became Vietnam, and 
the Vietnam War failed.   
 This process illustrates the strategic-tactical gap in U.S. foreign policy in 
the clearest possible terms, and Hoopes' characterization of it illustrated his keen                                                         
147 Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention: How Vietnam Policy Was Made—and 
Reversed—During the Johnson Administration (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), 1. 
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perception of its shortcomings in the pivotal year of 1965, when escalation was 
taking flight. As a WWII Marine Lieutenant who had risen to become Chairman of 
the House Armed Services Committee and served under three secretaries of 
defense before holding a number of high-level foreign-policy positions at the 
interchange between policymakers and defense officials, he was in a unique 
position to give his assessment of conceptual and logistical shortcomings in the 
FPDM chain of command. These shortcomings would become the applicative 
basis for the Vietnam imbroglio, a blunder spurred on by the persistent impetus 
of preponderance. The institutional and geographic hypertrophia of the global 
military presence of the United States engendered by the Second World War 
remains in place to this day; since 1945 it has never achieved its former success, 
and Vietnam was its crowning failure.  
 
Criterion I. Degree of fruition of primary and secondary objectives 
 
 Between 1964, when General William Westmoreland was appointed 
Commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), and 1968, when 
he was promoted to Army Chief of Staff, the number of troops in Vietnam grew 
from 16,000 to over 500,000. The United States either had to pour millions of 
troops into the country and invade North Vietnam proper or accept that it would 
never control the countryside, control the night, or stem the influx of fighters, 
support systems and weapons from North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. 
Instead, they kicked the can down the road until there was nothing left of it. From 
1960-1963, the United States and South Vietnam targeted guerilla activity but 
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neither fully understood nor actively targeted with sufficient scope the political 
and intelligence infrastructure of the Viet Cong (VCI). This allowed it to establish 
the underlying political and intelligence network that would sustain the guerilla 
arm of the insurgency in the years to come.  
 The VCI, made up of somewhere between 70,000 and 100,000 cadres by 
1967, was a "simple organization: Virtually every village had a cell made up of a 
Communist Party secretary; a finance and supply unit; and information and 
culture, social welfare, and proselytizing sections to gain recruits from among the 
civilian population. They answered up a chain of command, with village cadres 
answering to the district, then to the province, and finally to a series of regional 
commands which, in turn, took orders from Hanoi."148 Although operations were 
ultimately controlled by Hanoi, VC cadres and People's Revolutionary Party 
(PRP) officials also wielded their own amount of autonomy, being closer to the 
frontlines as they were. Although it was called such by some high-level U.S. 
foreign policymakers, this was no "ragtag" organization, as U.S. advisors and 
intelligence operatives learned during the advisory years (1954-1963). The VCI 
has been characterized as the largest and most sophisticated system of 
intelligence gathering and political organization in the modern (post-WWII) history 
of asymmetrical warfare.149  
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 It was also highly adaptable. For example, after the Tet Offensive, which 
left the VC decimated but was nevertheless a political victory for the North in that 
public opinion in America began to turn away from the war, the Communist 
Politburo in Hanoi enacted COSVN Resolution 9, which hailed Tet as a success 
in that it broke U.S. resolve and forced the Americans to "sink deeper into a 
defensive and deadlocked position," but also shifted its strategy to focus on 
fighting against pacification efforts rather than taking on the U.S. army in fixed 
battles.150 In other words, it instructed guerillas to go back to what they did best, 
now that the message that they could face the American army in sustained, 
pitched battles, including in urban areas, had been sent. With the loss of nearly 
all VC operational forces expended during Tet, VCI reorganization and 
replenishment would ensure long-term combat viability.  
 COSVN was an acronym for Central Office for South Vietnam, the center 
of the insurgency's political leadership, whose decision-making apparatus was 
described by the CIA thusly: "Leadership at all levels within the VC Infrastructure 
is provided through the PRP, through Party Committees set up at each echelon. 
According to the statutes of the PRP, the Central Committee—or, more formally, 
the Central Executive Committee—is the highest decisionmaking body of the 
PRP between Party Congresses."151 The American effort never succeeded in 
dismantling the VCI, which proved far more effective operationally than the                                                         
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government of South Vietnam (GVN), the American Army, or its U.S. civilian 
agency counterparts in terms of controlling the populace with a steady 
combination of ruthless intimidation, coercion, and ideational appeal. The U.S. 
effort suffered from discombobulation from the beginning of the buildup. General 
Westmoreland, for example, characterized this problem on January 7, 1966, the 
second year of the buildup: "It is abundantly clear that all political, military, 
economic, and security (police) programs must be completely integrated in order 
to attain any kind of success in a country which has been greatly weakened by 
prolonged conflict...The Viet Cong, themselves, have learned this lesson well. 
Their integration of efforts surpasses ours by a large order of magnitude."152 
 From the North Vietnamese perspective, the assessment of the war was 
not much different than Westmoreland's early lamentations of stunted progress. 
The authors of Hanoi's official military history of the "American War" 
acknowledges that over certain periods of the war, notably 1961-1963, 1966, and 
1969, North Vietnam faced intermittent setbacks in the overall war effort. 
Nevertheless, the admittedly biased account does highlight the one persistent 
truth of the war: the more forces the American army employed, the more the 
North resisted. It omits the substantial level of support it received from the Soviet 
Union and China, and downplays the level of support and direction it gave to 
prop up the insurgency in the South from 1959 onward. But it describes the 
"maturation" of the insurgency from a disparate band of disorganized peasant-
warriors to a fully capable insurgent army capable of challenging the American                                                         
152 Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 10. 
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military from the battle of Ap Bac in 1963 onward through ingenuity, resolve, and 
a whole host of prototypical guerilla warfare tactics.153 
 One of the ironies of the tactical dynamics of the Vietnam War was that 
the guerilla tactics used by the VC made it impossible to apply conventional 
military doctrine to their pursuit, but when they did decide to meet the American 
army in pitched battle, they won even when they lost by inflicting American 
casualties. Even at a 5:1 or 10:1 ratio, Ho Chi Minh and his military strategists 
knew that the Americans would eventually capitulate, given that for them this was 
a war of choice. Just as George Washington's Continental Army made great 
strides against the British Army with guerilla warfare tactics but gained coherence 
and strength by eventually confronting their imperial overseers in conventional 
battalion-strength battles, so too did the NVA and VC utilize both to their 
advantage. This never changed during the course of the conflict. When it suited 
them, such as in 1969 after the Tet Offensive, the enemy retreated into the 
hinterlands to reorganize and replenish. When in strength, NVA and VC 
battalions would materialize in order to inflict what were, by American standards, 
heavy American casualties. 
 The evolution from guerilla warfare to pitched battled took form as U.S. 
forces evolved from an advisory role to full-scale regimented search-and-destroy 
missions, which increased after escalation was settled upon in 1964. One of the 
first such confrontations was the January 2, 1963 Battle of AP Bac. In many                                                         
153 Mark Atwood Lawrence, Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of 
Vietnam, 1954-1975 (University of Kansas, 2002), translated by Merle Pribbenow, in Journal of 
Military History Vol. 67, No. 1 (January 2003), 304-305. 
  153 
ways, the story of the Vietnam War is the story of John Paul Vann. The 
corollaries between his individual contribution to the war and the overall war 
effort are unmistakable, as Neil Sheehan's Pulitzer Prize-winning biographical 
account details. His role in the conflict is relevant to FPE Criterion I because it 
illustrates how a failed military strategy was upscaled rather than reformulated; 
this in essence ensured failure in the military component of the war, if not the 
political component (which ultimately failed as well). This took place not in 1967 
or 1968, when the war was in full-tilt, but more than a year before escalation was 
eventually chosen as the course of action in the Johnson Administration, and 
long before the size of the U.S. commitment rendered withdrawal politically 
implausible. This attribute is nontrivial because of the fact that it affects how we 
understand and analyze the FPDM that led to the persistent policy of 
commitment.  
 Vann recognized that the VC held "the strategic and tactical initiative" 
(Westmoreland would later use this lack of initiative as a justification for 
increasing troop levels by an order of magnitude).154 He observed that the VC 
had access to all two million people in the division zone, and while the Army of 
the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) could move freely within it with American 
firepower, advisors, and the backing of fighter bombers, in no way did they 
control the countryside, nor was their presence welcome in many of the 
surrounding provinces. The average soldier of the shoddy ARVN showed up for 
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the paycheck, held few loyalties to the state, could barely adjust the sight of his 
rifle, and wanted nothing to do with fighting the VC. This attitude was not in spite 
of the loyalty of commanders; indeed, ARVN colonels tended to elbow each other 
for resources, regime favoritism, and stature, with little regard for nationalist 
sentiment and little more for the trade of combat. Colonel Cao, to whom Vann 
was assigned, stated simply, "It is not safe to go out at night." Vann cited in one 
of his reports "a deplorable condition" in which "commanders at all levels who do 
nothing can still retain their command, and even advance, while those who are 
aggressive may be relieved if they suffer a setback or sustain heavy losses.” 
Colonels were not incentivized to fight: “Petty jealousies among battalion and 
regimental commanders take precedence over, and detract from, the primary 
mission of closing with and destroying the enemy."155 
 The further ARVN companies ventured into VC territory, the more 
weapons would eventually fall into enemy hands, the lower morale would sink in 
their ranks, and the more tactical experience would be garnered and weaponry 
captured by the VC, thereby evening out what would have otherwise been 
guerilla disadvantages in technical capabilities and firepower. What the guerilla 
could draw on that the ARVN regular could not was faith in his or her cause and 
the backing of a state in Hanoi perceived to be legitimate in the minds of its 
citizenry, unlike the oligarchy headquartered in Saigon. For harassment, 
psychological warfare, and weapon-procurement purposes, the VC would attack 
Regional Force/Popular Force (RFPF) rural militia outposts at night, which would                                                         
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in turn lead to indiscriminate artillery bombing, allowing the enemy to gather more 
support from among the smoke of burning villages. When ARVN troops did 
venture out on patrol, ambush was a constant concern. VC cadres became so 
adept at policing battlefields abandoned by the ARVN and Americans that the 
trash heap left behind after even an unsuccessful battle would supply a treasure 
trove of materiel: "expended smoke grenades, safety levers and pins, LAW 
tubes, Claymore mine components, ammunition boxes and containers, grenade 
and projectile packaging tubes, propellant containers, packing material, pallets, 
sandbags, bandoleers, loading clips, machine-gun links, empty C-ration cans, 
mortar increments (propellant bags), artillery projectile booster charges (removed 
from fuse wells), expended 'pop-up' flare tubes, expended time fuse igniters, field 
telephone wire, expended batteries, used field dressings, IV (intravenous) 
bottles, and other soiled medical items."156 For a battle in which the ARVN was 
overrun, there was no limit to what could be uncovered.  
 Vann's cohort, Colonel Daniel Boone Porter, observed, "Everything he had 
seen had convinced him that if the Vietnamese on the Saigon side were going to 
prevail, they needed Americans who would show them how to fight their war and 
also find a way to goad them into fighting it.”157 The war the United States would 
eventually fight did not exist in Vietnam until Americans invented it. A climate of 
civil conflict, an official army of the state, mobilized guerillas, and sociopolitical 
strife were all present in 1962; the war as it came to be was not. Though Vann                                                         
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was particularly sensitive, in fact favorably inclined to, Vietnamese cultural 
standards and practices, the soldier in him recognized the primal imperative of 
security: “Security may be ten percent of the problem, or it may be ninety 
percent, but whichever it is, it’s the first ten percent or the first ninety percent,” 
and thus “without security, nothing else we do will last.”158 His plan was to coerce 
Colonel Cao into major policing actions that would smash the cornerstone 
guerilla forces that made up the hierarchy in Cao's area of operation; he thought 
he could accomplish this task within six months.   
 In some ways, the battle of Ap Bac was the prototypical Cold War 
battlefield. Vietnam itself as an international conflict zone was somewhat 
accidental, but also the product of certain geographical conditions. President 
Kennedy had become enamored with the intrigue of the Special Forces, in large 
part simply because he found them personally compelling, but also for practical 
reasons: Nikita Kruschev had announced on January 6, 1961, two weeks to the 
day before Kennedy assumed the presidency, his intention to support "liberation 
wars and popular uprisings," and the United States did not intend to sit on the 
sidelines while peasants the world over were given a copy of the Communist 
Manifesto and a Kalashnikov, preferring instead for them to be trained via a Bible 
and an M-14.159 The Special Forces would facilitate that exchange. Kennedy's 
military mentor, Maxwell Taylor, published a book enshrining the doctrine of 
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"limited war" that precipitated JFK's military predilection for "flexible response." 
These terms implied the ability to project power anywhere on Earth via a rapidly 
deployable force capable of working hand-in-hand with local allies and utilizing 
superior firepower and tactical prowess rather than relying almost exclusively on 
nuclear deterrence.160   
 This transformation in military doctrine responded to the innumerable low-
intensity "Third World" battlefields in which the United States and its allies was 
engaged, Vietnam chief among them. Although Kruschev had taken criticism 
from China for not doing enough to fight the hot battles of the Cold War, the 
Americans had plenty of reason to be wary of Soviet influence in Cuba, Vietnam, 
Algeria, the Congo, and elsewhere. Thus, what Vann concluded from the battle 
of Ap Bac, conclusions that would symbolize his and others' views toward the 
war in the coming years, carried with it global implications far beyond what the 
local population of 600 miserly inhabitants could begin to fathom. The terms of 
the battle, as described by Sheehan: 
 
The 350 guerrillas had stood their ground and humbled a modern 
army four times their number equipped with armor and artillery and 
supported by helicopters and fighter-bombers. Their heaviest 
weapon was the little 60mm mortar that had proved useless to 
them. They suffered eighteen killed and thirty-nine wounded, light 
casualties considering that the Americans and their Vietnamese 
protégés subjected them to thousands of rifle and machine-gun 
bullets, the blast and shrapnel of 600 artillery shells, and the 
napalm, bombs, and assorted other ordnance of thirteen warplanes 
and five Huey gunships. The Hueys alone expended 8,400 rounds 
of machine-gun fire and 100 rockets on the tree lines at Bac. With                                                         
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the weapons they held in their hands the guerrillas killed or 
wounded roughly four of their enemies for every man they lost. 
They inflicted about 80 killed and well over 100 wounded on the 
Saigon forces and also killed three Americans, wounded another 
eight, and accounted for five helicopters. (The Saigon side later 
officially admitted to 63 killed and 109 wounded, holding down their 
losses by misstating the number of casualties suffered by the 
reserve company in front of Bac.) The guerrillas managed to cause 
all of this damage while still conserving their own bullets. From the 
first shots at the Civil Guards through the last fight with the 
paratroops they fired about 5,000 rounds of rifle and machine-gun 
ammunition.161 
 
 
The tactical result of the battle was a stalemate. Cao's forces took no ground, 
retreating the following day, as was characteristic of this asymmetric war. Neither 
side had inflicted a mortal wound on the other. However, stalemate in this case 
meant victory for the guerillas. They could wait out. All they needed to do was 
survive as a fighting force capable of gathering popular support and intimidating 
or assassinating opponents. A tie or even a marginal loss in battle was a victory 
for the VC. The United States could continue fighting this type of battle even with 
disproportionate expenditure of resources ad infinitum, and indeed did so for the 
next decade. However, the four fundamental problems that would become more 
evident to more people later in the war were the four problems that would 
ultimately bring about defeat. First, to withstand the American army in pitched 
battle, even when taking substantially more losses, meant that the VC got 
stronger with each engagement. It gained tactical expertise; it established itself 
as a viable fighting force; it confiscated American weapons which were far in 
advance of their own; it signified to the populace that it meant to stay and meant                                                         
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to fight; it produced martyrs to inspire young men and women to fill their ranks; it 
facilitated South Vietnamese and American casualties; it sapped ARVN morale; it 
sapped the resolve of the American public. Second, while the guerillas stayed in 
the communities in which they fought, strengthening the bond between them, or 
retreated into the nearby hinterlands, the ARVN and Americans withdrew with 
nothing having been gained from the battle.  
 Third, the meta-battle perspective of the ordinary civilian caught in the 
conflict was to blame the foreigner (both the Saigon foreigner and the literal 
foreigner) for civilian casualties; this perception was greatly exacerbated by the 
indiscriminate artillery shelling and aerial bombing that often accompanied 
military action. Fourth, because the ARVN and Americans did not want to declare 
defeat, they changed the metrics for success: the 'body count' would define 
victory, which in turn implanted the incentive to produce corpses, whether 
combatants or civilians, that could verify this measure of 'success.' Furthermore, 
colonels like Cao knew that cornering the guerillas would force them into more 
aggressive action against his forces, which in turn would mean higher casualties. 
Since the regime in Saigon needed the army to uphold its own legitimacy and 
provide for internal security, it did not want to risk it against an army of peasants 
far detached from the confines of the capitol. These were the battlefield 
conditions that would eventually lead to the "Americanization" of the war effort, 
which in turn would eventually lead back to "Vietnamization" as the American 
public tired of the seemingly futile campaign. Vann understood these issues 
immediately; he spent the rest of the war making his case in vain. The further 
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significance of the story of John Paul Vann is his effort to inform high-level 
military and political leaders of the need to reformulate the war strategy, both 
strategically and tactically, which is discussed in Indicator IV of the OPM. 
 All this is not to suggest that with a better military strategy the war could 
have been won, nor that a military success would have led to political success. 
Both were always unlikely outcomes, and, as we shall see, U.S. foreign 
policymakers knew this to a reasonable degree of certainty from an early stage. 
1968 became the pivotal year of the war because of the confluence of the two 
main consequences of the Tet Offensive. The immediate battlefield effect was 
the near complete annihilation of the VC. The long-term effect was the loss of the 
most essential weapon in the 'arsenal of democracy:' public opinion. After being 
told for years that victory was just around the corner, the American public 
realized they were being told lies by their leaders, thus making the average 
American turn against the war. Once support was gone, it was never again 
recovered; anti-war momentum permanently assumed a critical mass, and 
Richard Nixon was elected partially based on the premise that he had a '"secret 
plan to end the war." That plan would be "Vietnamization," or the shifting of 
responsibility for the war's prosecution to the GVN. The war had come full circle, 
and would end with the 1973 Paris Peace Accords and the withdrawal of U.S. 
forces altogether in 1975 as North Vietnam assumed control of the entire 
country, fulfilling Hanoi's promise to someday reunite the quintessentially 
nationalistic nation.  
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Criterion II. Corollary strategic consequences 
  
 In terms of the national interest, the most disruptive effect of the war was 
an ideational effect. The American military had lost its first major war; its 
impenetrable invincibility had been punctured; to many Americans it had lost the 
moral high ground. This loss came at the height of the Cold War, deflating the 
sense of inevitable victory Americans had come to enjoy as members of the most 
successful nation-state since the Peace of Westphalia. And while one of the 
ironies of the Vietnam War was that it appeared to come at great loss and yet 
hardly appeared to affect the national interest, it had a devastating effect on the 
morale of the nation. This strategic irony mirrored the tactical irony of the war: 
there was little national interest in Vietnam until a commitment was made to 
invent one. Therefore, the effect on the national interest existed once a 
commitment was made to the country in the form of unprecedented aerial 
bombing, hundreds of thousands of troops, and hundreds of billions of dollars. 
These two ironies represent the divergence of the Cold War and its "hot" proxies 
and illustrate the strategic-tactical gap in U.S. foreign policy. The ultimate result 
was the loss of confidence for a nation that would not fight another major war 
until its next foreign-policy blunder, which is the subject of the next chapter (if we 
are to term the 1991 Gulf War a policing action).  
 In the February 1941 issue of Life Magazine, public intellectual and 
founder of Life, Time, and Fortune magazines Henry Luce coined the term 
"American Century," advocating a global role for U.S. leadership in the world and 
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a sharp turn away from the isolationism of the interwar period.162 His words were 
prescient, and the nation listened, promulgating what would later be referred to 
as the "Greatest Generation." To many, the national nightmare of Vietnam had 
washed away that optimistic internationalist vision. Sociologist, Daniel Bell, wrote 
that "the American Century foundered on the shoals of Vietnam."163 This loss of 
national morale was termed "Vietnam Syndrome" in popular and scholarly 
discourse over the next two decades, and was to some degree exorcised during 
the 1991 Gulf War, which many viewed as successful, before returning with the 
"Iraq Syndrome," a term not yet born given that the conflict is still ongoing after 
fourteen years of violent conflict.164 While the exact impact of Vietnam Syndrome 
is impossible to quantify, and the U.S. by no means avoided conflict during the 
time in which it most affected the national psyche, its presence was 
unmistakable. Even during the 1991 Gulf War, policymakers were careful not to 
repeat the mistakes of Vietnam. The so-called "Powell Doctrine" that emphasized 
'overwhelming force,' multilateralism, and public support was heavily influenced 
by the Vietnam War, all three of which were to some degree absent from the war 
planning of the 1960's (Powell was himself an infantryman in Vietnam and had 
witnessed its failures first-hand). 
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 Geoff Simons describes the dialect associated with "Vietnam" as a term 
with specified conceptual implications, rather than as a literal country or event: 
 
For many, Vietnam is less a territorial expanse or a political entity, 
more a warning, a rebuke, a shibboleth or a metaphor. Thus 
Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, the Argentinian revolutionary, wanted to 
create 'two, three or more Vietnams'; Afghanistan became 'Russia's 
Vietnam,' the Lebanon became 'Israel's Vietnam'; and on 10 August 
1996 the influential Moslem cleric Sheikh Mohammed Hussein 
Fadlallah warned the United States of a 'new Vietnam' if it attacked 
Iran... there was no 'Germany Syndrome', no 'Japan Syndrome', no 
'Italy Syndrome', no 'Korea Syndrome' and no 'China Syndrome' 
(except in a very different context)—though, as we shall see, there 
was a 'Somalia Effect.'165 
 
 
This led to the effect of "an enervating reluctance to use the American armed 
forces to protect U.S. interests around the world." 166  The 'Somalia Effect' to 
which the author refers was an echo of Vietnam Syndrome: many accredited the 
failure to intervene in the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 to the loss of eighteen U.S. 
soldiers in Mogadishu less than a year earlier. Indeed, the 'syndrome' was often 
compared to the 'effect' in the Clinton Administration's dithering over what to do 
with Rwanda; the international community did nothing, and nearly one million 
people were slaughtered in one hundred days. Though the author's conclusion— 
that "Vietnam forced the United States to refine its pursuit of global hegemony, 
with ethical factors continuing to weigh nothing in the scale of realpolitik 
calculation"—is a rather cynical one, it does highlight the impact of the event on                                                         
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the pursuit of hegemony, whether morally induced or brought about by practical 
considerations. The backlash against the Vietnam War would have international 
repercussions as well: it would eventually become "the rallying cry of the radical 
left throughout Western Europe and North America."167 
 Just as much of the justification for intervention in Vietnam was due to the 
perception of weakness that another country falling to Communism would create, 
perhaps the primary loss in terms of the U.S. national interest was one of 
perception. An army of peasants with limited technology and military 
sophistication had defeated the full force of the American military and 
demonstrated to the rest of the world that a determined Communist-nationalist 
army could defeat foreign aggression if it only stood its ground and refused to 
capitulate. Thus, in Kissinger's words, "Vietnam is still with us. It has created 
doubts about American judgment, about American credibility, about American 
power, not only at home but also throughout the world. It has poisoned our 
domestic debate. So we paid an exorbitant price for the decisions that were 
made in good faith and for good purpose."168 
 The "good faith" Kissinger and many other U.S. foreign policymakers at 
the heart of the Vietnam War clung to in the years of its aftermath is questionable 
on multiple grounds, not the least of which is what the campaign meant to the 
U.S. national interest, if anything. In human terms, the harm done in any large-
scale war in which hundreds of thousands or even millions of people are killed is                                                         
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immeasurable, and understandable only to those who are directly affected by it. 
The FPE process utilized here means to evaluate the foreign policy in question 
as it relates to the national interest. An accounting of casualties may therefore 
seem irrelevant to the social-science observer. However, in the context of the 
Vietnam War, this is not the case. The anti-war movement across the college 
campuses and streets of America indeed gained steam because of the harm 
being done to the Vietnamese people, and this movement precipitated the end of 
the conflict, at least as far as America was concerned. It was not an uncommon 
occurrence for U.S. soldiers to be spat at upon returning from the dangers of 
Vietnam; this was unheard of in American history and this sentiment has never 
returned to the treatment of U.S. soldiers who once again enjoy the reverence of 
a nation, if only in symbolism.  
 The Vietnam War is therefore singular in American history in terms of the 
direct effect between the loss of the war and the sentiment among everyday 
Americans that there was an inherently moral problem with perpetuating a 
conflict that was killing so many ostensibly innocent people in addition to its 
active combatants. The nature of guerilla warfare meant that Vietnamese 
civilians were caught in the midst of many of the war's battles, and the extreme 
difficulty in identifying and targeting combatants made it impossible for the U.S. 
military to avoid civilian casualties, whether by direct targeting out of ignorance of 
who the enemy was or by indirect collateral damage from indiscriminate artillery 
and aerial bombing. And while intentional massacres by ground forces like that of 
My Lai were far from regular occurrences, their presence on American television 
  166 
screens made Americans question whether they could claim the moral high 
ground for perhaps the first time in their history. It is therefore relevant here to 
take a brief accounting of the casualties caused by this war that nobody seemed 
to be winning prior to the end of the 'decent interval' and the North's full-scale 
invasion of the South in 1975.   
 Who exactly these people were that the American army was killing is 
therefore relevant as well. The VC were highly adept at violence and terrorism, 
and to target such actors was perhaps an acceptable 'casualty of war' to the 
average American. After all, in the context of Containment, 'spillover' was an 
inevitability. The world was in the midst of a Cold War and Vietnam was its hot 
landing zone. In the historical development of the remnants of French Indochina, 
that spillover was regional. It came in the form of the bombing of Laos and 
Cambodia. From the North Vietnamese and PRP side, the war was far more 
nationalistic than the United States ever let on. For the fiercely nationalistic 
Vietnamese people, the long-term goal was a unified, independent Vietnam, for 
which Vietnamese north and south of the 17th parallel had been struggling, often 
successfully, for hundreds of years.  
 For its part, the self-serving GVN viewed virtually all policy matters 
through the lens of maintaining governance and the system of bribery, 
clientelism, and opposition suppression that allowed it to keep its hold on power, 
at least in Saigon and its immediate environs. But for the Americans, Vietnam 
was part of "Indochina," which included the French colonies of Vietnam, Laos, 
and Cambodia. "The American commitment to anti-colonialism, seen in some of 
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President Franklin D. Roosevelt's pronouncements during World War II, 
diminished because Washington deemed it more important to stop Communism 
than to champion the cause of independence. Although there was an awareness 
that Ho was a popular figure, the United States almost inevitably opposed his 
movement because of its Communist leadership and ultimately gave its political, 
moral, financial, and material support to the French," as described by historian 
Kenton Clymer.169 This pragmatic attachment to colonialism, fundamentally at 
the heart of the American tug-of-war for international identity described in 
Chapter 3, made it inevitable that the conflict the United States was to assume in 
Vietnam would spill over into Laos and Cambodia. This effect was compounded 
by the insecurity in those countries, the international nature of the Communist 
materiel supply network from China and the Soviet Union, and the difficult terrain 
in the virtually borderless areas on the Vietnam-Laos and Vietnam-Cambodia 
borders that posed significant complications in targeting the mountainous and 
canopy-laden supply lines of the Ho Chi Minh trail.  
 Laos and Cambodia had their own independence struggles to deal with. 
Cambodia's took form in earnest after the 1942 arrest of two Buddhist monks by 
the French, while in Laos nationalists seized the opportunity to begin their 
movement when the Japanese displaced the Vichy French government in 1945. 
President Eisenhower declared in an NSC meeting on December 31st, 1960, 
"We cannot let Laos fall to the Communists even if we have to fight... with our 
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allies or without them," given that Laos was "the key to the whole area" and "it 
would just be a matter of time until South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Burma would 
collapse" and fall into Communist hands.170 On January 19, 1961, Eisenhower 
discussed Laos at length with Kennedy; Vietnam was not even on the agenda. 
Relative foreign-policy novice Kennedy viewed the situation through political 
expedience, remarking on the whole matter: "Whatever's going to happen in 
Laos, an American invasion, a Communist victory or whatever," to get it over with 
"before we take over and get blamed for it." While Kennedy "understood that 
Laos by itself was of little political or economic interest to the United States, he 
considered it symbolically important to the Cold War. An American failure in Laos 
would have important negative ramifications elsewhere in the world, he feared, 
including elsewhere in Indochina."171 
 The years of the Vietnam War bore witness to confusion, tension, and 
negotiation between the United States, Laos, and Cambodia, as well as 
extensive aerial bombing. In 1963, Norodom Sihanouk, King and later head of 
state of Cambodia from 1955-1970, ended American aid in 1963 after the 
assassination of GVN President Ngo Dinh Diem. But with or without consent, 
bombing of the border regions was an inherent potentiality, given the supply lines 
the NVA used to furnish their armies as well as the VC. Historian Alfred McCoy 
estimates the amount of bombing in Laos' Plain of Jars: "By war's end, this Plain 
of Jars, a small region with poor highland farms and no infrastructure, received                                                         
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over three times the total dropped on industrial Japan [during WWII], becoming 
the most intensely bombarded place on the face of the planet."172  
 If the political necessities of the Cold War were making and unmaking 
strange bedfellows in the remnants of French Indochina, so too were 
geographical hinterlands become epicenters of the hot wars fought under its 
guise: the Plain of Jars became "a strategic prize for both the communist forces 
in the caves of Sam Neua Province just to the northeast and the CIA secret army 
based at Long Tieng Valley just to the southwest."173 The amorphous battlefields 
of the Vietnam War not only posed complications for military tacticians, but also 
for U.S. foreign policymakers for whom moral questions of who to target and how 
to target them were reduced to quantifiable units like "structures," "enemy sites," 
"supply vehicles," and the ever-generic "Viet Cong Infrastructure," especially 
under the quantification-obsessed Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. 
There was no code under McNamara's obstinately statistical battlefield metrics 
for civilian casualties.174 B-52 bombers are simply not built to target small groups 
of individuals, even when assuming the opaque layers of canopy jungle do not 
prevent ground forces from identifying those individuals, itself a virtually 
impossible endeavor in the netherworld of borderlands comprising the supply-line 
warscape. While the American public did eventually find out about the bombing in                                                         
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Laos and Cambodia, the secrecy surrounding it delayed the ferocity and scope of 
the anti-war movement: 
 
Among the few things that the American public did not know was 
that thousands of innocent Laotians died in the bombing and the 
terrifying gunship attacks. The gunships, which operated during the 
night, unleashed 6,000 rounds per minute and were guided by 
sensors that detected the urine of mammals. Thus monkeys, water 
buffalo, cattle, guerillas, wandering refugees, and villagers—all 
suffered. Under international law, the American action in Laos may 
have constituted a war crime. Nor did most Americans know that 
the CIA tolerated Vang Pao's control of the heroin trade or that the 
intended market for the deadly drug was increasingly American 
soldiers in South Vietnam. Under Vang Pao's direction, Air 
America, the CIA airline, flew the raw opium to market. Vang Pao's 
control over the opium harvest and of food aid supplied through 
USAID also gave him enormous power over the Hmong 
villagers.175  
 
 
The "power over the Hmong villagers" is especially relevant because the Hmong 
were fearless warriors that were utilized by "Free World" forces in the struggle 
against Communism throughout their native territory, from which there was no 
escape. In 1973, ten years after Cambodia had ended its partnership with the 
United States, the United States ended its partnership with Laos. It is difficult to 
quantify the destruction the Vietnam War had on Laos and Cambodia, but simple 
enough to estimate that the use of each as pawns in the battle against 
Communism exacerbated the sense of tribalism and cyclical violence that these 
countries were already prone to. To be sure, neither was a united Jeffersonian 
democracy before the Americans came to town. But the stunted sociopolitical 
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development of these countries was relieved in no part by the American 
presence. The emergence of the Khmer Rouge during the Vietnam War and 
consolidation of power after the Cambodian Civil War were not a direct 
consequence of American actions, and in fact the movement was allied with 
North Vietnam. But it is not inconceivable that a different American approach in 
the rubble of French Indochina would have led to an outcome other than the 
most terrible reign of terror since the Holocaust, in which some two million 
Cambodians perished in mass executions, starvation and disease. 
 Although this dissertation focuses on these foreign-policy blunders as they 
affect the U.S. national interest, the perspective of the enemy, including their 
collective tolerance to withstand intimidation, displacement, imprisonment, 
torture, death, and other forms of misery cannot be omitted from this evaluation. 
The determination of the NVA and VC to resist the theretofore omnipotent U.S. 
military indeed played a major role in limiting the ability of U.S. foreign 
policymakers to make progress on their overall strategy. A survey of Vietnamese 
casualties as a result of the conflict paints a picture of a people ravaged by war 
yet unrelenting in their resolve, consistent with what might be expected from a 
nation that had been successfully fighting against foreign aggressors from the 
Chinese to the French for centuries. Vietnamese Casualties of the war are 
therefore rather crudely classified under this Indicator, because the Indicator is 
designed to assess undesired consequences and collateral side effects of the 
foreign-policy action, which those killed in the Vietnam War inevitably became on 
government charts.  
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 Although there was a careful accounting of the casualties sustained by 
foreign armies, there are no confident estimates of Vietnamese casualties during 
the "American War." Numbers from one to three million are frequently 
reported.176 One million Communist combatants are commonly thought to have 
lost their lives, along with 250,000 South Vietnamese soldiers.177 However, there 
are no reliable figures to this effect.178 The North Vietnamese government had no 
more motivation to admit to the staggering cost of war dead than did the U.S. 
government. One study utilized a demographically controlled model to estimate 
total Vietnamese war deaths between 1965-1975 at 655,000 adult males, 
143,000 adult females, and 84,000 children, totaling 882,000.179 The staggering 
numbers of war dead indicate perhaps as much as any other figure the extent to 
which military force failed to break the will of the enemy. In terms of long-term 
effects on the population, a 2002 study found that U.S. bombing did not have 
negative impacts on local poverty rates, consumption levels, infrastructure, 
literacy, or population density; however, a 2010 study found the opposite, 
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discovering a correlation between the number of "war invalids" and economic 
stagnation.180 
 The potential for civilian targeting facilitated by the incentive to tally enemy 
dead is described by Philip Caputo in A Rumor of War: 
 
General Westmoreland's strategy of attrition also had an important 
effect on our behavior. Our mission was not to win terrain or seize 
positions, but simply to kill: to kill Communists and to kill as many of 
them as possible. Stack 'em like cordwood. Victory was a high 
body-count, defeat a low kill-ratio, war a matter of arithmetic. The 
pressure on unit commanders to produce enemy corpses was 
intense, and they in turn communicated it to their troops. This led to 
such practices as counting civilians as Viet Cong. "If it's dead and 
it's Vietnamese, it's VC," was a rule of thumb in the bush. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that some men acquired a contempt for 
human life and a predilection for taking it.181 
 
 
At the height of the war in late 1967, General Westmoreland continued to insist 
that the "cross-over point" at which "North Vietnamese casualties exceeded their 
ability to replace them" was on the horizon, in fact claiming publicly multiple times 
that it may have already been reached. 182  It would never be reached, and 
Westmoreland in his memoirs would later blame hamstringing politicians in 
Washington, D.C. for failing to achieve the objectives he felt his futile war of 
attrition could have.                                                          
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Criterion III. Cost 
 
 Given that none of the primary objectives of the war were met, the extent 
to which it can be classified as a blunder is inexorably compounded by its 
enormous cost in political, financial, and military terms. Between 1964 and 
August 15, 1973, the U.S. Air Force expended 6,162,000 tons of ordnance over 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, primarily in Vietnam, with the U.S. Navy and 
Marine Corps expending an additional 1,500,000 tons, compared to a total of 
2,150,000 tons of aerially originated explosives in all of the Second World War in 
both the European and Pacific theaters.183 In Laos alone, a periphery of the war, 
$1.5 million a day was spent on a bombing load in eight-minute frequencies over 
a ten-year average, totaling two million tons, which in itself surpasses WWII 
ordnance in the European theater.184 (Laos still has 80 million unexploded bombs 
dropped by the U.S. Air Force that continue to maim farm animal and civilian 
alike).185 The Vietnam War was therefore by far the most intense aerial bombing 
campaign in the history of warfare. Ultimately, this unprecedented military might 
affected neither the morale nor the proliferation and mobility of the enemy in any 
decisive way, as the supply chains of the Ho Chi Minh Trail needed only to be 
shifted a few kilometers here and there to adjust to the predictable paths of 
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regular bombing campaigns. The war cost American taxpayers $686 billion in 
FY2008 dollars, peaking at 2.3% of GDP in 1968, an enormous cost in absolute 
terms but one the prolific U.S. economy could withstand without significant 
structural adjustments.186 
 2,594,000 U.S. military personnel served within the borders of South 
Vietnam in one capacity or another.187 58,220 U.S. military personnel perished in 
the war, 61% of whom were aged 21 or younger. 38,224 of these deaths were 
attributed to the Army, 14,884 to the Marine Corps, 2,559 to the Navy, 2,586 to 
the Air Force, and 7 to the Coast Guard.188 Roughly one-third of those killed were 
drafted. Table 2 gives an overview of American casualties:189 
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 Americans were far more concerned with the lives of other Americans 
than with the financial burden of the war, which was harmful to the U.S. economy 
but not substantial enough to be debilitating. While the "Vietnam Syndrome" 
discussed in Criterion II lasted for a great many years, it was more likely due to 
the fact that America failed than the fact that it expended great financial 
resources in the battle to defeat Vietnamese Communists. In other words, 
despite an alternative undercurrent of isolationism, Americans have always 
shown a willingness to go to war and pay a great cost for a cause believed to be 
worth fighting for. What Americans were neither prepared for nor accustomed to 
was to lose such a monumental military campaign, especially against a perceived 
Lilliputian such as North Vietnam, and to lose so many soldiers in the process. 
 A number of factors all but guaranteed that the cost of the war would grow 
as the years of escalation advanced. There was, of course, the obvious cost of 
Table 2: U.S. Casualties of the Vietnam War 
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maintaining and supplying more troops all the way around the world; hundreds of 
thousands were more costly than tens of thousands. But certain aspects of the 
military strategy in Vietnam built upscaling costs in them. In 1965, when the 
buildup was taking form, General Westmoreland shifted away from the extant 
strategy of protecting the population to seeking out the enemy wherever he lay, 
in order to seize the battle initiative and ferret out VC and NVA wherever they 
materialized en masse. He did not abandon pacification (pacification is discussed 
in OPM Indicator III), but he did reformulate the war effort from defensive 
protection to offensive maneuvers, shifting the aim from strategic defense against 
NVA and VCI incursions to aggression to seek out and eliminate their forces, or 
"search and destroy," as it came to be known. He instituted a three-phase plan 
that would utilize the increasing number of troops in an increasingly offensive 
capacity. First, he would stunt the NVA offensive in the central highlands in order 
to stop their momentum. He would then use the twenty-four battalions that would 
be at his disposal in 1966 to secure the capitol region, the delta provinces, and 
other key areas of the conflict. He envisioned victory in 1968, when "the 
incremental attrition of enemy strength would make the war too costly and force 
the enemy to seek a negotiated settlement," thus fixing the number of forces to 
the expectation of success as the buildup became fully implemented: 
 
The arrival of North Vietnamese and American combat forces in the 
summer of 1965 transformed the nature of the war in South 
Vietnam. By the end of the summer, the enemy's combat strength, 
which had steadily increased in 1964 and early 1965, reached an 
estimated 221,000, including 55 NVA battalions and 105 VC 
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battalions. At the end of July, President Johnson announced plans 
to deploy forty-four more army and marine battalions, increasing 
American military strength in South Vietnam to 175,000 by the end 
of the year. The president had decided to send regular U.S. Army 
units and not to mobilize any reserve units. It was no longer just a 
struggle to defeat Viet Cong insurgents. A war between 
conventional North Vietnamese forces that had entered South 
Vietnam and American ground forces, the so-called main force war, 
was superimposed on the continuing political struggle for the 
countryside. MACV changed from a staff originally concerned with 
advisory duties to a headquarters, dubbed "Pentagon East," that 
increasingly concentrated on operations. As U.S. Army and Marine 
Crops units arrived in 1965, pacification became known as the 
"other war," a patronizing usage that stigmatized the program's 
status as a noble but failing endeavor that was no longer the main 
event.190 
 
 
The "other war" was actually a commonly used official term in military and CIA 
documents, signifying the program to "win the hearts and minds" of the 
population by protecting it from the influence and intimidation of the VCI. The 
"main event" indeed changed dramatically in 1965, due to the intensification of 
combat, as described by Colonel Hal Moore recounting the Battle of the Ia Drang 
Valley:  
 
Now came the body count. From the beginning of the fight I had 
known that higher headquarters would eventually want to know 
what damage we had done to the enemy. So after each major 
action in this battle, hating it, I asked my company commanders for 
their best estimates of enemy killed. With the battle raging back and 
forth over three days and two nights, it was anything but orderly. 
There was no referee to call time out for a body count. We did the 
best we could to keep a realistic count of enemy dead. In the end it 
added up to 834 dead by body count, with an additional 1,215 
estimated killed and wounded by artillery, air attacks, and aerial                                                         
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rocket attacks. On my own I cut the figure back to 634, a personal 
allowance for the confusion and fog of war, and let the 1,215 
estimated stand. We captured and evacuated six enemy prisoners. 
On our side, we had lost 79 Americans killed in action, 121 
wounded, and none missing. But the body count on both sides, 
tragic as it was, did not go to the heart of the matter. What had 
happened here in these three days was a sea change in the 
Vietnam War. For the first time since Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the 
North Vietnamese Army had taken the field in division strength. 
People's Army soldiers were pouring down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 
unprecedented numbers, and now they had intervened directly and 
powerfully on the battlefield in South Vietnam. Seventy-nine 
Americans had been killed in just three days in X-Ray. The cost of 
America's involvement in this obscure police action had just risen 
dramatically. Vietnam was now a whole new ball game militarily, 
politically, and diplomatically. Decisions would have to be made in 
Washington and Hanoi, and they would have to be made soon.191  
 
 
Colonel Moore understood exactly how the war was evolving to the NVA division 
level even in real-time, just as John Paul Vann had understood the significance 
of the VC fighting a pitched battle and holding its own at Ap Bac. Moore 
understood the misperception involved in measuring success by enemy dead, as 
well as the connection between that strategy of attrition and the implication that 
American war dead would inevitably come to assume the other side of that 
metric. A war of attrition was a two-sided coin, even with a 10:1 kill ratio and 
superior firepower. When Ho Chi Minh estimated "You will kill ten of our men, 
and we will kill one of yours, and in the end it will be you who tire of it," the 
calculation was perhaps more scientific than even Ho realized.  
 The first chapter of Colonel Harry Summers' book American Strategy in 
Vietnam: A Critical Analysis, "Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat," opens with a                                                         
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quote that Colonel Summers received as Chief, Negotiations Division, U.S. 
Delegation, Four Party Joint Military Team, from Colonel Tu, Chief, North 
Vietnamese (DRV) Delegation, on April 25, 1975, after the North had taken over 
Saigon: 
 
"You know you never defeated us on the battlefield," said the 
American Colonel. 
 
The North Vietnamese Colonel pondered this remark a moment. 
"That may be so," he replied, "but it is also irrelevant."192  
 
 
Colonel Summers then briefly alludes to Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts' political-
bureaucratic study (discussed in the Part II), which asserts that the system 
worked, but nonetheless failed to achieve its objectives. Some military leaders 
lauded the contribution of the military effort as an "unqualified success" if its job 
were to "organize, train and equip active duty and reserve forces," given that "the 
Army doesn't make strategy," leaving grand strategy to the statesmen and 
figuring out tactics on its own. Repeatedly invoking the military philosophy of 
Clausewitz in his 1832 publication On War, such as the need to "develop a 
theory that maintains a balance among what he calls the trinity of war—the 
people, the government, and the army," Summers describes the 1832 work as 
"the most modern source available" (emphasis in the original) and "untainted by 
today’s bias."  
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 Summers blames both military tacticians for failing to develop a viable 
strategy and failing to communicate strategic imperatives to the FPDM officials in 
Washington, D.C., as well as the negligence of those officials. Specifically, he 
blames the war strategy for failing to attack the real enemy, the NVA, rather than 
the "near" enemy of the VC, who were directed and supplied by North Vietnam. 
His obsession with Clausewitz obscures the modern complexities of this war for 
preponderance with an unlikely Lilliputian. Yet, quite astutely, he recognizes that 
the Vietnam War was fundamentally a problem of American society: even in the 
time of Clausewitz it was necessary to maintain support for the war at home. The 
memoirs of the military men so involved in the Vietnam War illustrate how the 
correlation between its human cost and the confusion over how to evaluate it 
combined to lead the strategy into blunder.  
 
 
 
Criterion IV. Availability and consideration of alternatives 
   
 It is a common misperception that leaders are dragged into a 'quagmire' 
by circumstances, political demands, security concerns, or other inevitable 
imperatives, and that therefore we should not retroactively assess the very 
difficult decisions forced upon them by the constraints and demands of an 
anarchical, dangerous international system. Indeed, this is one of the perceptions 
scholars cite in dissuading against FPE in the first place. This perception is not 
only false, but it also carries with it the effect of providing excuses to future 
leaders that their actions will be accepted to the point of exculpation. This 
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chapter gives examples of this misperception in the scholarly literature, while 
also referencing the counter-literature that takes the opposite approach. This 
section addresses how the alternatives of advisory and escalation were settled 
upon as the advisory period shifted in 1964 to a full-scale military buildup. The 
experience of the Vietnam War shatters the illusion that FPDM officials rationally 
pursue the national interest. At the same time, it shows how a nation can be 
united in blunder, in that the policy that shows clearly harmful trends from an 
early stage is settled upon in spite of those trends because the national 
consensus precludes a more prudent course of action.  
 Two factors thus become clear in any study of the Vietnam War which are 
essential to the overall research objective of this dissertation. First, U.S. foreign 
policymakers did understand the very difficult circumstances in which the U.S. 
military would find itself if a full-scale war were to be the alternative settled upon. 
They knew that success was going to be hard to come by, and settled on 
escalation anyway because the "loss" of Vietnam was never accepted as a viable 
alternative. The grand strategy of preponderance fueled the refusal to accept that 
'Indochina' would fall into Communist hands. One of the many ironies of the war 
was the contradiction between the understanding that victory would be very hard 
to come by, especially when there were no metrics with which to evaluate it, and 
the overwhelming confidence that the invincible American military was incapable 
of losing in battle. In fact, it did not lose a single battle, but still lost the war.  
 Second, this alternative was settled upon as a national consensus, 
including incorporating the preferences of Congressional leaders and the 
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American populace, rather than being a hijacking of foreign policy by a faction of 
foreign-policy hawks that somehow clawed their talons into the Oval Office or a 
terrible FPDM fallacy by a few 'wise men.' This was a national blunder involving 
every aspect of American society and it cannot be attributed to a small group of 
misguided leaders. That said, the FPDM officials that made the mistakes that led 
to blunder must be held accountable for their actions, even if they were in fact 
pursuing the national consensus (if not the national interest—a distinction 
discussed throughout this dissertation).  
 A state's foreign-policy agenda is determined and operationalized based 
on what alternatives are available to the policymaker. The grand strategy of the 
United States necessitated action in any part of the world in which Communism 
could gain a foothold, even in the periphery. Because neither U.S. foreign 
policymakers nor the American people were content to sit back and allow further 
countries to 'fall' into Communist hands, U.S. leaders determined that the 
alternative of doing nothing and allowing a potential Communist takeover of 
Vietnam was neither politically nor morally viable. Thus the alternative that would 
have precluded this tragedy from ever occurring—that of staying out of the 
country militarily altogether, or at least limiting intervention to an advisory role—
never received the attention it needed in order to be considered a viable option. 
There are those who point to the military strategy as being the culprit, and not 
without reason. But any strategy short of attacking North Vietnam and perhaps 
even China with nuclear weapons would have proven insufficient in the face of 
the determined enemy.  
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 While there is now general consensus in both the scholarly and popular 
literature that the Vietnam War was a blunder from which there was little to gain 
even in victory, there is considerable debate over the extent to which non-
intervention in Vietnam was considered by foreign policymakers and the extent to 
which the Kennedy Administration differed from the Johnson Administration in its 
calculations. In The Bitter Heritage, historian and Kennedy advisor Arthur 
Schlesinger argued that the Vietnam debacle was "a tragedy without villains," as 
the United States slowly began to be embroiled in "a land war in Asia—a war 
which no president, including President Johnson, desired or intended."193 This is 
a shortsighted view of the circumstances. It may be true that no president desired 
it, but it is not true that no president intended it. Who, if not a presidential 
administration, can set and shape policy alternatives? If no president intended a 
war, how did the war come about? At the center of this debate over to what 
extent the various presidents involved held sway over the availability of 
alternatives is whether Eisenhower and Kennedy had so marooned Vietnam 
policy as to place it beyond the scale of de-escalation. 
 As Gary Hess describes, "this interpretation, which is reflected in much of 
scholarly literature, substantially exonerates America's leaders as reasonable 
men acting prudently on the basis of existing assumptions and projections, but 
with tragic consequences" (emphasis mine). Hess presents a distinction between 
what he terms the "turning point argument" and the "Cold War imperative 
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interpretation," with the former contending that Kennedy's exceptional "prudence" 
would have prevented a large-scale military intervention in Vietnam and the latter 
contending that Kennedy was a Cold War warrior like any other that held no 
special trait that would have prevented it. (This debate mirrors the change-
continuity debate discussed in Chapter 3). Unsurprisingly, those close to 
Kennedy, such as Schlesinger and Robert Dallek, Kennedy's preeminent 
biographer, argue that he was determined not to commit troops en masse to 
Vietnam, due to the tenuous circumstances in which the country and the GVN 
were attempting to survive. David Kaiser asserts that Kennedy had determined 
that if Diem's regime became untenable, the United States "would not regard 
South Vietnam as a vital American interest" and would therefore allow it to fall.194 
But as Hess notes, "although Kennedy talked of the need for the Vietnamese to 
fight their own wars, he actually took steps that pulled the United States much 
more deeply militarily and politically into the survival of South Vietnam."195 The 
same is true of Johnson, who proclaimed on multiple occasions that he wanted 
Vietnam to fend for itself, and yet he chose to escalate troop levels into the 
hundreds of thousands.  
 Just as the continuity in U.S. foreign policy argument discussed in Chapter 
3 is more compelling than the change argument, the "Cold War imperative" 
approach is more compelling as well. If the historiography of the Vietnam War                                                         
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has proved anything, it is that many of the pitfalls of a potential full-scale war in a 
former French colony were all too clear even to the Eisenhower Administration, 
which oversaw the unsuccessful French defense falter at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 
and thus inherited the "problem" of Vietnam for itself. Eisenhower, having written 
in his diary, "I am convinced that no type of military victory is possible in this type 
of theater," pledged only financial and air-power support to the French, adding 
$385 million in aid in addition to the $2 billion from the Truman Administration, 
which was willing to commit troops to Indochina but unable to do so with so many 
troops garrisoned in Korea.196  
 Despite the refrain of those who would absolve U.S. foreign policymakers 
of the colossal blunder that Vietnam ultimately became, as a state, across 
leaders, very few prominent figures involved in U.S. foreign policy at the highest 
levels were prepared to allow Saigon to fall into Communist hands, even if the 
threat of such an inevitability necessitated a military intervention, precisely the 
course these leaders charted from the very beginning. Perhaps none of them 
desired it, but by dismissing the possibility of 'Indochina' falling into Communist 
hands, they forced their own hands toward that intention. The leaders ignored the 
local realities of Vietnam because they chose instead to focus on the bigger 
picture, which is to say Containment policy and the total demonization of 
Communism everywhere. Although this was especially true after the 
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assassination of Kennedy, it was also true to a certain extent in his 
administration.  
 
Whether Kennedy would have withdrawn U.S. forces from Vietnam, 
as some have speculated, cannot be known. He probably would not 
have. He was as determined as Eisenhower had been to support or 
to build a viable state in South Vietnam opposed to Communist 
North Vietnam. But just as Kennedy should not be commended for 
planning to end the U.S. military commitment to South Vietnam, 
Eisenhower should not be congratulated for avoiding one. Both 
warrant plaudits putting the braces on more zealous, reckless 
advisers. Yet neither demonstrated the foresight or political courage 
to make a decision based on the realistic assessment that there 
never would be a viable state of South Vietnam and that a unified 
Vietnam under Communist leadership would not threaten the 
United States or its allies. For different reasons, Eisenhower and 
Kennedy would likely have responded to the challenges in Vietnam 
that confronted Lyndon Johnson differently and more effectively 
than he did. Yet neither can escape responsibility for their role in 
forcing those challenges on their successor.197 
 
 
Even this passage from the well-researched Richard Immerman, from the 
Columbia History of the Vietnam War, attempts to make a decisive projection of 
what Kennedy would have done without actually providing convincing evidence 
that he would have done anything differently than anyone else, because there is 
no convincing evidence—in fact, there is evidence to support either claim. 
Kennedy's statements on Vietnam and Laos were just as contradictory as every 
other leader's.  
 On November 22, 1963, when Kennedy's assassination made Johnson 
president, there were 16,000 troops stationed in Vietnam, not a meager number 
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by any stretch, but one that would soon be dwarfed over the course of the next 
two years. Once it became clear in 1964 that the government of South Vietnam 
could not stand on its own, there were essentially two options in Vietnam: commit 
troops en masse or permit the loss of South Vietnam, and potentially other 
neighboring countries comprising the former territory of French Indochina, to 
Communist expansion. McNamara summarized three alternatives in 1964 as 
"leave the country with as little loss as possible, maintain present force and lose 
slowly, or add 100,000 men—recognizing that number may not be enough—and 
adding more next year."198  Over the course of 1964, Johnson steadily 
began to Americanize the war effort on a scale that would eventually become 
monumental. What turned into a gradual buildup of forces was the result of the 
foreign policymaking establishment deciding that neither pulling out nor assuming 
responsibility for the war was a viable option. Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
griped "that the consequences of both escalation and withdrawal are so bad that 
we simply must find a away of making our present policy work."199 The "present 
policy" that ensued consisted of slowly ramping up offensive combative 
operations against the VC and initiating an aerial bombing campaign against 
North Vietnam to punish aggression against South Vietnam. This pseudo-
strategy, while destined to fail strategically in the long term, achieved two short-
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term tactical aims: it placated the Cold War hawks at home, and sent a message 
to the VC that attacks would be met in kind.  
 Unfortunately, what this alternative did was to institutionalize a war of 
attrition in which the NVA and VC became more motivated each time one of its 
own was killed, while the United States became less so and at the same time 
less willing to pull out. Roger Hilsman describes this stay-the-course philosophy 
with regard to the Kennedy Administration:  "In an interesting example of one 
type of gambit in the politics of Washington policy-making, the President avoided 
a direct 'no' to the proposal for introducing troops to Vietnam. He merely let the 
decision slide, at the same time ordering the government to set in motion all the 
preparatory steps for introducing troops." 200  Meanwhile, President Diem's 
promise to enact democratic reforms in exchange for American advisors, 
technicians, mechanics, B-26 and T-28 helicopters and their pilots turned up 
empty as he continued on with business as usual, maintaining the status quo on 
the GVN end. There seemed to be no way out, but only because nobody would 
devise an alternative that would incorporate the possibility of 'losing' Vietnam. 
 Ultimately, the story of Vietnam was not so much about what alternatives 
were available, but how foreign policymakers justified the need to adhere to the 
status quo of neither winning nor losing amongst themselves and to the 
American voting public. U.S. war planners and statesmen had every opportunity 
to rethink the strategy in Vietnam due to the low intensity of American 
involvement during the advisory years of the conflict. In sum, U.S. foreign                                                         
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policymakers set their own alternatives at only two: advise, assist, and hope for 
the best, which prevailed during the Kennedy Administration until his 
assassination, and assume and protect, which prevailed in the Johnson 
Administration once the GVN appeared unable to stand on its own. Because of 
his assassination, exactly what Kennedy may have done will forever remain a 
counterfactual. What did happen was that Johnson chose to "Americanize" the 
war effort in Vietnam rather than allow it to fall into Communist hands.  
 There is a tendency in the literature to place undue emphasis on the 
personal stubbornness of Johnson's and Nixon's myopia in dealing with the 
Vietnam War, and indeed both were myopically stubborn in conceptualizing and 
implementing their hopes and fears as far as the conflict was concerned. Many 
accounts of the Vietnam War focusing on presidential decision-making point to 
the character deficiencies of the two principle presidential protagonists, and not 
without substantial evidence. For example, David Halberstam's The Best and the 
Brightest quotes Johnson as saying, "I don't want loyalty. I want loyalty. I want 
him to kiss my ass in Macy's window at high noon and tell me it smells like roses. 
I want his pecker in my pocket."201 Donald Schmidt assesses that "a 'Caligula 
Syndrome' haunted the Executive Mansion as Lyndon Johnson overwhelmed all 
advisors," leading to an environment in which "advisors denigrated into 
sycophants as the Johnson ego swept all before it."202 In fact, entire volumes 
have been dedicated simply to illustrate the FPDM folly of the Johnson                                                         
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Administration (Because President Nixon took power after escalation had come 
to fruition, the line of inquiry is slightly less intriguing with regard to that 
administration). In Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam, H.R. McMaster declares, "The War in 
Vietnam was not lost in the field, nor was it lost on the front pages of The New 
York Times or on the college campuses. It was lost in Washington, D.C."203  
 While the low-hanging fruit of the arrogance, obstinacy, and cognitive 
biases of the faulty FPDM of the Johnson Administration no doubt contributed to 
the strategic folly in Vietnam, it does not account for the whole picture.  Although 
it is true to a certain degree that 'yes-men' were valued in the Johnson and Nixon 
Administrations as they are to a certain degree in any leadership group, the 
extent to which this philosophy informed war planning has been exaggerated. 
The central problem of the strategy was that the nation, not just the president and 
his cabinet, had an appetite to fight Communism militarily, at least until 1968. 
Larry Berman demonstrates the case in Planning a Tragedy that the failure of 
policy in Vietnam was not an isolated symptom of a particular, ephemeral FPDM 
ill but rather was seen as a weapon in the arsenal of preponderance that could 
hit Communism with force rather than words alone. At some point Americans 
needed to weaponize the lofty rhetoric of the Cold War or risk the self-emplaced 
label of cowardice; Vietnam was as good a place as any. President Johnson 
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explained as much when he addressed the nation in April 1965 at Johns Hopkins 
University: 
 
The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is 
never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to 
prepare for the next. We must stay in Southeast Asia—as we did in 
Europe—in the words of the Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no 
further..." Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam, and 
its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves—only that 
the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country 
in their own way.204 
 
 
Privately and among aides and small groups of journalists, he would characterize 
the Cold War and its hot proxies in cruder terms. "If you let a bully come into your 
front yard one day, the next day he will be on your porch and the day after that 
he'll rape your wife in your own bed."205 After bombing North Vietnam in 1964, he 
declared, "I didn't just screw Ho Chi Minh, I cut his pecker off."206 When asked 
about why he would be successful in Vietnam, Johnson "unzipped his fly, drew 
out his substantial organ, and declared, 'This is why.'"207  
 In this way, National Security Advisor to both President Kennedy and 
President Johnson McGeorge Bundy, whom the term "the best and the brightest" 
was named for, estimated that "Kennedy didn't want to be dumb," but "Johnson                                                         
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didn't want to be a coward."208 Bundy therefore concludes that Kennedy would 
never have allowed escalation to happen had he survived long enough to make 
that decision. While he is far from the only FPDM official to make that case, any 
account that focuses exclusively on the personality or foreign-policy preferences 
of the president omits the majority of the motivations and justifications for a war 
in Vietnam. The sociopolitical causes of this national blunder cannot be 
constrained to a small group of people. It was in large part the result of the 
pursuit of preponderance and its theoretical employment of Containment, 
especially in a region in which the United States was already invested.  
 
Criterion V. Context, scope, and stakes  
 
 The Vietnam War was being fought in the minds of U.S. policymakers long 
before American soldiers were ever deployed to the deltas, jungles, and 
highlands of Vietnam. Of the three case studies examined in this dissertation, the 
case of Vietnam is most heavily influenced by the international context. The Cold 
War affected every aspect of U.S. foreign policy. Most importantly, it defined the 
image America had of itself as the hegemonic defender of freedom in every 
corner of the globe, the world's only indispensible nation, without which the 'Free 
World' would inevitably succumb to the barbarities of heathenism and 
Communism. The question, in terms of policy, was never whether Communism 
or Soviet expansionism were evil or needed to be expelled from the earth. This 
was taken as a given. Instead, policymakers needed to find a way to satisfy the                                                         
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American impulse to purge the world of this scourge most effectively using finite 
resources as resourcefully as possible. They ended up doing the exact opposite 
of this. The answer to the question of why and how the United States instead 
ended up squandering 58,220 U.S. troops and $686 billion in the process of 
losing its first major war is therefore found in the American self-image as the 
global defender of the 'Free World.'  
 The rationalization for Vietnam policy—that Vietnam was at that time the 
frontier of the sacred battle against Communism and to abandon the freedom-
loving people of South Vietnam was in effect to abandon the perimeter of the 
'Free World'—was repeatedly invoked by virtually every major political and 
military leader of the era involved in the campaign. Ironically, the massive 
commitment that accompanied knotting the global lens of the Cold War so tightly 
with the effort in Vietnam may have been what doomed the war from the outset. 
Not only was Vietnam the wrong place to pick a fight with Communism given the 
ineptitude of the effete GVN and the strength and following of Hanoi, but it used 
resources in a way that meant the ends of anti-Communism and the means of 
military expenditure became inversely related in this anti-nationalist campaign.  
 To be sure, the military strategy in Vietnam failed. But to view the Vietnam 
War as a failure of military strategy obscures the historical context and the 
division within the American self-conception. To view this tragic event in 
American history, as many analyses do, dismissing the historical context 
obfuscates the larger picture with which policymakers made their calculations, 
practical or not. Just as the battlefields of the Cold War found seedlings in the 
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ashes of World War II, so too did the Vietnamese people transform their struggle 
to expel French colonialism into a struggle to expel American invasion. One of 
the most glaring oversights of war planning was the portrayal of the Vietnamese 
peasant as weak and incapable of mounting any meaningful resistance against a 
modern American army, even when acknowledging the French collapse at Dien 
Bien Phu in 1954. As far back as Yalta, President Roosevelt did not understand 
the devout history of Vietnamese nationalism, saying that "the Indochinese were 
people of small stature, like the Javanese and Burmese, and were not warlike," 
adding that "France had done nothing to improve the natives since she had the 
colony." 209  While Roosevelt, still in the midst of the fervor over the wartime 
campaign of freeing the peoples of the Earth, retained more sympathy for those 
living under the yoke of colonialism than would his Cold Warrior successors, his 
was but part of a long series of underestimations of the historical sense of 
nationalism that would become among the U.S. military's fiercest obstacles 
during the Vietnam War. This nationalism transcended the 17th parallel. 
 After 1954, U.S. foreign policymakers thus "inherited" the problem of 
Vietnam, realizing that financial assistance alone would not prevent Communist 
victory. Meanwhile, to the Vietnamese people, North and South alike, the polar 
opposite view was taken: the average Vietnamese cared little about the 
international context, and much more about their ability to pursue their daily lives 
without interference from meddlers, whether the meddlers hailed from the other                                                         
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side of Vietnam, a distant state in Saigon indifferent to their daily struggles, or an 
outside power intent on stemming the flow of Communism from Moscow or 
Beijing.   
 That the country divided into two, and subsequently fought what was in 
effect a civil war with a superpower taking one side, says much more about 
Vietnam than it does about the Cold War, as was true in every Cold War 
battlefield from Cuba to Uganda. This discrepancy between the views of the 
outside power and those of the local people, even in the virtually stateless areas 
of rural South Vietnam, precluded a workable partnership between the United 
States and the GVN, just as it has in various countries in which an outside power 
interferes in the internal affairs of another to advance its own objectives. Even 
where a 'puppet' state is emplaced, the outside power often finds it difficult to 
advance its own agenda, since locals have an agenda of their own. This is 
especially true when the local opposition can count on outside support, as the 
Soviets would later learn in Afghanistan.  
 U.S. foreign policymakers were correct about one thing: North Vietnam 
never would have accepted even a neutral South Vietnam, although if it had 
remained neutral war may have been delayed and less costly. What we now 
know about the domino theory, and what U.S. foreign policymakers failed to 
understand at the time, was the extent to which every state in the international 
system sought to advance its own interests above all else. Thousands of years of 
realist international-relations evidence, hundreds of years of state-centered 
international-relations evidence, and decades of modern realist IR scholarship 
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should have informed both American and Soviet understanding of the desired 
autonomy of even Lilliputians, but neither fully grasped this interminable social 
phenomenon. Although the concepts of state sovereignty and the national 
interest are well known fundamentals of realist theory, they seem to have been 
overlooked by strategy planners in Washington whose tunnel vision lumped all 
Communism into one category of evil. Communist countries around the world not 
only competed with each other along traditional balance-of-power lines, but also 
for influence in foreign insurgencies and access to markets and political systems 
throughout the developing world. Still, in the Cold War between the West and 
Communism, every country lost into enemy hands indeed fed the myth that the 
enemy had to be confronted or it would continue to expand.  
 One of the great ironies of the war was that the war itself became the 
stakes: there were very little stakes until the decision to commit was made, at 
which time victory became paramount because of the refusal to accept defeat. 
The 'investment trap' had the effect of increasing the cost of the war while 
increasing the scope of it on that cost alone. The strategic effect of the South 
being overrun by the North was nonzero, but it was neither significant in the 
larger picture of the international system. State Department Official Chester 
Cooper commented in the spring of 1965, just as the buildup was taking shape, 
"The 75,000 American troops in Vietnam were now a hostage. They represented 
too large a force to pull out without a tremendous loss of prestige, yet they were 
too small a combat force to take over the burden of the fighting from the clearly 
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ineffectual South Vietnamese forces."210 Cooper, who also served on the NSC, 
adeptly illustrates the groupthink aspect of Vietnam thinking: 
 
During the process I would frequently fall into a Walter Mitty-like 
fantasy. When my turn came, I would rise to my feet slowly, look 
around the room and then directly look at the President, and say 
very quietly and emphatically, 'Mr. President, gentlemen, I most 
definitely do not agree.' But I was removed from my trance when I 
heard the President's voice saying, 'Mr. Cooper, do you agree?' 
And out would come a 'Yes, Mr. President, I agree.'211 
 
 
Yet it was not groupthink that led to the tragedy of Vietnam. There simply was no 
way to reconcile the refusal to 'lose' Vietnam and the acceptance that it was not 
worth mass American casualties. 
 A passage from President Nixon's memoir displays the higher level of 
abstraction that the war permanently fell victim to: 
 
While the path to the Chinese Summit had unfolded relatively 
smoothly, the way to the Soviet Summit was strewn with pitfalls. 
During the first few months of 1972, our intelligence indicated that 
vast quantities of Soviet arms were pouring into North Vietnam. "I 
think that what offends me most about the Soviets is their utter lack 
of subtlety," Kissinger said when we learned this. "They're just 
trying to blacken China's eyes because of your trip. They want to 
increase their influence in Hanoi, but they don't see the danger of 
giving new toys to the North Vietnamese fanatics." On January 25, I 
wrote a letter to Brezhnev informing him of my speech that night 
and stating, "The Soviet Union should understand that the United 
States would have no choice but to react strongly to actions by the 
North Vietnamese which are designed to humiliate us. Such 
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developments would be to no one's benefit and would serve to 
complicate the international situation."212 
 
 
Lost in this international-system level of analysis is the situation in Vietnam itself, 
which had of course been quite tenuous for some nine years. Nixon then 
comments on his personal FPDM process with regard to the U.S. national 
interest in Vietnam: 
 
I pointed out that I had withdrawn over 500,000 troops from 
Vietnam. I had shown the greatest restraint when the North 
Vietnamese began their massive buildup in March, because I did 
not want anything to affect the summit. But when the North 
Vietnamese actually invaded South Vietnam, I had no choice but to 
react strongly. "The General Secretary remarked earlier that some 
people may have wondered whether the action I took last month 
was because of irritation," I said. "If that were the case, I would be a 
very dangerous man in the position I am in. But that is not the case. 
On the contrary, my decision was taken in cold objectivity. That is 
the way I always act, having in mind the consequences and the 
risks."213 
 
 
This "cold objectivity" with which he described his FPDM was quite a departure 
for the man who had confided in his Chief of Staff, H.R. Hadelman, "I call it the 
Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the 
point where I might do anything to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them 
that, 'for God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about communism. We can't 
restrain him when he's angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button' and 
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Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace."214 Perhaps 
following Machiavelli's advice that it can sometimes be "a very wise thing to 
simulate madness," this was one of his confounding responses to the maddening 
stalemate of the war and the feeling of helplessness brought about by a strategic 
inability to achieve victory and a political-expedient inability to withdraw.215  
 In the minds of U.S. foreign policymakers there clearly was some kind of 
connection between Vietnam and the broader Cold War, but what exactly was it? 
Kissinger coined a concept to describe the connection between the Soviet Union 
as the epicenter of the global Cold War and Vietnam, which he termed "linkage." 
Nixon had argued publicly in his 1968 campaign that that the Soviet Union was 
"the key" to getting some kind of settlement achieved in Vietnam. Kissinger, for 
his part, believed that the "proper incentives" were "not yet in place" for the 
Soviets to have enough of a stake in desiring an American withdrawal. As the 
war had drawn on, Hanoi had gained technical expertise, weaponry, resolve, and 
confidence, and therefore had become less reliant on its overseers in Beijing and 
Moscow; this all while continuing to receive arms and support from both, given 
that neither wanted to relinquish a foothold in the country to the other or allow 
Hanoi to slip completely from their grasp. Kissinger's biographer, Walter 
Isaacson, describes Kissinger's concept of "linkage" as a "variegation" of Nixon's 
focus on Moscow: 
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American policies toward the Soviet Union on various issues—
trade, arms control, Vietnam, etc.—should be linked. In the crudest 
sense, this meant using trade on arms agreements as bargaining 
levers to extract Soviet help on Vietnam. But in a subtler sense, 
linkage was a way to assure that policy reflected reality. For 
example, it would be unrealistic to expect great progress in arms 
control at the same time as there was increased Soviet-American 
tension over regional wars, such as Vietnam. By acknowledging 
these linkages, Washington could create a framework of incentives 
and penalties that would, in theory, make it in Moscow's interest to 
be helpful on Vietnam. Linkage was a policy that played to 
Kissinger's intellectual strengths: it appealed to a person who could 
conjure up the connections and motivations that linked far-flung 
events. That type of thinking came naturally to someone who was 
both a brilliant conceptualizer and slightly conspiratorial in outlook, 
who could feel the connections the way a spider senses twitches in 
its web. Nixon was receptive to the idea of linkage, which Kissinger 
spelled out to a meeting of the National Security Council on the day 
of the inauguration.216 
 
 
FPE Conclusion   
 
 The Vietnam War is commonly conceived of as the classic U.S. foreign-
policy blunder. The engagement failed to meet its objectives, fell victim to events 
and circumstances that could have been and were foreseen long before their 
unfortunate occurrence, cost an exorbitant sum in blood and treasure, and 
caused great harm to the national interest. This harm was most present in the 
prestige and morale of the nation, since one of the ironic elements of the blunder 
was the virtual irrelevance of the peripheral Southeast Asian nation of Vietnam to 
the national security of the United States, an irrelevance rendering the huge cost 
of the failed campaign grossly disproportionate to the importance of the policy's 
objectives. It is difficult to imagine U.S. foreign policymakers in 1964 being willing 
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to expend even for victory the cost that was ultimately expended in defeat. In the 
end, the national refusal to allow Communism to spread, under the guise of 
preponderance, amounted to a FPDM process at the highest levels akin to 
placing a blindfold over the conductor of a train. Though this blunder-inducing 
FPDM is certainly not unique to the "American War" in Vietnam, the event serves 
as a historical admonition against hubris, dismissal of state differentiation, and 
the cognitive and institutional biases promulgated my ideological myopia.  
 In his later writings, McNamara attempted to mitigate some of his 
miscalculations by engaging in a series of intellectual discussions and 
publications with various scholars and policymakers, including a book partially 
based on conversations with North Vietnamese politicians and war planners and 
a documentary. Among his conclusions in Argument Without End: In Search of 
Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy are that the war could not have been won along 
strictly military lines (hardly a controversial conclusion), but also that the war 
could have been much more limited in scope, perhaps even avoided altogether, if 
leaders in both Hanoi and Washington had taken a less aggressive stance.217 
This seems a superficial conclusion, given that simple conversations rarely 
resolve deep-seated international conflict. McNamara and his fellows delineate 
six principal lessons from the mistakes made in the Vietnam War on both sides: 
(1) understand the mind-set of your adversary; (2) communicate with your 
adversary at a high level; (3) in foreign policy, practice the democratic principles 
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you preach (by bringing the public and Congress into the decision-making 
process); (4) apply power only in a context of multilateral decision-making (aside 
from territorial self-defense of the United States); (5) acknowledge that some 
problems in international affairs have no solution, particularly no military solution 
(emphasis mine); and (6) organize to apply and administer military power with 
intensity and thoroughness.218 
 While the Vietnam War certainly was a national tragedy, and even a 
tragedy for the casualty-stricken yet victorious North Vietnamese and VC, the 
constant use of the war as tragedy by its policymaking overseers and their 
scholarly apologists obfuscates it understanding, characterization, and 
classification. While it can certainly be conceived as a national tragedy in that the 
American people were complicit and negligent in failing to scrutinize both the 
grand strategy of preponderance and the specific FPDM of their leaders, these 
leaders were not ordinary citizens. They held privileged information and 
intelligence and consistently lied amongst themselves and to the country about 
the motivations for the war, the methods used in the war, the state of the war, 
and the outlook for it to be brought to a successful conclusion. It is therefore 
imprudent of the scholar both on moral and academic grounds to examine it as "a 
tragedy without villains." Part II instead examines the war along the lines of the 
OPM model, the conceptual foundation of foreign-policy blunder in U.S. grand 
strategy expounded in Chapter 3.  
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 Stanley Karnow writes in his epic history of the war, "History is an organic 
process, a continuity of related events, inexorable yet not inevitable. Leaders and 
the people who follow them make and support choices, but within the context of 
their experience and aspirations. The roots of the American intervention were 
planted and nurtured in what Professor Daniel Bell has called America's concept 
of its own 'exceptionalism.'"219 This exceptionalism is a two-sided coin. William 
Fulbright describes this Manichean Americanism thusly: "The inconstancy of 
American foreign policy is not an accident but an expression of two distinct sides 
of the American character. Both are characterized by a kind of moralism, but one 
is the morality of decent instincts tempered by the knowledge of human 
imperfection and the other is the morality of absolute self-assurance fired by the 
crusading spirit." 
 While these two sides of the American character are fundamentally 
ideational in origin, the true understanding of their value, good, bad, and neutral, 
can only be assessed through their material manifestation in the physical world. 
An idea must find application to justify its relevance. At the center of that 
interchange is the foreign policymaker, whose trade defines the purpose and 
direction of the state in the process of colliding with other states. Distinctions 
between the words, desires, imperatives, alternatives, and actions of FPDM 
officials are sometimes in line and sometimes incredibly murky. So far, we have 
seen that they tend to get murkier the more they are attached to ideological 
pretense. While Part I has attempted to evaluate the what and how of the foreign                                                         
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policy of the Vietnam War, Part II attempts to address in further detail the how 
and why of the war in order to contextualize it within the broader umbrella of U.S. 
grand strategy. Where FPE meets OPM is in the bounded rationality of mission.  
 
Part II. OPM  
 
Indicator I. U.S. estimation of capability to transform the politics of Vietnam   
 
 Every aspect of the Vietnam War can be analyzed along some kind of 
paradoxical lines, and Indicator I is no exception. For while the long line of 
evidence of U.S. foreign policymakers' private statements demonstrates that they 
almost invariably held great reservations about committing to 'Indochina,' they 
willingly did so. This was due in part to the contradiction that it was inconceivable 
that the U.S. military could be defeated (the potential war being instead a 
concern of what victory would cost in blood and treasure), and yet it was also 
unclear what could be gained politically in a peripheral country with only a 
shadow of a state in Saigon. This reluctance to commit to Vietnam is evident in 
hundreds of communication transcripts between presidential advisors. For 
example, as early as February 1965, before escalation took hold as policy, 
McGeorge Bundy wrote that "at its very best, the struggle in Vietnam will be 
long," and McNamara agreed that "this war is one of attrition and will be a long 
one." Dean Rusk had warned of "a long and tortuous prospect." War planners 
estimated victory would require 200,000 men and two to three years to resolve. 
Kennedy's advisors had told him in 1961 that he would need 250,000 men and to 
be prepared to use nuclear weapons to secure Laos. And yet, despite all of this 
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ominous forecasting, in the words of Richard Neustadt, "Johnson's advisors just 
could not conceive that the North Vietnamese would not come to terms once they 
saw the opposition they were likely to face and the punishment they might 
suffer." Indeed, Johnson Administration officials told Neustadt "their great 
mistake was to underestimate the North Vietnamese."220 
 Thus while the United States never lost a battle in Vietnam, U.S. foreign 
policymakers still managed to greatly underestimate the will and capability of the 
VC, but particularly the NVA. David Halberstam's conclusion should therefore not 
come as a surprise: 
 
Our total military superiority was checked by their total political 
superiority. In effect this meant we could win any set-piece battle 
we wanted but the other side could easily replenish their battlefield 
losses whenever they wanted (emphasis in the original). What was 
even more depressing was the optimism I found among the top 
Americans in Saigon, which struck me as essentially self-deception. 
There was much heady talk implying that we were on the very edge 
of a final victory and that the other side was ready to crack. 
Invitations were even sent out that December by some high-ranking 
diplomats asking friends to come to the light-at-the-end-of-the-
tunnel Christmas party.221 
 
 
In comparing results to expectations, then, what transpired was the realization of 
foreign policymakers' fears without the realization of their hopes. They had 
accurately identified some of the potential problems in Vietnam, while greatly 
underestimating the cost required to achieve victory and the resolve and                                                         
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capabilities of the enemy. Whether the American people would have been willing 
to pay the costs estimated by war planners is difficult to ascertain, but it became 
a moot point because the costs for both the American public and foreign 
policymakers became too great to sustain, and "Americanization" became 
"Vietnamization," which became the "decent interval" that ultimately led to total 
defeat with the capture of Saigon by North Vietnam and the forced evacuation of 
all Americans and a handful of fortunate Vietnamese from the capitol.  
 From a grand-strategic perspective, the context of the Cold War dictated 
the attitudes, preferences, and assumptions of the U.S. foreign policymakers 
involved in the decision-making, planning, execution, and evolution of the 
Vietnam War. To understand the foreign policy of the Cold War, we must first 
understand the attitude with which American leaders envisioned the place of their 
nation within it. The history of Vietnam is far from insignificant to the Vietnam 
War, but, as it unfortunately was for those leaders, it is beyond the scope of 
current expedience. Briefly, the French colonization of Vietnam began in 1664, 
when a group of French religious officials and a group of French businessmen 
united under the guises of the Society of French Missionaries and the East India 
Company, respectively. A history of violence between France and Vietnam 
ensued. After the arrest of a French priest in 1845, for example, the French Navy 
shelled Da Nang, killing hundreds of people, to which the Vietnamese 
reciprocated by confiscating French Catholic property and killing a number of 
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Jesuits and Vietnamese priests, some of whom they cut in half lengthwise.222 
Chinese mercenaries and French Legionnaires provided security to French 
authority and property, and insurgent resistance against them found safe haven 
in the area around Hanoi, the all-but-impenetrable highlands, and the malaria-
infested swamps and marshlands of the South. In time, the Emperor's Council of 
Mandarin was supplanted with a system of oligarchic clientelism in which select 
Vietnamese, termed suplétifs, would acquiesce to French authority in exchange 
for a favorable position within the polity. Insurrection against French authority 
was suppressed with wanton incarceration, murder, and terrorism.  
 At the Potsdam conference, the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
China agreed to carve the country in half along the seventeenth parallel, with 
Chiang Kai-Shek and his nationalist Chinese Kuomintang army taking control of 
the North. By 1941, Ho Chi Minh began to formalize disparate bands of 
insurgents into an organized revolution under the banner of the Viet Minh (long 
form Vietnam Doc Lap Don Minh Hoi, or League for the Independence of 
Vietnam), an organization that held six of Vietnam's provinces around Hanoi by 
1945. While Ho was an admirer of the United States and its founding documents, 
and had helped the Office of Strategic Services (the precursor to the CIA) search 
for downed American planes, there could be no cooperation between the United 
States and Communists once the Cold War began to materialize.  
 There were some American soldiers alongside the French in the 1950's, 
but assistance mostly took the form of nearly three billion dollars in financial aid                                                         
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to suppress the insurrection, along with four million dollars a year "as a retainer 
for Emperor Bao Dai, who squirreled away the lion's share in Swiss bank 
accounts and foreign real estate."223 By 1954, after the French defeat at Dien 
Bien Phu, the United States had shouldered most of the cost of the French 
military struggle, even while denying the French a full military partner, in concert 
with its own struggle between pragmatism and idealism described in Chapter 3. 
In essence, the United States funded the status quo until the Viet Minh rendered 
it the status quo ante. Thus, just as the U.S. pursuit of preponderance began in 
full swing, the Vietnamese people were achieving their independence for the first 
time in three centuries (although not for the first time—imperial Chinese 
campaigns had been expelled many centuries earlier). The hands of time 
conspired to connect the United States with Vietnam on unfavorable terms.  
 From the outset, U.S. leaders assumed responsibility for Vietnam, and 
'French Indochina' more broadly, without assuming full ownership of it. This 
tenuous tightrope held until 1964, when the war in Vietnam was "Americanized" 
and Vietnam policy fell off the advise-and-assist wagon. In terms of the nation of 
Vietnam and its purpose within the Cold War, policymakers recognized from an 
early stage that it was not a vital interest in and of itself, significant instead for the 
perception of who held momentum between the West and Communism. This 
affected U.S. policy in Vietnam in two ways. First, in considering it a peripheral 
power, it dealt little attention to the problem of what would happen if the U.S. 
military were not able to establish dominance there and bring hostilities to a                                                         
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decisive conclusion in quick fashion. Second, it largely ignored the particularities 
of the Vietnamese people, transposing instead American values on what their 
motivations for support of or resistance to American involvement might be. 
Compounding these two inherent shortcomings was the issue that once it 
committed to defeating Communism in Vietnam, defeat there would be a defeat 
for the American way of life against the expansion of Communism, in accordance 
with broader Cold War objectives.  
 The general consensus is that President Johnson, the "man of little 
background and much uncertainty in foreign affairs" in the words of Hoopes, had 
very little interest in Vietnam and only acquiesced to foreign-policy hawks in 
order to develop his Great Society programs at home. His own public statements 
on Vietnam often followed the same language as those he used in his Great 
Society deliberations, promoting equality, freedom, and social justice. Vietnam 
was therefore not only in the periphery in terms of the national interest, but also 
in the periphery of the most important decision-making mind of the war. 
Escalation took hold under Johnson, even as his overwhelming political calling 
was the development of social justice at home. As described by Walter 
McDougall: 
 
Vietnam was the first war in which the United States dispatched its 
military forces overseas not for the purpose of winning but just to 
buy time for the war to be won by civilian social programs. Had the 
U.S. military been assigned the job of winning, Kennedy would 
never have consented to the 1962 Laos accord, which left that 
"neutral" country open to North Vietnamese infiltration, and 
Johnson would not have restricted U.S. ground and air action 
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against the real enemy, which was North Vietnam. Instead, General 
William Westmoreland was obliged to dispense his forces and to 
waste his firepower in search-and-destroy operations against the 
National Liberation Front, which was in fact Hanoi's cat's-paw and 
rival for control of the South. As Colonel Harry Summers has 
shown, this approach ensured tactical victories but strategic defeat, 
since it failed to isolate the battlefield, neglected to attack the 
enemy's center of gravity in North Vietnam, and indeed assigned 
the offensive role not to the army and air force but to the CIA, 
USAID, and MACV pacification agencies "tasked" with building 
South Vietnam's economy and winning over its people. Vietnam 
was thus "the international equivalent of our domestic Great Society 
programs where we presumed that we knew what was best for the 
world in terms of social, political, and economic development and 
saw it as our duty to force the world into the American mold—to act 
not so much as the World's Policeman as the World's Nanny."224 
 
 
While he overstates the apathetic attitude toward "winning" (nobody wants to 
lose, especially the most powerful state in the international system, and 
especially when that state has never lost a major war), McDougall's point that 
U.S. foreign policymakers never viewed Vietnam as central to U.S. grand 
strategy and never desired to fight a protracted war there is quite accurate. 
However, they did so; desire is all but irrelevant in the 'satisficing' world of 
statecraft. In President Johnson's typically rudimentary idiom, he cautioned 
himself against becoming embroiled in the world of foreign affairs when his true 
political raison d'etre rested at home: "If I left the woman I really loved, the Great 
Society, in order to get involved with that bitch of a war on the other side of the 
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world, then I would lose everything at home. All my programs. All my hopes and 
dreams."225 
 The 'imperatives' of the Cold War did indeed force themselves on U.S. 
foreign policymakers to a certain degree, and it is not entirely coincidental that 
Vietnam became their interlocutor. From 1954 onward, the United States 
assumed it could surmount the problems faced by the French, focusing instead 
on what the cost of keeping South Vietnam within the purview of the "Free World" 
would be. The American calculation was likely that Americans would succeed 
because they were American in the same way that the French thought they 
would succeed because they were French. Fredrik Lovegall examines this 
historical analogy in his exhaustive 2012 Embers of War, winner of the Pulitzer 
Prize in History, writing of American "self delusion," "Somehow, American 
leaders for a long time convinced themselves that the remarkable similarities 
between the French experience and their own were not really there." There was, 
of course, a fundamental difference in the ideology of French colonialism and the 
ideology of American preponderance and anti-Communist sentiment. While 
Charles de Gaulle "spoke of the cohesion, the unbreakable bond, between 
metropolitan France and her overseas territories," President Roosevelt before his 
death planned for the postwar years "to promote Indochina's development toward 
independence under a degree of international supervision."226  
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 The "Free French" movement was therefore a misnomer outside of 
France, just as American liberalism found itself undermined by the threat from 
Communism in the proxy battlefields of the Cold War. Lovegall identifies what he 
terms "The Long 1964" as the critical decision-making phase of mid-1963 to early 
1965 that led to the "Americanization" of the war in Vietnam. He contends that as 
the paternal financial overseer of the French defeat in Vietnam, U.S. foreign 
policymakers believed their superior financial and military power would succeed 
where the French failed. The author also details the overreliance on conventional 
military power to resolve the conflict, even with full knowledge of the prior military 
prowess of the Viet Minh.  
 The question of how U.S. foreign policymakers estimated the capacity of 
the United States to transform the politics of Vietnam is a difficult one, because of 
the contradiction between their genuine concern a land war in the country would 
pose and their absolute conviction not to let Vietnam 'fall' into Communist hands. 
This Indicator has therefore focused on the international lens through which U.S. 
foreign policymakers viewed the 'problem' of Vietnam, absent which the nation 
would never have landed on U.S. radar. Every president from Roosevelt to Nixon 
and virtually every high-level FPDM official expressed both deep-seated 
reluctance to become heavily involved in an expansive ground-troop campaign 
and a relentless determination to prevent it from being overrun by Communist 
forces.  
 At the same time, there seemed both an undying faith in the invincibility of 
American military might even amid persistent concerns over the viability of 
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fighting a war against a determined enemy that could count on a substantial 
amount of support from the public and material and ideational support from 
multiple external sources. On the one hand, it was inconceivable that an army of 
peasants could defeat the U.S. military in open battle (and in fact they never 
really did). On the other hand, if the war were to be one of attrition, how many 
American lives would it be worth? U.S. foreign policymakers ultimately paid more 
in blood and treasure to lose than they ever would have to win. Based on that 
factor alone, the conclusion would follow that they clearly underestimated the 
cost that would be required to achieve victory, and, conversely, overestimated 
the return the investment of American intervention would produce.  
 
Indicator II. The U.S. ability to control, bolster, and refine the host state of South  
         Vietnam 
 
 James Carter argues that the failure of Vietnam was primarily a failure in 
statebuilding, a proposition finding ample evidence in its support. The GVN never 
lived up to its promises to its people; in fact, in made scarce attempt to promise 
anything to its people with any regularity, and provided even less. Carter 
describes the telescopic view of Vietnam from the American perspective: "Just as 
in Europe, any potential for postwar recovery depended on the restoration of 
substantial regional trade and commercial intercourse. Policy toward East Asia, 
then, had less to do with Vietnam and much more to do with larger, regional and 
global interests and concerns." 227  Despite the fact that some scholars have                                                         
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engaged in revisionist history in an attempt to portray the GVN in a more 
benevolent light, there never existed a viable state or an effective military in 
South Vietnam, except in Saigon and its immediate environs.228 Although it was 
by historical default anti-Communist, it certainly could hardly have claimed to 
have been democratic.  
 Carter contends that the failure of the Vietnam War largely resulted from 
the failure of "the state-building experiment and the related refusal to recognize 
that failure."229 The decision to commit troops en masse to Vietnam came long 
after the United States had (somewhat reluctantly) supported French colonialism 
and subsequently installed a friendly leader to head the new government in 
South Vietnam. The "invented" (in the words of Carter) state U.S. foreign 
policymakers purported to send troops to defend would not have passed 
common standards for a viable state. Corruption reigned supreme; the 
inheritance of French Catholic colonialism by default rendered its leaders 
nondemocratic in a nation of mostly Buddhists; it had virtually no presence 
outside of Saigon; outside of Saigon it relied primarily on the occasional ARVN 
incursions and mercenary peasant militias to maintain its authority. The ARVN 
itself was as corrupt as every other institution of the state and incapable of 
national coordination or operation. 
 An intervention to support any given regime is only as strong as the 
regime itself. This was nowhere more true than in Vietnam, where a handful of                                                         
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generals, coup plotters, self-ascribed members of the fading French aristocracy, 
opportunists, and other forms of ineffectual officials occupied the highest 
echelons of Saigon, typically surrounded by sycophants and immediate family 
and employing a regime based on entrenched parochial interests. Leaders in 
Washington were somewhat aware of this unfortunate state of affairs, but had 
readily become accustomed to dealing with similar figureheads as the Cold War 
battlefields of the developing world turned hot and the need for establishing ties 
with nefarious characters became ensconced in this theretofore unchartered form 
of global confrontation. When Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai chose to appoint 
Ngo Dinh Diem as the leader of the newly formed Republic of Vietnam, the 
reaction in Washington was one of both cautious optimism and concern. 
Although Diem's idealism made him more reliable than other candidates that 
might have been more easily corrupted, his egomania, penchant for obstinacy, 
and distrust of anyone with whom he was not intimately familiar made him 
incapable of effectively heading a legitimate state.230  
 Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, his absence from Vietnam in the four 
years prior to his appointment, which no doubt clouded the legitimacy a more 
locally oriented leader would have enjoyed, also endeared him to a certain 
segment of American politicians, since he spent a significant amount of that time 
in the United States. (Although Ho Chi Minh had also spent many years outside 
the country, he enjoyed much wider support among Vietnamese people North 
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and South). His Catholic faith combined with his steadfast hatred of Communism 
to appeal to the increasing coalition of American leadership that valued anti-
Communist credentials over leadership efficacy or democratic ambitions. As U.S. 
Ambassador to France Douglas Dillon assessed of Diem, "We are prepared to 
accept the seemingly ridiculous prospect that this Yogi-like mystic could assume 
the charge he is apparently about to undertake only because the standard set by 
his predecessors is so low."231 
 That Washington eventually sent signals to Saigon power circles that it 
would tolerate the removal of Diem and his replacement with General Duong Van 
Minh, who himself lasted only three months in power, did little to offset the 
problem of leadership in South Vietnam. Never during the war was a leader in 
power who commanded the loyalty of a majority or even a plurality of the South 
Vietnamese population. This was one of a number of fatal flaws in the overall 
U.S. strategy. A dictator who can control the entirety of his territory and 
population can survive without its support, but a leader that can claim neither 
leaves himself open to insurgence from within and invasion from without. This 
was the first letter in the alphabet of obstacles in Vietnam. At this stage in the 
trajectory of the amateur state of South Vietnam, the next step was to marry the 
state with a field-worthy army. Once the French had acquiesced to its autonomy, 
"Lightning Joe" Collins of the U.S. Army had been dispatched to ensure its 
funding, maintenance, and functionality, but the ARVN never achieved its 
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potential because it was always hamstrung by the weakness of the state it 
worked for.  
 Diem countermanded, circumvented, or otherwise undermined whatever 
limited, procedural democratic institutions existed in the country, wielding the 
fledgling ARVN into "what could only be termed a police state." 232  With the 
United States funding two-thirds of the administrative costs of the GVN and the 
establishment of MACV under Lieutenant General Samuel Williams, the task of 
state-building lay firmly in the hands of U.S. military leaders, charged as they 
were to construct a new state by Washington's anti-Communist political 
establishment. As U.S. leaders began a program of land reform and social 
development in concert with America's liberal values, they meanwhile facilitated 
Diem's consolidation of power, which included the displacement (due to become 
an enormous issue in the war because of the reverence the Vietnamese people 
held for ancestral territory) of neutral Vietnamese into the controversial Strategic 
Hamlet Program and the incarceration of tens of thousands of suspected 
opposition citizens and execution of countless more.  
 Although the fishing-net strategy of rounding up suspected infiltrators 
caught more ordinary civilians than actual VC cadres or North Vietnamese 
sympathizers, the campaign was enough to attract the attention of leaders in 
Hanoi. In 1959, the Central Committee enacted Resolution 15, codifying the need 
to launch a military campaign against the South. Clandestine Group 559 began 
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to construct what would become the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In September of 1960, 
The Communist Party's Third National Congress formally approved a plan of 
insurrection against the South, and the subsequently formed National Liberation 
Front convened near the Cambodian border to organize the foundations of an 
insurgent army. Thus the seeds of the Vietnam War were planted. Upon leaving 
office, Eisenhower, who had neglected to directly intervene in support of the 
French in 1954, had nevertheless advised Kennedy that the need to preserve 
both Laos and Vietnam was absolute, up to and including armed intervention, 
which was to some degree already underway.233 Thus the two countries headed 
straight for each other on the same track.  
 While the United States viewed the South Vietnamese government as an 
indigenous regime it could wield as a medium for prosecuting the war against 
Communism, the government in Saigon viewed its security and police forces as a 
way of maintaining its disproportional share of the country's political power and 
material resources. The extent to which the Cold War was essentially a societal 
(ideational) struggle from the U.S. perspective, rather than being a standard 
matter of direct national-security concerns, is evident in the inherently civilian 
aspect of the "other war" to support and improve civil institutions. However, in 
both the pacification programs and other similar initiatives, the efforts sometimes 
did more harm than good. For example, in 1954, Michigan State University 
began a program to cooperate with the Süreté, the police force of the GVN, to 
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more effectively assert its authority. Although "this early attempt at bureaucratic 
streamlining was undermined by Diem, who kept the various police and security 
agencies spying on one another," it nonetheless had a substantial effect: 
 
In 1954, in the professed belief that it ought to extend the 
"American Way" abroad, Michigan State University (MSU) offered 
to provide the government of Vietnam with a huge technical 
assistance program in four areas: public information, public 
administration, finance and economics, and police and security 
services. The contract was approved in early 1955, shortly after the 
National Security Council (NSC) had endorsed Diem, and over the 
next seven years MSU's Police Administration Division spent fifteen 
million dollars of U.S. taxpayer's money building up the GVN's 
internal security programs. In exchange for the lucrative contract, 
the Michigan State University Group (MSUG) became the vehicle 
through which the CIA secretly managed the South Vietnamese 
"special police."234  
 
 
 The MSUG arrived under the guise of the International Cooperation 
Administration, the precursor to the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), which would later head many of the civilian programs of 
the war including pacification. The Süreté had been taught by the French how to 
form counterinsurgency programs that routinely employed mass incarceration, 
torture, and wholesale executions, but they were to be informed by the MSUG 
how to better identify and expose enemy sympathizers. Subsequently, in the late 
1950's the campaign to quash anyone suspected of Communist sympathies 
officially incarcerated at least 50,000 people who were sent to concentration 
(branded "reeducation") camps, but the actual, unofficial number may have been                                                         
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twice that.235 Diem's miscalculation was that in persecuting nationalists he would 
be persecuting many people who were indifferent toward Communism. Anyone 
who had fought with the Viet Minh against the French was considered a potential 
Communist sympathizer, leading to a growing correlation between nationalism 
and anti-Saigon sentiment. Partly because of its brutality and indiscrimination 
and partly because of its scope, many people feared the GVN's crackdowns 
more than the Viet Cong, which at least pretended to be a voice of the people, 
even while waging its own terror campaigns. Typical of the GVN, internal security 
was headed by a family member, Diem's younger brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, who 
would later institute the highly controversial Strategic Hamlet Program.  
 The unfortunate state of affairs between Saigon, its internal security, and 
the ARVN created an environment of fear and suspicion in South Vietnam that 
left it ripe for insurrection: 
 
Diem and his family believed that casualties suffered on offensive 
operations against the Viet Cong had been a major cause of the 
abortive coup d’état in November 1960. The Ngo Dinhs were 
convinced that the ARVN paratroop officers who had led the 
attempt had plotted with oppositionist politicians because they had 
been disgruntled over these losses. The Americans saw the ARVN 
as an army with which to defend South Vietnam. The Ngo Dinhs, 
on the other hand, saw the ARVN primarily as a force-in-being to 
safeguard their regime. The first priority of the Ngo Dinhs was the 
survival of their rule. To hazard the ARVN in a war was to hazard 
their regime, and that was unthinkable. Control of the army had 
enabled them to crush their non-Communist opponents in the 
young years of the regime in the mid-1950s. They thought that 
even if most of the South were ultimately lost to the Communists, 
an intact ARVN would enable them to hold on to Saigon and the                                                         
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other major population centers long enough for Washington to send 
the U.S. Army and the Marines to rescue them. They assumed that 
the United States, as the preeminent power in the world, could not 
afford to let their anti-Communist government fall to Hanoi’s 
guerrillas. That their attitude could prove expensive in the blood of 
Vietnamese was another of those thoughts that did not occur to the 
Ngo Dinhs. They were willing to accept casualties in defensive 
actions because they saw these as unavoidable to maintain the 
outpost system that was the substance of their rule in the 
countryside. Most casualties in defensive actions were also inflicted 
on the SDC militiamen who manned the posts. The Ngo Dinhs were 
not troubled by the deaths of these peasants. The stability of the 
regime was not affected, and the lives of the militiamen were 
cheap. They could be replaced by other peasant hirelings at the 
equivalent of $10 a month in Saigon piasters.236  
 
 
 What the United States never understood was the pervasive sense of 
nationalism that transcended the artificially transposed division between North 
and South. The fact that many South Vietnamese neither sympathized with the 
Communist cause nor desired to be ruled by Hanoi could never completely 
negate the nationalist sentiment that ultimately propelled many Vietnamese 
toward confrontation with the foreign occupiers. The war to expel the French 
guaranteed Ho Chi Minh's place as a revered hero in modern Vietnamese 
history, and rendered Diem, who sat on the sidelines, an irrelevant figure to 
whom loyalty would have to be purchased or otherwise incentivized. Absent that 
political purchasing power, his regime, like other regimes in Saigon during the 
American involvement there, could never rely on any meaningful level popular 
support. This already weak support was further undermined by the kleptocratic, 
clientelistic governance characteristic of Saigon in general, as well as its 
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wholesale repression against a large percentage of its population. The 
fundamental problem of statebuilding in Vietnam is summed up by William 
Hammond: 
 
U.S. policy sought to strengthen South Vietnam by fostering the 
confidence and self-reliance of the country's leaders, an end easily 
frustrated if Americans began assuming functions proper to South 
Vietnamese officialdom. The president of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh 
Diem, was also sensitive to any infringement on his nation's 
prerogatives. American policy makers believed that he would resent 
any attempt by American diplomats to become the source of news 
for South Vietnam and that he might even retaliate by curtailing the 
flow of information between his government and the U.S. embassy, 
a development almost certain to hamper the effort against the 
Communist insurgency in the countryside.237 
 
 
In other words, the needs of the United States and those of the GVN were not 
aligned, and therefore even the perfect implementation of every initiative would 
never have engendered any lasting success for the United States, because even 
when means were aligned they were in advance of different ends. Richard 
Immerman describes the precarious situation under Diem during the advisory 
period, as well as the opportunity sensed by Hanoi to foment civil disobedience: 
 
Beginning in 1959, however, Vietnam began its reascent to the top 
of the national security agenda. On the one hand, with land reform 
stalled and Diem's "rule by terror" producing the incarceration of 
tens of thousands of villagers in "reeducation centers" (an 
unspecified number were guillotined), unrest throughout rural South 
Vietnam intensified, as did sympathy for the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam in the North. On the other hand, Diem's internal security                                                         
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machine, although not particular about whom it caught its dragnet, 
took a toll on the Vietminh (referred to in Washington after 1959 as 
the "Vietcong"). Le Duan, who headed the Vietminh's Central Office 
for South Vietnam beseeched Hanoi for help. At the same time, in 
light of obvious signs that the unification of Vietnam would not 
come about through elections, momentum grew within North 
Vietnam's Communist Politburo to resume armed conflict. Le 
Duan's election as party secretary tipped the balance in this 
direction. At its meeting in Hanoi in January 1959, the Central 
Committee adopted Resolution No. 15. Although Resolution No. 15 
emphasized the continued importance of political action, it 
stipulated that final victory would be achieved only through 
protracted and heroic struggle. It also proclaimed the need to 
create and coordinate insurgent forces in the South. Within months, 
southern commanders began to build a revolutionary base in 
Vietnam's central highlands; the clandestine Group 559 began to 
construct what would become the Ho Chi Minh Trail through the 
Laotian mountains adjacent to Vietnam; and the Vietminh initiated 
"spontaneous uprisings" from central Vietnam  extending 
southward to the Mekong Delta.238  
 
 
Thus the strategic conditions for war, and therefore the possibility of U.S. 
escalation, were made riper by the tactical success of Diem rounding up 
opponents, because the sweeps made more enemies than they captured at 
home and stiffened the resolve of Hanoi to support insurrection from the North. 
The effort to confront that enemy is discussed in the next section.  
 
Indicator III. The U.S. ability to limit the power and influence of North Vietnam  
          and the VC  
 
 Dale Andrade and James Willbanks describe the numbers of the 
fundamental strategic problem the enemy presented American forces along with 
their South Vietnamese counterparts: 
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In Vietnam, the U.S. military faced arguably the most complex, 
effective, lethal insurgency in history. The enemy was no rag-tag 
band lurking in the jungle, but rather a combination of guerrillas, 
political cadre, and modern main-force units capable of standing 
toe to toe with the U.S. military. Any one of these would have been 
significant, but in combination they presented a formidable threat. 
When U.S. ground forces intervened in South Vietnam in 1965, 
estimates of enemy guerrilla and Communist Party front strength 
stood at more than 300,000. In addition, Viet Cong (VC) and North 
Vietnamese main forces numbered almost 230,000—and that 
number grew to 685,000 by the time of the Communist victory in 
1975. These main forces were organized into regiments and 
divisions, and between 1965 and 1968 the enemy emphasized 
main-force war rather than insurgency. During the war the 
Communists launched three conventional offensives: the 1968 Tet 
Offensive, the 1972 Easter Offensive, and the final offensive in 
1975. All were major campaigns by any standard. Clearly, the 
insurgency and the enemy main forces had to be dealt with 
simultaneously... Westmoreland's strategy of chasing the enemy 
and forcing him to fight or run (also known as search and destroy) 
worked in the sense that it saved South Vietnam from immediate 
defeat, pushed the enemy main forces from the populated areas, 
and temporarily took the initiative away from the Communists. 
South Vietnam was safe in the short term, and Communist histories 
make clear that the intervention by U.S. troops was a severe blow 
to their plans. In the end, however, there were not enough U.S. 
troops to do much more than produce a stalemate. The 
Communists continued to infiltrate main-force units from 
neighboring Laos and Cambodia, and they split their forces into 
smaller bands that could avoid combat if the battlefield situation 
was not in their favor.239 
 
 
 
 The war was essentially broken in half between these search-and-destroy 
missions that pursued and engaged the enemy and what was known as 
pacification, or the effort to protect the population in order to prevent them from 
siding with the enemy, defined by Kissinger as "the extension of the control of                                                         
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Saigon into the countryside." 240  Part I gave an overview of the former; this 
section discusses the latter. The term "pacification" was somewhat of a catchall 
phrase that basically signified support to the people of South Vietnam who were 
not involved in VC activity. The CIA, USAID, the U.S. Information Service, and 
the U.S. Department of State were the most relevant bureaucratic arms of the 
U.S. government to implement pacification, in addition to the military. The 
strategy to find and kill the enemy, the traditional and more comfortable role of 
the military, took precedent in the escalation years between 1964-1967. The 
"other war" of pacification to "win the hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese 
people had been existent for many years prior to 1967, but had never received 
full institutional attention until that year.  
 From 1964-1967, pacification intelligence suffered from a lack of 
command. This changed in 1967 with the creation of the Intelligence 
Coordination and Exploitation Program (ICEX), which was renamed Phoenix in 
December of the same year. On May 9, 1967, National Security Action 
Memorandum 362, "Responsibility for U.S. Role in Pacification," established the 
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) command 
structure within the military. Prior to 1967, "stability operations were entirely 
uncoordinated with different civilian agencies all running separate operations. 
While they were theoretically coordinating with the military through the U.S. 
                                                        
240 Henry Kissinger, "The Viet Nam Negotiations," Foreign Affairs (January 1969), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1969-01-01/viet-nam-negotiations 
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Embassy, this was not the reality."241 McNamara had initially attempted to form 
an office within MACV, but the military never granted the Office of Civil 
Operations access and assistance, which eventually led to its disbanding and the 
establishment of CORDS. Vietnam was perhaps the first war in history that 
combined military, civilian, and intelligence agencies into a concerted effort to 
control, subdue, and appeal to a foreign population to such an extent. 
 As Ambassador and head of CORDS, Robert Komer was one of the 
central figures of the pacification program for much of the war. His 
comprehensive, thorough, and veritable reports throughout the war reveal as 
much about the strategic-tactical gap of the Vietnam War as virtually any other 
series of reports. On May 7, 1970, he and his team published (in classified 
format) the 259-page "first comprehensive systematic treatment of the 
pacification program:" 
 
Consideration of all U.S. support for pacification under CORDS 
single management in May 1967 (to be followed by the parallel 
GVN consolidation over the next few years) inaugurated the first 
really comprehensive countrywide pacification effort on a scale 
commensurate with the needs of the highly atypical Vietnam War. 
This is not to denigrate prior efforts, especially the Strategic Hamlet 
Program or the RD Program which got going really in 1966. But 
none of them were on a large enough scale to have the necessary 
impact, and many promising small-scale programs were diffuse 
among competing agencies. Most of all, neither the U.S. nor GVN 
military were really backing pacification. It was regarded by them as 
essentially a civilian problem, to be handled by the remnant GVN 
civil ministries backed by the U.S. Embassy, AID, and CIA—
whereas the military were chiefly focused on the "main force war."                                                         
241 Jeremy Patrick White, "Civil Affairs in Vietnam," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
1, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/090130_vietnam_study.pdf 
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Yet most of the resources in country were controlled by the military 
(money, manpower, supplies, transport, the works). Without the 
military, territorial security in the countryside could not be expanded 
rapidly enough to exploit the anti-main force successes. Our 
solution to this problem was to saddle the military with pacification 
responsibility, and to create a unified civil-military management on 
the U.S. side under MACV. Reorganizing the Vietnamese was 
harder, but a major step toward it at end-1967 was the RVNAF 
reorganization, which helped put the RF/PF on the map as the 
essential territorial security component. Such a major restructuring 
and buildup took time, however; results down at the critical hamlet 
level were unimpressive in 1967.242 
 
 
 This excerpt illustrates the organizational deficiencies inherent in the 
pacification program, in addition to the overall results being "unimpressive." 
Komer's push to integrate civilian (pacification) and military organizational 
structure, given that nothing done outside of the military received the support, 
resources, or command that it needed, made logical sense. However, 
implementation came too late: by the time the unity of command in pacification 
programs were fully implemented, it was 1968, the year that Tet turned the tide of 
public opinion against the war. Furthermore, this unification met the inevitable 
institutional resistance such bureaucratic mergers always do. Major General 
Joseph McChristian, the MACV J2 commander from 1965-1967, predictably 
voiced concerns over the creation of ICEX: 
 
On my last day in Vietnam, I became aware that a new plan for 
attacking the Viet Cong infrastructure was to be implemented. It 
was to be called the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation for 
Attack Against the Infrastructure (ICEX) Program. Ambassador                                                         
242 Robert Komer, "Organization and Management of the 'New Model' Pacification Program—
1966-1969," May 7, 1970, Rand Limited Document, 52, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documents/2006/D20104.pdf 
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Robert W. Komer was to head the program as a deputy to the 
MACV commander. To put it mildly, I was amazed and dismayed. I 
called on Mr. Komer and General Westmoreland that last day and 
pointed out that I had not known about the program but that I was 
confident that the combined military intelligence system was out 
front leading the way against the infrastructure. I suggested that co-
ordination was in order.243 
 
 
McChristian was expressing the same dismay at the tactical level that 
Hoopes was at the strategic level of the infighting over turf that the bureaucratic 
discombobulation of the U.S. national-security infrastructure innately contained. 
On his last day in Vietnam, McChristian not only laments the integration of the 
pacification institutions, but also suggests that a new form of coordination is in 
order. In that statement lay the circular impasse of implementation that was 
charged with winning an already impossible war. It is not uncommon for an 
outgoing military commander to suggest significant reforms; this suggestion 
comes too late, and the new face that replaces the old commander comes in with 
his own agenda. When Hoopes says "our intervention in 1965 was misconceived, 
that viewed through cold, clear eyes it could not be justified on the grounds that a 
vital national interest was at stake," he does so in part because of the convolution 
of the U.S. foreign-policy 'apparatus,' as it is sometimes referred to in the 
literature, or institutional infrastructure. At every level, like a three-dimensional 
game of telephone, turf wars and regulatory complications muddle 
communication, policy creation and facilitation, and operationalization vertically in 
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terms of the chain of command and horizontally in terms of rank-wide 
implementation.244  
 Furthermore, every one of the hundreds of documents reviewed for this 
chapter produced by the United States, even those that specifically target the 
inefficiencies in the U.S. foreign-policy system, invariably characterize the same 
problem on the host government side as being far worse. Not a single instance 
was found in which the South Vietnamese government, bureaucracy, army, or 
leadership structure was estimated to be even marginally more effective or 
efficient than the American institutions partnering with them. Even accounting for 
national bias, these assessments appear to be genuine. This means that a 
highly-complex Vietnam War was being waged by the American military and its 
fellow U.S. institutions in an ineffective, inefficient manner to prop up a South 
Vietnamese government that was morally and institutionally bankrupt. Which in 
turn begs the question, who was the protagonist in the conflict? Who was fighting 
for what?  
 In South Vietnam the confusion over who was targeting whom for what 
reason knew no bounds and extended to every facet of the war. This confusion 
was perhaps no more evident in any program than that of Phoenix. Pacification 
had a darker side as well, which the name "Phoenix" would gain infamy for. The 
few dozen counterterror teams at the disposal of the CIA from 1964-1967 
                                                        
244 There are so many diagrams, charts, graphs, illustrations, and descriptions of the chains of 
command of different military and intelligence groupings, government agencies, programs, 
projects, and descriptions that they seem to defy quantification. There is not room here to offer 
even a summary of these various bureaucratic organizational clusters; suffice it to say that there 
are many. 
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morphed into a command that had a Phoenix advisor in all 44 provinces by the 
middle of 1968, with over 700 advisors in all.245 The Phoenix program was one of 
the key operational fulcra of the battle between South Vietnam and the VCI. 
Because there are too many battles of the war to document here, and because 
they rarely amounted to any lasting shift in the dynamics of the conflict, the 
Phoenix Program is examined because of the many metaphors between itself 
and the conflict overall. Douglas Valentine summarizes its organizational 
objectives:  
 
Developed in 1967 by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
Phoenix combined existing counterinsurgency programs in a 
concerted effort to "neutralize" the Vietcong Infrastructure (VCI). 
The euphemism "neutralize" means to kill, capture, or make to 
defect. The word "infrastructure" refers to those civilians suspected 
of supporting North Vietnamese and Vietcong soldiers... Under 
Phoenix, or Phun Hoang, as it was called by the Vietnamese, due 
process was totally nonexistent. South Vietnamese civilians whose 
names appeared on blacklists could be kidnapped, tortured, 
detained for two years without trial, or even murdered, simply on 
the word of an anonymous informer. At its height Phoenix 
managers imposed a quota of eighteen hundred neutralizations per 
month on the people running the program in the field, opening up 
the program to abuses by corrupt security officers, policemen, 
politicians, and racketeers, all of whom extorted innocent civilians 
as well as VCI. Legendary CIA officer Lucien Conein described 
Phoenix as "A very good blackmail scheme for the central 
government. 'If you don’t want what I want, you're VC.'"246 
 
 
Elton Manzione describes a mission he went on as a twenty-year-old SEAL in 
Vietnam in 1964 that illustrates the difficulty in targeting the right people. Ground 
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forces, of course, and especially Special Forces, were supposedly the 'surgical' 
instrument with which to target VCI in lieu of the more clumsy missions utilizing 
conventional battalions backed by artillery and aerial bombing, but even when 
these most-surgical missions were executed with great care and skill it was still a 
highly complex process to kill the right people:  
 
I go into the hooch, and I spot my person. Well, somebody stirs in 
the next bed. I'm carrying my commando knife, and one of the 
things we learned is how to kill somebody instantly with it. So I put 
my hand over her mouth and come up under the second rib, go 
through her heart, give it a flick; it snaps the spinal cord. Not 
thinking! Because I think 'Hey!' Then I hear the explosion go off and 
I know the gun is out. Somebody else in the corner starts to stir, so 
I pull out the sidearm and put it against her head and shoot her. 
She's dead. Of course, by this time the whole village is awake. I go 
out, waiting for Swetz to come, because the gun's been blown. 
People are kind of wandering around the hooch, and there were 
two young girls. I'd killed the wrong people.247 
 
 
 This account demonstrates the difficulties in fighting a guerilla war. This 
failed mission was after days of planning and employed the most highly trained 
soldiers in the U.S. arsenal. To avoid the use of guerilla tactics would concede 
the night, the countryside, and the initiative to the enemy who is willing to use 
those tactics, and yet to utilize them is to straddle the line between a time-
honored military code and terrorism. In that sense, counterterrorism is in itself a 
form of terrorism, and these counterterror missions were seen as necessary to 
take the fight to the enemy and deny it political control of the villages. While 
Special Forces teams would take great care in intelligence gathering, mission                                                         
247 Valentine 1990, iv. 
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planning, and coordination with the South Vietnamese counterparts who usually 
accompanied these patrols, it was not possible to guarantee an attack on the 
right people because it was rarely clear who the right people were, and even 
when it was, it was still possible to target the wrong people. This was of course a 
different situation when the enemy chose to fight pitched battles, but when it did, 
its purpose was to inflict casualties on the American army rather than 'win' in 
traditional military terms.  
 In this way, the North would bleed the Americans out of their resolve to 
keep fighting a war that for them the outcome was in some ways irrelevant; it 
certainly was not a war of survival, and, ironically, the main motivation became 
the determination not to lose resolve for an otherwise irrelevant war. To add yet 
another layer to the irony from the Vietnamese perspective, Phoenix "was not a 
mechanism to end the war quickly, but a means to extend it indefinitely, with a 
minimum of American casualties" in order to "show success," according to one 
NVA commander. 248  While the United States refused to consider "losing" 
Vietnam a possibility until it became clear that tens or even hundreds of 
thousands of American soldiers would have to perish, the enemy would not 
consider losing its own country for any price—this was the miscalculation to 
which Johnson's advisors referred in their interviews with Richard Neustadt. 
While the NVA and VC had only victory or death as possible outcomes, the 
Americans could leave whenever they wanted with only the shame of losing 
soldiers for nothing and the wounded pride of being defeated by supposedly                                                         
248 Valentine 1990, 50. 
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inferior forces. Therefore, to "show success" became paramount, which led to the 
'body count' metric, which in turn fueled failure for the reasons discussed in Part 
I. And at the same time, the United States never stopped trying to "win the the 
hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese people, even while reigning destruction 
upon them. This tactical paradox reflected the grand-strategic paradox of the 
'liberal leviathan' pursuing preponderance.  
 Like virtually all programs in the Vietnam War, Phoenix was indeed 
successful at its tactical prowess; like virtually all other programs it failed 
strategically. The word "Phoenix" eventually became the most notorious word 
associated with the Vietnam War. Not My Lai, nor Rolling Thunder, nor Khe 
Sanh, nor Tet nor Hue conjure up the same emotions in the popular literature, 
even if those names were far more significant to the soldiers who fought there. A 
fair assessment would be to say that "Phoenix was neither the devastatingly 
effective program its supporters have sometimes claimed nor the merciless 
assassination campaign that its detractors have alleged," in the words of a RAND 
study to evaluate its purpose and effectiveness.249 The study was commissioned 
in 2009 by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in order to learn 
counterinsurgency lessons that could be applied to contemporary 
counterinsurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, although the authors 
assert: 
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Some analysts conclude that the lack of an insurgent shadow 
government in Iraq and Afghanistan makes a Phoenix-style anti-
infrastructure program in those countries both unnecessary and 
unworkable. But insurgent documents captured in Al-Anbar—at one 
point, Iraq's most violent region—describe elaborate underground 
bureaucratic structures with functional elements devoted to 
intelligence and counterintelligence, media and propaganda, 
finances, recruitment, and religious affairs. The insurgencies in 
Afghanistan may not be as well organized or as highly 
bureaucratized, but they certainly have an apparatus for financing, 
intelligence, and recruitment that could be targeted in a selective 
fashion... Effective counterinsurgency today, as in Vietnam, calls for 
much more than defeating guerillas on the battlefield: It requires the 
ability to understand, map, and disrupt the insurgent 
infrastructure.250 
 
 
 The study aptly summarizes of the Phoenix program and Vietnam, "The 
Vietnam War must be considered an American failure," but "The pacification 
program in general, and the Phoenix Program in particular, met with success." 
In "Countering Global Insurgency," one of the most oft-cited counterinsurgency 
papers, one-time advisor to General David Petraeus David Kilcullen in fact called 
for a "global Phoenix program" to head the tip of the spear of the military-
intelligence war against what Kilcullen labels the "global Islamist insurgency," 
citing Phoenix as "unfairly maligned (but highly effective)." 251  Although this 
dissertation does not compare the events of the three case studies per se, it 
does intend to compare the motivations for and understanding of their meta-
event significance, and therefore these types of reports offer relevant evidence of 
how policymakers, military leaders, and scholars define and address national-                                                        
250 Rosenau and Long 2009, 25. 
 
251 David Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," Small Wars Journal, November 30, 2004, 
smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf 
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security problems, which is a central inquiry of this research. This topic is 
therefore reviewed in further detail in Chapter 6, the case study on the Iraq War.  
 In terms of the wider pacification program, Komer later found it to be 
insufficient in the face of a determined enemy and a populace at best suspicious 
of the Saigon government and the foreigners supporting it: 
 
Why has a cumulatively enormous U.S. contribution—on top of 
South Vietnam's own great effort—had such limited impact for so 
long? Why, almost regardless of the ultimate outcome, has U.S. 
intervention entailed such disproportional costs and tragic side 
effects? The reasons are many, complex, and interrelated. They 
include the unique and unfamiliar—at least in U.S. experience—
conflict environment in which we became enmeshed. Particularly 
contrasting was the sharp contrast between the adversary we faced 
and the ally we were supporting—a highly motivated and 
ideologically disciplined regime in Hanoi and revolutionary Viet 
Cong apparatus versus a weak, half-formed, traditionalist regime in 
Saigon. We repeatedly misjudged the enemy, especially in his 
ability to frustrate our aims by his tactics and to counterescalate at 
every stage—right up to 1972. Another constraint was implicit in the 
incremental nature of our response, doing only what we believed 
minimally necessary at each stage.252 
 
 
The "weak, half-formed, traditionalist regime in Saigon" could not contain the 
"highly motivated and ideologically disciplined regime in Hanoi" when faced with 
the incessant prospect of its ability to "counter-escalate." Komer tried his best, 
but could not overcome the logical fallacy of the overall effort. In 1966, he had 
authored a paper entitled "Giving a New Thrust to Pacification: Analysis, 
Concept, and Management," in which he had specified three areas to focus on: 
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security (protecting the populace), anti-VCI operations (targeting the enemy), and 
enlarging and streamlining the larger pacification campaign. He succeeded 
somewhat in the third effort; the effect, however, could never mitigate the 
shortcomings of the first two, for the same reasons conventional military 
operations failed. The population-protection programs that succeeded the 
progenitor of the Strategic Hamlet Program did achieve some success in some 
areas: A full 93 percent of South Vietnamese were judged to live in "relatively 
secure" villages, an annual increase of almost 20 percent from the middle of 
1968, the year marred by the Tet Offensive (President Johnson had trumpeted 
the percentages of "secure villages" in his January 17, 1968 State of the Union 
Address). However, these were often artificially constructed villages that had 
removed the steadfastly ancestral-oriented Vietnamese from their homelands, 
widening the chasm between the war effort and the population and doing little to 
overcome the parochialism innate in Vietnamese culture.  
 In November of 1967, Westmoreland gave a series of talks in Washington 
in which he specified "indicators" of military success, predicting that a drawdown 
of the successful campaign could be initiated in earnest in late 1968. But in the 
January 1969 issue of Foreign Affairs, Kissinger wrote that the Tet Offensive 
"overthrew the assumptions of the American strategy."253 By then, U.S. foreign 
policymakers knew that the fears they had held all along about a land war of 
attrition with a guerilla enemy in Asia had materialized. President Johnson chose 
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not seek reelection, and Richard Nixon was elected president, ushering in the era 
of "Vietnamization."  
 Confederate General George Pickett, who etched his name into history 
books by way of his infamous failed 'Pickett's Charge' through heavy Union fire at 
the battle of Gettysburg, was once asked how the Confederacy had failed to 
achieve victory. His reply, "I kinda think the Yankees had a little something to do 
with it," serves as a reminder that 'the enemy has a vote' in every battle of every 
war.254 Although American historians tend to see the history of the Vietnam War 
through the lens of the U.S. military and U.S. policymakers, the tenacity and 
fervent nationalism of the Vietnamese played a decisive role in the conflict, and 
tilted the balance in favor of NVA and VC forces. The war strategy in Vietnam 
has received more attention than it deserves, simply because U.S. objectives 
could not have been met by military metrics alone. The obsession over the "body 
count," or the drive to kill as many of the enemy as possible, may have created 
more of the enemy that it was able to kill. Figures 3 and 4 show U.S. troop 
strength in Vietnam and PAVN (NVA) infiltration of the South on an annual basis. 
They illustrate that the presence of the U.S. military had virtually no effect on 
Hanoi's ability to foment insurgency with their own forces (U.S. forces were more 
successful, at particular periods in the war, at targeting VC):255  
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Indicator IV. Rationalization and operational learning   
 
 The Vietnam War is in many ways a conundrum for the IR scholar 
because the obstacles were so clear and inherent in the strategy that statesman 
and citizen alike almost had to construct an alternative reality to maintain faith in 
Figure 3: U.S. troops in Vietnam 
Figure 4: PAVN infiltration of the South: 1965 - 1975 
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it. (But while the statesman, or his predecessors, must deal with the policy even 
after failure, the citizen can turn away and simply vote differently). This 
alternative reality was heavily influenced by the ideology-driven grand strategy of 
preponderance and its Cold War progeny, Containment. On one hand, military 
and political leaders lied to themselves, each other, and the country at every 
juncture about the prospects for success and the state of the war to date. On the 
other hand, the public was not prepared to accept the reality that in spite of its 
substantial power endowment, the United States could not be omnipotent. 
Statesman and citizen alike began to abandon the war in theory after 1968; the 
statesman was still faced with picking up the foreign-policy pieces until a 'decent 
interval' had come and gone and the war was lost completely.  
 In some ways, there in fact was a new reality that even "the best and the 
brightest" failed to develop a viable prescription for. Only once before in history, 
in Korea, had a state engaged in such a bloody war while storing its most 
powerful weapons on the sideline—in this case, nuclear weapons. While the 
contemplation of releasing the thermonuclear genie from the bottle was a 
potentiality that terrified every sane individual, especially with the advent of MAD 
(mutually assured destruction), it simultaneously seemed unthinkable to send 
young men into battle hamstrung. But the use of nuclear weapons would have 
made little difference against a guerilla enemy. The United States could have 
eliminated North Vietnam from the map as it could have North Korea, but would 
have risked Soviet or Chinese nuclear retaliation. Furthermore, the total bombing 
over North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, which still constitutes 
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the most extensive aerial bombing campaign in history, far exceeded the 
destruction a few nuclear weapons would have created.  
 The real hamstringing, many in the military felt, was the delicate balancing 
act of trying to avoid confrontation with the Soviets, engender support of the 
South Vietnamese populace, and maintain support for the war at home while at 
the same time trying to fight and win a brutal guerilla war, in difficult terrain, in 
which identifying the enemy was a virtually insurmountable quandary. This is the 
'holy trinity' that Summers discusses in his invocation of Clausewitz, with the 
compounding distinction that instead of only having to juggle the people, the 
government, and the military of the home state, U.S. foreign policymakers also 
had to deal with the people, government, and military of the state in which the 
United States intervened. This is the basic logical fallacy of regime-toppling and 
nation-building: if the state requires intervention, in what way is it worth 
supporting?  
 Among the untold ironies of this befuddling reality therefore emerged an 
environment in which the duplicity circulated by policymakers often transcended 
even their own knowledge of the 'situation' in Vietnam. They knew they were 
lying, but they did not always know the full truth, in part because, on multiple 
levels, the reality of it did not fit the reality of the American self-image—
specifically, in strategic terms, the possibility of failure and the concession to 
Communist expansion. On a tactical level, policymakers could never reconcile 
the fact that the guerillas and NVA regulars could not defeat the Americans in 
battle with the fact that the Americans seemed to be losing the war, nor that this 
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intrinsically nationalist struggle they were facing transcended the immediate 
medium of Communism and therefore ensured that the American values the 
United States was supposedly upholding were in fact some of the same values 
the enemy fought for. That the VC sometimes employed terrorist tactics mattered 
little in this equation, given the totalitarian destruction U.S. fighter bombers 
reigned down from the air, the hundreds of thousands of civilians caught in the 
crossfire between the two opposing armies, and the self-serving impotence of 
Saigon. And while the detestable blight of Communism was easy enough to 
imagine a foe, this was less than half of the Communist-nationalist struggle in 
Vietnamese eyes North and South.  
 For the United States there were many firsts in this most perplexing of 
conflicts: the first loss of a major war; the first time American citizens could watch 
the war from their living rooms; the first time Americans were fundamentally 
divided about the moral implications of the war to such an extent; the first time 
the 'body count' became the almost singular metric by which to judge success. 
These newfound puzzles were reflected in public opinion polls. In November 
1965, 29% of Americans thought the war would end in victory, 30% thought it 
would end in stalemate or compromise, and 10% expected a prolonged conflict. 
By May 1966, 54% expected a stalemate or compromise, and by February 1968, 
that figure grew to 61%. In May of 1967, the public was exactly divided about 
whether they knew what the United States was fighting for in Vietnam, at 48% 
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each.256 Unsurprisingly, as shown in Figure 5 from Gallup, the percentage of 
those believing it was a "mistake" to escalate in Vietnam grew as casualties 
mounted (why this figure dropped 5% between 1990 and 2000 would be a 
subject for another dissertation):257  
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Figure 5: Gallup poll, “Was it a mistake sending troops to Vietnam?” 
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Figure 6 shows the annual U.S. casualties of the war:258 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In evaluating the foreign policy of the Vietnam War and processing it 
through the OPM, A distinction must be made between the confusion of reality 
and the confusion caused by duplicity. Perhaps ironically, the misinformation the 
American people heard about the war was sometimes just as disingenuous 
within certain circles of the military and other areas of government even before 
being marketed to the public. This Indicator assesses feedback integrity and 
justification integrity. The deceit disseminated by U.S. foreign policymakers to the 
American people was but one link in a chain of delusion, mischaracterization, 
and outright lies. However, it is also the most important link. Foreign 
policymakers are the media through which a policy is settled upon, altered, and 
marketed to the public, and their words and deeds are more important than those                                                         
258 Associated Press, http://www.ap.org/explore/vietnam-the-real-war/ 
 
Figure 6: U.S. Fatalities in Vietnam 
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of the average citizen or soldier. Therefore, to categorize the Vietnam War only 
as a national "tragedy without villains" based on a particular set of terrible 
circumstances misses an opportunity to understand exactly how this FPDM 
failure came about.  
 Even a cursory review of declassified documents related to the Vietnam 
War reveals a systematic avoidance, rejection, and manipulation of the truth 
about the war. The review for this chapter has been more than cursory, and 
nothing reviewed for it has changed that characterization. What has been 
somewhat surprising is the extent to which this was a national crisis, just as the 
experience of the war for the average Vietnamese was a national crisis. 
Nevertheless, foreign policymakers are charged with successfully defining, 
clarifying, and pursuing the national interest, and they failed miserably at this task 
in the case of Vietnam. In part, this can be blamed on a nation wishing to 
conceive of itself as the preponderant power in the international system and 
unwilling to face its own contradictory demons. But it is the task for the statesman 
to lead the country in a prudent direction, employ its finite resources efficiently, 
and avoid unnecessary conflicts that will bring harm to the national interest. With 
respect to Vietnam, the statesmen in question did none of these things; in fact, 
they shunned their sacred duty intentionally because they refused to accept the 
reality of the situation presented to them. They could have attempted to fully 
grasp the indigenous complications in Vietnam and incorporated that into their 
calculations among themselves and in their conversations with the American 
public. They chose not too.  
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 As mentioned in FPE Criterion I, the significance of John Paul Vann and 
his role in the Vietnam War for this chapter is twofold: first, as an advisor, he 
understood the tactical complications of the war that would lead to strategic 
defeat if they were not rectified. Second, as both a soldier and later as a civilian 
working for CORDS, he spent the remainder of his life until his death on June 9, 
1972 attempting to proliferate understanding of the conflict to those who held the 
power to change it. As a soldier, Vann recognized the problems inherent in the 
ability of the United States to affect the local political and military conditions of 
South Vietnam, many of which have been highlighted throughout this chapter. 
Sheehan presents too many to summarize, but the paramount obstacles to 
success in the advisory stages of the war in Vann's view were: (a) the 
overrunning of the outposts, which were staffed by the peasant militia, (b) 
indiscriminate artillery shelling and aerial bombing, (c) maltreatment of the 
populace by the ARVN, (d) defining, identifying, and targeting the enemy, and (e) 
the disregard in the ARVN and GVN for professional and moral standards of 
state and security.  
 The (a) outposts were significant for two reasons. First, the fact that they 
were manned by peasants that stood guard like sitting ducks only for the pittance 
they were paid to staff the rural ramparts signified that the only loyalty the GVN 
could count on in much of the countryside was not loyalty at all, and certainly not 
Johnsons' 'Macy window ass-kissing' kind, but what amounted to indentured 
servitude. To much of the rural population of South Vietnam, there was no GVN 
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in functional terms, and what there was of it was less than appealing because of 
(b) and (c), indiscriminate bombing and maltreatment of villagers. From ABSL: 
 
If nothing was done to stop this drain of American arms through the 
outposts—and Harkins and his representatives were always 
prodding the training advisors to hand out weapons faster despite 
the warnings from Vann and other division senior advisors—then 
Vann would encounter increasingly better-armed Viet Cong in his 
shakily led campaign to destroy the Main Force and provincial 
guerrilla units. If his campaign was ever interrupted or lost 
momentum for some reason and the Communists were able to fully 
reconstitute their striking force and go on the offensive with 
impunity, the guerrillas would capture many more American 
weapons, build their strength far beyond current numbers, and 
become a foe more formidable than Vann cared to imagine. 
 
There was an ugly side to this war and to his Vietnamese allies that 
went far beyond the everlasting problem of the Saigon troops 
treating their peasantry like an occupied population, stealing the 
chickens and ducks and rice and molesting the women... Nothing 
he had seen or heard of in Korea would have prepared him for the 
cultivated sadism with which the Saigon troops treated captives. 
 
“Ziegler made a partial list in his diary of the techniques used by 
Thuong and his Rangers, cataloguing a dozen. Ziegler printed the 
title “Strong Methods” above the list in a translation of a French 
euphemism for methods of torture: 
Wrap in barbed wire. 
Strip skin off back. 
Rack by use of vehicle or water buffalo. 
Head in mud—1½ minute. 
Shoot thru ear. 
Hook up to EE8. [EE8 was the designation of the American-
supplied battery-powered field telephone. The common method 
was to tape the ends of two wires from the phone to the genitals of 
a man or to a woman’s vagina and a breast. Shock was then 
administered as desired by turning the crank handle on the phone.] 
Sit on entrenching tool. [The entrenching tool was the folding pack 
shovel the U.S. Army supplied the ARVN for use in digging 
foxholes. The shovel blade was thrust firmly into the ground. The 
prisoner was stripped of his pants and made to sit on top of the end 
of the shovel handle. He was then forced down on the handle.] 
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Knife strapped to back. [Thuong would tie the prisoner’s hands 
behind his back and lash the Bowie knife to the wrists with the 
blade pointing inward toward the back. He would have the prisoner 
hauled up against a tree, place his hand on the victim’s chest, and 
start pressing as he asked questions.] 
Water treatment. [Water was forced into the mouth until the 
stomach swelled painfully, when it was beaten to induce more pain, 
or a wet rag was held over the nostrils while water was poured 
down the throat to create the sensation of suffocating.] 
Calves beaten.  
Knee in back, face down, dislocate shoulders. 
Beat stomach until it collapses and indiv. vomits it out. 
 
The willy-nilly killing and maiming enraged Vann, not only because 
it contradicted his ideal of his profession, but also because it struck 
him as the worst conceivable way to fight this war. A 
counterguerrilla war surely required the strictest possible controls 
on air and artillery.” 
 
A single shot from a sniper was enough to stop a battalion while the 
captain in charge called for an air strike or an artillery barrage on 
the hamlet from which the sniper had fired. Vann would argue with 
the captain and later with Cao that it was ridiculous to let one sniper 
halt a whole battalion and criminal to let the sniper provoke them 
into smashing a hamlet. Why didn’t they send a squad to maneuver 
around the sniper and scare him off or kill him while the battalion 
continued its advance? 
 
The province and district chiefs kept their 105mm artillery pieces 
and large 4.2-inch mortars, the equivalent of artillery, positioned 
freely so that they could rotate them 360 degrees and shoot in any 
direction. During one of his first operations in another division area, 
Vann had stayed late in the command-post tent to work on some 
notes of the day’s events and had been alone with the Vietnamese 
duty officer and a few enlisted men. A voice came up on the radio. 
The duty officer picked up the microphone and, after a brief 
exchange with whoever was calling, walked over to the map, 
checked something on it, and then returned to the radio to give a 
quick reply. 
“What’s going on?” Vann asked. 
“That was the district chief. He wanted to know if we have any 
troops in this hamlet over here,” the duty officer said, pointing at the 
place on the map. “He says he’s got a report from an agent that VC 
are in the hamlet and he wants to shoot at them.” 
“What did you tell him?” Vann asked. 
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“I told him we don’t have anybody out there,” the duty officer 
replied. 
“But what about the people who live in that hamlet?” Vann asked. 
The duty officer shrugged. Several miles away a howitzer began to 
sound in the night.” 
 
As the spirit moved them day or night, the province and district 
chiefs and the major ARVN unit commanders would pick out places 
on the map—the ford of a canal or stream, a crossing of trails, a 
clump of water palm jungle, any place they guessed some Viet 
Cong might conceivably be at that particular moment—and would 
shoot at these spots. No air or ground observer zeroed the guns 
beforehand or adjusted the shelling after it started. The gunners 
calculated the direction and range from the grid coordinates on the 
map. The fact that the firing was done by the map, without being 
observed and adjusted, was a small gain for the peasantry. It is 
difficult to shell effectively from map coordinates alone, and the 
copies of French Army maps that the ARVN used were so outdated 
that the hamlet or other target might no longer be located where the 
map showed it. The irrationality of shooting artillery this way also 
did not seem to bother the Saigon officers, because nothing was 
done after a puzzled Vann pointed out this failing too. 
 
Cao and the other Saigon officers, Vann concluded, wanted to kill 
these people and destroy their homes and slaughter their livestock, 
not on a systematic basis, but often enough to intimidate them. 
Their theory of pacification apparently was to terrorize the peasants 
out of supporting the Viet Cong. For this reason Cao and the 
province and district chiefs also did nothing to stop the torture and 
murder. They thought it useful. Their attitude was: “We’ll teach 
these people a lesson. We’ll show them how strong and tough we 
are.” The only coherent reply he could ever get out of Cao when 
they argued about the air strikes and shellings was that the planes 
and the artillery flaunted the power of the government and made 
the population respect it. Vann had also been puzzled at first as to 
why Cao and most of his fellow Saigon officers did not feel any guilt 
over this butchery and sadism. He had come to see that they 
regarded the peasantry as some sort of subspecies. They were not 
taking human life and destroying human homes. They were 
exterminating treacherous animals and stamping out their dens. 
When Porter and Vann appealed to Harkins to stop this self-
defeating slaughter, he turned out to be as dense in his own way as 
the Saigon commanders. Instead of using his influence to put a halt 
to the bombardments, he was furthering them. It had been 
dismaying for Vann to watch himself and Porter lose the argument. 
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As they flew across the countryside and passed over a Viet Cong-
controlled area, Vann and Porter would call Harkins’s attention to 
the marks of recognition—the ditched roads, the dirt barriers 
blocking the canals, the ruins of an outpost. When they stretched 
out the map between the seats on the plane or during the briefing 
at the stop ahead, Cao and the Vietnamese officer from Saigon 
would point to a “Viet Cong hamlet” here and a “VC arms factory” 
there. “We must bomb it,” Cao would say. 
Having heard so many complaints from Vann and Porter, Harkins 
would ask if the place was not filled with ordinary people. 
“No, no, they are all Viet Cong,” Cao would answer. 
“Absolutely, all of them have been corrupted by the Communists,” 
the officer from Saigon would add. 
The moment they were alone afterward, Porter and Vann would 
explain to Harkins that the “Viet Cong hamlet” was just like many 
other peasant hamlets in the Delta. The Viet Cong occasionally 
used it to stay in overnight, and it had a pesky squad of local 
guerrillas who gave the district chief trouble. The squad would 
probably escape unscathed if the place was bombed. They had 
hideaways into which they would jump as soon as the planes 
appeared. The several hundred other inhabitants would not be so 
well prepared, and some of them might also panic and get killed out 
in the open. The Viet Cong taught the peasants to dig cave shelters 
under the sleeping platforms rural Vietnamese cover with mats of 
woven straw and use as beds. This expedient gave the peasants a 
handy shelter right inside the house, unless that house happened 
to be one of those set afire by the napalm or the white phosphorus, 
called Willy Peter in U.S. military idiom. The family inside the little 
cave would not have the time or the battle training to evacuate the 
shelter. They would be asphyxiated. As for the “VC arms factory” 
Cao had also put his finger on, Vann and Porter would explain that 
they had intelligence reports that the Viet Cong were fabricating 
shotguns out of galvanized pipe in that particular hamlet. 
 
Harkins would resist accepting what they had to say. He would look 
at them with disbelief when they said that Cao and the senior 
Saigon officer were not telling him the truth. They got the 
impression that the words “Viet Cong hamlet” and “VC arms 
factory” conjured up in his mind World War II images of a German 
barracks and a munitions plant. Harkins’s trips out of Saigon did not 
extend to marching with the infantry. He therefore never saw 
anything to contradict these preconceived images. Nor could Vann 
and Porter get Harkins to agree that, as Vann summed up for 
Ziegler, the bombing and shelling “kills many, many more civilians 
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than it ever does VC and as a result makes new VC.” Vann and 
Porter would usually be overruled and the hamlets would be 
bombed. Harkins also did not stop the abuse of artillery. He could 
have forced restrictions on the Saigon officers by rationing shells. 
 
It was not a question of some noncombatants, it was a question of 
mostly noncombatants, and this was not an ordinary war, Porter 
would counter. Porter had to be exaggerating, Anthis would say; 
the commander of the VNAF and the ARVN officers he met told him 
that most of the casualties were guerrillas and that the bombing 
was hurting the Communists a great deal. He was being deceived, 
Porter would tell Anthis, and try to set him straight with the latest 
report from Vann on how the bombing was driving “these people 
right into the arms of the Viet Cong.” Anthis would refuse to accept 
the possibility that his bombs could be a boon to the Communists. 
Porter would challenge again, if Anthis wasn’t afraid of the truth, 
why didn’t he come down and see for himself who his planes were 
hitting? Anthis would fall back on a legal argument. He and his 
people didn’t initiate any of the bombings. The air strikes were all 
conducted at the request of the country’s legal authorities—the 
responsible ARVN officers and the province and district chiefs. 
“But you wouldn’t honor the request for the strike if you thought you 
would kill “women and kids and old folks, would you?” Porter would 
ask. 
 
Porter had enough seniority as a full colonel and a corps advisor to 
take on an Air Force general and get away with it. Vann did not. He 
was fortunate never to have had an opportunity to confront Anthis 
or he might not have remained at 7th Division long enough to 
become Harkins’ star advisor. He understood what Porter was up 
against with Anthis. Every service wanted as big a role as possible 
in Vietnam as soon as Kennedy committed the United States to the 
war. The more the Air Force bombed, the bigger its role. If air 
power was restricted the way it ought to be, the Air Force would not 
have much to do in Vietnam. It was in Anthis’s personal interest 
and the interest of his institution to believe that the bombing 
furthered the war effort, and so he believed it. Letting himself be 
confronted with the corpses of women and children would inhibit his 
ability to bomb with enthusiasm. Vann did not blame the Air Force 
for being the institutional creature it was. The fault lay with Harkins 
for not grasping the nature of the war and curbing institutional 
proclivities. The bombing was worsening with each month as Anthis 
and his staff steadily built the power of their hybrid Vietnamese-
American air force. 
 
  252 
All buildings were called “structures” in the reports of the raids. This 
term removed the distinction between a hut that had been erected 
by the guerrillas and the home of a peasant family or, for that 
matter, a pigsty. At the same time the term fulfilled the bureaucratic 
need to demonstrate that the air strikes were achieving tangible 
results, i.e., “structures” blown up or burned down. The official 
reports naturally presented all “structures” as guerrilla “structures.” 
By September the fighter-bombers were blasting away an average 
of more than a hundred “structures” a week, and as far as Vann 
could determine from the evidence in his area the majority of them 
were peasant homes. 
The Rules of Engagement, the regulations governing what, where, 
and when the aircraft could attack, permitted the Vietnamese 
forward air controllers in the L-19S to decide that anyone on the 
ground who ran was a Viet Cong.  
 
After the strafing runs the FAC and the fighter-bomber pilots would 
tally a score sheet of how many “KBAs” the planes had dispatched. 
The initials stood for “killed by air.” Once dispatched, or reported as 
having been dispatched, a KBA was ipso facto a dead guerrilla for 
Harkins’ headquarters to add to the body count that was the 
fundamental measure of progress in the war. Vann coined a term of 
contempt for the forward air controllers. He called them “Killer 
Kings."259 
 
  
 These passages illustrate these problems with an unparalleled level of 
detail, due to Vann's military genius and moral fortitude and Sheehan's keen 
intellect and research moxie. In terms of the general (d) disregard in the ARVN 
and GVN for the sacred duties of statehood and security, the government and its 
military that Chester Cooper characterized as "ineffectual" were never designed 
to perform the functions of statehood nor to protect the citizens living within the 
territory of the state. By multiple definitions of statehood, there was in fact no 
state in South Vietnam save for in Saigon and its immediate environs; South 
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Vietnam was not even a state in technical terms except that it had been carved 
up like a country ham at Potsdam the way so many countries in the 'Third World' 
had been since the 'age of exploration' that gave way to colonialism.    
 The strategic crown of failure holding these tactical jewels together was 
Vann's valiant yet unsuccessful campaign to convince General Harkins, General 
Anthis, and others that the war would be lost if it were not fought in a different 
way. This campaign is displayed in unambiguous detail in ABSL, but there is not 
room here to include it. John Paul Vann's personal life was a disaster from his 
birth until his death, and yet he became one of the most respected officers in the 
Army and deputies of CORDS, even while challenging authority at every step of 
the way. He never lost faith in the military, the nation, or even the war, and yet in 
many ways he was its most vocal critic, at least in terms of the way in which it 
was being fought. Perhaps he was destined to symbolize everything Americans 
loved about themselves in the conflict that made them question what it means to 
be American. 
 He was not the only one with doubts. By the time public opinion shifted to 
the point of affecting the calculations of U.S. foreign policymakers in 1968, it was 
too late. Pacification intensification and "Vietnamization" efforts could never take 
shape because they were constructed on the debris of smoldering hamlets. The 
one element the United States needed in its favor— the Vietnamese populace—
was alienated by indiscriminate incarceration and killings and the frivolity of the 
state in Saigon. Compounding this problem was the ruthless efficiency of the 
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enemy and the U.S. underestimation of its motivation and capabilities.260 Just as 
U.S. foreign policymakers would stumble on their words attempting to justify 
Vietnam policy to the American public, they could never justify it to themselves.  
 As described in FPE Criterion IV, every president involved in the Vietnam 
War in some fashion from Truman to Nixon advised against large-scale 
intervention in one form or another. Lovegall argues that Kennedy "privately 
doubted the validity of a crude domino theory" and "perceived from early on that 
there were limits to what the United States could achieve in that part of the 
world."261 Kaiser further demonstrates that Kennedy's actions in Laos make plain 
that he “never regarded Southeast Asia as a propitious place to deploy American 
power.”262 At the same time, Kennedy himself stated that "Withdrawal would be a 
grave mistake. I know people don't like Americans to be engaged in this kind of 
an effort. Forty-seven Americans have been killed in combat with the enemy, but 
this is a very important struggle even though it is far away." 263  Johnson, a 
domestic-oriented president who likely never gave a damn about Vietnam and 
wanted instead to invested valuable political capital on his Great Society                                                         
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programs, repeatedly insisted that to Americanize the war would be a mistake. In 
September 1964 he explained to a crowd in New Hampshire, "What I have been 
trying to do with the situation I found was to get the boys in Vietnam to do their 
own fighting, with our advice and our equipment." A month later in Ohio he 
infamously proclaimed, "We are not about to send American boys nine or ten 
thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for 
themselves."264 A hermeneutics expert need not be employed to comprehend the 
disingenuous nature of that statement.  
 Johnson's downplayed announcement to the American people that his 
administration had decided on a policy of escalation on July 28, 1965, mirrored 
the process of decision-making in his inner advisory circles in that it was never 
described in grandiose war terms but simply as granting a request to give the 
generals what they needed to be more decisive in the field of battle. Instead of 
addressing Congress with the fanfare of a televised address, which would have 
befitted a decision of such a magnitude, he instead arranged for a midday press 
conference to announce that a request for an increase in troops had been met. 
What was grandiose, however, was the idealism in the language he used for 
justifying this ostensibly (to the American public) minute resolution. He spoke of 
"dominoes," "commitment," and "credibility," arguing that allowing South Vietnam 
to fall would "guarantee" that "the battle would be renewed in one country and 
then another, bringing with it perhaps even larger and crueler conflict, as we 
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have learned from the lessons of history." America would stand by "this small 
and valiant nation."265 Johnson's carefully chosen choreography allowed him to 
maintain both the image of restraint and the language of defender, as opposed to 
aggressor, even while committing several hundred thousand troops to a 
peripheral nation with an impotent, repressive government.  
 From the feigned Gulf of Tonkin incident to the fall of Saigon, there was 
very little to learn operationally because the dim prospects for success were 
known from the outset of escalation. In a conversation in 1965 about how many 
battalions to send to Vietnam, McGeorge Bundy wrote to McNamara that two of 
his primary concerns about a continued buildup were "What are the chances of 
our getting into a white man's war with all the brown men against us or 
apathetic?" and "Can we frame this program in such a way as to keep very clear 
our own determination to keep the war limited?"266 Based on an analysis of every 
recorded conversation and memo between the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Vietnam, 
H.R. McMaster demonstrates that inter-agency parochialism, a preoccupation 
with advancement, and an institutional failure to produce accurate and coherent 
advice to the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations left the words of military 
leaders unreliable at best. They were complicit in consciously adhering to 
decisions they knew to be detrimental to the national interest in order to placate 
President Johnson, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and other foreign 
policymakers, brushing aside concerns about Vietnam policy among lower-                                                        
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ranking military officers.267 At the same time, they knew that if they did not tell 
policymakers what they wanted to hear, their careers could be at stake. This 
contrasts sharply with the common view that the military could have won the war 
had it not been hamstrung by foreign policymakers in Washington.  
 A seismic chasm thus existed between commanders on the ground at the 
platoon level and the generals that reported to Washington, as evidenced by the 
saga of John Paul Vann. Information from the battlefield was so heavily filtered 
that by the time it reached the highest levels of government in Washington, 
reports often resembled their original wording about as much as the last in a 
sequence in the game of telephone. Recently declassified documents show that 
Nixon did not even read the President's Daily Briefs, the official intelligence 
briefing prepared for the president on a daily basis. These and other essential 
intelligence briefings from the CIA usually did not reach the president's eyes, and 
only did so once they had been filtered through Kissinger's typewriter, who would 
prepare memos of no more than four pages based on what he thought the 
President wanted to know.268 For a president that was inherently suspicious of 
dissent, as well as the CIA, this filtration ensured the president's ignorance of the 
information emanating from the theater that intelligence officials deemed most 
germane to the proceedings of the war. Philip Caputo's remark, "If that general's 
going to look at those bodies, we'd better hose the trailer down" epitomizes how                                                         
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the reality of the war was rinsed clean like so many fragments of bone and 
flesh.269 
 Between President Johnson deciding not to run for reelection on March 
31, 1968 and President Nixon deciding to invade Cambodia on April 30, 1970, 
"the Vietnam War more or less disappeared from the mainstream of American 
political debate as a major issue," reflecting the collective understanding that the 
war in Vietnam had fundamentally shifted toward disengagement.270 Yet during 
that time support for the war continued to deteriorate. In President Nixon's 
memoir, he stated, "Over the past thirty months, Kissinger, Rogers, and I had 
carefully tailored our public statements to protect the secrecy of the meetings 
because we were determined to do nothing to jeopardize any chance they had 
for success," even while downplaying "any belief that we would succeed in 
obtaining" an agreement.271  
 30 months was quite some time to be concealing the true facts of the war 
simply to avoid hampering negotiations, especially when confidence in the 
negotiations was low and monthly casualties were hovering around 100 KIA. On 
January 5, 1972, Nixon revealed to the American public that Kissinger had been 
maintaining secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese since August of 1969. 
While Americans welcomed the possibility of ending the war, it was still unclear 
what had been gained up to that point, and no peace agreement would come for                                                         
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another year. Furthermore, the secrecy surrounding the negotiations galvanized 
the sentiment that Nixon and other political leaders were not to be trusted. 
Indeed, their collective justifications for the war seemed to many like one giant 
grain of salt.   
 
OPM Summary  
 
How much did the grand strategy of preponderance fuel the impetus to act in 
Vietnam and the refusal to accept the great cost involved in defending the shell 
of a state in South Vietnam? Where was the intersection between that refusal 
and the estimation of U.S. capacity to control the situation within Vietnam? Why 
did FPDM officials adhere so vehemently to the status quo when it was so clearly 
failing to achieve its objectives? How did Vietnam differ from other interventions 
and why does it stand out as the most abysmal failure in U.S. foreign-policy 
history? The war has been approached from hundreds of different angles by 
highly capable scholars and students of the era. While this chapter has 
discussed many contending viewpoints as to how and why the event unfolded so 
unfavorably for the United States, there does exist a certain general consensus 
that transcends both realist and liberal critiques, as explain by David Anderson: 
 
The realist analysis emphasizes that Moscow's Red Army was not 
in Southeast Asia, that the strategic value of the region to the 
United States was low compared with the importance of other 
areas, and that costs of protecting limited American interests there 
were very high. The liberal critique adds that although it is true that 
the leaders of North Vietnam derived their intellectual and 
revolutionary dogma from Marx and Lenin, they were striving for 
self-determination and social justice, goals that were not unlike 
  260 
America's own core values. The liberal-realist scholars find from 
their examination of the origins of and rationale for the U.S. war in 
Vietnam that American military intervention in Vietnam was a 
flawed application of containment and based on a misinterpretation 
of the realities of Vietnamese history and identity. Although this 
thesis is widely accepted, there is considerable debate among 
scholars over why the containment strategy came to be 
misdirected.272  
 
 
 In real-time as well as in retrospect, the quagmire of Vietnam was both 
actual and theoretical. Even as early as 1966, before the effects of escalation 
had materialized, realists like George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau were 
arguing against over-committing in Vietnam because it was on the periphery and 
therefore peripheral to the national interest. Even the father of Containment 
policy recognized that U.S. resources were finite, that the Chinese were already 
preoccupied domestically with their own 'Cultural Revolution,' and that the 
Soviets were not indifferent about Indochina but were certainly more focused on 
Europe.273 Thus, to some degree, commitment to Vietnam was both espoused 
and denounced by both realists and liberals, for differing reasons, just as 
policymakers denounced intervention and then intervened. The main axis of 
confusion often came down to where exactly the interchange between material 
and ideational imperatives fell in FPDM calculations. 
 As in the theoretical sphere, the institutional arena faltered at every 
dimension of instituting policy and operationalizing the war-fighting and nation-
building efforts. And the disjointed dysfunction in the institutional arena inevitably                                                         
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led to problematic tactical issues, as described by James Wirtz in The Tet 
Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War: 
 
This interservice rivalry often affected the war effort, especially the 
air war over South Vietnam. In 1962, for example, the air force 
gained operational control of the light transport aircraft flown by the 
army. In early 1965, the air force prevented the army from 
operating Mohawk (light transport) aircraft in a ground attack role 
but failed in its effort to prevent the army from using helicopter 
gunships. On the eve of the Tet Offensive, the most divisive debate 
over command of the air war erupted when Westmoreland 
attempted to place marine air units under the operational control of 
air force tactical air control centers to increase the air support 
available to army units transferred to I CTZ and to facilitate air 
operations supporting Khe Sanh. In addition to interservice rivalry, 
U.S. officers were often preoccupied with controversies sparked by 
efforts to place South Vietnamese and Korean forces under 
Westmoreland's command.274  
 
 
 It is simply not possible for hundreds of thousands of people involved in an 
intervention and millions of people voting at the ballot box to have total 
informational and institutional purity. To illustrate the point, let us take a piece of 
information and counterfactually process it through the chain of command. Let us 
say a sergeant hunting down VC and attempting to 'pacify' South Vietnam by 
killing the enemy and protecting the villages, hamlets and population centers 
takes part in a battle in which he recognizes that several of his comrades were 
killed because the South Vietnamese RFPFs he is paired with provided 
intelligence to the VC with which they managed to lay a successful ambush 
against his platoon. The sergeant knows this for a fact; there is no doubt in his                                                         
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mind. He takes this information to his commanding officer, a lieutenant, who 
provides a willing ear, having experienced the same thing and understanding the 
predicament. The lieutenant in turn explains this problem to the colonel of his 
battalion, as well as to his South Vietnamese counterpart.  
 The South Vietnamese colonel is already hamstrung by two constraints: 
the first cognitive; he cannot leave his own country, his knowledge of this 
prevents him from thinking of the conflict in terminable terms; the second 
bureaucratic, his commanding overseers are part of a military in which each 
colonel perpetuates a rival against another, a parochial system in which 
resources are granted to those who incur the fewest casualties and bribery 
above all grants promotion. On the GVN side, this piece of battlefield intelligence 
dies at this level: everyone knows the extent of VC infiltration whether it is 
publicly stated or not, and nothing can be done about it. On the U.S. side, the 
colonel forwards the information to intelligence officials and to the commanding 
generals over the course of the next few weeks at the few audiences they grant 
him.  
 The intelligence officials are already working overtime to neutralize VCI, 
but will act on the intelligence if they are given specific names and locations of 
suspects. The generals hear his plight; they do not deny that the VC make up 
perhaps 50% of the RFPFs in that area of operation, but there is little they can 
do, other than raise the issue to the deaf ears of the Saigon regime, which has a 
set of priorities incongruent with their own. They are not pulling out of that area; it 
is in a strategic location that the enemy cannot be allowed to operate freely in. 
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One of the generals mentions the problem at a luncheon a month later in 
Washington, D.C. to someone at the grand-strategic level. There are hundreds of 
people at this level, but this particular official has the ear of someone in the NSC, 
to whom he passes on the information. That official does not want to share any 
information with his counterpart, due to a longstanding feud over turf within the 
Council, but will see what he can do.  
 Another month later one of the president's advisors mentions to the 
president over a glass of scotch, "I heard some of the units fighting alongside our 
boys are 50% VC in X area of operation." How is the president, beholden to 
every form of bureaucratic, interest-group, ideological, and political-expedience 
constraint imaginable, to respond? In the time it takes him to decide to do 
nothing, hundreds of people have died, and the conditions perpetuating failure 
have become more ingrained than they were when the intelligence manifested. 
The president cannot pull out, his foot is already too far in; he will not expand the 
war, the stakes would then be raised too high with the Soviets and Chinese. 
Perhaps he can put the screws to Saigon to put more effort into the fight. But 
Diem has already declared, "The principle export of this country is anti-
Communism."275 Where is the incentive for Saigon to end what is by far the 
largest influx of financial and military resources in the country's history?  
 This is, of course, a farcical caricature of bureaucratic information 
processing. It is not, however, far-fetched. This is the ideational battle that John 
Paul Vann fought until his helicopter crashed into a cemetery in Vietnam in 1972,                                                         
275 Sheehan 1988, 484. 
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a tragic yet fitting end for a man that gave his life for the ancestor-worshipping 
Vietnamese people and his view of the American way of life and warfighting. 
What those who were neck-deep involved in the bureaucratic jungle could not 
grasp was that the military and civilian institutions charged with implementing the 
Vietnam War performed exactly as they were designed to. In The Irony of 
Vietnam: The System Worked, Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts contend: 
 
America's war in Vietnam was obviously a failure. Whether the 
failure was strategic, tactical, conceptual, operational, military, 
political, diplomatic, moral, or all of these, will remain in dispute. But 
after decades of commitment to prevent Communist domination of 
the country, at the cost of many billions of dollars and many 
thousands of American and Vietnamese lives, virtually no one can 
credibly maintain that the effort was successful. By what seemingly 
perverse logic, then, can we argue that the system worked? The 
ironic logic is the central reason for this book, for now that the dust 
has settled, the conventional wisdom of most post-mortems still 
holds that America's failure in Vietnam was the failure of America's 
foreign policy decisionmaking system. Somehow the process of 
assessment, consultation, and decision must have gone awry. 
Given the results of the war, common sense suggests that U.S. 
leaders could not have realized what they were doing when they 
decided to do it. But this commonsense interpretation is simpler, 
and in a way more dangerously comforting in its implications, than 
the reality that those making decisions to increase U.S. involvement 
were aware that victory would probably not be the result. Of all the 
lessons of the war for Americans—and many of these lessons will 
prove to be as simplistic, confining, and misleading as the earlier 
ones of World War II and the cold war that prompted commitment in 
Vietnam—this paradox is the most fundamental. Without 
recognizing this point, it will be impossible to perceive accurately or 
to appreciate the other lessons of the war. Our argument is not a 
perfect one—the evidence indicates exceptions, particular ways in 
which the system did not work—but in general, and at the most 
crucial junctures, the argument is depressingly valid. The paradox 
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is that the foreign policy failed, but the domestic decisionmaking 
system worked (emphasis in the original).276  
 
 
By arguing that the system worked but the foreign policy failed, the authors make 
two points critical to the OPM. First, they illustrate that the system is not designed 
simply to achieve foreign-policy success. This may explain why it never has. 
When Kissinger says of foreign-policy objectives, "Whether these goals are 
desirable is relatively less crucial" than the process of settling on and 
implementing the policy, rather than the most prudent policy, he defines this 
FPDM fallacy in no uncertain terms. When David Baldwin invokes the sarcastic 
Pyrrhic victory, "The surgery was a success, but the patient died," he illustrates 
the same point. U.S. foreign policy is fundamentally designed as an output of 
bureaucratic and ideological "superabundant energy," as Tocqueville described 
it, not as a means to achieve particular foreign-policy ends. Therefore, by any 
common definition of grand strategy, the United States is not pursuing the 
national interest. It certainly did not in Vietnam, and yet the "system worked." If 
the most successful state in the international system is employing a highly 
functional system and still succeeding in the larger picture, then there are more 
questions than answers for IR scholars with regard to the definition of, production 
of, and pursuit of the national interest. This is not to say that leaders want to fail, 
but rather that success is not always the central directive. The fact that the war 
was lost with no in-policy loss to the national interest (that loss more a function of 
                                                        
276 Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Brookings 
Institution, 1979), 1. 
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losses in human lives, financial expenditures, prestige, and pride) demonstrates 
this tragic paradox. Gelb and Betts argue further: 
 
Vietnam was not an aberration of the decisionmaking system but a 
logical culmination of the principles that leaders that leaders 
brought with them into it. Radicals believe that the system produced 
bad policy because capitalism requires imperialism and 
counterrevolution. Reactionaries believe that the system produced 
bad policy because democracy requires compromise, and that 
overly accountable leaders lacked the autonomy and security to go 
to the unpopular extremes of either withdrawal or unlimited war. 
Both agree, in short, that the system worked yet produced bad 
policy because it was a bad system. For liberals, conservatives, 
and most Americans, the argument that a good system produced 
disastrous policy is understandably galling. But the painful reality is 
that if the system failed, it did so in ways almost unfavorable in a 
democratic regime and representative institutional pattern of 
policymaking, or because no system can compensate for errors of 
judgment (or felt needs to gamble on unlikely possibilities) if those 
errors are pervasive among authorities (emphasis mine). Failure of 
policy cannot automatically be the same as failure of the system; 
otherwise substance and process are indistinguishable (emphasis 
mine).277  
 
 
Here, the authors recognize what many FPDM accounts do not: the FPDM 
process and the outcome of a policy must first be studied separately and then 
integrated analytically, in order to assess each on its own and then evaluate in 
what ways the former did and did not lead to the latter. This is the fundamental 
premise of this dissertation. To learn only about the outcome is to learn nothing 
about the FPDM process; to learn only about the process is to limit analysis 
exclusively to a study of organizational behavior; to understand process, 
outcome, and the interaction between the two, all three must be studied as the 
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unified science of FPE. The Vietnam debacle exemplifies the need for this 
science in uniquely typical fashion. The system worked because "(1) the core 
consensual goal of postwar foreign policy (containment of communism) was 
pursued consistently; (2) differences of both elite and mass opinion were 
accommodated by compromise, and policy never strayed very far from the center 
of opinion both within and outside the government; and (3) virtually all views and 
recommendations were considered and virtually all important decisions were 
made without illusions about the odds of success." The authors pack a lot into 
their contentions, but the two most significant takeaways from their three criteria 
of the 'successful' system are that it did in fact pursue a popular policy (an anti-
war majority among the American populace was not achieved until after the Tet 
Offensive in late 1968) and that it was an understanding that success was 
unlikely and foreign policymakers stayed the course in spite of that 
understanding.  
 This leads the researcher to the conclusion that the maintenance of the 
system itself is prioritized in ideology, policy, and operation over the media of 
objectives the system purports to perform as a means to form any given policy. 
Domestic politics constrained alternatives to the status quo because of the dual 
imperatives of "Do not lose the rest of Vietnam to communist control before the 
next election" and "Do not commit U.S. ground troops to a land war in Asia, 
either," as described by Daniel Ellsberg. 278  Ellsberg's "Pentagon Papers," or 
United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: A Study Prepared by the                                                         
278 Daniel Ellsberg, Papers on the War (Simon and Shuster, 1972), 101. 
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Department of Defense, as was its official title, revealed to the public in June of 
1971 that the tactical lies U.S. foreign policymaking officials told them about the 
war itself were an inherent part of the faulty strategic thinking with regard to the 
foreign-policy means-end chain. There simply was no way to connect the search-
and-destroy missions in Vietnam either to success in that war or to the overall 
national interest. His counterpart in the leak at The New York Times, Neil 
Sheehan, would come to understand and document the depths of the strategic-
tactical gap all too well during the course of his encyclopedic research of John 
Paul Vann. It is perhaps fitting that Ellsberg's 1962 dissertation in the field of 
economics is a challenge to the rational decision-making model, arguing for 
distinguishing between risk and ambiguity as decision-making input factors.279  
 Robert Komer, involved in the military and civilian side of the war at every 
level as head of CORDS, Ambassador, and other positions, came to the same 
conclusion in 1972 that Gelb and Betts detailed in their exhaustive account: 
 
Essentially both governments attempted to handle an atypical 
conflict situation by means of institutions designed for other 
purposes. Such constraints as institutional inertia—the inherent 
reluctance of organizations to change operational methods except 
slowly and incrementally—influenced not only the decisions made 
but what was actually done in the field. These constraints led to (1) 
an overly militarized response; (2) diffusion of authority and 
fragmentation of command; (3) hesitation to change the traditional 
relationship of civilian to military leadership; and (4) agency 
reluctance to violate the conventional lines dividing responsibilities. 
The conclusion is that atypical problems demand special solutions. 
Policymakers must be sure the institutions carrying out the policy 
can execute it as intended. Adequate follow-through machinery 
must exist at all levels, to force adaptation if necessary. Where the                                                         
279 Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and Decision (New York: Garland, 2001). 
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United States is supporting an enfeebled ally, effective means of 
stimulating optimum indigenous performance are essential.280  
 
 
The argument that "rational bureaucracy does not necessarily have to serve 
rational purposes" therefore mirrors the idea that a foreign-policy outcome does 
not necessarily have to be rationally correlated with the FPDM process.281 These 
are unintelligible perspectives to promulgate. The genius of Komer, Gelb and 
Betts is their ability to recognize the process, the outcome, and their 
intersubjectivity. Kissinger was fond of such platitudes, and in fact often spoke in 
conceptually circular terms in spite of his admittedly acute mental acumen. 
Making the point that political expedience, bureaucratic restrictions, and 
institutional inertia are factors in FPDM is redundant; everyone knows that this is 
the case. Promoting the idea that these are more important than the production 
of the agreed-upon foreign policy is irresponsible; promoting the idea that they 
are more important than the production of the prudent foreign policy is criminal. 
To be sure, the U.S. foreign policy system achieved remarkable things in 
Vietnam, but none of them did the effort any good. The skill and bravery of U.S. 
soldiers and the incredible destructive power of U.S. aerial bombardment were 
indeed the instruments of a veritable superpower high on its might. This 
superpower was fighting against itself in Vietnam. The United States foreign-
policy system had been preparing for something monumental since it was 
attacked at Pearl Harbor, but it was not Vietnam that it was preparing for. The                                                         
280 Komer 1972. 
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Giroux, 2011), although he is not making that argument per se.  
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'arsenal of democracy' was therefore misapplied in Vietnam via what Kaiser 
brands "The greatest policy miscalculation in the history of American foreign 
relations."   
 A major part of that miscalculation was a mischaracterization of the 
psyche of the average Vietnamese and, in particular, the psyche of the enemy. 
Gelb and Betts mention "ethnocentricity and misperception" as a common 
criticism of the FPDM analysis that fueled the obstacles to success in Vietnam. 
From the perspective of the sociopolitics of intervention, the ignorance of the 
local political, cultural, and social conditions of Vietnam highlights the focus on 
great-power conflict more broadly. Militarily, the focus on using traditional military 
tactics to fight a guerilla war, certain exceptions like Phoenix notwithstanding, 
represents the tactical component of the strategic-tactical gap in U.S. grand 
strategy. The tragic irony of the Vietnam War was that the U.S. became willing to 
expend great-power-conflict resources against an enemy that lacked them in a 
country where the national interest was in fact never at stake.  
 In fairness to certain elements within military and foreign policymaking 
circles, the idea behind efforts like Phoenix was to get closer to the source of the 
insurgency and improve battlefield intelligence. Had this been the main 
provenance of counterinsurgency, as was the initial purpose when Kennedy 
initially sent advisors to the country, the effort may or may not have been 
successful, but it certainly would have left a smaller footprint, saving resources 
and humiliation in the face of defeat. This is where the metric of efficiency comes 
into play. The willingness to 'pay any cost' to 'protect freedom,' simplistic slogans 
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too often reverberating in the discourse of official U.S. foreign policy and certainly 
present during the Vietnam era, leaves policymakers hamstrung in terms of both 
limiting and maximizing the amount of resources expended. Contrary to the 
assumptions of many foreign policymakers involved in this catastrophic blunder, 
the employment of fewer resources may in fact have led to a more favorable 
outcome, given that the aggressively violent nature of the American intervention 
fed weaponry to the Viet Cong and motivated many Vietnamese countrymen to 
take up arms. This is not to say that the United States would have succeeded in 
preventing the North from taking over the South, which is likely to have happened 
anyway at some indefinite point. But it may have been more effective, and would 
have saved a fair amount of resources, American and Vietnamese lives, and 
humiliation.  
 British military officers described the American militiamen they confronted 
during the American Revolution as "a very effeminate thing, very unfit for and 
very impatient of war," and American civilians as "a worthless lot, a rabble, 
without discipline and without courage, running away from battle, deserting to the 
British ranks, leaving Mr. Washington with no army at all."282 What a difference a 
century makes: as the sun began to set on the British Empire, it would be this 
"worthless lot" of American power that would transpose the Pax Britannica with 
the Pax Americana. Roosevelt's "people of small stature" that were "not warlike" 
would in turn come to undermine that power by the way of the same                                                         
282 Piers Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783 (Cambridge, 1964), 30; Marion Balderston 
and David Syrett, eds., The Last War: Letters from British Officers During the American 
Revolution (New York, 1975), viii. 
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transformation from guerilla warfare to pitched regimented battle, combined with 
an absolute determination to expel foreigners from their native land. While it is 
now perceptible what effect the loss of the American Colonies signified for the 
British Empire, it is not yet clear what the loss in, not of Vietnam means to the 
United States. How Americans interpret the conflict conceptually still affects the 
U.S. encounter with the world in real terms.  
 Perhaps the two most distinguishable inferences garnered from this 
chapter are the trance-like myopia with which U.S. foreign policymakers viewed 
the situation in Vietnam and the complete inability of the state in Saigon to stand 
on its own. What caused this myopia is open to interpretation; this dissertation 
contends that it was informed by the pursuit of preponderance at every level due 
to the inability to think outside of that box and accept that Vietnam would be 'lost.' 
The problem of adherence to the status quo and the problem of the institutionally 
and morally barren GVN came together when U.S. war planners realized that the 
ARVN could not even make an attempt to fight the war effectively, let alone win 
it. They therefore took over the fight from 1965 onward, eventually relinquishing it 
back to the GVN through "Vietnamization" as the war came full circle, 
acknowledging that the price was greater than they wished to pay. There was no 
way to unify the two armies because the standards were so distinct: 
 
Westmoreland and the South Vietnamese command believed the 
ARVN was better suited to work among and protect the indigenous 
population than were foreign-born troops. Yet since they perceived 
ARVN as demoralized, they had little choice but to have fresh, well-
armed American troops engage the enemy's regular forces... 
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Command-and-control arrangements between U.S. and South 
Vietnamese forces reinforced the concept that the forces of each 
nation remained separate entities with distinct missions. In April, 
Westmoreland turned down the notion of encadrement, of placing 
American officers and cadres in charge of South Vietnamese units, 
because of the language barrier and the requirement of additional 
logistical support.283 
 
 
 In reviewing reports from the Vietnam War, one of the starkest realizations 
becomes just how predictable all of the problems of implementation were. And 
yet, even decades later, there is still much argument about why the war failed. In 
the same way that FPDM is often clouded by political expedience, bureaucratic 
necessities, ideology, the heat of the moment, groupthink, or just the endless 
confusion of statecraft, so too can the memory of that FPDM be confused even 
many years afterward. Just as cognitive biases and preference restrictions 
constrain and codify FPDM maxims, so too do accounts of that FPDM frame its 
understanding in both popular and scholarly analysis. This is in large part 
because whatever ideology, IR paradigm, political predilection, or general 
perspective you adhere to will inevitably determine to a large degree what 
happened, why it happened, how it happened, and what conclusions to draw 
from it. James William Gibson describes this confusion: 
During the 1970s various liberal interpretations of what happened in 
Vietnam were considered definitive. Some claimed the great lesson 
to be learned concerned "the limits of power." The United States 
had expended too many men and too much money fighting in a 
country that wasn't so important after all. Other liberals viewed the 
war as a tragic drama fueled by hubris. Our political leadership, the 
best and the brightest of the land, made a series of "small 
decisions," each decision being "reasonably regarded at the time                                                         
283 Hunt 1995, 34. 
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as the least that would be necessary." But Fate intervened and lo 
and behold we found ourselves "entrapped in that nightmare of 
American strategists, a land war in Asia." It was a sad, sad story, 
says Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "a tragedy without villains." Curiously 
enough, the views of the Conservatives were not so different. They 
offered another way of "getting over Vietnam" without ever 
searching for the war. In November 1980, President-elect Ronald 
Reagan declared that Vietnam had been a "noble cause." The war 
had been lost only because of American "self-imposed restraints." 
We had not been sufficiently "tough," but no longer would be weak 
or timid. Reagan promised to "rebuild" our "defense" capabilities. 
He announced a new plan for spending $750 billion for the military. 
A new Rapid Deployment Force was created for quick transport to 
the Third World. We were ready to go to war again. For months the 
news media talked and wrote about how the United States had 
finally gotten over the "Vietnam Syndrome." Never was the 
question raised about just what it was we were over. The Vietnam 
part of the "Vietnam Syndrome" was left blank. Perhaps the war 
was just a normal part of growing up for a young nation, a 
childhood disease like chicken pox, which leaves behind some 
small scars but builds character. In this way a strange consensus 
developed: it was okay to use the war as a point of departure for 
almost any discussion—whether on literature or Greek tragedy or 
foreign policy—but only as long as you didn't talk about the war 
itself. In this way the war became progressively displaced and 
repressed at the same time it was written about.284  
  
 
 To talk about it without talking about it is what Geoff Simons meant when 
he examined the war as an idea, and not an event, in his discussion of Vietnam 
Syndrome. At this point it is necessary to reiterate that the purpose of this 
dissertation is not to regurgitate old information in order to produce some 
cathartic exorcism in the reaction of the reader, nor to hoodwink the reader into 
normatively deploring any particular leader, but rather to make the case that the 
archetype of the stoic statesman rationally maximizing the utility-function in the 
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pursuit of a static, materially determined national interest is an inaccurate 
description of a much more human, much more complicated process. These 
foreign-policy blunders were chosen for case studies in part to illustrate that 
process.  
 If Vietnam Syndrome died with the perceived success of the 1991 Gulf 
War to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, the Iraq War resurrected the ghosts 
of Vietnam, as George H.W. Bush's multilateral effort to establish his "new world 
order," which accomplished its admittedly limited objectives, descended into 
George W. Bush's seemingly interminable tempest in the form of the Iraq War, 
perhaps the most egregious foreign-policy blunder in the history of the United 
States in terms of the national interest—only time will tell. While there is very little 
in common between the international conditions, motivations for choosing the 
particular country of conflict, or political climate of these two blunders, they 
nevertheless demonstrate in conjunction that two features remain immutable in 
U.S. foreign policy: the pursuit of the grand strategy of preponderance and the 
assumption that with great power comes the capacity to dictate the sociopolitical 
terms of other states. Gibson writes of the explosion of literature on the Vietnam 
War from 1983 onward (after eight years of mourning, presumably), "It was as if 
a legendary monster or unholy beast had finally been captured and was now on 
a nationwide tour."285 Along would come another monster exactly two decades 
later, and it now appears to be spawning new monsters of ever-increasing 
ferocity...                                                           
285 Gibson 1986, 2. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Iraq War: FPDM Prisms and the Man Behind the Curtain  
 
 
The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered 
dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction. We acted because we saw existing evidence in a new 
light through the prism of our experience on 9/11.286 
 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 2003 
 
 
 I'm here for a reason, and this is how we're going to be judged.287 
 
 President George W. Bush prior to the Iraq War 
 
 
Part I. FPE 
 
Criterion I. Degree of fruition of primary and secondary objectives 
 
 On March 21, 2003, the day after the invasion of Iraq, Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld set forth the preliminary goals of the invasion, or what 
he termed "aims and objectives we have for the days ahead:" 
 
Our goal is to defend the American people, and to eliminate Iraq's 
weapons of mass destruction, and to liberate the Iraqi people. 
Coalition military operations are focused on achieving several 
specific objectives: to end the regime of Saddam Hussein by 
striking with force on a scope and scale that makes clear to Iraqis 
that he and his regime are finished. Next, to identify, isolate and 
eventually eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, their 
delivery systems, production capabilities, and distribution networks. 
Third, to search for, capture, and drive out terrorists who have 
found safe harbor in Iraq. Fourth, to collect such intelligence as we 
can find related to terrorist networks in Iraq and beyond. Fifth, to                                                         
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collect such intelligence as we can find related to the global 
network of illicit weapons of mass destruction activity. Sixth, to end 
sanctions and to immediately deliver humanitarian relief, food and 
medicine to the displaced and to the many needy Iraqi citizens. 
Seventh, to secure Iraq's oil fields and resources, which belong to 
the Iraqi people, and which they will need to develop their country 
after decades of neglect by the Iraqi regime. And last, to help the 
Iraqi people create the conditions for a rapid transition to a 
representative self-government that is not a threat to its neighbors 
and is committed to ensuring the territorial integrity of that 
country.288 
 
 
 The following day, General Tommy Franks, commanding general of the 
invasion force, reiterated these objectives, promising, “This will be a campaign 
unlike any other in history, a campaign characterized by shock, by surprise, by 
flexibility, by the employment of precise munitions on a scale never before seen, 
and by the application of overwhelming force." 289  Use of the phrase 
"overwhelming force" was clearly intentional, given that Colin Powell and other 
military leaders had demanded just that as one of the lessons of the Vietnam 
War and a cornerstone of modern American war doctrine. Of course, these were 
all tactical objectives, as the Defense Department is charged with carrying out 
military policy, not creating it. As Harry Summers summarized of a particular 
attitude prevalent in the military, "The army doesn't make strategy." While this is 
technically true, the words and preferences of defense officials inevitably do 
affect policy to a certain degree. Both the military and the intelligence community                                                         
288 Defense Department Briefing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General 
Richard Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 21, 2003, 
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would become politically enmeshed in the Iraq War to a further extent than 
defined in their charters with respect to WMD, troop levels, and other matters. 
But in terms of establishing the war narrative, the Bush Administration set the 
tone. Its lofty rhetoric emphasized a more holistic approach to the Middle East 
more broadly, with establishing a "liberated," pro-Western Iraq as its primary 
policy piece within the regional grand-strategic puzzle.  
 Even though this war narrative was highly idealized in its choice of 
concepts and words, policy with regard to Iraq did establish particular objectives, 
including those specified by Rumsfeld and Franks. Chief among them, at least in 
terms of priority, was of course removing Saddam Hussein from power. This 
turned out to be the only aspect of the Iraq War that met or exceeded 
expectations. Coalition forces reached and secured Baghdad in one of the most 
rapid advances of modern warfare, and did so with remarkably few casualties. It 
would be difficult to classify this phase of the war as anything other than a 
resounding success. It took only days to reach Baghdad, and less than three 
weeks to sweep the country. This comprehensive battlefield accomplishment was 
due to myriad factors: weak morale in the Iraqi military and the decrepit state of 
its infrastructure; Saddam Hussein's strategic miscalculations and obsessive 
focus on internal rather than external threats; the rapid advance on Baghdad, 
leaving few opportunities for coordination of a counterattack; the skill and 
firepower of American ground forces; and the strength of aerial bombing. All of 
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these factors were compounded by the relative simplicity of fighting a war in the 
desert for the side with superior firepower.290  
 Given the open terrain and the shortcomings in Iraqi military capabilities, 
declarations by military officials that characterize the campaign as one of the 
most daring and impressive in history seem somewhat overstated. Nevertheless, 
this objective was in practical terms a clear success, even though Saddam 
Hussein and many other high-level targets were not captured until months into 
the conflict. The "shock and awe" aspect of the campaign may or may not have 
had an impact on Iraqi defections; it seems likely that defections would have 
been high regardless. What the blitzkrieg ground assault and leadership-and-
chain-of-command aerial targeting did accomplish was the immediate 
decapitation of the Hussein regime, even if some of its leaders managed to flee 
for the time being. Many of the faces on the deck of cards representing wanted 
regime members American soldiers were dealt would evade capture for some 
time, but within days few were able to affect the country's situation in any 
meaningful way. What the otherwise successful blitzkrieg did not address was 
the total accounting of all Iraqi military forces, many of which were bypassed, a 
maneuver which itself bypassed standard military procedure—never allow the 
enemy to roam free and occupy your flank, even in a full frontal assault that 
quickly captures the flag. Many of these chickens would come home to roost, 
especially after the dismissal of the Iraq Army.  
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  The most important medium-term goal, and the fundamental muse for the 
war, was the location, capture, and disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD). But the saga of Iraq's nonexistent WMD quickly became a 
game with a cat a no mouse as the aloof statements of Bush Administration 
officials promised WMD but delivered none. The narrative justifying the war 
therefore became 'the man behind the curtain' as the Bush Administration moved 
to justify the war on other grounds. This enormous balloon deflated a little bit 
each week as the American public and the world waited for a train to arrive that 
had never left the station.  
 This anticlimactic end was the result of a long chain of means whose 
mass-public forum began on February 5th, 2003, when Secretary of State Colin 
Powell, perhaps the most admired Bush Administration official and the one 
whose word carried the most legitimacy, made the official case for Iraq's pursuit 
of WMD in an impassioned speech at the United Nations. Powell claimed 
unequivocally that "the facts and Iraq's behavior show that Saddam Hussein and 
his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass 
destruction."291 This assessment of the situation on the ground failed to convince 
many heads of state, including many allies in Western Europe, who found the 
assertions exaggerated and unworthy of a major military confrontation. Concerns 
among allies were compounded by Hans Blix's testimony at the same body nine 
days later, which was largely contradictory. Blix testified, "More than 200 
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chemical and more than 100 biological samples have been collected at different 
sites," which produced no prohibited samples.292  
 The multilateralist element of the Bush Administration led by Colin Powell 
did manage to get Resolution 1441 passed, "Recognizing the threat Iraq's non-
compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security."293 
The resolution was left intentionally vague so as to receive a larger coalition of 
support and to deny anti-war leaders in the United Nations and the United States 
language with which to claim that Iraq was in fact complying with that and prior 
resolutions. In fact, the first declaration within the resolution was to recognize 
prior resolutions Iraq had been in violation of. Although roundly questioned the 
world over, Powell's assertions were consistent with virtually every public 
statement made theretofore by the Bush Administration.  
 President Bush's 2003 State of the Union Address, in which he famously 
singled out Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an "axis of evil," also contained a false 
report of the soon-to-be infamous 'sixteen words:' "The British government has 
learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium 
from Africa."294 Later, the Bush Administration recognized that the report was 
inaccurate, and dropped it from the rhetorical casus belli. Generally speaking,                                                         
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however, the Administration avoided specifics, proliferating in general terms the 
charge that Iraq was aggressively pursuing WMD and partnering with terrorists.  
 These claims were based in large part on the now-declassified October 
2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq's Continuing Programs for 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, which stated categorically: "Since inspections 
ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its 
missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; in the view of 
most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program."295 The 
British government's public claims were almost identical to U.S claims, as well as 
being equally vague. Tony Blair wrote in the Foreword to his government's 
version of the U.S. NIE, the 2002 Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The 
Assessment of the British Government: "What I believe the assessed intelligence 
has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical 
and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear 
weapons, and that he has been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile 
programme. I also believe that, as stated in the document, Saddam will now do 
his utmost to try to conceal his weapons from UN inspectors."296 
 However, declassified documents reveal that the certainty with which 
Saddam Hussein was assumed to be in possession of WMD was greatly inflated 
by both intelligence officials and Bush Administration officials. In fact, Defense                                                         
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Secretary Donald Rumsfeld estimated the low end of that certainty to be 0%, 
writing in a memo to Joint Chiefs Chairman Richard Meyers: "Please take a look 
at this material as to what we don't know about WMD. It is big. Our assessments 
rely heavily on analytic assumptions and judgment rather than on hard evidence. 
Our knowledge of the Iraq nuclear weapons program is based largely—perhaps 
90%—on analysis of imprecise intelligence."297  
 The job of the intelligence community is to use hard evidence to make an 
assessment with a specified level of confidence, not to make assumptions based 
on a lack of hard evidence and peddle them as certainty. In 2004, weapons 
inspector Charles Duelfer simply stated, "Saddam Hussein ended the nuclear 
program in 1991 following the Gulf War," and "There were no credible indicators 
that Baghdad resumed production."298 But as with the adage that statistics can 
be inferred to produce any conclusion, so too can 'credible indicators' be 
produced in intelligence where there exists a viewpoint unwilling to accept their 
nonexistence. Confirmation bias plagued WMD intelligence gathering and 
analysis at every step of the way because Bush Administration officials pressed 
the CIA for confirming evidence and systematically dismissed and discredited 
disconfirming evidence.  
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 "Conclusion 1" of the March 2013 "Final Report from the Special Inspector 
General for Iraq Reconstruction" states: "Most of the major key judgments in the 
Intelligence Community's October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), 
Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either overstated, 
or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting. A series of 
failures, particularly in analytic trade craft, led to the mischaracterization of the 
intelligence."299 This metric for evaluation therefore can only be considered a 
monumental failure, since the most significant justification for war was null and 
void before the war ever began. To make matters worse, the intelligence 
community failed miserably at its two most important tasks, remaining apolitical 
and producing solid intelligence. The Bush Administration had inflated the threat 
to such an extent that the lines between the actual intelligence and the claims 
made about Iraq's WMD became so blurred as to be immeasurable. The 
Administration thus shifted its rhetoric to other justifications for war in Iraq, but by 
that time, there was a new problem in Iraq and public attention shifted to it: 
rampant insecurity.  
 The final goal enunciated by Secretary Rumsfeld was "to help the Iraqi 
people create the conditions for a rapid transition to a representative self-
government that is not a threat to its neighbors and is committed to ensuring the 
territorial integrity of that country." This is an extremely vague reference to the 
absolute imperative of security and stability operations. Curiously, and highly                                                         
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problematically, nowhere under the veneer of his eight objectives is a concern 
over security even mentioned in any substantive terms. But insecurity in fact 
became the significant harm to the national interest that a simple toppling of the 
regime and exfiltration from a safe, secure country left behind would never had 
entailed had it been quickly and effectively achieved. As many people had 
predicted before the invasion, the drive to the capitol proved to be a fairly easy 
task short-term against the dilapidated Iraqi military, while the secure occupation 
of the country would become a virtually insurmountable challenge long-term.  
 The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) did 
manage to establish some basic services, but never retained enough resources 
to completely fulfill this task.300 The mixed success with which retired General 
Jay Garner oversaw Iraq in March and April of 2003 soon gave way to the 
leadership of Ambassador Paul Bremer III on May 1, when he was charged with 
developing a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). He subsequently 
incorporated Iraqi leaders into the Authority to cooperate in formation of the Iraqi 
Governing Council (IGC), which took the baton from the CPA in July, just as the 
insurgency was picking up steam. The prevailing environment rapidly turned into 
"a local political power struggle overlaid with sectarian violence and fueled by 
fanatical foreign jihadists and persistent criminal opportunists." 301  This power 
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struggle and the American-Iraqi campaign to establish security is detailed in 
OPM Indicators II and III.  
 While the idea behind foreign policy evaluation is to assess any given 
foreign policy as it relates to the national interest, there is no way of avoiding the 
intersection between the foreign policy in objective terms and the foreign policy 
as perceived by the group of people promulgating it. In the case of the Iraq War, 
that group was primarily made up of the Bush Administration, and the perception 
of the foreign policy from the view of its core group of individuals was highly 
idealized and in fact almost cavalier toward how it related to the national interest. 
This is simply because it did not relate to the national interest in real terms. The 
United States stood little to gain in Iraq, and in fact the country is now much more 
tied to the national interest (in a highly problematic fashion) than at any time in 
history, including the 1991 Gulf War. It was therefore marketed in ideational 
terms to the American public and Congress, who accepted the connection 
between Iraq and the national interest on those grounds. However, this was not 
an act of simple deception, but of self-deception. While the progenitors of the Iraq 
War did in fact manipulate the truth and lie about the threat posed by Iraq, its 
supposed WMD, and its ties to groups that meant to threaten the United States, 
they believed that they could successfully remake the Middle East in a more 
modern, Western-friendly image, and that this would benefit the national interest.  
 The Iraq War was intended by its neoconservative protagonists to 
symbolize the zenith of the American social-engineering project in the Middle 
East. Instead, it now represents a nadir above which it would never reach. 
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Assessing this metric provides both opportunities and challenges. On the one 
hand, there can be little doubt that toppling the brutal dictatorship of Saddam 
Hussein did indeed motivate revolutionary and progressive people in other 
countries in the region, as the Arab Spring has demonstrated. On the other hand, 
the current conditions within Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and 
elsewhere in the region signify that in no way has the Middle East in fact been 
democratized. Instead, extant U.S. allies have largely maintained their 
sociopolitical status quo ante, while sectarian strife has transformed from a 
dormant problem into a malignant regional firestorm.  
 As the architect of the Iraq War, the United States now finds its national 
interest transposed over a region in a manner much more acute than prior to 
2003. Because of its position as the originator of this social-engineering project, 
the United States has now been forced to engage even further with the region 
just as the motivation to do so among the American citizenry is fading and just as 
the "Asia pivot" is meant to be hitting full stride. There is still not a single 
democracy in the Middle East.302 Dictatorships and kingdoms that were U.S. 
allies prior to 2003 remain just as dictatorial, and U.S. enemies (chiefly Iran) have 
become emboldened by their influence in Iraq and Syria and the response 
against the Iraq War.   
 The ideational component of the Iraq War, which was its primary 
component, can therefore only be assessed as an utter failure. The message 
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sent by removing Saddam Hussein from power by military force, especially via 
the lightning-quick "shock and awe" military campaign that so swiftly removed his 
authority, may indeed have been received by other potential adversaries, 
including Iran and North Korea, that had been singled out by President Bush in 
his 2002 State of the Union Address. However, Iraq's descent into chaos and 
insurgency have all but eroded any victory in perception that lighting advance 
may have created. Furthermore, North Korea continues to flaunt its nuclear 
weapons program in the face of impotent U.S. threats against it, and Iran has 
taken control of the helm of the securitization effort in Iraq. In virtually every 
conceivable way, the Iraq War produced exactly the outcomes it meant to 
preclude in Iraq, in the region, and throughout the world.  
 In time, as WMD were not found and the justification for the war shifted, 
one alternative narrative became the need to "fight them over there so that we 
don't have to fight them here." This justification was one of a plethora of 
alternative justifications from mid-2003 onward, which included everything from 
humanitarian imperatives to hedging against Iran. Even if we set aside for a 
moment who "they" are supposed to imply, this is a highly problematic way of 
thinking, and yet the few policy and pundit stragglers that still cling to the Iraq 
War as a "success" consistently invoke this philosophy as evidence for why the 
United States has not been attacked again in any significant way since 9/11. But 
first, it is impossible to prove a counterfactual, so there is no way of establishing 
this as fact. Second, this assertion does not follow sound logic. The U.S. 
presence in Iraq was opposed by the Muslim community, and therefore 
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exacerbated the U.S. image problem in it rather than helping it. It is true that 
jihadists were attracted to Iraq because of the American presence, but since 
there were more of them available do to its presence, there is no way to link that 
presence with a lack of presence of the home front.303 Third, the price paid to 
dislodge Saddam Hussein in blood, treasure, and prestige, detailed in FPE 
Criterion III, was so enormous so as to render the argument moot. Indeed, more 
American soldiers perished in Iraq than civilians in the 9/11 attacks, and now 
continue to perish in the war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.   
 
 
Criterion II. Corollary strategic consequences 
 
 On June 10, 2014, the gigantic expenditure of time, money, soldiers, and 
political capital invested by the United States in Iraq largely dissipated in days 
when a wayward band of Sunni jihadists that came to be known as the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) captured Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city, after 
only four days of fighting. 304  In the hundred days between that date and 
September 23, when the United States began airstrikes on ISIS in Syria, the 
group established a self-described caliphate that covered hundreds of square 
miles between northwestern Iraq and eastern Syria, defeating the Iraqi army, the 
Kurdish Peshmerga, and the Syrian army on multiple fronts with adept military                                                         
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304 'Islamic State in Iraq and Syria,' 'Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant' (the Obama 
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State' has been utilized by the group to appeal to would-be jihadists beyond the borders of Iraq 
and Syria. 
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tactics, ferocious battlefield tenacity, and a systematic campaign of execution, 
extortion, and terrorism that enveloped everything and everyone within its path. It 
instilled fear into anyone who opposed it via summary executions, public 
beheadings, crucifixions, torture, and a highly public media campaign to 
proliferate its name, purpose, efficacy, and ruthlessness. For one analyst, the 
word that best described the group that seemed to so revel in violence for the 
sake of violence was "bloodlust."305  
 ISIS successfully assumed the mantle of the only Sunni force capable of 
defending the faith against the Shia oppression of the Iraqi government, 
solidifying the sectarian rift unleashed by the U.S. invasion of Iraq a decade 
earlier. In desperate times, people back a winner, and ISIS, in spite of its 
austerity and brutality, seemed the only force capable of advancing Sunni 
interests in the face of the Baghdad government's Shia domination. While the 
group is certainly not universally praised among Sunnis, in large part due to the 
ruthless nature of its 'governance,' a nontrivial portion of the Sunni community 
within Iraq either openly supported it or tacitly approved of it as a wedge against 
the perceived inside-out power grab that replaced Sunni Saddam Hussein with a 
host of Shia partisans in Baghdad. The same is often true in Syria, where "ISIS is 
more popular in the Sunni towns and villages they have captured around Aleppo 
than many other rebel groups that are halfway to being bandits." 306  In the 
wasteland of anarchy, fear alone is enough to stimulate inhabitants to back the                                                         
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group that appears to be winning, even in the case that it is frowned upon 
ideologically—to resist can often mean mass slaughter, and ISIS has shown little 
restraint in that regard.  
 One of the most dire admonitions against a military intervention to topple 
Saddam Hussein was the concern that removing the regime, which had 
successfully (if brutally) asserted authority in the country, would expose a 
centuries-old sectarian rift within Iraq between Sunni, Shia, and Kurd; the Sunni-
Shia divide dates all the way back to the death of Muhammad in year 632 of the 
Common Era. Even before the rise of ISIS, this fear had been realized in the 
form of Shia death squads operating with either the implicit approval of or direct 
support from the Iraqi government battling it out with disparate Sunni Arab 
tribesmen. In the early years of the insurgency, loose bands of militias targeted 
Sunni leaders, with Sunni groups forming in defense to retaliate.  
 By 2006, even Sunni groups that were "heavily armed and lightly 
supervised" were collaborating with the Shia-dominated government to facilitate 
extrajudicial killings in Sunni-dominated areas, while Shia death squads operated 
freely in Shia-dominated areas, in both rural and urban areas alike. 307  The 
insecurity that took hold after the 2003 invasion led directly to the alienation of 
Sunnis, the bitterness of ex-army soldiers that had been disbanded by Paul 
Bremer's wholesale anti-Baathist purges, and the humiliating treatment of 
detainees in the invasion's aftermath. These nationalists and former Ba'athists 
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either partnered with foreign jihadists or fought them for the authority to fight the 
American-Iraqi government alliance. Many of the core fighters that would 
eventually form ISIS had been detained together at the U.S. prison at Camp 
Bucca, including Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri, who came to be known by his 
nom de guerre Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the organization's 'caliph.'308  
 By the time ISIS had conquered vast swaths of Iraq and Syria, leading to a 
consolidation of territory covering 80,000 square kilometers by the end of 2014, 
sectarian tensions had become so entrenched that going by Weber's definition of 
a state as having achieved the monopolization of violence left Iraq without a state 
at all.309 The current security situation in Iraq is dire, and the long-term outlook 
may be even more precarious (while government forces have made slow 
advances on Mosul and other ISIS strongholds, long-term sectarian strife is far 
from solved). The nonstate armed groups on both sides of the Sunni-Shia divide 
that emerged following the 2003 invasion and subsequent insurgency continue to 
operate at will. The force charged with liberating northwestern Iraq from ISIS—
the same force that melted in the face of its advance—the Iraqi army, is 
incapable of retaking Mosul without significant help, and often even direction, 
from Shia militias backed by Iran and their leader on the ground, Qasem 
Soleimani, the commander of the Iranian Quds force.  
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 While a delicate balance currently exists between the Iraqi government, its 
Shia militias, Iranian commanders and fighters, the small contingent of U.S. 
Special Operations troops, and the Kurds, this balance will likely evaporate as 
ISIS is destroyed and Iraq returns to its previous state of virtual anarchy between 
its rival factions. That these groups are currently allied to fight a common enemy 
is not to suggest that the alliance is stable even in the short term: the Asaib Ahl 
al-Haq militia, known as the League of the Righteous, recently warned on its 
television channel, "If the U.S. doesn't withdraw its forces immediately, we will 
deal with them as forces of occupation."310 When territory has been successfully 
taken back from ISIS, extrajudicial reprisal killings, torture, unlawful arrests, and 
wanton destruction of property have followed in its wake, blurring the moral war 
between ISIS and its multifarious adversaries.311 While the heinous nature of 
ISIS terrorism and its sleek usage of media make it profoundly clear how barbaric 
the group is, there is still no obvious moral high ground anywhere to be found. 
The Iraqi state and its proxies seem at best the lesser of two evils.  
 While ISIS is under siege in Iraq, it still operates relatively freely in Syria, 
where a half-million people lost their lives between 2011 and 2015, 11.5% of 
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Syria's population. 312 Whereas the rebellion against dictator Bashar al-Assad 
may have otherwise been comprised of ordinary, relatively secular (or at least 
non-jihadist) groups, ISIS has largely intimidated all others to become the 
primary opposition force. The fact that Russia has largely avoided targeting ISIS 
in Syria, as Assad views the other groups as more threatening to his regime 
given that the United States and others oppose both he and ISIS, has only 
allowed them to further consolidate their rule there. While U.S. airpower has 
proven sufficient to prevent the group from traveling freely in armored columns 
(often made up of U.S.-supplied Humvees and tanks abandoned by or lost from 
the Iraqi army), it has proven equally insufficient to prevent it from maintaining its 
authority and buttressing its newly conquered territories.  
 Another significant problem with challenging Assad in Syria was recently 
described by Vice President Joe Biden in typically blunt Biden-esque terms: "Our 
allies poured hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of tons of 
weapons into anyone who would fight against al-Assad," leading directly to the 
proliferation of groups each of these allies (specifically Turkey, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, or each of the Sunni Gulf states) is now in 
direct confrontation with, such as al-Nusra and ISIS. 313  To summarize, the 
security vacuum left by the 2003 toppling of Saddam Hussein, whose regime had 
successfully established order in Iraq and who posed no threat to the United 
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States or any direct threat to its allies, has been filled in both Iraq and Syria by 
forces defiantly opposed to the United States and its interests, most notably 
international Sunni jihadists, Iranian-backed militias, and the Russo-Syrian 
alliance. This outcome was far from unpredictable and far short of surprising, as 
the FPE Criterion IV section discusses further.314  
 
 
Criterion III. Cost  
 
 Through FY2009, the war cost U.S. taxpayers $683 billion according to 
the Congressional Research Service (CRS). 315  By FY2011, this figure had 
reached $784 billion in constant $FY2011.316 However, this figure includes only 
direct combat costs and excludes the substantial costs of reconstruction 
assistance, diplomatic security, and all other costs by all agencies apart from the 
Department of Defense (DoD). Other estimates put the cost much higher, even 
when only considering direct military costs. Economist Joseph Stiglitz' exhaustive 
attempt to quantify the direct and corollary costs of the war estimated the cost of 
the campaign as The Three Trillion Dollar War, producing a book in 2008 of the 
same name. This estimate included indirect expenses such as caring for disabled 
veterans, replenishing military hardware, the price of oil, and macroeconomic                                                         
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impact on the American economy. 317  In 2015, Stiglitz revised that estimate, 
raising it to an astounding $5-7 trillion.318      
 In December 2011, the last U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq, belatedly 
fulfilling a campaign promise by President Obama, and leaving the fledgling Iraqi 
army to fend for itself. According to the final report of the Special Investigator 
General for Iraq Reconstruction, the United States spent $26 billion training, 
equipping, and staffing the Iraqi military and Iraqi police between 2003 and 2013, 
in addition to $34 billion in nonmilitary reconstruction projects.319 Iraq itself spent 
$41.6 billion between 2011-2014 on its army, which by then totaled 350,000 
soldiers.320 When considering that President Bush's economic advisor projected 
that the war would cost $200 billion, and his political advisor Paul Wolfowitz 
argued that the war would "pay for itself," even the more conservative of these 
estimates are quite staggering. The Center for Economic and Policy Research 
has shown that the long-term effect of the post-9/11 military spending increase 
has damaged the economy by decreasing payroll employment, housing 
construction, and car sales, raising inflation and interest rates, and diverting 
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precious resources away from sectors of the economy that tend to multiply GDP 
and standard of living indicators.321 The Costs of War Project at Brown University 
assembles data on U.S. defense expenditures from 9/11 onward and maintains 
the following figures as shown in Table 7, with total defense spending totaling 
$4.79 trillion, not including interest on previous expenditures and debt:322 
 
 
These figures include areas of operation other than Iraq, but Iraq is 
overwhelmingly the largest expense within them. Brown's Costs of War Project 
also keeps an estimate of war casualties. 4,489 members of the U.S. military                                                         
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died in Iraq between March 2003 and April 2015, along with 12,000 Iraqi miiltary 
and police, 3,481 U.S. contractors, and 319 allied troops from other countries. It 
estimates 370,000 "direct war" casualties as a result of the wars in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan.   
 It is impossible to quantify the damage done to the image of the United 
States in the world as a result of the functionally unilateral (though technically 
multilateral) Iraq War, the lack of WMD found, the insecurity the power vacuum 
caused, and the hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties. While President 
Bush often trumpeted the "Coalition of the Willing," in reality this consisted of the 
United Kingdom and a token set of marginal U.S. allies. In the early years of the 
war, images of prisoners improperly treated and sometimes tortured made 
headlines around the world. General David Petraeus estimated the total number 
of detainees to be a whopping 27,000 at the height of detentions, quite a sum 
considering the lack of proper prison infrastructure and military police trained to 
control and care for so many prisoners. The photos that emerged from Abu 
Ghraib, the ongoing detentions at Guantanamo, and reports of CIA "extraordinary 
renditions" and "enhanced interrogation techniques," limited though the programs 
may have been, produced the perception that torture and excessive and/or illegal 
detentions were an inherent piece of the global war on terror (GWOT) strategy. 
 As ISIS began filming the public execution of prisoners, they did so with 
the prisoners dressed in orange jumpsuits, as Guantanamo Bay prisoners and 
some Abu Ghraib prisoners had been. The perception within the United States 
that abuses of prisoners were widespread in Iraq, Afghanistan, and at overseas 
  299 
interrogation and rendition sites became cemented in 2012 with the release of 
the Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and 
Interrogation Program published by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 
Based on the review of six million documents reviewed between 2009-2012, its 
primary finding was that "The CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques 
was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from 
detainees."323  
 Robert Kagan, one of the founding fathers of neoconservatism, lamented 
only one year removed from that ideological movement's centerpiece that "For 
the first time since World War II, a majority of Europeans has come to doubt the 
legitimacy of U.S. power and of U.S. global leadership." He described the shell of 
multilateralism that made consensus on Iraq-related issues difficult, as opposed 
to the 1991 Gulf War when multilateralism was pursued in earnest:  
The situation was quite different in Iraq: although President George 
W. Bush bragged that his coalition was ultimately larger than the 
one his father created in 1991, it was of much lower quality. No 
Arab countries were willing to associate themselves with the 
occupation; many big NATO allies, such as France and Germany, 
similarly refused to join, and some that did, such as Spain, 
withdrew under pressure from domestic opinion or terrorist acts. 
The United States was wary of the United Nations in the weeks and 
months following the invasion and was not eager to seek a broader 
role for the organization until its plans started unraveling in late 
2003.324 
                                                        
323 Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program, 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, December 13, 2012, 2, 
https://fas.org/irp/congress/2014_rpt/ssci-rdi.pdf 
 
324 Robert Kagan, “America's Crisis of Legitimacy,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 83, No. 2 (March/April 
2004), 239. 
 
  300 
 
 The backlash against both the decision to go to war in Iraq and the 
feigned justification for doing so was fierce among both allies and adversaries. 
Indeed, the unification of these allied and adversarial actors would turn out to be 
one of the most incisive shortcomings of the war effort as well as its aftermath. 
Germany, France, China, Russia, Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, and Mexico all 
aligned against the war, with only a token level of support from countries 
eventually comprising the "Coalition of the Willing." Prime Minister Tony Blair, as 
the only prominent ally with a substantial enough military to substantively support 
the war, was to suffer mightily in political terms for years afterward.  
 Blair, who was vilified within Great Britain as a pawn of President Bush, 
successfully managed to convince the president with the support of Colin Powell 
that the United States could not afford to go it alone, and that he needed to go to 
the United Nations in order to win the backing of his British constituents. He was 
surprised to find Vice President Cheney alongside the president when he arrived 
at Camp David to discuss his multilateralist agenda, but the conclusion to at least 
attempt a U.N. resolution was eventually settled upon.325 The alienation felt by 
nations disregarded in the decision-making process produced an environment in 
which "the impression of a belligerent United States was reinforced by 
Washington's half-hearted approach to the U.N., the timetable of which was 
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driven by military imperatives rather than diplomatic necessities."326 Having had 
the world behind it after the devastating attacks of 9/11, by 2003 virtually all of 
that goodwill toward the United States had been squandered.  
  
 
Criterion IV. Availability and consideration of alternatives 
 
 There was enough to dislike about the policy of containing Saddam 
Hussein and his reign of terror over the Iraq people. When George W. Bush 
assumed office, lamentations over allowing Hussein to retain his position as 
dictator of Iraq after the Gulf War continued to reverberate in certain circles 
around Washington. Although far from an ideal outcome, President George H. W. 
Bush, along with his military and political advisors and the consultation of allies in 
the Middle East, had considered it more practical than assuming ownership of 
the entire country. Although sanctions have been show to have little effect on the 
target state except under specific unique conditions, Iraq was particularly 
susceptible to sanctions given its overreliance on a single export product, oil, and 
international alienation. Sanctions are most effective where a country is highly 
dependent on international trade, has limited options in terms of substitutes for 
export products, and cannot rely on allies to circumvent the sanctions.327 All of 
these factors were present in Iraq, leading to an environment in which "the 
sanctions regime imposed on Iraq was unprecedented in its comprehensiveness, 
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severity, and length, and in the enormous human and economic cost which it 
inflicted."328  
 A World Health Organization report assessed that "the quality of health 
care in Iraq, due to the six-week 1991 war and the subsequent sanctions 
imposed on the country, has been literally put back by at least 50 years."329 
Every social indicator, from infant mortality and childhood education to life 
expectancy and rate of infectious disease, had risen dramatically. The war with 
Iran, the Gulf War, and the subsequent sanctions on the Iraqi economy had 
devastated the country's oil productivity output, infrastructure, health, and social 
well-being. Hussein, meanwhile, remained in power with as much of a 
stranglehold on the country as ever before. While his presence was a thorn in the 
side of U.S. objectives in the Persian Gulf, he was contained, his military lacked 
the strength to invade any other state again, and his WMD program had been 
shut down after the Gulf War.    
 These obstacles to Hussein posing a serious threat to anyone other than 
his own people notwithstanding, the Bush Administration would argue 
convincingly enough to persuade a majority of the American people and 
members of Congress, with the rubble of the Twin Towers in the rearview mirror, 
that sanctions had not achieved their objective and should be abandoned in favor 
of military intervention. After 9/11, and in many ways even before 9/11, the story 
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of the decision to initiate the Iraq War was never about the delineation and 
discussion of alternatives, but rather how to sell the war to Congress and the 
American public and how to win it in the most efficient manner possible. As 
described by Paul O'Neill, Treasury Secretary under President Bush, the 
Administration was already on a war footing long before 9/11: "It was all about 
finding a way to do it. That was the tone of it. The president saying, 'go find me a 
way to do this.'"330  
 In April 1999, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted 
war games on the "worst case" and "most likely" outcomes of an invasion of Iraq 
to depose Saddam Hussein. Among its findings were that any invasion force 
would encounter "rival forces bidding for power," "fragmentation along religious 
and/or ethnic lines," the antagonization of "aggressive neighbors" (principally 
Iran), and a "period of widespread bloodshed in which various factions seek to 
eliminate their enemies." 331 It further warned that any tenderfoot state would 
meet stiff resistance in its attempts to coalesce around a single government and 
that a swift exit strategy would be complicated by insecurity and sectarian 
divisions. These games were not conducted with the small, nimble force that 
Secretary Rumsfeld eventually employed, but with a full 400,000-strong invasion 
force, the figure that many military leaders later called for in the months prior to 
the invasion.  
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 The other alternative in addition to invasion, of course, was maintenance 
of the status quo, which meant isolation of Hussein, sanctions, isolated bombing, 
a no-fly zone, and diplomatic pressure on the regime, which had collectively 
succeeded in both limiting Hussein to the confines of Iraqi national territory and 
preventing him from even attempting to initiate a WMD program, from fear that 
rigorous inspections would reveal just such an activity. As such, the most 
vociferous voice against maintaining that relatively pacific status quo, Vice 
President Dick Cheney, made it his mission to undermine just that approach. In 
speeches to troops, conversations with talk show hosts and pundits, privately to 
Bush Administration advisors, and in conversations with intelligence officials, he 
excoriated what he termed "appeasers" and stated repeatedly both that the 
threat from Hussein and his WMD had to be confronted militarily and that this 
mission would arrive quickly at a resounding success.  
 In August of 2002, for example, he told a Veterans of Foreign Wars 
congregation: "A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of 
his compliance with U.N. resolutions. On the contrary, there is a great danger 
that it would provide false comfort that Saddam was somehow 'back in the 
box.'"332 He paired this menacing opinion with the false claim that "there is no 
doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no 
doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies and 
against us." This claim went beyond any intelligence report, even reports that                                                         
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assessed that it was likely that the regime had not entirely shut down its WMD 
programs. The approach to securitizing the Middle East was not invented on the 
fly by Vice President Cheney or any other Administration official, but rather a 
direct result of the grand strategy of preponderance expounded by the Bush 
Administration from its earliest stages, stated in no uncertain terms in the 2002 
National Security Statement (NSS) and other official documents and policy 
statements.  
 Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia found himself dumfounded at the 
Senatorial podium on February 12, 2003, when his call to at least discuss the 
merits of invasion fell on deaf ears: "Listen. You can hear a pin drop. There is no 
debate. There is no discussion. There is no attempt to lay out for the nation the 
pros and cons of this particular war. There is nothing."333 With no attempt to 
delineate for the American people why the United States was going to war in 
Iraq, Byrd summarized in a few simple words the gigantic disconnect between 
what would become the most costly war since 1945, the most bloody since 1975, 
and the new breeding ground for Islamist terrorism and the debate about the 
foreign policy's value. Not only was it not clear how a war in Iraq would affect the 
national interest—good, bad, or neutral—but Congress barely discussed the 
matter at all, leaving anyone to guess as to what ought to be gained on such a 
monumental foreign-policy campaign. In comparison to the lack of intellectual 
interest in Congress as to what to do with the 'Iraq problem,' it seems somewhat 
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unremarkable that the Bush Administration sought to go to war in Iraq. Many a 
presidential administration has sought to assert itself in times of crisis by 
launching a military campaign of some sort against a foreign adversary. What is 
more remarkable, however, is the aloof capitulation of Congress to invade a 
sovereign nation with whom the United States had already maintained a 
persistent, comprehensive, successful campaign of political isolation and 
deterioration of military capabilities.  
 The determination that the war was inevitable under the leadership at the 
time does not entirely discount the fact that there were in fact prominent voices 
warning against the dangers of invading and occupying Iraq. Barack Obama 
eventually ascended to the presidency based in part on his opposition to the war. 
In August 2002, Brent Scowcroft, who had been George H. W. Bush's National 
Security Advisor and maintained close ties to the George W. Bush 
Administration, argued in a Wall Street Journal op-ed: "There is scant evidence 
to tie Saddam to terrorist organizations, and even less to the September 11 
attacks. Indeed, Saddam's goals have little in common with the terrorists who 
threaten us, and there is little incentive for him to make common cause with 
them."334 Scowcroft maintained the same reservations that he had when the 
George H. W. Bush Administration, after much debate, decided to leave Hussein 
in power rather than take responsibility of the whole of Iraq. After all, who would 
want such a possession?  
                                                        
334 Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and Alastair Smith, The Spoils of War: Greed, Power, and the 
Conflict that Made Our Greatest Presidents (New York: Public Affairs, 2016). 
  307 
 As the war began to become a reality, a group of IR scholars initiated an 
unprecedented campaign to engage in political activism galvanizing around 
realist principles that, if adhered to, would reveal the impending conflict as an 
imprudent misadventure away from thousands of years of empirical evidence in 
international relations. This movement is particularly noteworthy given the 
disconnect between theory and praxis in international politics, a disconnect which 
itself has been the subject of scholarly inquiry and indeed informs this 
dissertation to a certain degree.335 In one of the few instances in which the 
academic community found itself ahead of political events, rather than 
responding to and debating over their aftermath, dozens of prominent IR 
academics came out against the war by forming the Coalition for a Realistic 
Foreign Policy.  
 No lesser names than Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer, Richard Betts, 
Jack Snyder, Barry Posen, Stephen Walt, Robert Jervis, Charles Kupchan and 
many others united to form a platform of dissent against "worrisome imperial 
trends" that encouraged "other nations to form countervailing coalitions and 
alliances." The self-described “diverse group of scholars and analysts from 
across the political spectrum” argued for urgency in resisting the “imperial 
impulse,” given that “imperial policies can quickly gain momentum, with new 
interventions begetting new dangers and, thus, the demand for further actions.” 
Based on the Founding Fathers’ notion that “republic and empire are                                                         
335 See, for example, Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower: International 
Relations Theory and the Issue of Policy Relevance (Columbia University Press, 2001), 4 and 
Joseph Nye, "Bridging the Gap between Theory and Policy," Political Psychology Vol. 29, No.4 
(August 2008), 593-603.  
  308 
incompatible,” the flagship statement of the Coalition assailed elements of the 
'Bush Doctrine' and the 2002 NSS, particularly its reliance on preemptive strike, 
for its pursuit of a foreign policy “inconsistent with our traditions and values and 
contrary to our true interests.”336 While realists formed the basis of this assembly, 
liberal scholars also filled out its ranks, representing an unprecedented 
partnership of inter-paradigm perspectives that sought to transcend the theory-
policy gap for a particular moral purpose.  
 Nevertheless, the voices of dissent were drowned out within the Bush 
Administration, in Congress, and in the public. Richard Haas, then director of 
policy planning at the State Department and aide to Colin Powell, recalled of a 
July 2002 conversation with Condoleezza Rice in her office in the West Wing, "I 
raised this issue about were we really sure that we wanted to put Iraq front and 
center at this point, given the war on terrorism and other issues. And she said, 
essentially, that the decision's been made, don't hold your breath."337 Before the 
NIE that Congress subsequently requested in September 2002, and without 
consultation with the Secretary of State, a select few Bush Administration officials 
had decided on going to war in Iraq. But when this was taking place, "no one had 
yet presented the president with a full range of options," and a Bush aide simply 
described the FPDM process with regard to Iraq as, "Sometimes, decisions 
happen as much as they're made."338 This way of thinking is eerily reminiscent of 
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the faulty FPDM that led to the Vietnam War. A decision is not a sentient entity 
and does not propagate itself; an individual or group of individuals must create it, 
even if those individuals are informed by certain conditional constraints. Saddam 
Hussein had been a dormant threat for more than a decade, and to characterize 
him as such a grave threat to national security that the decision to invade Iraq 
made itself is to make a needle out of a haystack.  
 The encyclopedic British 2016 Chilcot Report, also known as the Iraq 
Inquiry, found that a thorough examination of alternatives to war was purposively 
avoided by the Bush Administration.339 On February 5, the day of Colin Powell's 
U.N. speech, 20 members of Congress assembled at the Cabinet Room of the 
White House to hear the case for war against Iraq straight from the camels' 
mouths of President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The 
conversation was short on substance and long on blanket concerns about, as 
well as blanket prescriptions for, potential problems if (progressively when) war 
came about. Rice was the typically succinct, vague Bush Administration official: "I 
don't know what we will find exactly, and what period of time. Blix says he can't 
tell you they don't have them [WMD]... He's hiding a lot. I'm quite certain he's 
hiding a lot of it."340 Senator Carl Levin, the ranking Democrat on the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, was perceptive enough to retort, "Blix also says he 
can't tell you they have them. You're inconsistent." Nancy Pelosi simply asked, 
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"Is war the best way?" Like many other Congressional leaders, she asked the 
right questions, but provided no answers of her own, ceding to the 
Administration. Senator John Warner told National Security Advisor Stephen 
Hadley, "You got to do this and I'll support you, make no mistake. But I sure hope 
you find weapons of mass destruction because if you don't you may have a big 
problem." Then-Senator Joe Biden further added, "If we go in and don't find 
caches, we'll have a serious perception problem." The Senators were thus quite 
literally "hoping" that there were WMD in Iraq, even while cognizant of the threat 
that could pose to the invasion force.  
 The wish to maintain the perception of the moral high ground was obvious, 
but the "hope" for WMD also exposed an underlying flaw in the FPDM with 
regard to Iraq. The justification for invading and occupying a Muslim country in 
the heart of the Middle East was now contingent upon hoping for the existence of 
weapons so terrible that their use would almost certainly cause mass casualties 
for American troops. The flawed logic went that the perception that the 
justification for invasion was valid became more important than the actual 
existence of WMD. But if WMD were not as important as the perception of them, 
the whole justification would therefore by null and void. Wouldn't Senator Warner 
and Senator Biden be grateful to find no WMD in Iraq? Their nonexistence would 
certainly be a relief for the international community. In that fallible logic lay the 
exposure of a Constructivist threat-perception FPDM marketed as a liberal-realist 
threat. Iraq did not pose a threat to the United States. Even if it had been in 
possession of WMD, it is highly likely that Saddam Hussein would have found a 
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way to make a deal with the Americans to relinquish them, as Iran, Libya, South 
Africa, Argentina, and other nations have done.341 And in fact, he did not possess 
them, precisely because he knew that their possession would justify an invasion.  
 Indeed, we now know that Hussein was so concerned with the American 
threat to his regime from the 1991 Gulf War onward that he believed that the CIA 
would know for certain that his WMD program had been dormant, and that his 
flaunting of sanctions, threats, and inspections would be accurately interpreted 
by the CIA as nothing more than hollow saber-rattling.342 And this was in fact the 
consensus within most of the intelligence community, until an environment was 
created within it that incentivized WMD evidence from 2001-2003. And yet the 
consideration to stay the course with sanctions was never really considered by 
the Bush Administration, and neither Congress nor the American people 
questioned it. The war path settled on from within, the Bush Administration would 
then turn outward to contextualize its scope and stakes to the public and 
Congress via magnifying, distorting, and inventing Iraq's purpose within the U.S. 
national interest.  
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Criterion V. Context, scope, and stakes  
 
 It is conceivable that the Bush Administration would have pushed for a 
military intervention in Iraq to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein had the 9/11 
attacks never taken place, given the significant influence of neoconservative 
ideology on the Administration and President George H.W. Bush's history of 
conflict with Saddam Hussein, including the 1991 Gulf War and an assassination 
attempt on his life.343 However, if such a push had ever commenced, it would 
have met with much stiffer opposition from the general public and from Congress, 
particularly Democrats. In his 9/11 address, even without having a full picture of 
what had transpired, President Bush was already preparing for a military 
response, warning adversaries that "Our military is strong, and it's prepared," and 
setting forth a striking policy making no demarcation between hostile states or 
nonstate regimes and terrorism: "We will make no distinction between the 
terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them," the president 
warned.344 
 The rhetoric produced by the Bush Administration and its counterparts in 
Congress made the case that nothing short of the existential physical safety of 
the American people, and the future of the free world more broadly, were at stake                                                         
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in Iraq. It successfully convinced a majority of the American public, and a majority 
of U.S. lawmakers, that Saddam Hussein was harboring terrorists and seeking to 
produce and proliferate WMD, including nuclear, chemical, and biological agents. 
But the rhetoric did not match the reality, and as with the Vietnam War, but for a 
different reason, the stakes therefore increased from virtually zero to quite 
significant once the decision to militarize the policy took shape. Robert Brigham 
explains how Bush Administration officials were able to "speak to ideals and not 
to interests" as they made their case to the American people: 
 
The main problem in Iraq, as in Vietnam, was that it was relatively 
easy for the president to speak to ideals and not interests when 
laying out his war plan before Congress and the American people. 
Heightened threat perceptions and the uniquely American impulse 
to strike out against potential adversaries led the United States to 
war in Iraq and Vietnam. In both wars, fear and the appeal to ideals 
all but completely quashed debate. It is remarkable that most 
members of Congress waited until the 2006 midterm elections to 
voice any serious opposition to the president’s policies in Iraq. 
Congress finally held hearings in January 2007 to consider the Iraq 
Study Group Report, but even these deliberations were more 
publicity events than serious inquiry. Not one major policy revision 
came out of these investigations.345 
 
 
The Bush Administration thus made scarce attempt to link Iraq to the national 
interest in any strategic terms as far as a direct line from Saddam Hussein to 
9/11, because it knew there was none. What it did attempt to do was to 
characterize him as a threat in general terms and link that generalized threat to 
the security of the United States via the interlocutors of WMD and 9/11. WMD                                                         
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thus became the basis for the war, and the pressure on intelligence agencies to 
produce the "smoking gun" combined with the Bush Administration's eagerness 
to receive it to foster an atmosphere unresponsive to anti-war evidence. That 
eagerness was married with the rage of the American people to justify invading 
Iraq. There was thus ample 'context' with regard to Iraq and the war against 
terrorism, but that context was invented in extremely ideational terms and made 
operational by the ignition of the spark of WMD.  
 Sometime between 1973 and 2003, the United States unlearned many of 
the primary lessons of the Vietnam War, chief among them how to perceive, 
conceptualize, and contextualize threats in the FPDM input process, as well as 
how to apply power in the FPDM output process. W. Edwards Dunning warned, 
"If you can't describe what you are doing as a process, then you don't know what 
you're doing." The Bush Administration never described the process of getting 
from 9/11 to WMD to Baghdad. They described their disparate parts and hoped 
Americans would bite and, in their rage, they sunk their rabid teeth into the 
bounded rationality of mission—where they were going and why they did not 
know, but only a hand basket would do in those uncertain, vengeful times.  
 The U.S. government is highly adept at producing exhaustive research 
reviews that are intended to put a particular policy issue, problem, or threat into 
the proper context so that FPDM can utilize the most accurate, timely information 
available. Indeed, that is one of its primary functions. The State Department, the 
CIA, and other bureaucratic arms can direct great resources to understanding a 
problem if they are instructed to do so. In both Vietnam and Iraq, perhaps 
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contrary to the intuition of those who watched each policy fail, this in fact took 
place. It was less pronounced in Iraq, in part because the shift to focus attention 
there was so sudden. But there were significant volumes to draw on nonetheless, 
especially given the history of antagonism between the United States and Iraq as 
a result of the 1991 Gulf War, sanctions, and aerial bombing. Renewed vigor had 
been instilled into the teams at foreign policymakers' disposal in 2001, with the 
aim of being prepared in the event of war, an event which the Bush 
Administration desired. But with regard to Iraq, as with regard to Vietnam, the 
enormous studies highlighting the complications in the country were dismissed in 
favor of highly idealized interpretations of each country's purported purpose 
within the national-security portion of the national interest of the United States. 
Dave Halberstam describes an in-depth review of the efficacy of the bombing of 
North Vietnam in 1964: 
 
It was, in a classic sense, a pure study. It reflected the genuine 
expertise of the government from deep within its bowels, not its 
operational functions, not its ambitions, not its success drives. 
None of the staffers represented vested interests, and none really 
saw his future being affected by either a positive or negative study. 
They considered all kinds of bombing, quick tit-for-tat retaliations 
and massive, prolonged saturation bombing. They worked under 
intense pressure for about two weeks, eight hours a day, six days a 
week. When they finished they had a stack of papers about a foot 
high and the essential answer, which was no, bombing the North 
would not work. Basically, the study showed that the bombing 
would fail because the North was motivated by factors which were 
not affected by physical change and physical damage. The North 
Vietnamese were not hooked on the idea of economic growth 
determination (which was one of the great hang-ups of Rostow), 
but were determined to extend their regime's control to the entire 
country rather than maintain their industrialization. That was what 
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motivated them, and that was what they considered their unfinished 
business. They had invested a great deal in it and they would 
continue to invest in it; no North Vietnamese government could 
afford to do less. Hanoi, the study said, enjoyed the nationalist 
component of unity and the Communist component of control, 
which made for an organized, unified state.346  
 
 
Iraq, of course, enjoyed neither unity nor control but for the ruthlessness of 
Saddam Hussein, thus compounding the obstacles of its occupation. The result 
of the bombing campaigns in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia have been detailed in the previous chapter. The next two sections 
discuss this phenomenon with regard to Iraq. Bush Administration officials 
intentionally deceived themselves into believing that Iraq would be a walk in the 
park, even though none of the empirical evidence suggested that. The more 
doubt circulated amongst themselves and was subsequently transmitted to the 
American people, the less faith there would be that the war would be worth it. 
Both within the higher circles of leadership of the Bush Administration, the CIA, 
and the DoD, an environment was therefore constructed that would shun 
disconfirming intelligence and magnify evidence confirming Iraq's WMD program. 
Any intelligence analyst can testify that where to direct the siphons of information 
is just as important as deciphering whatever information is siphoned, especially 
in the information age when there is such an order of magnitude of capturable 
information.  
 The United States has the technological tools to learn virtually anything 
that is learnable, and can sequester virtually any information from virtually any                                                         
346 David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993). 
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source if given enough time.347 If the president orders to find a shred of evidence 
that can be sold to proliferate the idea that some kind of WMD evidence exists, it 
will be found. If he says to ignore evidence to the contrary, it will be ignored. The 
seventeen intelligence agencies of the United States government are apolitical in 
theory; they can be partisan when the wind blows in partisan directions (the 
president, after all, appoints intelligence officials). The paltry evidence presented 
by Colin Powell failed to convince American allies of the need to confront 
Saddam Hussein militarily. The rest of the story is history. That history is further 
recounted in Part II.  
 The incentive to believe what was not otherwise believable was eventually 
processed through the American people and Congressional leaders like sausage 
through a grinder. By the time the American people realized the truth, Iraq policy 
had come full circle, and there actually was now a national-security threat coming 
from within its borders, a threat created by the 2003 invasion. That the Bush 
Administration turned its back on Afghanistan, where the veritable masterminds 
of the 9/11 attacks still wandered freely, in order to commit all its resources to a 
dormant benchwarmer was highly problematic. But that it left Iraq in such a state 
of sectarian strife and social disrepair that from it would spawn the fiercest 
terrorist threat in the history of the world is catastrophic. This foreign-policy 
outcome was a direct result of the strategic ineptitude of the Bush Administration,                                                         
347 Recent developments have made this phenomenon abundantly clear. Wiretapping, spying on 
foreign allies, the NSA programs exposed by Edward Snowden, the U.S.-Israeli Stuxnet virus, 
and many other tools and electronic surveillance and warfare initiatives are by now well known in 
the field of cybersecurity. See documentary Zero Days, dir. Alex Gibney (2016), for a description 
of the story of the Stuxnet virus, including a recounting by an intelligence analyst detailing the 
total sequester of Iran's electronic and nuclear systems by U.S. cyberwarfare technicians.  
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the tactical dismissal (as opposed to ignorance) of the social conditions within 
Iraq, the further dismissal of evidence against the case for Iraq possessing WMD, 
and the acquiescence of a berserk American public and its Congressional 
leaders seeking revenge in the wrong place. Ignorance must be distinguished 
from dismissal because of the exhaustive research planning at its disposal 
(discussed in OPM Indicators I and II). The leaders involved in the FPDM that led 
to the blunder in Iraq knew they were lying about the threat posed by Saddam 
Hussein, even if they thought they were lying to justify the right choice.  
 
 
FPE Conclusion  
 
 This analysis demonstrates that the Iraq War resulted from gross errors in 
strategic judgment. These errors convinced Congress and the American public 
that Iraq represented a grave threat to the United States and the free world and 
had to be "disarmed." The tactical errors made in the invasion's aftermath, such 
as disbanding the Iraqi army, not furnishing enough troops to secure the country, 
and assuming that Iraqis would fall in line with the new state exacerbated the 
strategic error of invading the country in the first place. The war clearly caused 
significant harm to the national interest in prestige, cost, and direct security 
concerns in a country that did not present them previously, most notably in the 
rise of ISIS, which would render the 2011 withdrawal from Iraq a measure lasting 
only a few short years. The United States is still enmeshed in that conflict in both 
Iraq and Syria, which itself has metastasized into a stalemate with Russia, Iran 
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and Syria on the government side and the United States and rebels backed by its 
Sunni Arab allies on the other.  
 Despite some startling admonitions based on research and planning within 
the State Department and other agencies, including the DoD, planning at the 
highest levels accepted the incorrect declaration by Dick Cheney that U.S. forces 
would "be greeted as liberators." The corresponding assumption that initial 
military victory, which was indeed simple enough to achieve, would translate into 
political stability and the embrace of peaceful democracy fell flat. Once the 
insurgency took hold, the development of civil society and state-building took a 
backseat to immediate security concerns, and that culture of fear and suspicion 
based on sectarian loyalties continues to this day. 
 From a broad point of view, the challenges posed by global terrorism 
make traditional threat perception and military power calculations in many ways 
more difficult than in centuries past. There is little doubt that the Iraq War failed to 
address 9/11 and exacerbated Islamist fundamentalism by providing a breeding 
ground for Sunni extremism and feeding the narrative of the American anti-
Muslim crusader, but this is an ongoing problem for the United States, and it 
must learn from the lessons of Iraq if it intends to address this threat effectively in 
the coming decades. Robert Jervis highlights an important factor in the largely 
irrational thinking that eventually coalesced around the necessity of immediate 
invasion: 
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The difficulties in coping with this fear [of terrorism] may be one 
reason why the American debate over whether to go to war in Iraq 
was so feeble. Also important were the president's political skill, the 
Democrats' desire not to look weak, and—a factor often 
overlooked—the fact that the draft has been abolished. The 
immediate danger in the war was to other people and to other 
people's children. But in another way the debate was typical, in that 
both proponents and opponents of invading Iraq displayed irrational 
cognitive consistency, motivated bias, and the refusal to face value 
trade-offs. Those who favored invasion rated the long term 
prospects of deterring Saddam as low, the likelihood of a fairly easy 
military victory as high, the regional effects of overthrowing Saddam 
as favorable, and the prospects for constructing a stable and even 
democratic Iraq as bright. Opponents disagreed on all four points. 
Only a psychological explanation will account for this pattern, 
because the four factors being judged are logically independent 
from each other (emphasis added). A world in which allowing 
Saddam to build his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would be 
very dangerous is not necessarily one in which overthrowing him 
would be relatively cheap. But people want to minimize the costs 
they perceive in their favored policy. In fact, many of the reasons 
they gave are rationalizations, not rationales, and come to their 
minds only after they have reached their decisions (emphasis 
added).348 
 
 
 Just as President Johnson's advisors could not contemplate the 
potentiality that North Vietnam would not capitulate in the face of overwhelming 
American military might, the United States did not believe its overwhelming 
military might could not secure Iraq. Sherman Kent described the (short-term) 
intelligence failure of the Cuban Missile Crisis by simply remembering, "We 
missed the Soviet decision to put missiles into Cuba because we could not 
believe that Kruschev could make such a mistake." 349  The 1962 National 
Intelligence Estimate concluded that Kruschev was too rational an actor to make                                                         
348 Robert Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
 
349 Wilhelm Agrell and Gregory Treverton, National Intelligence and Science (Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 45. 
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a decision so rash so as to place nuclear weapons 90 miles from Miami at the 
height of the Cold War. To what extent the word "rational" can be considered 
scientific depends on the mind of the observer, although some decisions clearly 
display a certain comfort with risk that others do not (assuming the decision-
maker has accurate information and has accurately calculated that risk, which is 
in itself somewhat of an irrational assumption to make). Nevertheless, what is 
clear with reference to Iraq, as with Vietnam, is that the pursuit of preponderance 
fueled the motivation to liberalize the Middle East, and the dismissal of the 
strength and complexity of the indigenous response was once again greatly 
underestimated, as Part II brings into fuller light.  
 
 
Part II. OPM 
 
Indicator I. How U.S. foreign policymakers estimated the capacity of U.S. power 
 to transform the politics of Iraq 
  
 President Bush predicted on October 7, 2002, "The lives of Iraqi citizens 
would improve dramatically if Saddam Hussein were no longer in power, just as 
the lives of Afghanistan's citizens improved after the Taliban," a view Dick 
Cheney had echoed two months earlier on August 26: 
 
Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to 
the region. When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the 
freedom-loving people of the region will have a chance to promote 
the values that can bring lasting peace. As for the reaction of the 
Arab 'street,' the Middle East expert Professor Fouad Ajami 
predicts that after liberation, the streets in Basra and Baghdad are 
'sure to erupt in joy the same way the throngs in Kabul greeted the 
Americans.' Iraq is rich in natural resources and human talent, and 
  322 
has unlimited potential for a peaceful, prosperous future. Our goal 
would be an Iraq that has territorial integrity, a government that is 
democratic and pluralistic, a nation where the human rights of every 
ethnic and religious group are recognized and protected. In that 
troubled land, all who seek justice, and dignity, and the chance to 
live their own lives, can know they have a friend and ally in the 
United States of America.350 
 
 
 What exactly "justice and "dignity" signify is of course different for an Iraqi 
than for an American. While it is a fair assessment that most Iraqis would have 
preferred a different leader, many Sunnis did not, and any regime can only be 
compared to another. What replaced Saddam Hussein was worse by virtually 
any measurable, but most importantly that of safety and security. As John Paul 
Vann had said of South Vietnam, “Security may be ten percent of the problem, or 
it may be ninety percent, but whichever it is, it’s the first ten percent or the first 
ninety percent." The sweeping platitudes of "freedom-loving" people and "values 
that can bring lasting peace" said little about the actual social conditions within 
the state of Iraq. Indeed, that was the whole idea—social engineering from 
without that could only take place after military dislodgement of the regime. 
Although elections, a democratic political foundation, and sovereignty were all 
tremendous achievements in theory, the insecurity and sectarian violence that 
have characterized Iraq's internal environment since 2003 largely rendered these 
procedural accomplishments hollow. The enormous cost in blood and treasure 
also calls into question whether the modest progress in these areas was worth 
the cost.                                                          
350 "Report on Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were 
Substantiated by Intelligence Information," Senate Committee on Intelligence, June 2008, 84, 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB254/doc11.pdf 
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 Although President Bush built his campaign on ushering in his domestic-
focused 'compassionate conservatism,' the 9/11 attacks allowed the foreign-
policy hawks he brought with him into office to espouse a theretofore relatively 
unknown ideological bent now infamously known as neoconservatism, a set of 
core ontological assumptions that generally advocate a Manichean view of the 
world pitting good against evil, a penchant for unilateralism, reliance on military 
power as the arbiter of international conflict as well as the willingness to use it, 
disdain for excessive diplomacy, and positioning the United States as the 
singular preponderant power in the international system with the unique ability 
and duty to right the wrongs within it. 351 Many Bush Administration advisors 
entered his cabinet bitter about the way in which the 1991 Gulf War ended, with 
Saddam Hussein still in power, and viewed the 9/11 attacks as an invitation to 
correct that error.352 A primer on the historical development and policy nuances 
of neoconservatism is beyond the scope of this research, but the impact of its 
tenets on this Indicator cannot be entirely omitted.353 The stark language of its 
propounders is unmistakable in documents such as the Bush Administration's 
2002 NSS. 
 The 2002 NSS is one of the most idealistic statements of public policy in 
the history of official U.S. discourse. It is unequivocal in its declaration of the                                                         
351 Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global 
Order (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 11. 
 
352 James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2004). 
 
353 For an introduction to the history of the movement, see Irving Kristol, The Autobiography of an 
Idea: Neoconservatism (New York: Free Press), 1995. 
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ideational triumph of Western liberal democratic capitalism and straightforward in 
its definition of the American purpose in the world. Beyond advocating the 
doctrine of preemptive strike, itself a violation of some of the basic tenets of 
realism, it also grossly oversimplified international threats and the strength of 
state and nonstate challengers, ironically even while propagating a policy of 
interventionism abroad. As if building on the premise of Francis Fukuyama’s “end 
of history,” the NSS declared that the “great struggle of ideas” that pitted 
“destructive totalitarian visions versus freedom and equality” simply no longer 
existed and “is over.”354 U.S. national-security policy would henceforth “be based 
on a distinctly American internationalism” with an expanded mandate to utilize 
“unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world” in order to 
“to help make the world not just safe but better.”  
 Thus, even while dismissing threats to global order as peripheral and 
incapable of organized challenges, official United States doctrine was enshrined 
as the singular driver of international affairs and the party responsible for 
modernizing the world in its own image. Inherently contradictory in this 
philosophy of international relations is that if the defined threats are so severe, 
how can it be so that they are easy to confront? Conversely, if the war between 
good and evil has been won, why is there such a need to reignite it? This logical 
fallacy has been at the heart of the American grand-strategic pendulum for two 
centuries. There is perhaps no document in this dissertation that so unites the 
                                                        
354 “National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Department of State, September 
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pursuit of the grand strategy of preponderance and the overestimation of U.S. 
power to transform the politics of other states as the 2002 NSS.  
 The document was neither an anomaly nor a policy statement pulled from 
a vacuum, but rather a continuation of the modern (postwar) American tradition 
of assuming (a) that the world tends to divide between good and evil and (b) that 
only the United States can lead the charge to purge evil from the world. While 
there is ample precedent for the grand strategy of preponderance since 1945, as 
well as precedent for the occasional preemptive strike dating back even further, 
the 2002 NSS perhaps stated these tenets in more unequivocal terms than ever 
before, especially given the 'unipolar moment' that supposedly existed after 1989 
and the enormous wound-up energy of 9/11. Stephen Westphal has found that 
preemptive attack had been used by Woodrow Wilson in Haiti in 1915, President 
Lyndon Johnson in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Ronald Reagan in 
Granada in 1983. However, Westphal also concludes that "[n]o president has 
explicitly raised, emphasized, and moved the practice into a stated and used 
government policy."355   
 The strike-first mentality, buoyed by the attacks of 9/11, eventually 
became codified in what came to be considered the 'Bush doctrine,' or the 
doctrine of preemptive strike, based on the perceived threat from Islamist 
terrorists, their state or nonstate guardians, and the WMD they could get their 
hands on. Arthur Schlesinger described the Bush Doctrine as "striking a potential 
                                                        
355 Lt. Col. Stephen D. Westphal, "Counterterrorism Policy of Preventive Action," USA WC 
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enemy unilaterally if necessary; before he has a chance to strike us. War, 
traditionally as a matter of last resort, becomes a matter of presidential choice. 
This is a revolutionary change. Mr. Bush replaced a policy aimed at peace 
through prevention of war by a policy aimed at peace through preventive war."356 
But rather than a "revolutionary change," this was more a minor adjustment to 
longstanding policy. It was Schlesinger himself, remember, who said that "there 
is no older American tradition in the conduct of foreign affairs than unilateralism." 
The United States had always at least reserved the right to attack another state 
preemptively even if it only employed that right scarcely and selectively, in 
addition to utilizing force to expand the territory of the nation in the 18th century, 
protect overseas markets in the 19th century, and stem the flow of Communism 
in the 20th century. Even with regard to the Second World War, that most 
transformative of events for the United States, President Roosevelt prepared his 
nation for war long before December 7, 1941, even if he waited for the Japanese 
to fire the first shot.   
 On February 26, 2003, a month before the "shock and awe" aerial 
bombing portion of the invasion began, President Bush echoed the social-
engineering language of the 2002 NSS by proclaiming: "We meet here during a 
crucial period in the history of our nation, and of the civilized world. Part of that 
                                                        
356 Arthur Schlesinger, War and the American Presidency (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
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history was written by others; the rest will be written by us." 357  Quotes by 
President Bush linking the role the United States in the world to the fate of all 
people everywhere were not the exception, but rather the norm. In discussing 
why he included the "axis of evil" phrase in his 2002 State of The Union speech, 
for example, he told Bob Woodward: "I believe the United States is the beacon of 
freedom in the world. And I believe we have a responsibility to promote freedom 
that is as solemn as the responsibility is to protecting [sic] the American people, 
because the two go hand-in-hand."358 This statement in particular revealed two 
enormous claims with regard to U.S. foreign policy. First, it declared that the 
objective of transforming the nondemocratic states of the world was as important 
as national security, which in effect denied the absolute existential nature of the 
duty of a leader to protect its constituent citizens. This muddles the meaning and 
purpose of the national interest to an unrecognizable extent. Second, it linked 
that protection to the effort to transform nondemocratic states, in effect 
proclaiming that there is no difference between the two.  
 The U.S. national interest, he exalted, was now to reinvent the trouble 
spots of the world. Those who propound the lens of examination that Bush 
radically manipulated U.S. foreign policy point to this type of rhetoric, as well as 
its operationalization in the Iraq War, as evidence. Although this claim is 
exaggerated, as evidenced by the quotes and actions attributed to the leaders 
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who came before him, it is not difficult to understand why many scholars adhere 
to it, because the idealized nature of Bush Administration foreign-policy 
discourse was so profoundly pronounced. In his June 1, 2002 speech at West 
Point, which is often cited as one of the most unequivocal and public declarations 
of the 'Bush doctrine,' he again declared, "Our nation's cause has always been 
larger than our nation's defense."359 In that speech, he told cadets that he would 
implement his brand of foreign policy according to that axiom, given that the 
"Cold War doctrines of deterrence and Containment" no longer applied to this 
new war against terrorism, which could only be won by employing a strategy to 
"confront the worst threats before they emerge."  
 President Bush was right that the nature of 21st-century threats had 
transformed security dynamics; he was wrong to apply the old tools of 
overwhelming force and interstate conflict to these changing dynamics. He was 
hardly singular in promoting a nebulous conception of the U.S. national interest, 
but he carried the normative idealization of the national interest to new heights. It 
was as far from the realist definition of a fixed set of zero-sum, relatively 
intractable, given material indicators as a president could travel. Had the Iraq 
War been a success, it is quite plausible that other regimes, possibly not North 
Korea but likely Iran, would have been the next targets.  
 In conjunction with this contention, Robert Jervis has attempted to 
contextualize the Iraq War as a product of a policy rather than a policy in and of 
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itself, calling it "even more noteworthy as a manifestation of the Bush Doctrine" 
and summarizing that "the doctrine has four elements: a strong belief in the 
importance of a state's domestic regime in determining its foreign policy and the 
related judgment that this is an opportune time to transform international politics; 
the perception of great threats that can be defeated only by new and vigorous 
policies, most notably preventive war; a willingness to act unilaterally when 
necessary; and, as both a cause and a summary of these beliefs, an overriding 
sense that peace and stability require the United States to assert its primacy on 
world politics."360  
 There is significant overlap between what Jervis refers to as "primacy" and 
preponderance, as Chapter 4 teased out. While these four pillars are consistent 
with the postwar history of the OPM, and therefore far from a post-9/11 
metamorphosis of U.S. foreign policy in general, they certainly represented an 
invigoration of the more hawkish, as well as idealistic, tendencies in U.S. foreign 
policy that the national humiliation of the Vietnam War had largely precluded until 
that time. In that sense, the Iraq opportunity, if it could be carried out 
successfully, presented a chance to exorcise the demons of Vietnam, along with 
planting a seed of democracy in the Middle East as a beacon of hope to the 
region and a wedge against the Islamist terrorism narrative. That Iraq did not 
expel 'Vietnam Syndrome,' from the American psyche, but rather further 
ingrained it, and that it perpetuated the Islamist terrorism narrative, now presents 
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en enormous challenge to U.S. policymakers: the need to reconcile a transition 
back to isolationist sentiment among the American public along with the need to 
prosecute the war against Islamist terrorism, perhaps the first war since the 
Second World War that is not a war of choice.      
 Consistent with the lofty grand-strategic ambitions of the 2002 NSS was 
the military-strategic post-9/11 defense strategy "designed to eliminate the 
conditions that spawn asymmetric threats."361 In terms of global military posture, 
this means preparing to intervene anywhere in the world where potentially hostile 
actors enjoy a safe haven. The problem with this perspective is that much of the 
world is dangerous, chaotic, and 'alternatively governed,' meaning that "the 
conditions that spawn asymmetric threats" are found in so many places that to 
plan for eliminating them all is all but unfathomable. As the poster child of this 
policy, the Iraq War did not hold up to its protagonists' hopes, and the Obama 
Administration has since shifted away from large-scale military intervention and 
counterinsurgency in favor of the 'targeted strike' of (suspected) Islamist 
militants. Thus an era that began with international social-engineering ended on 
the polar end of the spectrum, with the favored policy of the Obama 
Administration to kill from the air even before capturing, let alone invading and 
occupying. Indeed, the prevailing sentiment in prosecuting the war against 
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Islamist terrorism now is that to capture is to carry a vexatious burden.362 This is 
not to say that Obama's approach to the war against terrorism has been pacific: 
his unprecedented drone campaign is discussed in Chapter 8, the concluding 
chapter.           
 In any case, U.S. policymakers at the highest levels of the Bush 
Administration were overwhelmingly confident that the Iraq War would swiftly be 
brought to a successful conclusion. The provenance of this confidence was not 
duplicated at the Pentagon or the State Department, which were much more 
wary of what might happen in the aftermath of the war, as well as the host of 
dilemmas that might erupt during the combat phase, including the potential for 
the use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, as well as the possibility of 
oil wells being set ablaze, as they were in the previous confrontation between the 
United States and Iraq two administrations prior. In concert with the perennial 
concern war-planners always have for the potential for loss of military life and the 
unexpected potentialities of open conflict, and in concert with the cultural 
complications inherent in Iraq, the Department of Defense and State Department 
conducted research to define and describe what might happen if the Executive 
Branch decided that war was the only way. It did eventually decide this, as 
detailed in FPE Criterion IV, but it did not give these comprehensive reviews 
adequate consideration. 
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 The DoD, to which President Bush eventually granted almost exclusive 
authority to plan for postwar Iraq, thus carried out significant preparation for the 
conflict as it would with any other in order to confront many of those potentialities. 
The exhaustive reviews performed at the lower levels of government, what 
Halberstam refers to as its "bowels," never received the full attention they 
deserved because the higher levels of government were focused on the sale of a 
war they had already set course on rather than how to successfully manage Iraq 
in the war's aftermath. Furthermore, the extremely detailed planning that was 
carried out was disregarded in order to facilitate a smoother chain of command of 
the country when Baghdad fell. The Bush Administration did not want to get 
mired down with bureaucratic entanglement, and thus left experts, particularly at 
the State Department, out of the planning for and early administration of post-
conflict Iraq.    
 As James Fallows describes it: "The Administration will be admired in 
retrospect for how much knowledge it created about the challenge it was taking 
on. U.S. government predictions about postwar Iraq's problems have proved as 
accurate as the assessments of pre-war Iraq's strategic threat have proved 
flawed. But the Administration will be condemned for what it did with what was 
known. The problems the United States has encountered are precisely the ones 
its own expert agencies warned against."363 In practice, therefore, planning was 
neglected and thus operationally indecisive. Anthony Cordesman states simply, 
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"The U.S. government failed to draft a serious or effective plan for a 'Phase 4' of 
the war: the period of conflict termination and the creation of an effective national 
building office."364 The fact that the final war plan presented to President Bush by 
General Tommy Franks included no plan for the postwar phase deposited much 
of the hope for a smooth transition to Iraqi democracy securely in the 
bureaucratic wastebasket. Some of it would eventually be recycled once the 
insurgency began in earnest; most of it would not. The dismissal of rich, country-
specific cultural research Halberstam chides U.S. foreign-policymakers for during 
Kaiser's "The Long 1964" was precisely the type recurring in 2003, and led 
directly to the overestimation of U.S. power to transform the politics of Iraq.  
 Ironically, one of the few voices warning against invasion at a high level 
was the man who was eventually charged with selling the case for war at the 
United Nations, Secretary of State Colin Powell, who stated simply: "Once you 
break it, you are going to own it, and we're going to be responsible for 26 million 
people standing there looking at us. And it's going to suck up a good 40 to 50 
percent of the army for years. And it's going to take all of the oxygen out of the 
political environment."365 In that conversation, Powell was urging President Bush 
to get the United Nations on board with any invasion that might take place. The 
president's response was to send Powell to do just that. If he desired it, so went 
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the logic, go achieve it, especially since he was one of the most respected 
members of the Bush Administration.  
 He would expend virtually all of that reverential capital in selling a war to 
the United Nations that nearly every leader whom he addressed would come to 
condemn. In the end, Vice President Dick Cheney's pre-invasion claim that "we 
will in fact be greeted as liberators" won out over the voice of those advocating a 
more guarded approach to "disarming" Saddam Hussein.366 Failure to adhere to 
prewar admonitions on the postwar environment inevitably led to myriad 
complications in the invasion's aftermath. Francis Fukuyama, one of the chief 
architects of neoconservative doctrine, later lamented in his requiem on the 
nation-building effort in Iraq:        
  
The administration did plan for a number of contingencies that did 
not occur, such as a humanitarian/refugee crisis and oil well fires; 
however, it was completely blindsided by the collapse of state 
authority in Iraq and the chaos that followed. This omission is a 
perfect example of institutional memory failure. Almost every 
postconflict reconstruction during the previous decade and a half, 
from Panama to East Timor, had been characterized by the 
collapse of local police authority and the ensuing disorder. 
Consequently, a great deal of thought and effort had been given to 
improving the so-called “civ-pol” function through the early 
deployment of constabulary forces. Unfortunately, few of the 
officials responsible for the Iraq reconstruction had personal 
experience with these earlier efforts, and they evidently expected 
that the post-Saddam transition would look like those in Eastern 
Europe in 1989. That misjudgment would prove extremely costly, 
as looters stripped government ministries bare and Iraq’s 
infrastructure crumbled. Throughout its entire existence, the CPA 
was understaffed and had to spend considerable energy building                                                         
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up its own organization rather than providing governmental services 
to Iraqis.367 
 
 
This elegy, particularly ironic given the source, was as predictable (and in fact 
was predicted) as it was tragic. The idealized response to the existential threat of 
Islamist fundamentalism all but guaranteed the U.S. would experience a 
quagmire in Mesopotamia. CIA Director George Tenet's "slam dunk" assessment 
of Iraq's presence of WMD and Dick Cheney's giddy predictions on Iraq's 
reception of American troops illustrated a reality whose ultramodern futurism met 
no ally in the reality of postwar Iraq.  
 U.S. foreign policymakers not only overemphasized the assumption of 
rational-choice modeling in presupposing that Iraqis would not exercise the will to 
fight against superior firepower and technical military expertise, but also 
underestimated the ideological motivation for why many Iraqis did take up arms 
against them. Many Iraqi insurgents were motivated by a general sense of 
nationalism, rather than the fanatical religiosity that foreign jihadists brought with 
them. Insurgents in Iraq were often fighting for far more than a living wage or 
because no other economic opportunity existed, including those members of the 
Iraqi army that had been disbanded by Paul Bremer's executive decree. In a 
study on insurgents in Iraq, a team of economists examined 3,799 payments to 
insurgents by al-Qaeda and found that fighters were paid less than the 
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opportunity cost of their time, or less than an unskilled job in Iraq would pay.368 
While al-Qaeda's interest in Iraq was of course transnational, this contradicts the 
image of the insurgent as an economic unit.  
 The rational-choice models that U.S. policymakers surmised in 
preparation for invasion therefore failed to hold up against a people—albeit a 
disparate, balkanized people with intense sectarian tensions—unwilling to accept 
the presence of foreign, Christian troops on Muslim, Iraqi soil. The fact that most 
Iraqis did not want Saddam Hussein in power did not mean that they wanted an 
American-installed regime in power. The calculation among U.S. foreign 
policymakers that Iraqis would buy the official narrative in the U.S. that it was 
Saddam or freedom—publicly stated by various U.S. leaders—failed to gain any 
understanding of the true animosity an invasion force would be met with. The fact 
that such ingrained sectarian fault lines did in fact exist only exacerbated the 
problem, rather than serving to unite the nation against the outgoing common 
enemy of Saddam Hussein. Thus the overestimation hubris of Vietnam was not 
exorcised but exercised in Iraq.  
 
Indicator II. The U.S. ability to control, bolster, and refine the host state  
 
 The United States went to war in Iraq to enact "regime change" that would 
remove Saddam Hussein from power, eliminate his Ba'ath party from the 
government, and build a new government that would serve as a democratic 
example to other nations in the region. In that sense, the extent to which a new,                                                         
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secure state that went beyond procedural democracy to functional democracy 
could be established would be one of the most fundamental benchmarks for 
success or failure in Iraq. U.S. policy was therefore tied inextricably to the idea 
and practice of nation-building, a concept that President Bush campaigned 
steadfastly against as a presidential candidate, telling voters in a 2000 
presidential debate, "If we don't stop extending our troops all around the world in 
nation-building missions, then we're going to have a serious problem coming 
down the road, and I'm going to prevent that."369   
 As with other U.S. interventions in areas of (actual or perceived) strategic 
significance, state-building was a key component of the overall objectives. One of 
the tragic ironies of the Iraq case was that a (relatively) stable, orderly state was 
already in place under Saddam Hussein, with some social indicators such as 
education level higher than regional averages, as Dick Cheney alluded to in his 
speech on August 26, 2002. While the increase in nation-building campaigns 
after the end of the Cold War were largely directed at failed states, which were 
judged to be breeding grounds for terrorism and other nefarious activity, Iraq 
deviated from that pattern in that it was a robust, wealthy state, rendered less so 
because of Hussein's kleptocracy and wars and because of the sanctions those 
actions drew in response. And while the official justification for the war was 
cloaked in practical national-security considerations of disarming Iraq from WMD 
and preventing it from proliferating Islamist terrorism, the true motivations for the                                                         
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war were more ideological, as the official discourse in 2002/2003 made plain. As 
such, the nexus between that neoconservative ideology and the actual 
prosecution of the state-building aspect of the campaign prevented effective 
execution in both the planning and operational stages.  
 As mentioned in the previous section, the tragic paradox of prewar 
planning for the postwar effort was that enormous resources were poured into 
planning for the postwar environment, but the most important concerns going into 
the conflict were brushed aside because the emphasis at the highest levels of the 
Bush Administration and the Pentagon was always on how to successfully 
convince Congress and the American people to go along with the war effort as 
well as guarantee military victory in the first few weeks of conflict, rather than 
addressing the glaring problems that the coalition was sure to experience once 
the early phases of conflict concluded. Further compounding the planning effort 
was President Bush's acceptance upon Secretary Rumsfeld's recommendation 
to bestow authority for planning to the Pentagon rather than the State 
Department and its diplomatic tentacles.  
 This was the first time since the Second World War that there were not 
two equally authoritative concomitant lines of direction between Defense and 
State. Unity of command was valued at the expense of delegating civil postwar 
efforts to the arm of government most experienced in doing so, the State 
Department. Thus, while State, USAID, Justice, and other agencies had all been 
planning for the postwar effort since President Bush's August 2002 Presidential 
Directive to begin doing so, none had the authority necessary to execute its plans 
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with the exception of DoD, and there was no coordinating central command on 
the diplomatic side to partner with that of the office of General Tommy Franks. 
Postwar planning ultimately fell to the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, 
which "had no prior experience with this kind of operation and had limited 
institutional capacity for setting up the kind of organization needed." 370 Larry 
Diamond's characterization of this problem in Iraq is almost identical to 
Halberstam's characterization of the same problem in Vietnam:  
 
Indeed, the administration of the occupation was highly centralized 
under Bremer personally, in a manner that impeded the flow of 
analysis and knowledge from the field, elevated a small circle of 
political appointees, and marginalized those with vast stores of 
knowledge and understanding about Iraq—not just the career U.S. 
diplomats, but also well-informed British experts, as well as Iraqis 
and Iraqi-Americans not tied to any specific political interest. This 
same centralization plagued the challenge of postwar 
reconstruction. The obsession with control was an overarching flaw 
in the U.S. occupation, from start to finish.371 
 
 
 Johanna Mendelson Forman has identified four strategic imperatives in 
the reconstruction effort of any postconflict area with the objective of creating "a 
minimally capable state:" (a) security; (b) governance and participation; (c) social 
and economic well being; and (d) justice and reconciliation, analyzing post-
invasion Iraq along those four areas of assessment. On security, as with other 
analysts, Forman cites the dismissal of the Iraqi army as "the single most costly 
error committed by the American-led coalition, with the second most costly being                                                         
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the concomitant de-Ba'athification order in which "by the stroke of a pen, the 
CPA forbade thousands of mid-level party civil servants, including doctors and 
teachers, from participating in public life." 372 These decisions, made in small 
circles under the tutelage of high-ranking Bush Administration officials such as 
Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith and his cohort of inner-echelon 
confidants, were concocted and processed in such an encapsulated fashion that 
actors and events on the ground played at best a secondary role, if any at all, in 
planning and executing the post-invasion environment.  
 Presidential Directive 56, placing the DoD in charge of all Iraqi activities, 
while ensuring presidential chain of command leadership, all but guaranteed an 
ineffective governing processes by dismissing and alienating Iraqi counterparts in 
Baghdad and other administrative provinces. Throughout the CPA's reign from 
May 2003 until the handover on June 28, 2004, the disconnect between Iraq's 
administrators and Iraq's indigenous leaders grew so great that in effect there 
was no authority in Iraq that could represent any semblance of legitimacy. Out of 
the vacuum left by the lack of social and military authority in Iraq would breed an 
insurgency whose ferocity would forestall the installation of a consensus 
government. In turn, the institutions of civil society that were needed to buttress 
any security operations would be bypassed, because the U.S. State Department 
and the Iraqi "mid-level civil servants" most able to administer the basic civil 
functions of society were placed on the sidelines. These two decisions by the 
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Bush Administration, combined with the dismissal of the Iraq army, all but 
guaranteed a conflict-ridden transition and the continuation of decrepit Iraqi civil 
functions and infrastructure. It was far from unforeseeable that these actions 
would revert Iraq to a state of anarchy in which tribalism would dominate the 
sociopolitical environment.  
 The Future of Iraq Project (FOIP), the exhaustive organization that banded 
together disparate parts of the State Department, intelligence agencies, national 
security professionals, and Bush Administration officials, stated simply: "The 
people of Iraq are being promised a new future and they will expect immediate 
results. The credibility of the new regime and the United States will depend on 
how quickly these promises are translated to reality." 373  While the FOIP 
contained an extensive amount of research and planning, it also suffered from 
some inherent weaknesses. Its greatest obstacle in its creation was that it was 
constantly being jumbled and hamstrung by inter-agency parochialism and 
rivalries. Although it contained an immense amount of information, it never could 
have succeeded in formulating a detailed plan at state-making or state-building 
because of its lack of institutional coherence. It was intended as a collaborative 
project with Iraqi exiles in order to plan for what complications might ensue 
should the United States invade Iraq.  
 Its greatest obstacle in implementation, however, was that it was never 
actually implemented. Paul Bremer had arrived in Baghdad to take full control of                                                         
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Iraq over the interim transition before he had even heard of the FOIP.374 General 
Sir Michael Jackson, commander of the British invasion force, lamented simply: 
"All the planning carried out by the State Department went to waste."375 Two 
months before the invasion, President Bush authorized National Security 
Presidential Directive 24, which granted the DoD authority to oversee all 
reconstruction in Iraq. Whether to ensure that the chain of command remained 
intact or to militarize the overall process, this Directive guaranteed that the State 
Department, responsible for so much prewar planning, would be brushed aside 
once the invasion began.376 The Directive also placed ORHA under control of 
DoD, further establishing DoD as the preeminent authority on immediate postwar 
reconstruction. Ultimately, the FOIP lacked the specificity to be utilized as a 
practical guide to reconstruction, and the Bush Administration and DoD officials 
in charge of reconstruction discarded it anyway.  
  Thus, the ability of coalition authorities to control, bolster and refine the 
fledgling Iraq state could never take form because the revert to tribal survival 
orientations made state-building a secondary concern. Whoever owns Iraq must 
patrol 438,317 square kilometers of ethnic tensions between Sunni, Shia, and 
Kurd, each with loyalties to their own before that of the nation (with further intra-                                                        
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sect divisions), along with borders on either side that have been subject to 
sustained warfare, most notably the 1991 Gulf War with Kuwait and the Iran-Iraq 
war of the 1980's.377 Few geographical barriers prevent foreign entry into Iraq's 
territory, and tensions with neighbors make border patrol difficult. In short, 
maintaining security in the country is no small feat. The strategy for removing 
Saddam Hussein from power failed to give these difficulties sufficient 
consideration.  
 Prewar planning underestimated the number of troops needed to secure 
the country's cities and borders, the extent to which Iraq's dilapidated 
infrastructure, which had been neglected by Saddam Hussein, needed 
rebuilding, and, most importantly, how much chaos would ensue from the 
removal of Iraq's dictator. It overestimated the extent to which Iraqi troops would 
rejoin the state after a swift military defeat (few did), the ability of Iraqis to govern 
their old country with a new state, and the expectation that ordinary Iraqis and 
ex-soldiers would accept the authority of the new state simply because it was no 
longer headed by a tyrant. In short, from the beginning of the U.S. occupation of 
Iraq in March of 2003, the new U.S. and Iraqi authorities in the country fell victim 
to "a serious underestimation of the work needed to secure, stabilize, and 
reconstruct Iraq after Saddam Hussein's regime had been toppled."378 
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Indicator III. The U.S. ability to limit the power and influence of adversarial 
 leaders and insurgent groups 
 
 Military planners were keen to avoid the mistakes of Vietnam in their 
calculations. For example, General Peter Pace, who would become Chairman of 
the JCS in 2005, described his disgust of the 'body count' metric for assessing 
success in war: 
 
Not once in this building have we ever reported a number, probably 
because guys like me from Vietnam know what happens when you 
start counting. You completely skew the way people think, the way 
folks on the ground operate. What we want the people on the 
ground to understand is that we want to get the job done with the 
least amount of killing, but with whatever is needed to be done to 
protect our own guys. And asking for body counts…causes people 
to focus on 3-to-1, 5-to-1, 7-to-1. The purpose was not to kill X 
number of people, the purpose was to remove a regime. If you 
could do that without killing anybody, you win. If you have 1,000 
people killed and you haven't done anything to replace the regime, 
you lose. So numbers don't count.379  
 
  
Indeed, this mistake was not repeated in Iraq, but that incident of prudence was 
offset by other mistakes. By July 2003, only four months after the invasion, 
General John Abizaid, commander of all forces in Iraq, characterized the 
gathering insurgency as a "classical guerilla-type campaign."380 The conditions 
within Iraq by default pitted the disparate band of insurgents that united to fight 
the common enemy of the United States and the nascent Iraqi state against one 
another. To a certain extent, the various groups attacking American and Iraqi                                                         
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forces had to do so in order to be noticed or forfeit relevance to more aggressive 
groups. Unfortunately for the coalition, this incentivized even groups that may 
have been ambivalent toward the Americans to engage in open combat against 
them. Secular Ba'athists, local nationalist leaders such as Muqtada al-Sadr's 
Mahdi Army, Iraqi soldiers now out of work, Iraqi nationalists, and foreign fighters 
seeking martyrdom came together in a way that never would have been possible 
without American troops on Muslim soil in the heart of the Middle East. Though 
these groups were by no means all aligned or in full cooperation, the necessity to 
seek relevance made the power struggle after March 2003 inherently a struggle 
of violence.  
 Furthermore, the fact the foreign jihadists focused the lion's share of their 
violence against the Americans cemented the ingrained perception that this was 
a war between foreign aggressors and a nationalist war to expel them, even if led 
by jihadists from abroad. What ensued in subsequent years was what John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt describe as netwar: "In this loose, ambiguous, and 
constantly shifting environment, constellations of shells or collections of 
individuals gravitate toward one another to carry out armed attacks, exchange 
intelligence, trade weapons, or engage in joint training and then disperse at times 
never to operate together again." 381 Thus, regime change in Iraq removed a 
national dictatorship and unwittingly replaced it with small-scale organizations 
that together formed a network worthy of the label of wholesale insurgency.                                                         
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Those violent enough to exert their will—more often than not, foreign jihadists—
hijacked the lead role in the effort to advance their own brand of global jihad, 
precisely the outcome U.S. policymakers went to war in Iraq to prevent. 
 The lack of prewar planning for the postwar environment and the series of 
missteps in implementing Operation Iraqi Freedom have by now been well 
documented. From March 2003 to December 2011 the United States fought, 
sometimes successfully and sometimes less so, to keep Iraq secure from 
domestic threats and safe from foreign jihadists. It left in its wake a fragile 
government reliant on Iran, the sworn enemy of the United States, and an army 
so innocuous it evaporated in the face of a small band of jihadists in the form of 
ISIS. In sum, as it relates to the national interest, there was no enemy in Iraq until 
the United States invaded it. Once that enemy materialized, it proved a most 
difficult adversary, even though it was heavily balkanized, and the United States 
was never able to vanquish it, as the rise of ISIS has illustrated. This Indicator 
therefore must be assessed as a strategic failure, even while achieving many 
tactical victories along the way.  
 As with the war against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army, 
tactical military victories never produced the strategic political victories necessary 
to fulfill the overall umbrella of strategic objectives. American forces and their 
Iraqi counterparts were never able to secure the country, and it remains insecure 
today as the state attempts to wrest Mosul and other areas back from ISIS. In 
spite of its experiences in Vietnam and other Cold War battlefields, "the broader 
U.S. national security system is not optimized for counterinsurgency support," but 
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rather more aligned to achieving overwhelming force against a state enemy on a 
conventional battlefield, as evidenced by the rapid advance on Baghdad and 
subsequent struggles in dealing with the insurgency.382  
 The transformations in war fighting sought by Donald Rumsfeld were not 
entirely indifferent from the 'flexible response' promoted by President Kennedy. 
But Rumsfeld's emphasis on a small, nimble force backed by overwhelming 
military firepower was only relevant in the first three weeks of the campaign, after 
which the nature of urban guerilla warfare complicated the security effort. 
Kennedy died before deciding whether or not to shift to a full-scale conventional 
military buildup, and Rumsfeld's push to modernize the American way of war 
appears to have been embraced by the preference for the “targeted strike” of the 
Obama Administration that emphasizes small groups of Special Forces, air 
power, and drone attacks rather than large, clumsy, conventional military 
operations.  
 In any case, with particular respect to Iraq, the history of the insurgency 
reads like a state-building manual in reverse. The veneer of a functioning state 
based on the monopolization of violence and a hierarchy of power in which those 
deemed non-hostile by the regime could more or less go about their lives 
imploded the day Baghdad was taken by coalition forces. The Sunni insurgency 
began almost immediately. Although Sunni leaders naturally "saw themselves as 
the target of the invasion," given that their interests were inextricably tied to                                                         
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Saddam Hussein's minority Sunni regime, many did not actually take up arms 
until they witnessed Shia political domineering of the neophyte government begin 
to take hold. 383 Others, however, fought the Americans from the first day of 
conflict. While U.S. leaders were quick to declare success in the overtaking of the 
country, the ensuing insurgency "forced the U.S. military to relearn 
counterinsurgency on the fly," in the words of counterinsurgency expert Steven 
Metz, given that the end of the Cold War had ushered in a pivot away from 
interest in and preparation for asymmetrical conflicts.384 
 Throughout the course of the counterinsurgency effort, the U.S. military 
did make some gains, but these were always offset by the sectarian nature of the 
Iraqi conflict, the lack of civil society functions, and the Iraqi reliance on the U.S. 
military to fight in its stead. In September 2005, General George Casey 
estimated that of 115 Iraqi police and military battalions, one was prepared to 
stand on its own without American oversight. 385 By 2008, security had been 
improved somewhat, buoyed by the 2006 Sunni Awakening, in which Sunni tribal 
leaders in the "Sunni Triangle" allied against al-Qaeda with U.S. support, and the 
2007 troop surge, which flooded Iraq's more volatile areas, particularly in 
Baghdad, with U.S. troops to quell the violence. But this only further stoked 
sectarian tensions. The further the U.S. was perceived to be allied with Iraq, the                                                         
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more motivated the Sunni population was to take up arms. But the more the U.S. 
distanced itself from the Iraq state, the less it could stand on its own. Thus the 
direst prognostications of the postwar environment transformed from an 
admonition into reality.  
 Sadiq al-Rikabi, a close advisor to prominent Shia politician Jawad al-
Maliki, told an American reporter in June 2007, "The government’s aim is to 
disarm and demobilize in Iraq, and we have enough militias now in Iraq that it is 
hard enough to solve the problem. Why are we creating new ones?" But the 
American view was that the Sunni Awakening was a resounding success. 
General Rick Lynch simply stated, "When you've got people who say, 'I want to 
protect my neighbors,' we ought to jump like a duck on a june bug." Lynch cited 
areas of the country such as Babil that were susceptible to al-Qaeda and other 
international terrorist groups because the Iraqi state was not providing security 
there.386 What was tantamount to treason for the Shia-dominated Iraqi state was 
thus a no-brainer for the United States. This is but one example in which U.S. 
interests and the interests of the Iraqi state, and many of the various factions 
within it, were not even remotely aligned—in fact, they were often diametrically 
opposed.  
 Even if we were to exclude the reign of terror of ISIS from the equation, 
the security situation in Iraq is now tenuous at best. A comprehensive report by 
Amnesty International detailing arms trafficking in Iraq from 2014-2016 found that                                                         
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"militias allied to the Iraqi government have access to arms from at least 17 
countries." Specifying the Munathamat Badr (Badr Brigades), Asa'ib al-Haq, 
Kata'ib Hizbullah, and Saraya al-Salam militias as among the chief recipients of 
arms among the government-sanctioned Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), the 
report denounces the government's complacency in systematic atrocities: "The 
Iraqi authorities have helped to arm and equip the PMU militias and pay their 
salaries—they must stop turning a blind eye to this systematic pattern of serious 
human rights violations and war crimes."387 Aside from the moral question of 
extrajudicial detainments and killings, the issue raises serious concerns over 
whether the Iraqi state is simply operating as a governor of a disparate band of 
sectarian Shia militant groups, which raises further questions about the long-term 
stability of the country and region as well as the overall war against Islamic State. 
The fact that Iranian-backed militias are now on the frontlines of the fight against 
ISIS in Iraq presents concerns both for the U.S. national interest and for the 
future of secular Iraq.  
 
 
Indicator IV. Rationalization and operational learning  
 
 The historical narrative of the Iraq War and the official narrative by the 
Bush Administration did not operate in the same galaxy. This is, of course, true to 
some extent with regard to Congress as well as the American public, who 
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hopped on the foreign-policy merry-go-round with little resistance. But the 
American public requires leadership and does not wish that the government lies 
to them, just as Congressional leaders want to believe that the CIA is correct 
when it gives an assessment about WMD. In addition, the Executive Branch has 
been setting foreign policy for many decades, as evidenced by the lack of a 
declaration of war (required by Congress) since 1941. But in none of these three 
arenas was there much common sense to be found. That begins and ends with 
the Bush Administration, even if meanders through the Congress, the public and 
the fourth estate on the way there.  
 21 Democrats and one Republican, Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island (who 
later switched to the Democratic Party) voted against the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force (AUMF) in the Senate, with 29 and 48 Democratic and Republican 
Senators, respectively, voting for the resolution; in the House of Representatives 
the Republican vote was 215-6 in favor, while the Democratic vote was 126-82 
against. 388  The tally recorded only two independent votes in total from both 
chambers, both were from Vermont, and both voted against the measure, 
Senator James Merrill Jeffords and then-Representative Senator Bernie 
Sanders. As was the Vietnam War, this was destined to be another national 
tragedy, with or without villains. No secret society hijacked U.S. foreign policy; 
the pantheon of leaders leading the nation into Iraq represented a majority of 
both Congress and public opinion.                                                          
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 Whether it is therefore fitting or ironic that the nation went to war based on 
faulty intelligence, misinformation, misperception, duplicity, and outright lies 
depends on the eye of the observer. There can be little doubt that the intentional 
distortion of the threat by U.S. leaders influenced public opinion in favor of war, 
just as there can be little doubt that the American people were willing to go along 
with that false narrative if only to exorcise the demons of 9/11. Had this been the 
first time in history such an occurrence had been produced by the American 
political system, it could be understood as a singular phenomenon based on a 
sudden and overwhelming disorientation caused by a truly horrifying attack on 
the nation's soil. But we have seen this movie before, and while these two 
situations have very different circumstances, one development ties them 
together: the incorporation of otherwise irrelevant foes into the national-security 
threat-perception mechanisms of the state, a perception which is then distorted 
beyond comprehension.  
 Seldom before in history has the official discourse about a policy been so 
clearly opposed to its realty. Even with regard to the Vietnam War, U.S. foreign 
policymakers made little attempt to characterize North Vietnam as an existential 
threat, but rather an ideational threat. But with regard to the Iraq War, Bush 
Administration officials married the two in an unprecedented public-relations 
campaign: because Iraq's "evil" dictator possessed weapons of mass destruction, 
he should therefore be confronted as a symbol of dangerous tyranny so that the 
'Middle East' could be democratized and made safe and "rogue" states would 
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understand that to stray from the international system, or U.S. authority, would be 
to risk annihilation: "Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists."389   
 As the months following the invasion passed, no WMD were found, and 
soldiers were being killed and wounded on a daily basis, causing the White 
House to struggle to defend its prewar statements on WMD and to continue to 
justify the invasion and subsequent occupation on other grounds, in addition to 
scrambling to explain how it could have been so wrong about WMD in the first 
place. An exchange between a reporter at the White House and Press Secretary 
Ari Fleischer from July 7, 2003 is particularly symbolic of this effort, in reference 
to the infamous "sixteen words:" 
 
Q : I just want to take you back to your answer before, when you 
said you have long acknowledged that the information on yellow 
cake turned out to be incorrect. If I remember right, you only 
acknowledged the Niger part of it as being incorrect—I think what 
the— 
 
Mr. Fleischer: That's correct.  
 
Q : I think what the President said during his State of the Union was 
he— 
 
Mr. Fleischer: When I refer to yellow cake I refer to Niger. The 
question was on the context of Ambassador Wilson's mission.  
 
Q: So are you saying the President’s broader reference to Africa, 
which included other countries that were named in the NIE, were 
those also incorrect?  
 
Mr. Fleischer: Well, I think the President's statement in the State of 
The Union was much broader than the Niger question.                                                          
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United States.  
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Q: Is the President's statement correct? 
 
Mr. Fleischer: I'm referring specifically to the Niger piece when I say 
that.  
 
Q: Do you hold that the President—when you look at the totality of 
the sentence that the President uttered that day on the subject, are 
you confident that he was correct? 
 
Mr. Fleisher: Yes, I see nothing that goes broader that would 
indicate that there was no basis to the President's broader 
statement. But specifically on the yellow cake, the yellow cake for 
Niger, we've acknowledged that the information did turn out to be a 
forgery.  
 
Q: The President's statement was accurate? 
 
Mr. Fleischer: We see nothing that would dissuade us from the 
President's broader statement.   
 
Q: Ari, that means that, indeed, you all believe that Saddam 
Hussein was trying to obtain uranium from an Africa nation; is that 
correct? 
 
Mr. Fleischer: What the President said in his statement was that 
according to a British report they were trying to obtain uranium. 
When I answered the question it was, again, specifically about the 
Niger piece involving yellow cake.  
 
Q: So you believe the British report that he was trying to obtain 
uranium from an African nation is true? 
 
Mr. Fleischer: I'm sorry? 
 
Q: If you're hanging on the British report, you believe that that 
British report was true, you have no reason to believe— 
 
Mr. Fleischer: I'm sorry, I see what David is asking. Let me back up 
on that and explain the President's statement again, or the answer 
to it. The President's statement was based on the predicate of the 
yellow cake from Niger. The President made a broad statement. So 
given the fact that the report on the yellow cake did not turn out to 
be accurate, that is reflective of the President's broader statement, 
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David. So, yes, the President's broader statement was based and 
predicated on the yellow cake from Niger.  
 
Q: So it was wrong?  
 
Mr. Fleischer: That's what we've acknowledged with the information 
on— 
 
Q: The President's statement at the State of the Union was 
incorrect? 
 
Mr. Fleischer: Because it was based on the yellow cake form Niger.  
 
Q: Well, wait a minute, but the explanation we've gotten before was 
it was based on Niger and the other African nations that have been 
named in the national intelligence— 
 
Mr. Fleischer: But again, the information on—the President did not 
have that information prior to his giving the State of the Union.  
 
Q: Which gets to the crux of what Ambassador Wilson is now 
alleging—that he provided this information to the State Department 
and the CIA 11 months before the State of the Union and he is 
amazed that it, nonetheless, made it into the State of the Union 
Address. He believes that that information was deliberately ignored 
by the White House. Your response to that? 
 
Mr. Fleischer: And that's way, again, he's making the statement 
that—he is saying that surely the Vice President must have known, 
or the White House must have known. And that's not the case, prior 
to the State of the Union.  
 
Q: He's saying that surely people at the decision-making level 
within the NSC would have known the information which he passed 
on to both the State Department and the CIA.  
 
Mr. Fleischer: And the information about the yellow cake and Niger 
was not specifically known prior to the State of the Union by the 
White House.  
 
Q: What does that say about communications? 
 
Mr. Fleischer: We've acknowledged that the information turned out 
to be bogus involving the report on the yellow cake. That is not 
new. You can go back. You can look it up. Dr. Rice has said it 
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repeatedly. I've said it repeatedly. It's been said from this podium 
on the record, in several instances. It's been said to many of you in 
this room, specifically.  
 
Q: But, Ari, even if you said that the Niger thing was wrong, the 
next line has usually been that the President's statement was 
deliberately broader than Niger, it referred to all of Africa. The 
National Intelligence Estimate discussed other countries in Africa 
that there were attempts to purchase yellow cake from, or other 
sources of uranium— 
 
Mr. Fleischer: Let me do this, David. On your specific question I'm 
going to come back and post the specific answer on the broader 
statement on the speech.  
 
Q: Will you post something later? 
 
Mr. Fleischer: I'll just get the word out. If you don't hear from me, 
just assume that there is nothing new that moves the ball today.390  
 
 
 Press briefings and conferences in which the speaker is available to 
respond to questions are often the most revelatory of any public statements, 
given that the speaker, in this case the Press Secretary, has little or no time to 
invent an answer consistent with the official narrative. The speaker can simply 
refuse to answer, but this simply adds to the interest surrounding any given 
inquiry. In this case, Secretary Fleischer begins by acknowledging that the claim 
that Saddam Hussein attempted to purchase yellow cake from Niger was 
"bogus." He then defends the "broader" claim that Hussein may have been 
pursuing material for weapons of mass destruction from somewhere in Africa, but 
uses the debunked Niger claim as evidence to support that claim. This is 
obviously a logical fallacy, an omission that the reporter quickly pounces on.                                                         
390 "Press Gaggle by Ari Fleischer," The James S. Brady Briefing Room, July 7, 2003, Digital 
National Security Archives, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB215/def_ex/DX616.pdf 
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Once the specious line of explanation is exposed, Fleischer abruptly ends the 
press conference, promising to return with further information. A week later, 
when questioned on the African uranium issue by another reporter in another 
briefing, Fleischer succinctly responded by offering, "We don't know if it's true. 
But nobody, nobody, can say it is wrong."391 In other words, anything that cannot 
be proven to be wrong may be correct. Using this substandard benchmark for 
intelligence facilitates the justification of any policy a given policymaker wishes to 
promote, and that is exactly what happened in the case of Iraq.  
 The mushroom cloud of "bogus" WMD claims died a slow, radioactive 
death. Although there were certain acknowledgements about the faulty WMD 
intelligence and the inflation of the Iraq threat, there was also a continuation of 
claims of ties between Hussein, WMD, and terrorism for years afterward. After 
stating on Meet The Press on March 16, 2003, four days before war began, in no 
uncertain terms, "We believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons," 
Dick Cheney simply remembered, "Yeah, I did misspeak. We never had any 
evidence that he acquired a nuclear weapon" on the same television program on 
September 14, 2003.392 But never was there a hint that this called into question 
the justification for invasion.  
 President Bush cited the CIA's 2004 report that found that Saddam 
Hussein had abandoned his WMD program in his book to repeat the false claim 
that "Saddam wanted to re-create Iraq's WMD capability... after sanctions were                                                         
391 Fleischer 2003. 
 
392 Statements from Meet the Press, NBC. 
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removed and Iraq's economy stabilized," completely dismissing the fact that no 
weapons were ever found.393 The WMD fence-hopping understandably confused 
Americans. The public relations campaign to terrorize the American public into 
acquiescence was so successful that months after the invasion, one-quarter of 
Americans still believed not only that Iraq possessed WMD, but that they had in 
fact already been found, with a full half of Americans believing the falsehood that 
"Saddam was personally involved in the 9/11 attacks." 394  While the 
misinformation campaign is partially to blame, there is no other statistic that so 
unambiguously illustrates the willful ignorance of the American public.  
 Some scholars blamed the media for the public's eagerness to embrace 
false beliefs. For example, Mary Cardaras attributes the ignorance of the 
American people to media "complacence:" 
 
How could knowingly bad intelligence clear the way for war? In the 
absence of answers to these questions, the people did not hold the 
president to account because they could not hold the president to 
account. This was because the news media was largely 
complacent in their work. Information imparted to them by the Bush 
administration was largely accepted as face value and reported as 
such back to the public.395 
 
  
 But the media is an easy punching bag. If people do not believe what they 
see, they will turn the channel. It is not the media's job to assess CIA intelligence. 
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That task is assigned to the Executive and Legislative Branches of government, 
and neither performed its task properly. What the media does do is facilitate how 
the issue is framed through what Robert Entman calls the two functions of 
"problem definition, which often virtually predetermines the rest of the frame, and 
remedy, because it directly promotes support (or opposition) to public policy."396 
In these two areas the media put up little resistance, but it was hardly the media's 
role to reinvent the words of politicians.  
 Furthermore, the source of the misinformation and threat inflation was not 
the media, but the Bush Administration. And nowhere within that body was there 
ever any substantial remorse or responsibility to be found. Even the revered 
Colin Powell, whose U.N. speech made the case for war in Iraq, in addition to 
containing false information about Iraq's WMD, mentioned al-Qaeda operative 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who would eventually lead al-Qaeda in Iraq, 27 times, 
even though the intelligence community had not produced any credible evidence 
that there had been any collaboration between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. 
Despite this fact, Powell continued to blame the intelligence community for the 
false information, characterizing his U.N. speech as "a great intelligence 
failure."397  
 Michael Morrell, who eventually served as CIA Deputy Director and acting 
Director in 2011 and 2012, when asked whether "they [Bush Administration                                                         
396 Robert Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy 
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officials] gave a false presentation of what you said to them," responded: "On 
some aspects... What they were saying about the link between Iraq and al-
Qaeda publicly was not what the intelligence community" had concluded on its 
own.398 It does not take a non-proliferation or terrorism expert to recognize what 
"aspects" they gave a false representation of. The intelligence community, for its 
part, also failed miserably to remain apolitical, in accordance with its charter, and 
to provide solid intelligence. As with the failure to detect and prevent the 9/11 
attacks, there was plenty of blame to go around. But of the five people most 
central to the Iraq War, George Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin 
Powell, and Condoleezza Rice, none ever offered a complete about-face of their 
position in its creation.399   
 This is also generally true of its lower-level protagonists, such as Paul 
Wolfowitz, Karl Rove, Douglas Feith, Scooter Libby, George Tenet, and others. 
Rather than issue a mea culpa, each was quick to blame the others. For 
example, in his memoir, Donald Rumsfeld says of Paul Bremer, "His formal 
direction from the President to report through me was being ignored."400 Francis 
Fukuyama, who coined the "end of history" phrase whose spirit is invoked in the 
2002 NSS, is one of those who did begin to question his assertions, perhaps due 
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to his academic nature, eventually regretting the lack of learning among his 
colleagues: 
 
What is remarkable about this entire experience is how little 
institutional learning there has been over time; the same lessons 
about the pitfalls and limitations of nation-building seemingly have 
to be relearned with each new involvement. This became painfully 
evident during the American occupation and reconstruction of Iraq 
after April 2003.401 
 
 
Though he was not an official in the Bush Administration, he eventually 
recognized the questionable logic inherent in neoconservative doctrine.  
 Perhaps those most central to the Bush Administration had trouble 
regretting their position within the Iraq War because the mountain they made of a 
molehill in Iraq's WMD evidence was so fragile that to question any of it would 
bring down the whole house of cards. Much of the misinformation and confusion 
about WMD emanated from the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). This 
confusion and misinformation were present in its creation, alteration, and public 
characterizations. A 2014 RAND study summarized that the NIE "contained 
several qualifiers that were dropped... As the draft NIE went up the intelligence 
chain of command, the conclusions were treated increasingly definitively."402 This 
politicization of intelligence information is precisely the opposite of how it is 
supposed to be treated, and this does not even account for its public 
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mischaracterization once the final report had reached the highest levels of 
command. One of the most controversial aspects of the NIE was the discussion 
of what Iraq’s pursuit of aluminum tubes signified. Condoleezza Rice flatly stated 
on CNN that they "are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs," which is 
factually inaccurate.403 
 On the evidence surrounding the connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda, 
the declassified NIE cited "sources of varying reliability" and noted that "several 
dozen additional direct or indirect meetings are attested to by less reliable 
clandestine and press sources." 404  When contrasted with Donald Rumsfeld's 
claim that the evidence linking Iraq with Al Qaeda was "bulletproof," or CIA 
Director George Tenet's assertion that WMD existence was a "slam dunk," the 
gap between the facts and the rhetoric becomes irreconcilable. David Kay, an 
Iraq weapons inspector who headed the Iraq Survey Group, believed the 
intelligence community did a "poor job" with the NIE, calling it "probably the worst 
of the modern NIE's, partly explained by the pressure, but more importantly 
explained by the lack of information they had. And it was trying to drive towards a 
policy conclusion where the information just simply didn't support it."405 In other 
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words, the gap in information was filled by confirmation bias, breaking the first 
rule of intelligence.  
 The tragic genius in the Bush Administration's marketing of the Iraq War to 
the public was in being simultaneously vague and specific: vague in exactly what 
charges were being leveled against Saddam Hussein and how they 
corresponded to the 9/11 attacks, but specific about the overall threat posed by a 
multitude of hostile states and their supposed connection to terrorism and WMD, 
Hussein chief among them. The source of much of this vague specificity was 
none other than Donald Rumsfeld, whose Mr. Rogers-like demeanor and manner 
of speech caused the audience to respond at once understandingly and 
suspiciously. Consider, for example, the following excerpt from his speech in 
New York on February 14, 2003: 
 
Now the connection between those kinds of weapons, terrorist 
states that have those weapons—and let there be no doubt they 
do—and terrorist organizations like the ones who attacked the 
Towers here in this city and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., that 
nexus has created something that's totally different. It must cause 
us as individuals to think fresh about these things. That's not easy 
to do. And to the extent people don't have the same sets of facts 
that they're working off of, they're very likely to come to different 
conclusions. It takes time for those facts and that information to 
seep out.406 
 
 
 What his speech did not mention was that he did not have those facts 
because they did not exist. He had snippets and snapshots of highly                                                         
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questionable half-cooked projections that were twisted by confirmation bias at 
every step up the chain of command. When Administration officials were not 
suggesting that there was much that was unknown, and that what was unknown 
was dangerous, they were stating outright false claims about Iraq's WMD. Thus, 
in prepared remarks, they were specific about the threat Hussein posed without 
being specific about the evidence supporting that claim, and in unprepared 
remarks, they were intentionally opaque. At a press conference on February 12, 
2002, Rumsfeld offered the following characterization of his approach the 
subject: 
 
As we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we 
know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we 
know there are some things we do not know. But there are also 
unknown unknowns—the ones we don't know we don't know.407  
 
 
This was not in response to an erudite question about the infinite nature of the 
metaphysical universe. The question was (in statement form), "There is no 
evidence of a direct link between Baghdad and some of these terrorist 
organizations." When asked if that was an unknown unknown, he responded, 
"I'm not gonna say which it is." The statement became so emblematic of the 
turbid discourse of the Bush Administration that it became the subject of a 
documentary film by Errol Morris, The Unknown Known, whose documentary The 
Fog of War on Robert McNamara is referenced in the previous chapter. 
Rumsfeld even named his memoir Known and Unknown. While Rumsfeld's                                                         
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epistemological rant is logically plausible, as anyone in the scientific community 
can attest, it is hardly a viable explanation for one state invading another. A 
Google search conducted to reference this quote produced only one result in the 
top-ten attempting to utilize it for any rational purpose, and it came from a two-
page 2009 entry of the Journal of Experimental Botany, perhaps where this type 
of logic belongs.408  
 
 
OPM Summary  
 
 As summarized by Robert Brigham, "the main difference between the 
Eisenhower years and 2003" was not the desire to impart American institutions 
internationally but rather "the undying belief of Bush [Administration] officials in 
the efficacy of conventional military power to achieve its objectives. Few 
administrations have embraced the notion that the world could be remade by 
American military power as securely as the Bush team."409 The same could be 
said of the Vietnam War, with the difference being that Iraq was an immediate 
invasion and Vietnam was a slow build. What did not change between 1945 and 
2003 was the assumption of the role of international arbiter and defender of the 
"Free World" American leaders (as well as citizens) embraced. The Iraq War 
certainly represented one end of the spectrum, but its opposite end is not so far 
away as many would imagine. The more internationally ambitious end that 
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produced the Iraq War gathered steam in the 1990's after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall.     
 Robert Kagan and William Kristol argued in the Summer 1996 Foreign 
Affairs issue that "American hegemony is the only reliable defense against a 
breakdown of peace and international order. The appropriate goal of American 
foreign policy, therefore, is to preserve that hegemony as far into the future as 
possible." Their United States was one in which isolationists and declinists 
"absentmindedly dismantle the material and spiritual foundations on which their 
national well-being has been placed," instead of recognizing that "the main threat 
the United States faces now and in the future is its own weakness."410 There can 
be no more lucid statement on preponderance than the assumption that U.S. 
power is truly unlimited, if only Americans would accept that fact of reality.  
              In 2000, Kagan and Kristol again railed against "flagging will and 
confusion about our role in the world," calling for a "benevolent hegemony" that 
wielded "the capacity to contain or destroy many of the world's monsters."411 
Their mission rested on the ideological point of departure that "the re-
moralization of America at home ultimately requires the re-moralization of 
American foreign policy." This perspective not only mischaracterized the nature 
of U.S. power and the transformative utility of power in general, but also built its 
presumptions on the ontological fallacy that national identity is drawn from                                                         
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international mission, when the opposite is how a state is defined. A state cannot 
know what it means to pursue and how it means to pursue it without first 
understanding its own national identity. Conceptualizing national purpose and 
national security in global terms makes a grandiose assumption: the world can 
be engineered by the powerful. Both times the United States has employed the 
full arsenal of its financial, military, and ideational tools to this end since 1945, it 
has failed.  
 When Donald Rumsfeld claimed that "the coalition did not act in Iraq 
because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of weapons 
of mass destruction" but rather "because we saw existing evidence in a new light 
through the prism of our experience on 9/11," he conceded the ultimate tragedy 
of the conflict as a war of choice with no clear muse. This quintessentially 
Constructivist statement revealed that the narrative of the evidence was more 
important to Bush Administration officials than the evidence itself. This belief 
subsequently necessitated duplicity in the sale of the Iraq War to Congress and 
the American public. That the argument for war was based on ideology, some of 
it taking its provenance from the neoconservative movement but much of it from 
steadfast, enduring traditions in U.S. foreign policy since 1945, compounded the 
problem of clarity of purpose and mission. As Constructivist scholar Karl 
Schonberg has described it, "To understand the role of America in this period it is 
necessary to consider not just the relative power relationships between the 
United States and other actors in the international system, but also the ideational 
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framework through which U.S policymakers have viewed and made sense of the 
world around them."412 
 In the eyes of many observers, Islamist terrorism, a term the Obama 
Administration avoided either out of excessive political correctness or out of 
concern that the proliferation of the term would alienate friendly Islamic allies 
(likely both), presents the most glaring challenge to American national security. If 
this is indeed the case, the Obama Administration’s shift from 
invasion/occupation doctrine to the doctrine of targeted killing seems the least 
terrible in a cesspool of terrible alternatives. What we can learn based on the Iraq 
experience is to focus like a laser on the perpetrators of any attack on the United 
States or American allies rather than launching a social-engineering attempt to 
completely reformulate problematic (whether threatening or not) states and even 
entire regions.  
 Terrorism is far from a new problem. Terrorism against the Roman 
occupation of Judea helped spread the liberation cause and convince the 
Romans that they would pay an unspecified, unpredictable, but nonetheless 
frightening and annoying cost for its attempt at subjugation in that particular area 
two millennia ago. David Fromkin, writing in 1975 in response to what many 
inaccurately viewed as the new phenomenon of terrorism, understood even then 
the two fundamental necessities of fighting terrorism: (a) although it has to be 
confronted, never assume that it can be eliminated, and (b) never play into the 
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terrorists' hands by allowing them to dictate the terms of the battlefield and the 
narrative of the ideational conflict.413 Fromkin also correctly predicted that the 
stakes involved in terrorism would rise exponentially, complicating the effort to 
curtail terrorist financing, occupation of land, operational capabilities, and 
ideational prowess. The Iraq War not only fueled the narrative of Islamist 
terrorism, but also provided it safe haven within the country, precisely the 
outcome it meant to prevent.  
 In the words of Barry Posen, "Officials in the Bush Administration 
convinced themselves that a quick application of overwhelming military power 
would bring democracy to Iraq, produce a subsequent wave of democratization 
across the Arab world, marginalize al Qaeda, and secure U.S. influence in the 
region."414 But just as Bush Administration officials greatly exaggerated the threat 
from Iraq as they sought to rouse the nation into a war-footing frenzy, so too did 
they retroactively exaggerate prewar concerns about the ease with which 
security would be established in Iraq. When asked if his prewar projections were 
too optimistic, President Bush replied, "No. I think I was pretty well prepared for a 
pretty long haul." 415  This revisionist history was paired with constructing an 
alternative reality of facts on the ground in Iraq in the months after invasion. Even 
after the country had begun to fall victim to insecurity, President Bush was still                                                         
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invoking the lofty rhetoric of militaristic liberalization. On May 1st, 2003, more 
than one decade before the capture of Mosul by ISIS, Bush declared victory in 
Iraq:  
 
Our commitment to liberty is America's tradition—declared at our 
founding, affirmed in Franklin Roosevelt's Four Freedoms, asserted 
in the Truman Doctrine, and in Ronald Reagan's challenge to an 
evil empire. We are committed to freedom in Afghanistan, in Iraq, 
and in a peaceful Palestine. The advance of freedom is the surest 
strategy to undermine the appeal of terror in the world. Where 
freedom takes hold, hatred gives way to hope. When freedom takes 
hold, men and women turn to the peaceful pursuit of a better life. 
American values, and American interests, lead in the same 
direction: We stand for human liberty. The liberation of Iraq is a 
crucial advance in the campaign against terror. We have removed 
an ally of al-Qaida, and cut off a source of terrorist funding. And this 
much is certain: No terrorist network will gain weapons of mass 
destruction from the Iraqi regime, because the regime is no 
more.416 
 
 
It was later revealed that the White House had furnished the "Mission 
Accomplished" banner for his declaration of victory aboard the U.S.S. Abraham 
Lincoln, in contrast to statements by the Bush Administration that the Navy had 
provided the banner.417 While a shameful photo op is one thing, every politician 
commits that type of transgression. The true crime of the distortion of reality 
before, during, and after the invasion was the inability to predict, recognize, and 
account for problems on the ground that would lead to insecurity in Iraq, 
thousands of dead American soldiers, and the development of one of the most                                                         
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significant terrorist threats in the history of the world. No international terrorist 
group has ever held so much land in addition to such a large audience.  
 If statements of the war's purpose, evidence to justify it, and rosy 
predictions of its successes to come were completely distorted by Bush 
Administration officials, which they surely were, why did Congressional leaders 
and the American people not put up more of a fight? If nine days after Colin 
Powell's speech Hans Blix had rendered Powell's contentions inaccurate, why 
was there not more of a backlash in America, even if there was abroad? 72% of 
the American people favored war in Iraq prior to the invasion.418 That number did 
not lose its plurality until two years later, as shown in Figure 8:  
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 What accounts for this disconnect between reality and perception in the 
case of Iraq? To attribute the Iraq War to the Bush Administration alone is to 
mischaracterize the views of the American people. An administration wishing to 
promote the demonization of a particular foe found ready ears among the public 
so soon after the most catastrophic attack on American civilians in the nation's 
history. Had the Bush Administration chosen Iran as the object of its rage 
instead, it is likely that a plurality of support would still have been present. 
Someone had blindsided the sleeping giant again six decades later, this time 
against a civilian complex, and rattling the cage of a small band of 
fundamentalists in a country less than 1% of Americans could locate on a map 
hardly seemed just reprisal. Never mind that fifteen of the 9/11 hijackers were 
from Saudi Arabia and that none of the four others were from Iraq, but from 
Lebanon, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. Every one of the perpetrators of 
the attack was a citizen of a state with which the United States had benevolent 
relations, and yet the U.S. military would turn its guns on a state that had no 
involvement in it that did not possess a single weapon of mass destruction, nor 
any connections with Islamist terrorist groups that could threaten America. 
Recognized for the pragmatic dictator he was, Saddam Hussein was not even 
considered a legitimate Muslim in the Muslim community.  
 As with the "tragedy without villains" that the Vietnam War became, Iraq 
was chosen by U.S. leaders as the target for a new mission—against terrorism, 
so was the refrain—and again the nation acquiesced. But while South Vietnam 
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was under attack by Communist forces, Iraq neither possessed WMD nor 
maintained ties with any organization threatening the United States. And while a 
variety of factors limited U.S. casualties in Iraq to 4,424, the harm to the national 
interest is likely to be far greater as a result of the Iraq War than with the Vietnam 
War. 9/11 proved that Islamist fundamentalism is not just an ideational threat but 
also existential—perhaps not in the literal interpretation of the word, since 
jihadists will not be able to conquer the country, but in terms of the security of 
American citizens, infrastructure, and leadership compounds, which can no 
longer be taken for granted.  
 The two giants moats that protected the nation from attack before the 
advent of international terrorism are no longer relevant in the globalized age. And 
it is now beyond debate that the focal point of the American response to 9/11 has 
created far more terrorism than it ever could have prevented. Islamist 
fundamentalism is here to stay, and the United States will need to constantly 
assess the response to it as it machetes its way through the increasingly 
asymmetrical threats of the 21st century. One of the responses to another of 
these threats, the war against drugs, largely defines itself according to the pursuit 
and definition of that threat, rather than the elimination of the problem itself. Just 
as terrorism is a tactic, drugs are a social phenomenon, if a social blight, and the 
weaponization of the response to them carries the potential to further weaponize 
the response to that response, just as bleeding weapons from the remnants of 
French Colonial outposts under Diem and stirring the wrong hornet's nest in Iraq 
have demonstrated.  
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 Donald Rumsfeld' FPDM "prisms" informed the conception of, planning 
for, and justification for the motivations and characterizations of the purpose and 
direction of the Iraq War. Prudent FPDM does not incorporate prisms. The further 
a statesman travels away from a strict definition of the national interest and the 
role of national security within it, the more he risks becoming mired in the smoke 
and mirrors of those prisms. The American people and their Congressional 
leaders did not pay sufficient attention to 'the man behind the curtain' because 
they did not object to the preponderant nature of American grand strategy and 
did not understand that power does not innately contain a capacity to transform 
the politics of other states. While the blunder of the Iraq War indeed blemished 
the neoconservative movement and the names attached to it, as evidenced by 
the collapse of the think tank Project for a New American Century, Brian Schmidt 
and Michael Williams explain why this should not be viewed as a "momentary 
aberration:" 
 
The difficult and deteriorating situation in Iraq has no doubt 
damaged the neoconservative project, in some eyes fatally. Yet 
even if neoconservatism is no longer the power it was, it is 
important to be clear about its impact and its implications both for 
realism and for future debates over foreign policy in the United 
States and beyond. As we have shown, neoconservatism's impact 
cannot be reduced to circumstances alone. However important 9/11 
and the location of specific individuals in the Bush Administration 
may have been, the ability of neoconservatives to influence the 
debate over Iraq also reflected a coherent intellectual position 
grounded in a specific philosophy of politics, a capacity to locate 
these arguments within powerful currents in American political 
culture, and an ability to use rhetorics and social networks 
connected to both. Obviously, the particular circumstances 
surrounding the invasion of Iraq will not be repeated, and the dire 
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consequences of the decisions made may make it more difficult to 
use these arguments, rhetorical moves, and political alliances in the 
future. But appreciating the diverse resources that neoconservatism 
was able to mobilize should make us cautious about seeing the 
run-up to the Iraq War as nothing but a momentary aberration. 
Neoconservatism as it has been expressed in foreign and domestic 
politics over the past two or three decades may or may not pass 
from the scene, but the political potential it reflects is rooted in 
much deeper aspects of American politics and political culture, and 
is unlikely to prove as ephemeral as many of the critics and 
obituary writers of the neoconservative moment are wont to wish.419 
 
 
The Iraq War, despite the various threats that it created that we now must 
confront, is not coming around again, as Schmidt and Williams point out. But at 
the same time, it is an inaccurate portrayal of the American identity and political 
system to suggest that the philosophies and assumptions guiding the failed 
policy have come and gone.  
 From a theoretical perspective, the FPDM of the Iraq War seems to exhibit 
all of the most imprudent elements of liberalism, realism, and Constructivism, 
with few of their more prudent qualities. It combined the Manichean, unilateral 
realpolitik of realism, the idealized messianism of liberalism, and the social-
engineering of Constructivism into an unmitigated disaster not even the Vietnam 
War rivals in terms of harm to the national interest. In terms of the international 
perception of the United States, after 9/11, the United States enjoyed a level of 
sympathy perhaps never before seen in its history. The goodwill showered upon 
the United States, including by a majority of Muslims the world order, all but 
evaporated in the months after March 2003. By contrast, the environment of the                                                         
419 Brian Schmidt and Michael Williams, "The Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives 
Versus Realists," Security Studies No. 17, 2008, 219. 
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Cold War was so diametrically opposed and morally murky that the crimes 
committed within it by both sides were more or less considered water under the 
bridge from 1989 onward (except, of course, for those caught in its 'hot' war 
zones). The fact that the United States came to be viewed by many as an 
imprudent, self-serving, imperialist power after 2003 is not simply ideational. It 
transforms into the existential via the narrative of Islamist terrorism, the most 
acute national-security threat the United States now faces.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  377 
CHAPTER 7 
The Infinite Multidimensionality of Foreign Policy Analysis  
 
 
I do the very best I know, the very best I can, and I mean to keep 
doing so until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what is said 
against me won't amount to anything. If the end brings me out 
wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make no difference. 
 
Abraham Lincoln  
 
 
The Battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on 
September the 11th, 2001, and still goes on. 
 
President George W. Bush on May 1, 2003, aboard the U.S.S. 
Abraham Lincoln 
 
 
Square pegs, round holes, and FPDM  
 
 To evaluate a particular foreign policy, we must understand the FPDM 
process, the outcome, and the relation between the two. One cannot be 
determined by the other alone; they are fundamentally codetermined. If 
international relations are conducted in a multidimensional sphere in which 
unpredictable, dynamic, asymmetrical threats can come from any angle and any 
provenance, in many ways the policies produced by FPDM constitute a one-
dimensional plane of constraints and restrictions on those charged with pursuing 
the national interest abroad. At the same time, the multitude of FPDM inputs, be 
they psychological, ideological, bureaucratic, interest-group, or otherwise, so 
disambiguate the FPDM process that how to study that process in relation to the 
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national interest leaves the researcher with too many tools in the toolbox, as 
shown in Table 9:420 
 
 
 
 
Yet all of these tools are necessary for understanding that process. Thus, in a 
sense, the FPDM conditions leaders operate in are multidimensional, the foreign-
policy issues they seek to address are multidimensional, but the foreign policies 
produced by the multidimensional FPDM process end up being one-dimensional 
outputs. The agreed upon foreign policy, or resultant, in Foreign Policy Analysis 
terminology, represents "the lowest common denominator outcome: the outcome 
upon which a majority of the participants in the process can agree," which 
produces a policy that "would probably not coincide with the one chosen by any                                                         
420 Valerie Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory (Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2014), 44. 
Table 9: Major levels of analysis in FPA 
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unitary rational actor."421 (Outcome here is the FPDM output outcome, not the 
result of the implementation of the policy, or foreign-policy outcome). As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, Henry Kissinger described the process of establishing 
and maintaining any given policy as a negotiated bargain: "Whether these goals 
are desirable is relatively less crucial," and alterations to policies, once settled 
upon, is highly problematic because "the alternative to the status quo is the 
prospect of repeating the whole anguishing process of arriving at decisions." This 
operation applies a set of tools that is often incapable of responding to and 
dictating the terms of the system in which that toolset is applied. What follows as 
an outcome is therefore akin to using the skills required for a game of tick-tack-
toe to solve a Rubik's Cube. 
 Whatever policy settled upon still has to be operationalized through 
whatever foreign-policy resources and institutions are available to the state. Even 
with perfect information (intelligence) and perfect policy operationalization, which 
is never the case, the resultant can never be created and employed with the 
singular formation of addressing the policy problem, because of these 
multidimensional FPDM input constraints and restrictions. This entire process is 
before the policy ever reaches its target environment, in which it will find a new 
host of obstacles that dwarf those encountered in the FPDM process. Once the 
policy meets the target environment, the need for assessment and reassessment 
is absolute, but the motivation to do so is minute due to the "anguishing process" 
of having to repeat the procedure all over again—it is not only frowned upon, but                                                         
421 Hudson 2014, 114. 
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impossible, because the various input-parties will never again assemble as they 
did to construct the policy in the first place. Intelligence operatives have new 
tasks; Congressional leaders have new constituencies and issues to face; 
officials in the Executive Branch must respond to changing conditions, problems 
in other areas of the world, and problems on a higher grand-strategic scale than 
the one in question, which is itself often a peripheral policy-target environment 
(for various reasons, interventions tend to be in areas of the periphery); citizens 
have accepted the policy and moved on with their lives. The policy never again 
receives the attention it requires after those essential decision points have come 
and gone—"The Long 1964" with regard to Vietnam and 2002/2003 with regard 
to Iraq.  
 No matter how many Senate Select Committee on Intelligence closed-
door meetings, House Armed Services Committee hearings, presidential cabinet 
assemblies, public inquiries, or formal investigations take place, no entity exists 
that can put the policy genie back in the box. The events of 1964 and 2003 make 
that painfully clear. The complexity of creating and subsequently operationalizing 
and implementing an intervention therefore inherently relies on a multitude of 
fortuitous inter-subjective, codetermined conditions to achieve its objectives. No 
matter how many factors contribute to the confluence of inputs that inform FPDM, 
a policy that can be widely understood, institutionalized, and sustained 
temporally must still be specified and reevaluated. It may take a 100,000-word 
document to begin to understand the social conditions within Iraq or Vietnam, but 
a presidential administration cannot concoct a 100,000-word policy that invents 
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tools to address the multitude of issues an intervention will face. No institutions of 
foreign policy are variegated enough to fulfill so many objectives within so many 
parameters, and the average citizen possesses neither the time nor the 
inclination to sift through miles of documents to understand any given foreign 
policy; hence the need for platitudes, sound bites, and the manipulation of the 
public perception (fortunately for the foreign-policy practitioner, these are skills 
required of any policymaker).  
 It cannot be expected, for example, that commanding generals speak the 
native language fluently, understand the local culture, recognize the strengths of 
the adversary, and recognize the weaknesses of the partner state politically and 
military, much less an ordinary private sent into a village. The target environment 
is therefore by default far more complex than the intervening policy attempting to 
control it, when the inverse would be much more likely to achieve success. A 
bovine will always have difficulty outmaneuvering its human domesticator for this 
exact reason. It is small wonder, then, that sweeping interventions are often 
domesticated by the sociopolitical conditions in which they are targeted, rather 
than the intervening authority domesticating local sociopolitical conditions. The 
partner actors in the target area utilize the intervention to their own advantage 
because their interests in many cases do not align with that of the intervening 
state and because they know they can get away with it.  
 Even when they do align, the local actor can still use its leverage to extract 
resources, vicarious authority, and vicarious legitimacy from the intervening 
state, limiting its own incentives to provide civil institutions and services to the 
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populace, thereby creating even more pressure on the intervening state to 
provide those institutions and services. In Vietnam, for example, advisors were 
assigned to ARVN units for one-year terms, which meant that "just as he was 
getting to know the ARVN commander whom he was advising, the American 
would have to leave and be replaced by a new one who probably knew nothing 
of the language or what was really going on and who could thus be manipulated 
or circumvented by the local ARVN leaders," leading to the common adage that 
Americans did not fight one war in Vietnam, but ten one-year wars.422 
 This problem is of course compounded by the potential of adversarial 
actors to wreak havoc on the intervening state's plans. If the total military and 
political strength of the intervening and partner state x is weaker than the military 
and political strength of the collection of adversarial actors y within the target 
area, t time will slowly bleed the motivation of the intervening state and force the 
partner state, which had its own agenda to begin with, to rely less on the 
intervening state and thus pursue its own agenda even further. This phenomenon 
alone is enough to problematize intervention, and indeed has done exactly that 
for many centuries. But it becomes further compounded by myriad other factors, 
many of which have been documented in the case studies. It is therefore of 
absolute importance that a state pondering intervention be fully aware of these 
inextricable eventualities and construct remedies to address them prior to 
intervening.  
                                                        
422 Anthony James Joes, The War for South Viet Nam, 1954-1975 (London: Praeger, 2001), 91. 
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 The case studies have highlighted problems with the weakness of the 
partner state, the strength and determination of local adversaries with support 
from abroad, the phenomenon of the actions of the intervening state creating the 
opposite of their objectives, and the inherent ineptitude involved in operational 
learning and institutional policy adaptation. These are all problems in 
implementation, irrespective of the problems a given foreign policy may have in 
its construction, definition, and proliferation throughout the relevant foreign-policy 
agencies and institutions. Many of these factors are more pronounced than they 
were in 1945, when the United States decided to capitalize on the expansion of 
the Second World War by maintaining fixed interests, political institutions, and 
military installations abroad.  
 It is true that guerilla warfare, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism 
all existed prior to 1945, but the plethora of national-security threats have 
undergone a sea change in how they materialize and pose challenges to the 
material and ideational national-security objectives of the state. Combatting the 
Viet Cong with B-52 bombers was as effective as combatting Islamist terrorism 
by toppling a secular, non-religious dictator in a sovereign state, which is to say 
not at all. New threats require new strategies, tactics, and ways of thinking. The 
United States was late to shift to these new ways of operating because of the 
enormous ideational and institutional inertia created by the overwhelming 
victories of the Second World War. Not only are institutions of the state always 
slow to adapt, but where is the motivation to adapt when everything in the 
broader picture seems to be proceeding along swimmingly?  
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 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who made a concerted effort to 
modernize the American military in spite of some of the problems this caused to 
commanders (such as minimizing troop levels in Iraq), was widely panned for his 
comment, "You go to war with the army you have—not the army you might want 
or wish to have at a later time."423 This was a farcical statement for two reasons. 
First, Iraq was a war of choice, and could have been fought at a later time; 
second, his insistence on minimizing troop levels had nothing to do with timing. 
Nevertheless, it was half true. "What I saw from 9/11 forward was Don 
Rumsfeld's shock and disillusion with intelligence," a covert operations specialist 
who worked for Rumsfeld recalled after 9/11. "He had been working for decades 
with an intelligence community that was focused on one question: the Soviet 
order of battle. But when the intelligence community had to move down the scale 
to low-intensity conflict, well..." 424  The United States never adequately 
modernized the order of its military because it has largely maintained the same 
grand-strategic perspective since 1945.  
 This ideational and institutional inertia that catapulted from the launchpad 
of the Second World War facilitates the factors complicating intervention. The 
pursuit of preponderance and the belief that sheer material power can transform 
the politics of other states fuels a FPDM process that values output over 
prudence. The U.S. foreign-policy system exists in many ways to perpetuate 
                                                        
423 Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Ron Nessen, "You Go to War with the Press You Have," Brookings, 
December 30, 2004, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/you-go-to-war-with-the-press-you-have/ 
 
424 Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 
2006), 32. 
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itself, rather than to respond to particular policy issues or national-security 
threats. It is therefore unsurprising that it has not adapted well to new conditions. 
The process of seeking out monsters to slay has been systematically prioritized 
by U.S. foreign policymakers since 1945 over the need to deal with specific 
threats because the American identity relies on that process to assert itself on 
the international level. Voltaire mused in the 18th century, "If God did not exist, it 
would be necessary to invent him." This is the philosophy behind the tradition of 
mission in the history of U.S. foreign relations and the crusading spirit more 
isolationist tendencies have never been able to completely subdue: if no threats 
appear on the horizon, wade further into the depths of the sea; you are sure to 
encounter some eventually.  
 John Quincy Adams feared the United States wandering about "abroad in 
search of monsters to destroy." But the events of the Second World War 
convinced Paul Nitze and other U.S. foreign policymakers that the only way to 
achieve lasting security would be to achieve a "preponderance" of power. The 
United States indeed achieved a preponderance of power in the subsequent 
seven decades—but in spite of, rather than because of, its most ambitious 
foreign-policy campaigns. And while the United States remains the preeminent 
power in the international system, the overall balance of power is careening away 
from U.S. preponderance, irrespective of U.S. desires, objectives, and actions. If 
it wishes to remain the preeminent power, it would do well to recognize its 
limitations and de-idealize its international ambitions. Perhaps most importantly, 
U.S. leaders must recognize that the power of the United States is not defined by 
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its displays of military power alone. The failure of the wars in Vietnam and Iraq 
obviate this simple fact of power and prestige precisely because they did not 
bring about any substantial shift in the overall balance of power.  
 Chapters 3 and 4 described grand strategy as a means-end chain. If the 
stated objectives of grand strategy are limited and pragmatic, they can 
sometimes be achieved, even in a difficult, dangerous, and unpredictable world. 
When the objectives are sweeping, heavily idealized, Manichean, and 
transformational, they become much more difficult to reach, regardless of power 
endowment. One of the perceived constraints on the science of FPE is the 
obstacles the researcher must overcome to identify and explain the veritable 
motivations for and objectives of FPDM leaders. But these objectives are more 
discernible than is commonly thought. When we go back and analyze the 
Vietnam War and Iraq War, we do not find some hidden treasure trove of secrets 
that flips the extant perception of the war on its head (even while we do 
encounter misinterpretations and highly subjective historiography in the scholarly, 
policy, and popular literature). The data point to very similar motivations and 
objectives as were commonly held before the years have passed, the relevant 
documents declassified, and the memoirs written. The grand strategy of 
preponderance and the overestimation of sheer power to transform the politics of 
other states are open secrets. They are not hidden away in some arcane lockbox 
beneath a government building in Washington. Every major policy document of 
the last seven decades contains at least traces of each of the two, if not a full-
blown endorsement of each as with the 2002 NSS. Even if FPDM leaders had 
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taken every effort to conceal their true motivations and calculations, they would 
still have to answer for their actions, which inevitably render their words, 
thoughts, espionage and statecraft secondary in the minds of the American 
citizens empowered with the ability to vote them into oblivion. Foreign 
policymakers are judged by their actions, not their thoughts, and should be 
evaluated along those lines. While intention is not irrelevant, it hardly constitutes 
the whole picture.  
 The reason many scholars have focused so diligently on the limits of U.S. 
power is because U.S. foreign policymakers have so often characterized U.S. 
power as omnipotent. But if there is one thing thousands of years of international 
relations have demonstrated, it is that there is no such thing as omnipotent 
power. Robert Gilpin notes that “no state has ever completely controlled an 
international system; for that matter, no domestic government, not even the most 
totalitarian, has completely controlled a domestic society."425 Not the Romans in 
the Mediterranean, nor Ghengis Kahn in Asia, nor the Third Reich in Europe, nor 
the sunset-less British Empire, nor American preponderance have ever achieved 
anything remotely characteristic of global omnipotence. If for no other reason, 
this could be attributed to the simple idea that if x amount of individuals are 
willing to die to expel foreign occupiers, and those individuals effect y deaths on 
the soldiers of that occupying force, in t time the occupier will withdraw, realizing 
that the costs outweigh the benefits, and having the privilege of ending a war of 
choice in which the national interest is peripheral at best, and sometimes being                                                         
425 Robert Gilpin, War & Change in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1981), 28. 
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negatively impacted by intervention. The key distinction between the American 
crusading spirit and those of her preponderance-seeking forefathers is that she 
often did so with a noble purpose in mind, which is to say securitizing and 
liberalizing the international system.426 But when you are on the receiving end of 
the most powerful military in the history of the world, intention is hardly a relevant 
factor.  
 
U.S. grand strategy, IR theory, and change   
 At the center of the interchange between scholarship and praxis is the 
intention-result spectrum, otherwise characterized (in reverse) as the description-
prescription spectrum. Realism intends to describe the conditions from the 
present backward, liberalism intends to normatively improve the world by 
developing theories and tools to facilitate its betterment, and Constructivism 
intends to shatter the fourth wall as would have a traveler on the Further bus with 
Ken Kesey's Merry Pranksters in the watershed year of 1964. Classical and neo-
realism, with their emphasis on human nature and a relatively fixed, materially 
and/or structurally determined national interest, assumes that a change in 
leadership or a change in ideas seldom brings a substantial change in foreign 
policy. Liberalism, for its part, is more of a paradox than commonly conceived in 
                                                        
426 Recognition must be given here that this a highly contentious assertion. Chapter 3 offers a 
discussion of literature on whether the U.S-directed international order imposed after 1945 was 
benevolent or exploitative. It is likely that it was both, in contrast to, for example, purely colonial 
empires, which were unabashedly exploitative, even if claiming to be otherwise. The preference 
for anti-Communism over democracy During the Cold War, particularly in the 'Third World,' has 
been duly noted.  
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this regard. In theory, with its emphasis on the value of human liberty, its primary 
focus is in fact the individual.  
 However, in practice, this is a bit of a conundrum. Because the paradigm 
takes standard ideals as its defining characteristics, it is fundamentally trans-
individual by default. An idea in one person's mind is irrelevant until they share it 
with another. Ralph Waldo Emerson observed, "Every revolution was once a 
thought in one man's mind, and when the same thought occurs to another man, it 
is the key to that era."427 While in theory liberalism espouses the value of one life, 
one body, and one idea-unit unto itself, in practice it specifies specific normative 
ideas based on specific international objectives—democracy to achieve self-
determination, interconnectivity to achieve peace, the free market to achieve a 
medium through which individuals and groups of individuals can pursue 
happiness and variegated standards of living based on the intersection of 
personal ambition and societal efficiency. In practice, however, liberalism is 
intolerant of ideas, polities, institutions, and international processes that do not 
abide by those specific tenets.  
 It is therefore a fundamentally international paradigm at its core, which 
leads to an international situation in which the tenets of Democratic Peace 
Theory render relations between democracies and non-democracies virtually as 
antagonistic as those between non-democracies. In the words of E.H. Carr, "The 
doctrine of the harmony of interests thus serves as an ingenious moral device                                                         
427 Ralph Waldo Emerson, "The Mind in History," in The World's Best Essays, from the Earliest 
Period to the Present Time, eds. Edward Archibald Allen and William Schuyler (St. Louis: Ferd P. 
Kaiser, 1900) 1623. 
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invoked, in perfect sincerity, by privileged groups in order to justify and maintain 
their dominant position."428 Perhaps this has been one of the reasons why the 
most powerful state in the history of the international system, which was also the 
first liberal, pluralistic, secular state, has had such a chaotic interchange with the 
rest of the world, especially nonliberal states. The United States, as the 
(supposed) peerless exemplar of liberal power, has had an especially difficult 
time relating to nonliberal powers, with certain notable exceptions during the Cold 
War when anti-Communism temporarily eclipsed liberalism as its international 
identity-creator. It may be the case that the only reason this 'liberal leviathan' has 
had such antagonistic relations with nonliberal states is because its enormous 
share of world power by diffusion creates more areas of overlap with nonliberal 
states than other less powerful liberal states have, inevitably leading to more 
conflict. Where the territory of the lion and the hyena intersect, the ground will be 
bloodied sooner or later. And while the magisterial king of beasts is unchallenged 
on an individual basis, he is often outnumbered by the tenacious hyena.  
 However, two things stand out about the United States irrespective of its 
substantial power endowment. First, no other state has pursued preponderance 
to the point of the United States even when accounting for its great power 
differential since the material and ideational demise of colonialism. Either this 
says something about the economy of scale inherently changing the behavior of 
a state—which would not only be a surprising development, but one which would 
                                                        
428 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, in 
The Realism Reader, eds. Colin Elman and Michael Jensen (New York: Routledge, 2014), 42. 
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be impossible to test given the singularity of U.S. power since the Second World 
War—or there is some other factor at play. Christopher Fettweis notes that "the 
stronger a country gets, the more mistakes it seems to make."429 But this is due 
to the affordability of mistakes a large power endowment offers. This dissertation 
has demonstrated that the other factor is the pursuit of preponderance. Second, 
the United States seems to have chosen the blunders herein virtually arbitrarily—
that is to say, without proper consideration for the role of the country chosen as it 
relates to the national interest—neither Vietnam nor Iraq had any in any 
substantial sense. The two most notable of these wars of choice utterly failed to 
achieve their objectives.  
 Therefore, either there is a terribly unscientific process for choosing these 
conflicts, or there is another factor at play. This dissertation has demonstrated 
that preponderance is the other factor at play and that there is a terribly 
unscientific process for choosing these conflicts. This is without even considering 
the extremely difficult obstacles that must be overcome if one state wishes to 
transform the politics of another. In other words, at each one of the input, output, 
operationalization, and implementation phases of foreign policy, the U.S. grand-
strategic means-end chain contained neither theoretical nor applicable prudence 
as it related to these blunders. The theory of preponderance that has been 
guiding the nation for seven decades has not found effective application where it 
is applied with the most vigor. In fact, in the two most notable of these cases, that 
                                                        
429 Christopher Fettweis, Making Foreign Policy Decisions (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 
2015). 
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vigor was actually a source of the overwhelming response against it by armed 
indigenous and external actors. In Vietnam, investment of troops, bombs, and 
dollars was inversely related to objectives there. In Iraq, this phenomenon was 
even more pronounced. In Vietnam the enemy was singular—the North 
Vietnamese/VC alliance, with modest external assistance. In Iraq, the enemy 
was also singular in that it consisted of social conditions of fractionalization within 
the state, as well a modest external disruption in the form of Salafist jihadism. 
The problems producing this social condition were of course multifarious, but the 
United States was essentially fighting a singular war against this malignant 
condition.  
 In fact, the security vacuum left in the invasion's wake hardly signified anti-
Americanism. Anti-Americanism was certainly a part of it, and anti-Americanism 
certainly achieved a stature that it had not held prior to the invasion (recall that 
the United States was drowning in international sympathy in the months after 
9/11). But just as the 9/11 attacks had little (nothing) to do with Iraq, neither did 
its internal social conditions. Instead, Iraq descended into a cauldron of 
sectarianism, regionalism, and balkanization as one faction warred on another for 
its share of domestic-national autonomy. Ironically, this was both nationalist and 
anti-nationalist in nature. Groups were essentially fighting each other for a right to 
fight against the foreign Christian occupier, and at the same time fighting both 
with and against the fledgling Iraqi state. Shia fought Shia for control from within 
the state, and Sunni fought the state's oppression. He who could take the banner 
of the 'nationalist' movement in ideational and militaristic terms would be able to 
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take a larger share of political power within it in material, political, and territorial 
terms.   
 The international jihadism that overtook Iraq in the aftermath of March 
2003 existed as but one of these rival factions, and could enjoy little local 
authority and sparse support in its early days of 2003-2004, for two reasons. 
First, in order to establish its name, it had to resort to brutal bombings and 
executions in order to be noticed, especially as the extant violence became 
further exacerbated. Second, as these groups were international in nature and 
did not exist in Iraq prior to the invasion, they could not rely on the solidarity of 
extant groups that did not resort to those barbaric tactics, in part because no 
such nonsense was permitted under Saddam Hussein's monopolization of 
violence (except of course by his own forces). As is always the fundamental 
conundrum for any terrorist organization, the brutality of the tactics of terrorism 
by default alienate a majority of the audience for which the attacks are 
engineered.  
 If the story had ended there, Iraq would have been a simple one-off 
foreign-policy disaster, the United States would have left it in disarray as it did 
South Vietnam, and the Americans would have moved on and forgotten about 
that sorry state of affairs as would have been its prerogative in a war of choice in 
which the national interest was not at stake. However, because of the sectarian 
rift exposed by the toppling of Saddam Hussein, the story did not end there, and 
Iraq became relevant to the U.S. national interest because there now was 
international jihadism there just as Vietnam became relevant to the national 
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interest because each American soldier killed there served as a call to arms to 
send more soldiers to die in Vietnam in his name. The United States created the 
perfect Petri dish for ISIS to emerge from the rubble of shock and awe: a weak, 
Shia-dominated state with an impotent military incapable of confronting the Sunni 
militant movement that predictably assembled after being toppled over by a 
nation still angry about attacks launched against it by barely more than a dozen 
members of states allied with that nation orchestrated by a nonstate group based 
in a country 1,800 miles away. This was not a crusade against Islam—as 
Saddam Hussein was not even religiously inclined—but to many in the Muslim 
community, and certainly to Salafi jihadists, it contained all the hallmarks 
necessary to perpetuate their narrative.   
 Had the FPDM process been perfectly designed, processed and applied 
with the express purpose of harming the national interest, it could scarcely have 
achieved such success. Based on results alone, it seems as if the leaders 
involved in both cases not only did not pursue the national interest, but did 
everything within their power to harm the national interest. Of course, this is not 
the case. It is the case, however, that the national interest was neither properly 
defined nor prudently pursued with respect to Vietnam or Iraq. For all of their 
frivolities, hypocrisy, dishonesty, and incompetence, these leaders did the best 
they could to pursue the national interest within the bounded rationality of 
mission. Whether the mission of pursuing preponderance at the international 
level, or the mission of transforming the politics of the state in question, cognitive 
biases and preference restrictions prevented these leaders from thinking 
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rationally. At the grand-strategic level, it was not possible for them to conceive of 
relinquishing South Vietnam or allowing Iraq to exist under Saddam Hussein. At 
the individual policy-level, it was not possible for them to conceive that their 
shortsighted plan was incapable of working.   
 At the grand-strategic level, this could be labeled a simple act of hubris; at 
the individual-policy level, this is a basic ignorance of what can happen when 
very different cultures collide. A paradigm that dismisses cultural factors is likely 
to fail at intervention; indeed, one that recognizes them is unlikely to undertake 
intervention. Somewhat paradoxically, American militant liberalism has taken a 
realist approach to the lack of differentiation in states as archetypical boxes, even 
while superimposing liberal projections of what foreign citizens desire; all this 
while utilizing highly Constructivist interpretations of the national interest as it 
relates to liberalizing the world through militancy (creating the material world 
through ideational inventions). Out of the wreckage of this paradigmatic 
salmagundi emerges a grand strategy confused about its own means-ends 
chain.  
 One phenomenon none of the major paradigms adequately address is that 
of change in the international system. Liberalism purports to; its emphasis on the 
determinative nature of ideals understands only a system base on those ideals. 
Constructivism, true to its form, embraces malleability to such an extent that so 
much potential change changes the nature of change, and thus change cannot 
be understood except in the absence of change. Marxism is so confident of its 
prognostications of cyclical class warfare that its predictability renders it 
  396 
incapable of out-of-model change. Marxists have also yet to be tapped on the 
shoulder and reminded that their predictions have never historically materialized. 
Realism likewise only understands change within the confines of its highly 
parsimonious conceptual prison: 
 
The realist theory of international political change is based on what 
can be called the law of uneven growth, in contrast to the Marxist 
law of uneven development. According to realism, the fundamental 
cause of wars among states and changes in international systems 
is the uneven growth of power among states. Realist writers from 
Thucydides and Mackinder to present-day scholars have attributed 
the dynamics of international relations to the fact that the 
distribution of power in an international system shifts over a period 
of time; this shift results in profound changes in the relationships 
among states and eventually changes in the nature of the 
international system itself. Underlying the operation of this law and 
its significance is the fact that power by its very nature is a relative 
matter; one state's gain in power is by necessity another's loss.430 
 
 
This nonzero calculation of power feeds directly into the security dilemma, 
in which every state seeks to increase its relative power in order to increase its 
relative security. The rest is history. But change has been the only constant in the 
international system since the domestication of agriculture some ten thousand 
years ago in present-day Iraq. And change is occurring more rapidly now than at 
any time in history. Each of the paradigms has lessons and shortcomings for the 
change the international system is now experiencing. We have learned from 
Democratic Peace Theory that liberal states tend not to fight one another; 
however, they do fight other states at more or less the same rate, and 
                                                        
430 Gilpin 1981, 94. 
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modernization models have failed to bring about democracy in China and other 
partially liberalized economies in authoritarian states (President Nixon 'opened' 
China in 1972—45 years ago). We have learned from Constructivism that 
attitudes and ideas can most definitely contribute to the definition of interests, if 
not control them altogether, as evidenced by the European Union. We have 
learned from Marxism that people are concerned with class, as evidenced by the 
previous presidential election, even if Vietnam and China have moved to 
modernize their economies, if not their governments. And the primary strength of 
realism, understanding prudence in international affairs, has not quite been offset 
by its primary weakness, the dismissal of culture and state differentiation, 
throughout the course of this dissertation.  
  
 
Conclusions drawn from the case studies  
 
 A summary of the FPE and OPM of each case study was contained 
therein; as such, another here would be redundant. A summation of the lessons 
provided by these case studies in correlation with their FPE and their relation to 
the OPM in aggregate now follows. The case study chapters were elected to 
illustrate the functionality of FPE, examine why and how blunders occur, and 
explore the connections between the OPM and the blunders its assertions might 
contribute to. The data suggest that the process of constructing alternatives and 
deciding on an initial choice of invasion or escalation is the most important factor 
in determining how the conflict will be viewed by policymakers in later years. In 
other words, once a policy course is set toward a substantial investment of 
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foreign-policy resources, alterations and deviations become difficult. The 
common illustration of the battleship being turned around as a metaphor for the 
lack of adaptation of government and its policies comes to mind. If a particular 
policy problem is framed as a must-win between good and evil, it will be difficult 
for policymakers to walk back that framing, as they would have to not only 
contradict themselves but also renegotiate through all of the different 
bureaucratic machinations (Congress, military services, public opinion, advisors) 
that had to be negotiated to initiate the policy in the first place.  
 Above all, these case studies illustrate a neurasthenia in the central 
decision-making system at the highest levels of leadership, especially in three 
determining decision axes: the interpretation of the problem, as it is detected in 
the foreign policy system's tentacles; the digestion of the problem through 
domestic governmental processes and the court of public opinion; and the 
construction of the policy response by way of arriving at a consensus. Once 
these three conditions have been met, they become so ingrained in the 
production of foreign policy with regard to a particular state, region, or issue that 
they achieve a critical mass whose momentum cannot easily be reversed. 
Proclamations that the enemy is evil—along with the imperative that it must be 
confronted—leave policymakers hamstrung in terms of more cautious options.  
 The overarching lesson from these blunders is to be more prudent when in 
the decision-making phase, before the policy carries so much institutional and 
ideational inertia that its course arrives at a point of no return. Policymakers must 
keep close at hand the absolute necessity to demand precise exaction and 
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unfiltered clarity in defining the three fundamental decision axes. It is perhaps for 
this reason that scholars gravitate toward the question of whether President 
Kennedy may have kept the United States out of a policy of escalation: such a 
conclusion would signify that it was the critical decision-making phase that 
faltered, rather than underlying conditions in the American foreign-policy system. 
In fact, both feature prominently in each of these cases. While these conditions 
are of utmost significance, in each of the examined cases, policymakers indeed 
committed grave errors of strategic judgment at each decision axis. These 
conditions, described in Chapter 3 and detailed throughout the case studies, are 
directly related to the interpretation of the policy problem (the first decision axis) 
and the imperative of response (as opposed to inaction).  
 The case studies elected are special cases—strategic blunders replete 
with a multitude of tactical shortcomings that result in total failure and significant 
harm to the national interest. They are by definition different from normal 
interchanges between one state and another in which the outcome is 'mixed-
result,' or each state loses some battles and wins others (whether political or 
military). The purpose of utilizing these blunders as case studies is therefore to 
produce inferences about how the process of imprudent FPDM can lead to 
unfavorable outcomes via a host of FPDM fallacies. Nevertheless, while some 
are specific to the United States, some of the lessons from this volume can 
inform all interstate interactions, whether extreme or normal. Avoiding the same 
FPDM errors made during the course of these events should in theory lead to the 
betterment of any given policy, maximizing what the state is able to gain from the 
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other, even under conditions of cooperation in which the rising tide raises all 
boats. For even among partners the art of statecraft must still be adeptly 
employed, just as the art of diplomacy is never completely absent among 
adversaries.  
 
Each Criterion and Indicator offers conclusions from the analysis of the case 
studies: 
 
FPE  
 
Criterion I. Degree of fruition of primary and secondary objectives 
  
 Redefine the interaction between intervention and the national interest.  
 
  
 The perpetual pursuit of monsters prohibits the development of foreign-
policy tools, institutions, and processes capable of distinguishing unfortunate 
circumstances and events from existential threats. Conceiving of national 
security in global terms and threat hypersensitivity raise the costs of intervention 
and lower its return on investment by setting virtually impossible objectives and 
assuming that total victory is the only acceptable outcome. 431  Although he 
characterizes war as "a dramatically nonzero-sum activity," Thomas Schelling 
recognizes that "winning in a conflict does not have a strictly competitive 
meaning; it is not winning relative to one's adversary. It means gaining relative to 
one's own value system; and this may be done by bargaining, by mutual                                                         
431 Thomas C. Schelling, Choice and Consequence: Perspectives of an Errant Economist 
(Harvard University Press, 1984), 269. 
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accommodation, and by the avoidance of mutually damaging behavior." 432 
Chapter 5 noted that Robert McNamara attributed much of the damage of the 
Vietnam War to a lack of cooperation and communication between warring 
parties. Like many of the protagonists of the Vietnam War, as well as the Iraq 
war, he wished to blame the events on inevitable conditions, uncontrollable 
circumstances, and "what-ifs."  
 But this is not an accurate characterization of the conditions under which 
the two adversaries interacted. Neither was interested in the other's perspective 
because the perspectives were diametrically opposed, which is why secret 
negotiations continued for years even with President Nixon and Henry Kissinger 
expecting to gain little from them, and indeed gaining little from them and 
eventually losing control of Saigon to the Communists. Even while maintaining 
these modest expectations, the war was directed by its leaders in a fashion in 
which total victory was the expectation. What the United States was willing to 
settle for at the Paris Peace Accords was far short of what it had sought at the 
outset of the conflict, after expending far more in defeat than it ever would have 
even to achieve success—even after winning every battle of the war.  
 The same was true in Iraq. No militia or band of jihadists could challenge 
the American military in any open battle. But as with the NVA and VC, they 
managed to make the cost too great to be worth the effort. The words of Sun Tzu 
remind us, "To win victory is easy; to preserve its fruits, difficult." Likewise, 
Machiavelli's deliberations led him to the conclusion, "Everyone may begin a war                                                         
432 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1960), 4. 
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at his pleasure, but cannot so finish it." 433 After the spurious Gulf of Tonkin 
incident, and in the months after 9/11, the United States went to war at its 
pleasure, but could not finish it in accordance with its objectives. The 
fundamental lesson from Criterion I is twofold: do not characterize a particular 
policy problem in terms of good and evil or total victory and total defeat, and do 
not fight a war of choice as if it were a war of survival. Fit particular policy 
objectives to the national interest, not the national interest to particular policy 
objectives, which is exactly what the 2002 NSS did.  
 
 
Criterion II. Corollary strategic consequences  
 
 All politics is local: do not conflate states in the aggregate or individually       
 and do not apply grand-strategic lenses to local problems.  
 
 No two foreign-policy assumptions can be equally applied to any two 
different states. U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War exemplifies this grand-
strategic shortcoming. Classical realism, with its emphasis on the generalities of 
human nature and hard power, and neorealism, with its emphasis on structural 
constraints, largely ignore the relevance of culture in international relations. 
Critical scholars accurately contend that "pure or unadulterated (Western) IR 
concepts do not correspond with many local realities.” 434  But in the case of 
intervention, culture is an essential component of the efficacy of the policy. By 
                                                        
433 Both quotes from Michael Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London: 
Frank Cass, 1992), 150. 
 
434 Arlene Tickner and David Blaney, Thinking International Relations Differently (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 4. 
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imposing the concept of the 'ungoverned area' into security considerations, an 
intervening power mischaracterizes the area in question. There is no such thing 
as an 'ungoverned area:' "In reality, many so-called 'ungoverned spaces' are 
simply differently governed."435 In fact, in South Vietnam, as with many other 
Cold War battlefields, the state being 'defended' in intervention had little 
presence in the areas of the country where the enemy was active, which was 
precisely the problem with that state. It only controlled a tiny fraction of the 
country and ceded the rest as alternatively governed areas. William Odom wrote 
in 1992, soon after the Cold War ended: 
 
Two things seem to be missing from the various lines of study of 
the problem that the Third World poses for U.S. security. First, 
there is seldom an effort to stand back and view the U.S.—Soviet 
competition in its broader context, to examine the assumptions and 
political values on both sides, to reexamine the record on both 
sides, and to relate the competition to the indigenous factors that 
cause wars in the Third World. Second, there has been little 
effective effort to integrate the military dimension of wars in the 
Third World with two other dimensions—external influences and 
indigenous politics. Mention of their importance and urgings that 
they be seen as important are numerous, but how they interrelate 
and how they affect U.S. strategy are integrating issues that are 
largely neglected.436  
 
 
Odom recognized that to superimpose the perceptions and misperceptions of the 
global Cold War over indigenous local politics meant the misapplication of power 
in an intervention because such power would only be exploited by local                                                         
435 Anne Clunan and Harold Trinkunas, Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an 
Era of Softened Sovereignty (Stanford University Press, 2010), 17. 
 
436 William Odom, On Internal War: American and Soviet Approaches to Third World Clients and 
Insurgents (Duke University Press, 1992), 5. 
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adversaries as well as partners. Robert Komer, whose writings are detailed in 
Chapter 5, argued that linking human rights with military aid in foreign policy was 
akin to "fiddling while Rome burns," even while he administered pacification 
programs in Vietnam. 437  But the self-defeating perspective "Blowtorch Bob" 
Komer propounded was ineffective for exactly that reason: not understanding 
local conditions led to unsuccessful interventions because the two were related, 
but in precisely the opposite way. You could positively affect the overall balance 
of power by adeptly partnering with local actors, but you could not turn local 
actors into pure Cold War proxies because they already had their own set of local 
objectives.  
 Henry Kissinger concluded after the failure in Vietnam, "We probably 
made a mistake" by viewing Vietnam strictly through the FPDM prism of 
international Communism, lamenting of this myopia, "We perhaps might have 
perceived the war in more Vietnamese terms, rather than as the outward thrust of 
a global conspiracy."438 There is no other conflict in American history that has 
been subject to such histrionics, as Chapter 5 details. Kissinger's comment about 
the need to "perceive the conflict in more Vietnamese terms" is most welcome to 
the social scientist, but unfortunately came after the war, when it was needed 
before. This is the first lesson of the Vietnam War; the second being to 
understand the limits of the utility of even virtually unlimited military power. The 
                                                        
437 Walter Ladwig, III, “The New FM 3-24: What Happens When the Host Nation Is the Problem?” 
Council on Foreign Relations, June 10, 2014, http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2014/06/10/the-new-
fm-3-24-what-happens-when-the-host-nation-is-the-problem/ 
 
438 Brigham 2008, 153. 
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third lesson of the Vietnam War is that the United States never fully accepted the 
first two, which were un-learned sometime between 1975 and 2003. The heavily 
idealized foreign policy of the Bush Administration is documented in Chapter 6, 
but the re-militarization of U.S. foreign policy began before that. On August 18, 
1980, presidential candidate Ronald Reagan nostalgically addressed the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention in Chicago, recounting, "For too long, we 
have lived with the 'Vietnam Syndrome.'" His Vietnam War requiem was entirely 
distinct from the depiction offered in Chapter 5: 
 
Over and over again they told us for nearly 10 years that we were 
the aggressors bent on imperialistic conquests. They had a plan. It 
was to win in the field of propaganda here in America what they 
could not win on the field of battle in Vietnam. As the years dragged 
on, we were told that peace would come if we would simply stop 
interfering and go home. It is time we recognize that ours was, in 
truth, a noble cause. A small country newly free from colonial rule 
sought our help in establishing self-rule and the means of self-
defense against a totalitarian neighbor bent on conquest. We 
dishonor the memory of 50,000 young Americans who died in that 
cause when we give way to feelings of guilt as if we were doing 
something shameful... There is a lesson for all of us in Vietnam. If 
we are forced to fight, we must have the means and the 
determination to prevail or we will not have what it takes to secure 
the peace. And while we are at it, let us tell those who fought in that 
war that we will never again ask young men to fight and possibly 
die in a war our government is afraid to let them win.439 
 
 
 This is not only a complete distortion of the events of the Vietnam War, but 
it is a perspective that continues in both the popular imagination and in some 
segments of the scholarly literature, some of which is discussed in Chapter 5.                                                         
439 Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention in Chicago," The 
American Presidency Project, August 18, 1980, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85202 
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President Reagan, knowingly or unwittingly, completely ignores, and in fact 
lambasts, the most important lessons of the war. When he says "they," he is 
referring to the enemy. He does not name them by their actual political titles, as 
in Viet Cong, or North Vietnamese Army. He is promoting precisely the 
perspective that Kissinger realized was wrong by characterizing it as a "global 
conspiracy," in Kissinger's words. Nowhere in his statement is there any 
responsibility of any wrongdoing or even poor FPDM, except to say that political 
hamstringing lost the war, which is factually inaccurate.  
 If far more bombs were dropped on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia that all 
ordnance expended over the Pacific and European theaters in all of the Second 
World War, in what way was the military effort hamstrung? If this is to suggest 
that the air war should have been expanded into China, or the ground war into 
North Vietnam, which would have provoked the same Chinese response as did 
crossing into North Korea, Reagan is virtually pining for World War Three. His 
characterization of South Vietnam as a "small country, newly free" omits the role 
the United States played defending French colonialism, as well as the repressive 
tyranny of the government in Saigon. North Vietnam was not a "totalitarian 
neighbor." In fact, it did not take orders from Beijing or Moscow, and the idea of 
nationalist Vietnamese unification was popular in South Vietnam as well as 
North.  
 This mendacious misrepresentation of the most tragic war in American 
history not only dishonors the men who died there—which were nearly ten 
thousand more than the figure he offers—it all but guarantees that similar 
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tragedies will recur. What was "shameful" about Vietnam policy was not the 
brave soldiers who fought there, but the imprudence of the men who sent them 
there to fight a losing war. While the American public has been at least 
complacent in if not supportive of preponderance, the imprudent FPDM involved 
in the two foreign-policy blunders of the case studies require both self-deception, 
in terms of how U.S. foreign policymakers estimate U.S. capabilities to transform 
other states, and duplicity to the American people, in terms of how easy the 
campaign will be. John Mearsheimer’s Why Leaders Lie explains that deceiving 
the public is an inherently democratic activity, because of the fact that voters in a 
democracy can boot leaders out of office if a policy is perceived to be contrary to 
the national interest.440 FPDM leaders therefore take great care to preserve their 
narrative of events as it suits their particular brand of political expedience.  
 
Criterion III. Cost   
 
 Do not equate military power with political power.  
 
 The possession of power is not universally fungible across different 
applications of power. Military power cannot always buy political power, much 
less become the other. One of the common themes throughout these case 
studies in terms of the FPDM that led to blunder is the intentional magnification of 
preferred conditions, traits, and ideas with respect to specific policy issues and its 
concomitant depreciation of the threats obstacles to policy implementation 
present. This is especially evident in terms of defining the struggle and what 
                                                        
440 John J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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resources are necessary and feasible in order to win. These problems are 
compounded by a conflation of global ideology and local realities. The cousin to 
Criterion III is Criterion V, which addresses context, scope, and stakes. When 
evaluating cost, it is necessary to evaluate the cost in relation to the value of 
success. As mentioned in Chapter V, it is unlikely that the United States would 
have paid the cost for success that it ultimately paid for failure in Vietnam. The 
same could be said of Iraq. Therefore, when evaluating the FPDM of the relevant 
leaders, it is necessary to evaluate what they estimated the cost of intervention to 
be in relation to what it turned out to be. The wider the gap, the less accurate the 
FPDM. While it is impossible to calculate with precision the cost an intervention 
will have, this is part of the job of responsible leaders.  
 Assuming that with a great power endowment comes the ability to 
transform the politics of other states is imprudent. The calculations of the Second 
World War and the Cold War—the destruction a fielded military can wield on 
another, for example, or the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons—are not 
relevant to the majority of today's conflicts. The theories and tools of great power 
politics cannot be applied to asymmetrical and/or nonstate threats. Even in 
Vietnam, when Kennedy touted 'flexible response,' the war still became the 
application of great-power military doctrine to such an extent that it became the 
most destructive bombing campaign in history, but it mostly destroyed the 
animals and trees of the jungle. In Iraq, with both the justification for invading the 
country and the prosecution of the war itself, great power politics were employed 
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again against a single individual and his tyrannical regime, with the same 
unfavorable results.  
 The argument could be made that the United States was in fact going to 
war against another state, but this was explicitly denied by President Bush in his 
war-eve address. Having already made the case several times that the war was 
not with the Iraqi people but with the head of state alone, President Bush was 
quick to equate Saddam Hussein with terrorism in moral terms: "America faces 
an enemy that has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality." He did 
attempt to warn that war would be long: "A campaign on a harsh terrain in a 
nation as large as California could be longer and more difficult than some 
predict." But "some" could have referred to the majority of his cabinet, with the 
exception of Colin Powell, the only member of it with combat experience. His 
claim, "We have no ambition in Iraq except to remove a threat" would be 
contradicted by events on the ground. His claim, "Our nation enters this conflict 
reluctantly" was as far from the truth as Baghdad from Washington.  
 Having applied the Manichean morals of the crusade, he lastly offered, 
"The only way to limit its duration is to apply decisive force, and I assure you, this 
will not be a campaign of half-measures, and we will accept no outcome but 
victory."441 This comment was a direct acknowledgement to the perception that 
political hamstringing prevented victory in Vietnam, which was not the case, and 
to the criticism of allowing Hussein to retain power during the 1991 Gulf War.                                                         
441 President Bush's address to the nation on March 19, 2003, retrieved from Youtube, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WejYdT3Lof8 
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Throughout the heavily idealized rhetoric and the constant demonization of 
Saddam Hussein by Bush Administration officials in the media, great care was 
taken to frame the relevant "issues, story line, and slogans" in order to 
manipulate public perception into a more warlike footing.442 Entire volumes have 
been published on this disinformation campaign.443 Ultimately, when it came to 
the conflict itself, Defining victory would become as mercurial a prospect in this 
struggle as it was in Vietnam, and "decisive force" would again result in decisive 
defeat.  
 Cost is perhaps the most difficult metric to project while being the easiest 
to evaluate retroactively. When the deed is done, the financial cost can be 
calculated to the dollar. But before intervention takes place, the cost is somewhat 
a matter of conjecture. The estimation by Paul Wolfowitz that the Iraq War would 
"pay for itself" demonstrates how oblivious FPDM leaders can be to the costs of 
impending conflict. While they cannot be expected to predict cost to the dollar, 
the incentive on those promoting war is to depreciate its expected costs, and 
therefore other FPDM leaders and ordinary citizens must question these 
somewhat arbitrary projections. Applying military power to political grand-
strategic objectives will inevitably carry high financial costs, in addition to 
provoking strong reactions from adversaries.  
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 Robert Brigham reminds us, "The progressive impulse in American foreign 
policy has led to the realization in some circles that there generally is no political 
corollary to American military strength when the United States engages in nation 
building abroad." 444  When President Kennedy pronounced in his inaugural 
address, "We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support 
any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty," it is 
likely that he was both undecided about whether this was true with respect to 
'Indochina' and somewhat ignorant about the costs ambitious foreign-policy 
campaigns could sustain.445 It is certain that he did not know that the full force of 
the American military would be applied to the deltas and jungles of Vietnam and 
falter: 
 
The primary lesson of Vietnam, and one completely ignored by 
President Bush and his advisers, is that there is often no political 
corollary to America’s overwhelming military power. In Vietnam, the 
armed forces of the United States fought with courage and valor. 
They never lost a major military engagement and they inflicted 
severe pain on their adversaries. Yet U.S. objectives in Vietnam 
proved illusive. The United States was never able to translate that 
massive military might into sustainable political results. Without a 
successful political war, there was little that could be done militarily 
in Vietnam to change the course of the war within acceptable risks 
and costs.446 
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Kennedy was inaugurated during a time of unbridled American patriotism and 
optimism. The Vietnam War would cause Americans to question everything they 
thought they had come to take for granted about American power, American 
morality, and the dynamic between them. If the 1991 Gulf War served as a 
cathartic exorcism of those questions, the Iraq War would cause them to revisit 
those doubts once again.  
 
 
 
 
Criterion IV. Alternatives  
 
 No policy is inevitable.  
 
 This is the perhaps the most crucial of all the FPE Criteria, at least for a 
state with a great power endowment that can bear a very high cost of conflict. 
The manner in which the alternatives are created and processed through the 
FPDM system are absolutely essential in how the conflict will proceed and its 
prospects for success. By incorporating the respective policy issues into the 
grand strategy of preponderance, both the Vietnam War and Iraq War distorted 
the predictions, assessments, and costs calculated by the relevant leaders. They 
began from a point of victory, rather than striving towards it. They began from the 
assumption that 'Indochina' could not fall into enemy hands and that Saddam 
Hussein could not remain in power, rather than accepting it as a possibility. They 
began from the assertion that American military power could not be challenged. 
They began by assuming the NVA and VC would rapidly capitulate when they 
saw what they were up against and that American soldiers in Iraq would "be 
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greeted as liberators." 447  Beginning from a presumption of success is an 
imprudent way to achieve it. Worst of all, they linked the fate of South Vietnam to 
the fate of the Cold War, perpetuating the perception that a loss there was the 
loss of the Cold War. They did lose in Vietnam, they did not lose the Cold War, 
and the Vietnam War was not worth 1% of the cost incurred in blood and 
treasure in terms of the national interest. The same was true in 2003, when 
President Bush rashly linked the fate of Iraq with that of the "free world."  
 Arthur Schlesinger's assertion that the Vietnam War was "a tragedy 
without villains" represents a fatalist school of historiography that accepts 
particular events in history as inevitable. It may be the paramount lesson of 
history, as well as international relations, that every event everywhere in the 
world somehow simultaneously affects every other in an unpredictable symphony 
of surprises, especially in a world globalized by the astronomically expanding 
technological advancements in the transportation of material and information. As 
Captain Lawrence proclaimed in the film epic Lawrence of Arabia upon having 
rescued an outcast boy on an ostensibly impossible mission back through the 
Nefud Desert, "Nothing is written." Just as to deny the plausibility of constructing 
comprehensive, consistent methods and metrics to evaluate foreign policy is to 
ignore one of the basic necessities in international relations, so too is the 
exoneration of leaders because of presumed inevitability, a logical fallacy that 
reduces the value of scholarship and the general progress of humankind. If 
history is inevitable, then we cannot learn from it, and if we cannot learn from                                                         
447 This was one of a host of inaccurate predictions by Dick Cheney and his cohort.  
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history, then the future may as well be considered just as inevitable as history. 
This line of thinking is decidedly irreconcilable with the entire premise of this 
dissertation. FPE and FPA need more prominent roles in IR literature precisely 
because of the fact that decision-makers are human and their policies, both 
ideationally and practically, malleable.  
 It could hardly be said of the FPDM of the Iraq War that leaders 
"agonized" over it. In fact, discussion was tragically truncated. Senator Robert 
Byrd spoke to an empty audience during his lonesome rhetorical deliberations on 
the war in the Senatorial chambers. In contrast, FPDM leaders did indeed 
"agonize" over what to do with Vietnam. From March 10-24 of 1965, still part of 
the decision-making phase of "The Long 1964," Assistant Secretary of Defense 
John McNaughton reported to Robert McNamara proportioned U.S. objectives in 
Vietnam as "70%—To avoid a humiliating defeat (to our reputation as a 
guarantor); 20%—To keep SVN (and the adjacent) territory from Chinese hands; 
10%—To permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer, way of life."448 At the 
time, there were less than 30,000 U.S. troops in country, and less than 500 
soldiers had lost their lives there.449 And even with those modest (relative to what 
would come) losses, prestige was still of utmost importance. The U.S. thus fell 
victim to what Hilton Root termed the "commitment trap."  
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The trap the United States faces in Iraq exemplifies a recurring 
dilemma in U.S. foreign policy. Presidents have continuously 
coddled client regimes that are unwilling to make the political trade-
offs necessary for national legitimacy. Despite American rhetoric 
about overseas reform and ambivalence about backing dictators, 
throughout the cold war many U.S. political leaders relied on one 
authoritarian regime to help defeat another more odious 
authoritarian regime. And there were the proxy wars, too, when the 
United States armed Iraq against Iran and the mujahedin against 
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Such myopic policies 
consequently impaired America's ability to forcefully advocate 
domestic reforms within those regimes. Once engaged, U.S. 
support weakened American demands for pro-reform quid pro quo 
terms. This is the U.S. commitment trap. Committed to the survival 
of allies but lacking the leverage to discipline recalcitrant regime 
leaders, America creates a strategic vulnerability that even weak 
client states can exploit. The commitment trap reduces America's 
credibility as a reform advocate. It binds the United States so that 
America cannot walk away from allies without eroding its credibility. 
Curiously, this trap isn't sealed abroad but at home—by the fears 
that have driven the U.S. electorate since the cold war.450  
 
  
The United States has faced this problem everywhere it has intervened to prop 
up a weak state, as OPM Indicator II illustrates. Another memo from the 
Pentagon Papers discussing alternatives for Vietnam described a situation in 
which "the bombing campaign is reaching the point where we will have struck all 
worthwhile fixed targets except the ports," leaving Air Force commanders "no 
major military targets [remaining] to be struck in the North." With nowhere left to 
bomb in North Vietnam, the Air Force moved on to Laos and Cambodia and the 
Army pondered invading North Vietnam proper: "These new military moves 
against North Vietnam, together with land movements into Laos and Cambodia, 
are now under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Even long before the                                                         
450 Hilton Root, Alliance Curse: How America Lost the Third World (Washington, D.C: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2008), 174. 
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Tet Offensive turned the tide of public opinion against the war, U.S. war planners 
knew the effort was futile: "With respect to interdiction of men and materiel, it now 
appears that no combination of actions against the North short of destruction of 
the regime or occupation of North Vietnamese territory will physically reduce the 
flow of men and materiel below the relatively small amount needed by enemy 
forces to continue the war in the South." The memo concluded that "there 
appears to be no attractive course of action."451  
 In McNamara’s memoir, he similarly recalled the 1967 JASON study 
mentioned in Chapter 6: "Since the beginning of the Rolling Thunder, air strikes 
on NVN, the flow of men and materiel from NVN to SVN had greatly increased, 
and present evidence provides no basis for concluding that the damage inflicted 
on North Vietnam by the bombing program has had any significant effect on this 
flow. In short, the flow of men and materiel from North Vietnam to the South 
appears to reflect Hanoi's intentions rather than capabilities even in the face of 
the bombing."452 This was a profound statement about U.S. calculations. U.S. 
foreign policymakers were unable to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable 
developments that all the bombing in the world could not alter "Hanoi's 
intentions." At this point, it should have been obvious that the calculations the 
United States commenced the war with were no longer operable, but the war 
continued full-tilt for several more years. U.S. foreign policymakers could not                                                         
451 The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 4, Chapter I, "The Air War in North Vietnam, 
1965-1968," Mount Holyoke College, 1-276, 
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improve Vietnam policy because the reality of the situation did not fit the 
preconceived notions with which they entered hostilities. Disconfirming 
information was therefore useless because it was too late to change the course 
of events.  
 
Criterion V. Context, scope, and stakes  
 
 Redefine the scope of the American grand-strategic means-end chain by 
 avoiding characterizing the world in Manichean terms.  
 
 This need not, should not, and does not imply a renegotiation or 
compromise of American values. In fact, this is an American value—the freedom 
of every people to chart its own destiny through the course of its sociopolitical 
trajectory. In neither Vietnam nor Iraq did America control the moral high ground. 
The world is not flat, and its varying 195 nation-states contain differing levels of 
economic and social development, cultural preferences, democratic values, 
national identities, and foreign-policy customs. So many volumes have been 
published on the irony of the "arsenal of democracy," "empire by invitation," 
"liberal leviathan," "benevolent hegemon," or whatever term we choose to 
describe the engagement of the world by the United States that all sense of irony 
has dissipated and it has simply become a fact of life. The hypertrophy in 
American foreign relations has become problematic precisely because of the fact 
that republicanism is incompatible with interventionism. The ideational and 
material impulse to achieve total security by liberalizing the world produces an 
ideational and material backlash where it is applied in militant fashion. In the 
words of Colin Dueck, "The United States cannot be all things at once. It cannot 
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be the epitome of mortal virtue on a state scale and the international arbiter of 
world affairs; the consummate liberal utopia and the world's foremost war-
initiator."453 It is therefore essential to deeply examine the context and scope of 
U.S. grand strategy in correlation with any particular foreign policy by explicitly 
defining how its stakes relate to the national interest. President Bush declared 
that it was "our responsibility in history" to "rid the world of evil."454 This is far too 
great a burden to place on any one nation.  
 Characterizing the enemy as an "Evil Empire or an "Axis of Evil" severely 
constrains the availability of policy alternatives for foreign policymakers, because 
of the perception that allowing evil to roam freely is not only weak but also a form 
of morally bankrupt appeasement. It therefore links the strength of the state to 
the ability to purge those evils from the world. In reality, there is no such thing as 
'pure evil,' and conquering that evil may be much more difficult than policymakers 
believe. This characterization was particularly acute during the Cold War, when 
the bipolar world seemed divided, at least to the two protagonists, between 
inextricably dyadic poles, split along pervasively ideological terms. Richard 
Herrmann points out that this 'enemy image' subsided somewhat when this 
conflict came to its termination.455 But it experienced a revival with the 2002 NSS 
and President Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address. The 'enemy image'                                                         
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represents a "psychological construct as it signifies the actor's perception of the 
enemy," facilitating a process of demonization through which is created a 
"'bipolar' 'us' versus 'them' environment where 'good' is associated with 'us' and 
'evil' with 'them.'"456 The Constructivist Copenhagen School of IR describes this 
type of discourse as a process of "securitization" whereby threats are interpreted, 
codified, and made public: "In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that 
refers to something more real, the utterance itself is the act."457 Whether we 
should accept the Constructivist premise that security exists primarily in the 
ideational sphere is up to the observer to decide. What is certain is that U.S. 
leaders would be wise to under-promise and over-perform rather than 
overpromise and underperform in relation to the pursuit of prestige and moral 
Puritanism in the international system. 
 
 
OPM  
 
Indicator I. The estimation of the capacity to transform other states 
 
 Recognize that even relatively unlimited power has limitations.  
 
  
 In War and Peace, Tolstoy ponders, "What is power?" to which he 
responds rather rhetorically, "Power is power. That is, power is a word the 
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meaning of which we do not understand."458 In slightly less philosophical (more 
scientific) terms, James March's 1966 classic paper "The Power of Power" poses 
the question, "To what extent is one specific concept of power useful in the 
empirical analysis of mechanisms for social choice?" to which he offers the half-
response, "The answer to the original question is tentative and mixed... the 
concept of power and a simple force model represent a reasonable approach to 
the study of social choice... on the whole, however, power is a disappointing 
concept. It gives us surprisingly little purchase in reasonable models of complex 
systems of social choice."459 Gilpin defines power in his discussion of prestige, 
part of the FPE Cost Criterion: "Prestige is the reputation of power, and military 
power in particular. Whereas power refers to the economic, military, and related 
capabilities of a state, prestige refers primarily to the perceptions of other states 
with respect to a state's capacities and its ability and willingness to exercise 
power." Prestige can "deter or compel other states to achieve its objectives," but 
at the same time, "the fact that the existing distribution of power and the 
hierarchy of prestige can sometimes be in conflict with one another is an 
important factor in international political change... prestige, rather than power, is 
the everyday currency of international relations."460  
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 With respect to Vietnam and Iraq, the United States possessed relatively 
unlimited power (virtually unlimited material power vis-à-vis the target state). It 
could have destroyed each country, and everyone in it, hundreds of times over. 
But this would not have accomplished the objectives of inspiring anti-
Communism or combatting terrorism, and would have provoked a response from 
other states. Therefore, power itself is becoming an increasingly problematic 
measure of means. The extent to which U.S. leaders have assumed that hard 
power innately wields the capacity to control the political processes and 
outcomes of other states cannot be overstated. Indeed, the literature cited in this 
research is riddled with implicit and explicit declarations that where there is 
military and financial power there must also be the ability to affect and control the 
politics of other states. What prevails in reality is the ability to have a say in those 
politics, just as the enemy has a say in any confrontation, as Confederate 
General George Pickett adroitly proclaimed. State power is a factor in any 
interstate interaction or confrontation, it is not necessarily the factor.  For all the 
tactical pitfalls in Iraq, "the deeper problem was that the fundamental premise of 
the Bush revolution—that America's security rested on an America unbound—
was mistaken."461  
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Indicator II. The ability to support and bolster the host state  
 
 Do not intervene to shield an ineffectual government.  
 
 
 The paradox of intervention in support of a friendly government is that if it 
is worth defending, it should be able to stand on its own, but if it cannot stand on 
its own, it must be defended. Hilton Root addresses this exact problem when he 
refers to the "commitment trap." It is therefore up to the intervening state to 
calculate whether the state is worth defending, whether it can in fact be defended 
via successful intervention, and whether the cost required to successfully defend 
it is worth it. The calculations are the same whether the state is defending itself 
against adversaries foreign or domestic (though it is often a combination of the 
two). Just as an intervening state tends to believe that it can overcome the 
strength of local adversaries, it also tends to believe that its interests are aligned 
with local partners.  The problematic manifestations of this paradox were highly 
acute during the Cold War, as the United States partnered with states of varying 
quality, often non-democratic, in order to fend off Communist expansion. In 1971, 
Robert Keohane described the "cruel and unusual paradox" of the case of the 
Lilliputian powers that are the "badgers, mice and pigeons—if not the doves—of 
international politics, and in many cases they have been able to lead the 
elephant." 462  In addressing the evolution of the U.S. military's 2006 
counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24, juxtaposed with its 2014 version, Walter 
Ladwig envisions an interest-inverse interaction whereby "U.S. military                                                         
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assistance saps the host nation’s motivation to defeat insurgents on their own or 
undertake the measures necessary to enhance their counterinsurgency prowess, 
while economic aid reduces an allied regime’s incentives for fiscal reforms which 
would grow and strengthen their wartime economy."463 While the 2014 version of 
FM 3-24 recognizes that the intervening state and the partner state do not 
necessarily share aligned interests, counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine itself 
requires an intervention by an outside power. The 2014 version therefore simply 
limits the scope of the U.S. intervention, which is prudent, but nevertheless relies 
on U.S. COIN support to accomplish its objectives. But whenever military 
intervention is undertaken, it will face these strategic issues no matter how 
tactically adept its planners.  
  
 
Indicator III. The ability to restrict the power of adversaries  
 
 Do not assume that more of the same means more success. 
 
 
 This is the all-too-common adage of the powerful state: more resources 
within the same parameters will achieve superior results. In fact, the opposite 
may hold true: it is entirely plausible, and, in the cases examined here, factual, 
that the intervention itself perpetuates precisely the problems its undertaking 
sought to prevent. Milton Friedman's quote, "If you put the federal government in 
charge of the Sahara Desert, in five years there'd be a shortage of sand," is 
somewhat more famous than his marginally more reasonable contention: "Almost 
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all government programs are started with good intentions, but when you look at 
what they actually achieve, there is a general rule. Almost every such program 
has results that are the opposite of the intentions of the well-meaning people who 
originally back it." 464  This is, of course, an extreme characterization of 
government waste. Many government programs are far more efficient, important, 
and effective. But these are extreme cases of blunder, and these statements 
apply. In both Iraq and Vietnam, the military effort was the source of the 
gathering response against it.  
 Pickett's assertion supporting the idea that 'the enemy has a vote' in any 
confrontation, "I kinda think the Yankees had a little something to do with it," 
illustrates this point. No matter how inferior the strength and firepower of the 
enemy, his will alone is a metric that is not only difficult to judge, but impossible 
to judge until the war is well underway. Not until the fight is on can the enemy's 
will be known. Chapter 5 quoted Roosevelt as describing the people of 
'Indochina' as "not warlike." Nothing could have been further from the truth. The 
Vietnamese were in fact well versed in the art of war and had been repelling, or 
at least attempting to repel, invaders from the Chinese to the French to the 
Japanese for hundreds of years. The strategy and tactics used to inflict 
casualties on the Americans and break the will of the American people to fight 
were not plucked from thin air, but taken from the theoretical military doctrine of 
insurgency and guerilla warfare and put in practice by the Viet Minh against the 
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French. The lessons learned in Communist insurgency acquired during Mao Tse-
Tung's experience in the Chinese Civil War would inform NVA and VC military 
doctrine later on. 'Chairman Mao' describes his evolution of guerilla warfare in 
stages: 
 
The first covers the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and 
our strategic defensive. The second stage will be the period of the 
enemy's strategic consolidation and our preparations for the 
counter-offensive. The third stage will be the period of our strategic 
counter-offensive and the enemy's retreat. It is impossible to predict 
the concrete situation in the three stages, but certain main trends in 
the war may be pointed out in the light of present conditions. The 
objective course of events will be exceedingly rich and varied, with 
many twists and turns.465 
 
 
 The Chinese guerillas' experience honing patience, timing, 
resourcefulness, and leverage of the populace against an otherwise superior 
force paid dividends in Vietnam once the atmosphere of the Cold War brought 
the interests of the two countries more in line than they had been for the 
thousand years prior. Just as intervening states tend to assume that the interests 
of local partners are aligned with their own, they also tend to assume that they 
can overcome the strength of local adversaries. But the guerillas of South 
Vietnam, backed by their North Vietnamese counterparts, relied on a way of war 
that was more favorable to the conditions of the conflict than was the American 
way of war. While the Viet Cong relied on maximizing available resources and 
using time as a weapon, the U.S. military relied on superior firepower and short-
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term "decisive victory" as a crutch, and time was therefore against it over the 
long-term.  
 In Iraq, the sense of brooding nationalism that had been lying dormant 
under the authoritarian dictatorship of Saddam Hussein suddenly discovered 
flight in the total power vacuum that prevailed after the disbanding of the Iraqi 
army and the institutional purge of all Ba'ath Party civil servants. Those who had 
been unable to express a sense of nationalism now found it a necessity in order 
to preserve relevance in the fledgling Iraqi state. Political and religious sects and 
factions thus organized on those militarized terms, paradoxically linking the 
development of the state with its fractionalization. In both cases, the very 
presence of the intervention galvanized the militarized response against it. 
Furthermore, the simple condition of one state intervening in another creates 
such a confusion so as to create an overabundance of interests, perspectives, 
and overlapping alliances. Clausewitz describes the 'fog of war:' "If we remember 
how many factors contribute to an equation of forces, we will understand how 
difficult it is in some cases to determine which side has the upper hand. Often it 
is entirely a matter of the imagination."466 Mao's portrait of war as one in which it 
is "impossible to predict the concrete situation" and to always be prepared for 
"many twists and turns" fit perfectly with protracted guerilla warfare, and was the 
ideal counterpunch to the reliance on the quick, decisive battles of superior 
firepower employed by the American military.  
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Indicator IV. Rationalization and operational learning  
 
 Place more care into defining the national interest in painfully transparent 
 terms with respect to a particular policy.  
 
 According to Arnold Wolfers, "It would be an exaggeration to claim that the 
symbol of national security is nothing but a stimulus to semantic confusion, 
though closer analysis will show that if used without specifications it leaves room 
for more confusion than sound political counsel or scientific usage can afford."467 
As such, FPDM leaders would do well to exercise a higher level of caution in 
assessing the value of a given country as it relates to the national interest. 
Vietnam never held the significance to our national interest that we applied to it, 
nor did Iraq. These were wars of choice, chosen not at random but certainly 
arbitrarily, in which the national interest was superimposed over the respective 
country via the medium of the ideology of preponderance.  
 In a dangerous world, statesman must be borderline obsessive over the 
process of defining the national interest and seek to make that process as clear 
and scientific as possible. It is not in the national interest to have an extremely 
esoteric vision of grand strategy carried out by recondite leaders via clandestine 
methods and practices. Indeed, this has not been the problem with the grand 
strategy of preponderance, which has been openly and transparently pursued 
with little effort made to conceal it. Any encounter with another state, even a 
cooperative one, potentially carries with it disastrous consequences. It is                                                         
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therefore incumbent upon statesmen to engage in the world with extreme 
discretion. Even in circumstances of extreme benevolence, it is difficult to affect 
local conditions. Researchers at the London School of Economics, for example, 
found that that "no relationship exists between the levels of aid and rates of 
growth in recipient countries," resulting instead in "increasing the size of recipient 
governments and lining the pockets of elites."468 
 Rather than relying on a presumption of meliorism, U.S. grand strategy 
should be more focused on specifying more precisely what goals the nation 
seeks in its relations with others. George Kennan envisioned a stricter 
interpretation of the national interest than his preponderance-promoting 
colleagues. In simultaneously deploring "the histrionics of moralism" and 
advocating the pragmatism of pursuing "real possibilities for acting upon the 
international environment," his response to the "moral problem" of fending off the 
"two unprecedented and supreme dangers" of environmental destruction and 
catastrophic systemic wars was to strike a balance between morality, the national 
interest, and foreign relations: 
 
This would be a policy founded on recognition of the national 
interest, reasonably conceived, as the legitimate motivation for a 
large portion of the nation's behavior, and prepared to pursue that 
interest without either moral pretension or apology. It would be a 
policy that would seek the possibilities for service to morality 
primarily in our own behavior, not in our judgment of others. It 
would restrict our undertakings to the limits established by our own 
traditions and resources. It would see virtue in our minding our own                                                         
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business wherever there is not some overwhelming reason for 
minding the business of others.469 
 
  
The key passage in this excerpt is "primarily in our own behavior." The 
United States is at its most powerful as an exemplar of liberty to other states, 
rather than as the international dictator of liberty. In the modern world in which 
pacific, liberal norms are paraded and militarism is frowned upon, power 
becomes more powerful by creating an interdependence that relies on norms and 
best practices of liberal interaction. The two most militarized U.S. foreign policies 
in the last forty years, the Vietnam War and the Iraq War, failed miserably. This 
says as much about changing conditions in the international system in terms of 
security, norms, and the value of hard power as it does about the United States 
itself. There has not been a direct great-power conflict since 1945. That does not 
mean it could not happen tomorrow, but it does mean it is unlikely to happen 
soon. Under these conditions, the most powerful state in the international system 
would benefit more from selective cooperative engagement than selective 
militarist engagement. Military power, for the time being, has been eclipsed by 
other forms of power as international currency.  
 At the height of the Cold War, in quintessentially Nixonian fashion, 
President Nixon pronounced, "When the president does it, that means it's not 
illegal." As the former President of the Duke University Bar Association, Nixon 
would have known this to be legally incorrect. But this train of thought has 
informed the inverse manner in which FPDM is conducted in the United States.                                                         469 Benjamin Frankel, Roots of Realism (New York: Routledge, 1996), 361. 
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The impulse to slay monsters abroad complicates FPDM because rather than 
responding to a policy problem with a proportional understanding of its place in 
the national interest and proportional tools with which to address it, it places the 
cart before the horse. The innate spirit of mission described in Chapter 3 so 
characteristic of the American collision with the world, especially since 1945, 
places emphasis on pursuit over capture. The chase is the game. It is therefore 
unsurprising that the bounded rationality of mission ensues within that 
overarching perspective. The leaders involved in the FPDM of these foreign-
policy blunders willfully pursued a policy that was known to have a low likelihood 
of success, even while paradoxically overestimating U.S. capacity to affect local 
politics, because they molded reality into their preferred grand strategy of 
preponderance rather than molding a grand strategy around reality.  
 This bounded rationality of mission on the grand-strategic level correlates 
to the same problem on the tactical level. Chapters 5 and 6 illustrate this in detail. 
To offer another example, eight years into the war in Afghanistan, General 
Stanley McChrystal entered a situation in which "there was no single effective 
campaign assessment" mechanism.470 He would also lead an effort in which the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found that the availability of indigenous 
translators "remains essentially nonexistent." 471  The availability of linguists in 
Vietnam and Iraq was likewise a tiny fraction of the amount needed to interact                                                         
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with local communities and gather sufficient intelligence with which to protect 
those communities and thus win the war. The assessment by the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence of prewar intelligence with regard to Iraq concluded, 
"Much of the information provided or cleared by the Central Intelligence Agency 
for inclusion in Secretary Powell's speech was overstated, misleading, or 
incorrect."472 General Tommy Franks, who led the invasion force into Iraq, led a 
style of command that "tended to distort the information that flowed upward to 
him." One officer that worked under his command simply lamented, "I am 
convinced that much of the information that came out of Central Command is 
unreliable because he demands it instantly, so people pull it out of their hats. It's 
all SWAGs [scientific wild-assed guesses]. Also, everything has to be good news 
stuff.... You would find out you can't tell the truth." 473  This preference for 
confirmation bias fit perfectly on the political side with the Bush Administration.  
 
 
Where to in U.S. foreign policy?  
 
 The change/continuity in U.S. foreign policy debate continues, and many 
of its contentions remain in progress. Did the United States build the postwar 
international order based strictly on in its own interests, or did the 'benevolent 
hegemon' actually build something normative that transcends interests? Can that 
international order survive a world without a hegemon, or a world in which the 
superpower does not wish to arbitrate international affairs? Richard Haas                                                         
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473 Ricks 2006, 32. 
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predicts that without forceful U.S. leadership, smaller countries will appease 
rising powers like China, the international system will revert to self-help, nuclear 
weapons will proliferate, and U.S. leaders defining the American national interest 
in very narrow terms will force other countries to do the same.474  
 John Mearsheimer contends that the United States is a regional hegemon, 
hegemonic only in the Western Hemisphere, while in Europe and Asia the United 
States is an offshore balancer.475 But the expansion of NATO after the Cold War 
(which Mearsheimer opposed on realist grounds), U.S. maneuvers in the South 
China sea, and the rhetoric emanating from U.S. foreign policymakers call this 
characterization into question. Charles Krauthammer, who heralded the 'unipolar 
moment' when the Soviet Union collapsed, recently declared that the triumphant 
era of liberal democracy "is over. The autocracies are back and rising; 
democracy is on the defensive; the U.S. is in retreat. Look no further than 
Aleppo."476 But prognostications of American decline are as oversimplified as 
were prognostications of the "end of history" and the triumph of post-Cold War 
American hegemony. The phrase "is over" juxtaposes paradoxically with the 
declaration in the 2002 NSS that the battle between tyranny and liberty "is over."  
 Paul Kennedy attributes the "fall" of great powers to imperial overstretch 
and fiscal irresponsibility, in addition to natural cycles in the distribution of power:                                                         
474 Richard Haas, A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order 
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Ideally, of course, "profit" and "power" should go hand in hand. Far 
too often, however, statesmen found themselves confronted with 
the usual dilemma: between buying military security, at a time of 
real or perceived danger, which then became a burden upon the 
national economy, or keeping defense expenditures low, but finding 
one's interests sometimes threatened by the actions of other states. 
The present large Powers in the international system are thus 
compelled to grapple with the twin challenges which have 
confronted all their predecessors: first, with the uneven pattern of 
economic growth, which causes some of them to become wealthier 
(and, usually, stronger), relative to others; and second, with the 
competitive and occasionally dangerous scene abroad, which 
forces them to choose between a more immediate military security 
and a longer-term economic security. No general rule will provide 
the decision-makers of the time with a universally applicable course 
of action. If they neglect to provide adequate military defenses, they 
may be unable to respond if a rival Power takes advantage of them; 
if they spend too much on armaments—or, more usually, upon 
maintaining at growing cost the military obligations they had 
assumed in a previous period—they are likely to overstrain 
themselves, like an old man attempting to work beyond his natural 
strength.477   
 
 
The key line in this passage is "No general rule will provide the decision-makers 
of the time with a universally applicable course of action," which signifies that 
there are no absolute truths in statecraft, and decision-makers can seek to 
maximize their utility function but they can never guarantee wealth or security. 
The cyclical economic vision of changes in the balance of power over time 
implies a certain inevitability about the "rise and fall of the great powers," as 
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  434 
Kennedy terms it. George Modelski envisions these cycles in specifically 
predictable patterns, as shown in Table 10:478 
 
 Kennedy's work was published in 1989, and Modelski's power cycle theory 
in 1981, before the coming of the (perhaps short-lived) 'unipolar moment.' But the 
studies were based on historical trends, and if those trends are to continue, the 
United States will need to be wary of 'imperial overstretch' and fiscal imprudence 
if it wishes to extend its current status as the world's preeminent power. At the 
center of this crossroads is the 'military-industrial complex' that President 
Eisenhower warned against in his presidential farewell address. At best, the 
gargantuan American military-industrial complex functions as a necessary 
system of military-hardware production processes and public-corporate 
partnerships in order to protect the private sector while ensuring that the United 
States government never gets militarily flanked by a rival power. At worst, it 
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Table 10: Modelski’s Long Cycles (adapted from Modelski, 1981) 
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simply leads to a fiscal catch-22 in which “circulation of the ‘wheeling and 
dealing’ elites between and within the Pentagon, its contractors, the military 
brass, and government officials has become an ominously efficient vehicle for the 
waste and plunder of the citizens’ tax dollars appropriated by the Pentagon.”479 
The truth is likely somewhere in between these two characterizations.  
 The absolute cost of maintaining preponderance, although perhaps made 
temporarily manageable by the relative size of U.S. GDP during the second half 
of the previous century, is made more costly in relative terms by its 
ineffectiveness. The U.S. economy may be capable of maintaining the status quo 
ad infinitum, or for at least a number of decades to come, based on current 
projections. But whether this is money well spent, when many U.S. standard-of-
living indicators fall short of those in other industrialized nations, is one question 
Americans need to answer. Another is whether the money spent on maintaining 
the status quo is being used effectively. On December 5, 2016, the Washington 
Post published a story on a January 2015 internal Pentagon audit that "revealed 
for the first time that the Pentagon was spending almost a quarter of its $580 
billion budget on overhead and core business operations such as accounting, 
human resources, logistics and property management."480  
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 The U.S. military is currently engaged in at least 190 military operations in 
a majority of the world's countries.481 U.S. Special Operations Forces deployed to 
138 countries in 2016.482 Whether the average citizen is openly supportive of, 
barely cognizant of, or simply serving as a myrmidon to the prevailing status quo 
of American preponderance remains somewhat of an open question, given that 
public opinion vacillates depending on the perceived success of whatever 
foreign-policy engagement features most prominently in the headlines at any 
given moment. But seven decades of preponderance have ossified a credence in 
the citizenry that the world cannot survive without American direction, the 
viewpoint described by Richard Haas. Precisely to what extent this credence is 
inherent in the American mind versus perpetuated by the American leader is 
difficult to ascertain; the preceding chapters offer clear evidence that both 
phenomena have been operative for a long time.  
 Central to the viewpoint that the world needs a liberal hegemon to function 
properly is the concept of interdependence, a subject on which common ground 
between realists and liberals has sometimes been hard to come by. Like many 
inter-paradigmatic debates, it has at times suffered from overly simplistic 
parochialism. It is rudimentary to argue that interdependence produces conflict, 
just as it is rudimentary to argue the opposite. In the end, neither can be a law if 
even a general rule, as the nature of that interdependence, and the prevailing 
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conditional circumstances of the era, will define whether it produces war, peace, 
or something in between. Engaging with a trouble world means more trouble 
under certain circumstances, while isolationism from a troubled world means 
more security under certain circumstances.  
 What the case studies illustrate is what happens when the conception of 
the national interest with respect to a particular policy issue becomes distorted. If 
the United States continues to perceive threats to the national interest where 
none exist—and to respond to these benign dangers in militarized fashion—it 
risks precisely the national quicksand described by Kennedy. Writing in 1976, 
Robert Jervis examined the power of perception and misperception as related to 
capabilities, threats, and intentions: 
 
Differing perceptions of the other state's intentions often underlie 
policy debates. In the frequent cases when the participants do not 
realize that they differ on this crucial point, the dispute is apt to be 
both vituperative and unproductive. This has been the case with 
much of the debate in the United States over deterrence theories 
and policies. Although the arguments have been couched in terms 
of clashing general theories of international relations, most of the 
dispute can be accounted for in terms of disagreements about 
Soviet intentions.483  
 
 
The beauty of Jervis' argument is in its simplicity of purpose and clarity of 
explanation. He is correct to assert that there is a limit to the utility of the "general 
theories of international relations," just as Kennedy is correct to assert that "no 
general rule will provide the decision-makers of the time with a universally                                                         
483 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton University 
Press, 1976), 59. 
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applicable course of action." IR requires more depth as a field, more attention to 
the particularities of circumstances and conditions, and a richer appreciation for 
the exceptions to rules rather than to the rules themselves; one step in this 
direction is to recognize the differentiation between states. What all states do 
have in common, however, is the desire to avoid annihilation. The Cold War is 
such an enticing case study because of the presence of MAD. If the American 
leaders could simply have said to the Soviet leaders, "We will not attack you if 
you do not attack us," there would have been no Cold War and thus no need to 
produce more nuclear weapons than are required to vaporize the human planet. 
But there is no such entity as total trust, and the gap between that lack of totality 
and the totality that fear of annihilation produces in the human spirit created the 
security dilemma that existed long before the advent of nuclear weaponry. The 
stakes are simply higher now. How to escape this madness? 
  
The ideal solution for a status quo power would be to escape from 
the state of nature. But escape is impossible. The security dilemma 
cannot be abolished, it can only be ameliorated. Bonds of shared 
values and interests can be developed. If actors care about what 
happens to others and believe that others care about them, they 
will develop trust and can cooperate for mutual benefit. When two 
countries are locked in a spiral of arms and hostility, such bonds 
obviously are hard to establish. The first step must be the 
realization, by at least one side but preferably by both, that they 
are, or at least may be, caught in a dilemma that neither desires.484  
 
 
While the impending doom experienced during the height of the Cold War has 
come and gone, nuclear weapons and the art of deterrence are now permanent                                                         
484 Jervis 1976, 82. 
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fixtures of the international system. There is only one way for the human race to 
survive, which is of course to learn to cooperate. Jervis references a 1947 article 
by George Kennan in Foreign Affairs: "It is an undeniable privilege of every man 
to prove himself in the right in the thesis that the world is his enemy; for if he 
reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct, he is 
bound eventually to be right." If the United States looks abroad and sees threats 
first, they will materialize in the flesh. There are two problems with this 
perspective. First, it dilutes the real threats facing U.S. and global security—
namely, at the present time, nuclear proliferation in unpredictable states such as 
North Korea and Iran, Islamist fundamentalism, and environmental destruction 
(Kennan was decades ahead of his time on this third issue). Second, it reduces 
the incentives for other states to engage in cooperation. These issues will be 
resolved in one fashion or another if the great powers continue to avoid military 
confrontation as they have since 1945.  
 The U.S. experience during the Second World War convinced U.S. foreign 
policymakers that only a preponderance of power would suffice in the 
interminable quest to achieve lasting security. This may or may not have been 
true in the immediate postwar years. It is not true now. The only path to security 
in a nuclear-armed, power-diffused world is to straddle the fence of 
interdependence and promote the idea that it leads to pacific enterprises, rather 
than accepting that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they 
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must."485 The world can no longer afford to escape normative interpretations of 
international relations. Security in a world with these two conditions must be 
codeterminally created. As perhaps the preeminent authority on 
interdependence, Robert Keohane understands that interdependence, like 
anarchy, "is what states make of it."486 As was the conclusion of Jervis, Keohane 
simply states, "Cooperation is necessary," while recognizing, "It will be 
cooperation without hegemony."  
 
Interdependence in the world economy generates conflict. People 
who are hurt by the unexpected changes emanating from abroad, 
such as increases in the prices that producers charge for oil or that 
banks charge for the use of money, turn to their governments for 
aid... If discord is to be limited, and severe conflict avoided, 
governments' policies must be adjusted to one another. That is, 
cooperation is necessary. One way of achieving such mutual policy 
adjustment is through the activities of a hegemonic power, either 
through ad hoc measures or by establishing and maintaining 
international regimes that serve its own interests while managing to 
be sufficiently compatible with the interests of others to be widely 
accepted... The United States played this role during the first fifteen 
or twenty years after world War II; hegemonic cooperation was a 
reality...The United States is still the most important country in the 
world political economy [and] remains an essential participant in 
international regimes. Indeed, U.S. involvement is usually 
necessary if cooperation is to be fostered successfully...The ability 
and willingness of the United States to devote substantial resources 
to maintaining international economic regimes have both declined 
since the mid-1960's... It seems unlikely that the United States will 
reassume the dominant position that it had during the 1950's, or 
that any country will come to occupy such a position, in the 
absence of a wrenching upheaval such as occurred in the past as a 
result of major wars. Since war in the nuclear age would have                                                         
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altogether different and more catastrophic effects than the world 
wars of the past, it is probably safe to assume that hegemony will 
not be restored during our lifetimes. If we are to have cooperation, 
therefore, it will be cooperation without hegemony. Nonhegemonic 
cooperation is difficult, since it must take place among independent 
states that are motivated more by their own conceptions of self-
interest than by a devotion to the common good.487 
 
 
 A symposium on Dale Copeland's book Economic Interdependence and 
War at the 2016 International Studies Association Annual Conference produced 
a fierce debate between John J. Mearsheimer and Copeland, in which the 
disciple eclipsed the master simply by evolving theory beyond the dinosauric 
age.488 Mearsheimer hysterically repeated that the boundaries of realism cannot 
be punctured by liberal advancements, to which Copeland responded by doing 
exactly that. His book examines interdependence and war through historical 
analysis, with the most relevant current debate of course being that of U.S.-China 
relations. He argues that one of the underappreciated factors in determining how 
states calculate the costs and benefits of war versus peace are the expectations 
of benefit from future trade, a dynamic more important in today's globalized world 
than at any time in all of history. The merits of his precise argument can be 
debated by political economists, but its relevance here is in the adaptation of 
realism by incorporating liberal tenets. Mearsheimer's died-in-the-wool realist 
parsimony is adeptly propounded by his magnificent scholarship, but Copeland's 
epistemological evolution surpasses the confines of that parsimonious ontology.                                                          
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 IR as a field has been designed to resolve system-level questions. As 
such, it tells us little about smaller questions. However, these are the questions 
that define the larger questions. A state is made up of the smaller units of groups 
and individuals, just as the structure of the international system is made up of 
states. Grand strategy and the international balance of power are intricately 
linked to events and processes of seemingly less significance. Since the Second 
World War, the United States has controlled the 'world stage,' all the while 
declining in relative power and losing many smaller battles (Vietnam, fiscal 
discipline, efficient defense policy, Iraq, Afghanistan, the war against drugs) 
along the way.489  
 Alternatives to the Bretton Woods model pursued by actors such as 
Russia, some East Asian countries, China, and others continue to threaten the 
legitimacy of the Western world order. Chaos in the Middle East, the source of 
much of the world’s energy, continually threatens to derail any semblance of 
stability in international relations. In short, though the United States is by no 
means responsible for the maelstrom of instability that characterizes the 
unpredictable, dangerous nature of international relations, it has fallen short of 
the mark in terms of producing, clarifying, pursuing, and achieving its grand 
strategy because of inconsistencies and shortcomings between that grand 
strategy and the application of particular foreign-policy objectives. The resulting 
strategic-tactical gap fails to account for, for example, how local indigenous 
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will be achieved there.  
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politics relate to great-power interventions. This dissertation has attempted to 
take a step in the direction of filling that lacuna.  
 When dealing with the losing powers after the Second World War, in the 
construction of the Bretton Woods system, a large-scale, hegemonic-like 
ushering in of an international regime was possible because of glaring cultural 
similarities between Europeans (despite the despotic regime of the Third Reich) 
and Americans, and even Japan and its crumbling empire (despite its adherence 
to Shinto-Buddhist militarism). However, the current foreign-policy climate pits 
major powers against nonstate actors such as guerillas (hence the need to 
establish COIN doctrine) and Islamist terrorist groups. While the security 
demands of the United States and the West have shifted, the United States still 
maintains a Cold War-like foreign-policy posture that was designed to prevent 
aggression from the major powers. To solve these new problems, the United 
States sometimes uses a .44 Magnum to destroy a gnat, and ends up getting 
caught in the crosshairs of its own crossfire. A new era of foreign policy is 
needed. The sweeping notions of hegemony and grandiose grand strategy need 
to be abandoned entirely. Modern security threats require a modern toolbox of 
utility, not an aggressive one-size-fits-all approach applied by the gargantuan 
monolith of the U.S. defense establishment's "decisive force." 
 
 
The status quo or the status quo ante?  
 
 On the morning of January 12, 2016, Senator John McCain offered words 
in support of the confirmation of General James Mattis, perhaps the least 
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controversial cabinet selection of the new administration, to the post of Secretary 
of Defense. His characterization of "business as usual" in U.S. foreign policy was 
particularly telling:  
 
As we meet today, at a time of increasing global threat and 
disorder, for seven decades, the United States has played a unique 
role in the world. We've not only put America first but we've done so 
by maintaining and advancing a world order that has expanded 
security, prosperity, and freedom. This has required our alliances, 
our trade, our diplomacy, our values, but most of all, our military, for 
when would-be aggressors aspire to threaten world order, it's the 
global striking power of America's armed forces that must deter or 
thwart their ambitions. Too many Americans seem to have 
forgotten this in recent years. Too many have forgotten that our 
world order is not self-sustaining. Too many have forgotten that 
while the threats we face may not have purely military solutions, 
they all have military dimensions. In short, too many have forgotten 
that hard power matters. Having it, threatening it, leveraging it for 
diplomacy, and, at times, using it. Fairly or not, there is a perception 
around the world that America is weak and distracted, and that has 
only emboldened our adversaries to challenge the current world 
order. The threat posed by violent Islamic extremism continues to 
metastasize across the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Europe, and but 
for those who remain vigilant, our homeland. It should now be clear 
that we will be engaged in a global conflict of varying scope and 
intensity for the foreseeable future. Believing otherwise is wishful 
thinking. So, if confirmed, General Mattis, you would lead a military 
at war. You of all people appreciate what that means and what it 
demands. At the same time, our central challenge in the Middle 
East is not ISIL. As grave a threat as that is, it is a breakdown of 
regional order in which nearly every state is a battlefield for conflict, 
a combatant, or both. ISIL is a symptom of this disorder. At the 
same time, Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions have been 
postponed, but not halted, and it continues to modernize its military, 
expand its maligned influence, and seek to remake the region in its 
image from Syria to Iraq to Yemen. In Asia, the rise of China is 
shifting the balance of power in ways that increasingly challenge 
longstanding U.S. interests. We see a new assertiveness in China 
to confront U.S. allies and partners, make vast territorial claims with 
no basis in international law, carve out spheres of influence, and 
revise the current order. North Korea is testing Nuclear weapons 
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and ballistic missiles at an alarming rate. Our intelligence 
community publicly assesses that North Korea will soon develop a 
nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile that is capable of 
striking the U.S. homeland. This may become a defining crisis for 
the next president. And then there is Russia. Over the past eight 
years under Vladimir Putin, Russia has invaded Ukraine, annexed 
Crimea, threatened NATO allies, [and] intervened militarily in Syria, 
leaving a trail of death and destruction, and broken promises in its 
wake. Russia's military has targeted Syrian hospitals and first 
responders with precision weapons. Russia supplied the weapons 
that shot down a commercial aircraft over Ukraine. Russia's war in 
Ukraine has killed thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians. 
And in the most flagrant demonstration of Putin's disdain and 
disrespect for our nation, Russia deliberately interfered in our 
recent election with cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns 
designed to weaken America and discredit Western values. Each of 
our last three presidents has had great expectations of building a 
partnership with the Russian government. Each attempt has failed. 
Not for lack of good faith and effort on the U.S. side, but because of 
a stubborn fact, that we must finally recognize: Putin wants to be 
our enemy. He needs us as his enemy. He will never be our partner 
including in fighting ISIL. He believes that strengthening Russia 
means weakening America. We must proceed realistically on this 
basis. We must build a position of significant strength vis-á-vis 
Russia and any other adversary that seeks to undermine our 
national interest and challenge the world order; we must reestablish 
deterrence, and that is primarily the job of the Department of 
Defense. But for too long, the Department of Defense has planned 
and optimized itself for short-term episodic contingencies, whether 
against great powers or global terrorist movements. We now face a 
series of long-term, strategic competitions with clear military 
dimensions that often occur below the threshold of armed conflict 
(all emphases added).490  
 
 
 This view hardly seems one of a great power that has not fought a war 
against another even middle power for the seven dominant decades celebrated 
in the opening line of McCain’s comments. McCain went on to criticize the status 
quo of U.S. military spending and administration, citing "less combat power. In 
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constant dollars we spend almost the same amount on defense as we did thirty 
years ago, but we are fielding 35% fewer combat brigades, 53% fewer ships, and 
63% [fewer] future combat aircraft squadrons, all this while overhead costs that 
do not add to combat power have steadily increased. In short, we have done 
great harm to our military." It is unclear whether McCain has read Kennedy's 
book, which points out that costs of maintaining large militaries inevitably 
compound—he acknowledges that "overhead costs" rise, but does not account 
for the lesser return on constant FY dollars. "Business as usual is not just 
misguided, it is dangerous," he argued, attributing less spending to budgetary 
constraints: "All of these problems are compounded by the self-inflicted wounds 
of the Budget Control Act. For five years, national defense spending has been 
arbitrarily capped," leading to what he characterizes as "deferred modernization" 
in each branch of the military.  
 The obvious solution to the Senator, then, would be both ideational and 
material replenishment: "We need to stop deterring ourselves and return to 
strategy, aligning our ends, ways, and means to address global threats. We need 
to resize, and, more importantly, reshape our military." Naturally, this would all 
correspond with a substantial increase in spending: "This will not be cheap but it 
pales in comparison to the cost of failing to deter a war or, worse, losing one." 
But of the major wars fought since 1945, Korea was a stalemate, Vietnam was a 
resounding defeat, the 1991 Gulf War was a short-term victory but long-term 
stalemate, which led to the 2003 Iraq War, which was a catastrophe; there is also 
Afghanistan, which eclipsed Vietnam as America's longest war, and is steadily 
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slipping back into Taliban hands. In none of these wars was moral or military 
weakness an impediment to victory. As James Fallows and many others have 
asked, "Why do the best solders in the world keep losing?"491 Andrew Bacevich, 
scholar, retired U.S. Army colonel, and critic of U.S. foreign policy states simply, 
"The global military supremacy that the United States presently enjoys—and is 
bent on perpetuating—has become central to our national identity."492 Figure 11 
from the International Institute for Strategic Studies illustrates the scope of 
American military spending, which is higher than the next ten countries 
combined: 
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https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/01/the-tragedy-of-the-american-
military/383516/ 
 
492 Andrew Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War 
(Oxford University Press, 2005), 2. 
Figure 11: U.S. accounts for more than a third of global military spending 
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Figure 12 depicts military spending as a share of total discretionary spending:493 
 
 Though McCain is often cited as a "hawk" by the media, this depiction of 
the expectations of the U.S. position in the world and the capabilities of U.S. 
military power hardly strays from the common interpretation among his fellow 
foreign-policy practitioners. In fact, he has been at the forefront of many of the 
nation's foreign policies for the three decades he has served in the Senate since 
1987, and his rostrum as the Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
affords him an unrivaled pulpit with which to promulgate viewpoints unfiltered by 
the foreign-policy establishment. The irony, however, is that "maverick" McCain 
personifies the establishment he prides himself on bucking as well as just about 
anyone.                                                          
493 National Priorities Project, nationalpriorities.org/budget-basics/federal-budget-101 
Figure 12: U.S. Military spending as a share of total discretionary budget 
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 Contained within his overall perspective, which is much in line with the 
prevailing grand strategy over the seven decades his comments open with, are 
several implicit and explicit assumptions and contentions that reveal much about 
the 1945-onward endurance of preponderance in U.S. foreign affairs. "Unique," 
though accurate, hardly begins to describe the U.S. role in the world. The reason 
McCain's assumptions and contentions neither require further explanation nor 
invite debate in the confirmation hearing is because they are not controversial in 
U.S. foreign-policy discourse. First among these assumptions is the idea that 
American military power is directly and primarily credited with maintaining the 
postwar global order. Although there is no doubt that American military power 
turned the tide of the Second World War and indeed ushered in an era of global 
stability, democracy, and free market capitalism, assuming that the U.S. military 
is still "most of all" to credit for the "world order" all but disregards the liberal 
institutionalism that order is built on (though McCain does provide lip service to 
"our alliances, our trade, our diplomacy, our values" in passing). To place U.S. 
military power as the overwhelming caretaker of the international order is, in spite 
of its regular occurrence in official U.S. foreign-policy discourse, a monumental, 
and perhaps impossible, task to charge it with, just as President Bush's assertion 
that the United States is responsible for ridding the world of evil bears a cross 
contrary to pragmatism.  
 Second, when McCain problematizes the modern American zeitgeist by 
asserting that "too many Americans seem to have forgotten this in recent years," 
he is issuing a rallying call to American militarism that harkens directly back to 
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the early neoconservative publications of the 1990's, with striking similarity to 
William Kristol and Robert Kagan's 1996 essay in Foreign Affairs referenced in 
Chapter 6: "American hegemony is the only reliable defense against a 
breakdown of peace and international order. The appropriate goal of American 
foreign policy, therefore, is to preserve that hegemony as far into the future as 
possible." When McCain argues that "we need to stop deterring ourselves," he 
echoes the call to arms of Kristol and Kagan two decades earlier when they 
looked within to find the strength to destroy the monsters without: "The main 
threat the United States faces now and in the future is its own weakness." They 
too had warned against "flagging will and confusion about our role in the world," 
calling for a "benevolent hegemony" that wields "the capacity to contain or 
destroy many of the world's monsters."494  
 The refrain remains unchanged: the world is filled with monsters, and only 
the United States can destroy them; it cannot do so unless it maintains 
hegemony; and it cannot maintain hegemony unless it finds the strength to do so 
among the populace. Most strikingly, there is no mention of any historical change 
since 1945 with the exception of threats posed that seemingly are meant to 
represent a new manifestation of old threats, given that none of them are 
contextualized in a modern-historical juxtaposition. Schlesinger may have been 
correct in asserting that unilateralism is the most enduring feature of American 
foreign relations. But if we look specifically at the seven decades since 1945, the 
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language still invoked by our foreign-policy leaders reveals that the most 
enduring feature of American foreign relations goes one step further, to 
preponderance.  
 Inherent in this grand strategy is the ideational exceptionalism of the 
United States to the extent that no other power can exist alongside it, and states 
labeled as threatening such as Iran are not afforded the same rights as the 
United States and its allies. If Iran is going to "seek to remake the region in its 
image from Syria to Iraq to Yemen," it must be countered en force at every step 
of the way; meanwhile, the American way of life ought to be promoted en force 
wherever plausible in order to remake the world in its image. In colloquial terms, 
McCain's perspective argues that might makes right, although it at least caveats 
that approach by defending the "values" that have supposedly made the right 
mighty. Here is where realpolitik and values intertwine, although McCain focuses 
overwhelmingly on the "hard power" of realpolitik.  
 Morgenthau's contention that “political realism refuses to identify the moral 
aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe" 
was invoked by he and others during the escalation phase of the Vietnam War, 
the conflict that would call into question whether Americans could indeed claim 
the mantle of the moral high ground, as well as material invincibility. 495 
Morgenthau and other war-skeptic realists were vilified by the Johnson 
Administration for their disapproval of the Vietnam War. Although U.S. leaders 
still cling to this moral superiority and material invincibility, neither is more readily                                                         
495 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (1948). 
  452 
apparent now than it was in 1968 when the Tet Offensive would signify the 
beginning of the end in Vietnam, five full years before the acknowledgement of 
failure in the cease-fire.  
 Third, when McCain quite accurately asserts that "our central challenge in 
the Middle East is not ISIL," he exposes the rupture any great power faces 
between the "cold" and "hot" threats discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Where 
should statesmen focus attention—on the active combatants seeking to destroy 
American institutions, allies, and interests, or on the great-power rivalry proxy 
battlefields that populate the great-power-conflict hinterlands? Should the focus 
be on the existential threats of terrorist groups, environmental issues, and the 
like? Or on the balance of power and the rising, revisionist powers that seek to 
reorient status-quo international norms, institutions, and leadership? Perhaps it is 
unsurprising that so much attention is given to places like Syria, where both 
existential and power-rivalry threats can be engaged simultaneously.  
 The irony there, however, is that without the cooperation of the Russian 
menace, waging a war against Bashar al-Assad and Islamist terrorist groups 
within Syria becomes impossible, given that the Kurds and weaker Syrian 
Democratic Forces are the only other groups capable of challenging the 
tyrannical Syrian state, and they are opposed by the Russo-Turkic alliance. The 
incredibly convoluted and tenuous interest webs in Syria are so intertwined so as 
to render the whole situation relatively hopeless—every enemy is a friend to 
some friend and, conversely, every friend is a friend to some enemy. As an 
illustration of this complexity, when Vice President Joe Biden lamented the 
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support of Salafi jihadists in Syria by Turkey, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, 
and Saudi Arabia in a speech at Harvard University on October 2, 2014, he was 
forced to publicly apologize for making remarks that everyone with two eyes 
knew to be true, in order to avoid alienating those allies.496 As McCain accurately 
depicts, the ISIS problem is but a "symptom" of a larger regional malaise 
beholden to sectarian, regional, and power-dynamical intricacies. 
 Fourth, very much in conjunction with the third assumption/contention, 
McCain correctly calls into question the ultimate direction of the Department of 
Defense. While he recognizes that the U.S. military is not designed to fight the 
wars of the 21st century (a contention implicit in the OPM), portraying it as having 
"optimized itself for short-term episodic contingencies, whether against great 
powers or global terrorist movements," he misses the meta-argumental elephant 
in the room: how military power should be organized and applied is indeed an 
important question, but whether military power can solve the problems of the 21st 
century is quite another. This dissertation has attempted to demonstrate that 
sometimes it can, and sometimes it cannot; in the case studies as in many other 
cases, U.S. foreign policymakers have greatly overestimated the extent to which 
military power can slay the seemingly infinite production of the world's 
increasingly amorphous monsters.  
 It is impossible to hear McCain beseech his audience for more means to 
achieve his ever-expanding ends without conjuring up Gaddis and "the gap 
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Americans had allowed to develop between aspirations and accomplishments. 
We had preached self-determination but objected when others sought to practice 
it; we had proclaimed the virtues of economic freedom even as we sought to 
impose economic control."497 If grand strategy is essentially a means-end chain, 
in Gaddis' words, then preponderance, by definition, expands the ends beyond 
whatever the means become, no matter how much the means expand. A toddler 
rationing apple juice could comprehend the paradoxical predicament inherent in 
such a philosophy.  
 Barry Posen offers a depiction of U.S. grand strategy, in addition to a 
prescription for its ills, in Restraint: 
 
This undisciplined, expensive, and bloody strategy has done untold 
harm to U.S. national security. It makes enemies almost as fast as it 
slays them, discourages allies from paying for their own defense, 
and convinces powerful states to band together and oppose 
Washington's plans, further raising the costs of carrying out its 
foreign policy. During the 1990s, these consequences were 
manageable because the United States enjoyed such a favorable 
power position and chose its wars carefully. Over the last decade, 
however, the country's relative power has deteriorated, and 
policymakers have made dreadful choices concerning which wars to 
fight and how to fight them. What's more, the Pentagon has come to 
depend on continuous infusions of cash simply to retain its current 
force structure—levels of spending that the Great Recession and the 
United States' ballooning debt have rendered unsustainable. 
 
It is time to abandon the United States' hegemonic strategy and 
replace it with one of restraint. This approach would mean giving up 
on global reform and sticking to protecting narrow national security 
interests. It would mean transforming the military into a smaller 
force that goes to war only when it truly must. It would mean                                                         
497 John Lewis Gaddis, "The Tragedy of Cold War History," Foreign Affairs Vol. 73, No. 1 
(January/February 1994), 142. 
  455 
removing large numbers of U.S. troops from forward bases, 
creating incentives for allies to provide for their own security. And 
because such a shift would allow the United States to spend its 
resources on only the most pressing international threats, it would 
help preserve the country's prosperity and security over the long 
run.498  
 
 
This diagnosis, as well is its prescription, find concert with the findings of 
FPE and OPM contained in the previous chapters. There is always a 'justification' 
for intervening and pursuing preponderance. As long as there is a world there will 
be monsters, and as long as there are monsters, you can always try to justify 
intervening to slay them. The United States vacillated back and forth between 
isolationism and hegemony throughout its history because American identity 
itself is somewhat confused between hunger for power and moral messianism. 
Somewhere in the penumbra of this ineluctable paradox is an irreducible axiom: 
if means are not correlated with ends, and ends are not clearly defined, foreign 
policy is likely to end in blunder. 
 If John Quincy Adams did not wish for the United States to parade around 
the globe on quests to expurgate monsters, some of his contemporaries did. 
Thomas Jefferson promoted the idea of an "Empire of Liberty," just as his 
successors would pursue hegemony in Latin America, Western Europe, and Asia 
many years later. 499  But while it was always present in American foreign 
relations, the real push for preponderance came in the years after 1945. 
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Mearsheimer reminds us that "for every neck, there are two hands to choke it." 
The United States, no matter how powerful, cannot afford to employ both hands. 
It will end up choking itself. This is not to suggest the morality should be entirely 
distinguished from statecraft, and that is not what Morgenthau suggested either. 
It is merely to acknowledge that morality is but one of many factors in the 
international interchange between states and other social groups.  
 
Monster in the closet, monsters at the gates  
 The monster of restraint in the closet lives only in the American 
imagination. But there are real monsters in the world that require our attention, 
and the United States and its allies now face a terrifying monster in the form of 
Islamist militarism. While this threat does not yet wield the capacity that a great 
power would, it does not play by the rules a normal state would either. In making 
the contention that applying only a grand-strategic lens to any given policy 
problem invites disaster, the OPM does not mean to suggest that a state should 
not have any grand strategy, but rather that grand strategy and foreign policy 
should take into consideration the constraints of pragmatism and the 
particularities of localities in any calculation of means and ends, in addition to 
understanding the limits of power and the inherent issues of transforming the 
politics of other states. This dissertation has posed research questions relating to 
intervention and responded to them with case studies that illustrate the manifold 
problems inherent in the exercise of that policy. Its conclusions point to a 
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response to Islamist terrorism that would be most effective by employing a 
narrowly defined set of national-security interests. 
 As a response to the 9/11 attacks and the enduring thorn of Islamist 
fundamentalism, the war against terrorism seems to have become a never-
ending feature of American foreign policy. For the most part, other than the two 
obvious exceptions (Afghanistan and Iraq), targeted killings, usually from the air, 
have become the method of choice for attacking terrorists or would-be terrorists. 
In July of 2016, President Obama's White House revealed that between 2,372 to 
2,581 combatants and between 64 and 116 civilians had been killed by U.S. 
attacks (mostly drones, presumably) in 473 non-specified "strikes" against 
"terrorist targets" between January 20, 2009 and December 31, 2015 "outside 
areas of active hostilities," which does not include Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria.500 
The number offered for civilian casualties is highly questionable, since there is 
often no way to verify with certainty who has been killed afterward. Whether 
these targeted attacks do more harm than good by motivating more terrorists 
than they kill is an open question, but it is certainly less costly than the alternative 
of large-scale military intervention, which itself has been shown to produce a 
fierce backlash.  
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 The war against terrorism has thus far been delineated into three 
phases.501 In the first, personified by Donald Rumsfeld, the buzz words were 
“liberation,” “democracy,” “blitzkrieg,” and “shock and awe.” This era saw the 
invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and the foundations for future 
counterinsurgencies. The pacification era, personified by General David Petraeus 
and later General Stanley McChrystal, advocated engagement with local 
populations in the form of COIN and the establishment of an American 
civil/military hybrid force to secure the populace and address the needs of the 
people, thus aiming at the root causes of hostility to the foreign power. The first 
phase led into the second phase as invasion turned into occupation. The paradox 
of COIN is the paradox of American identity: it relies both on the "noble cause," in 
Reaganite terminology, of winning "hearts and minds," and on "decisive force," in 
Bush terminology, which clears the way for civilian 'pacification' in the first place 
by attacking hostile actors.  
 In Vietnam, pacification ultimately failed along with the war, but Robert 
Komer and John Paul Vann learned lessons that can be applied today to the war 
against terrorism. Recently, there have been voices within U.S. foreign 
policymaking circles that have argued for a more human approach to 
intervention. One example of this brand of thinking was the Human Terrain 
System (HTS). Defined by Kipp as "the social, ethnographic, cultural, economic, 
and political elements of the people among whom a force is operating," HTS was 
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a program designed to culturally map the people of a given area, with the hope of 
better integrating military forces with the local population and thus providing 
better security, incurring fewer military casualties and inflicting fewer casualties, 
and gathering better intelligence.502 Operating with a budget of $190 million, HTS 
was for a time "among the largest social-science projects in history."503 But while 
the attitude behind such a program is indeed a "noble cause," incorporating 
anthropologists into war also incorporated war into anthropologists, which 
eventually led to formal disapproval by the American Anthropological 
Association's Executive Board, citing the potential for militarizing scientists in 
addition to obvious questions of scientific biases. Furthermore, these efforts have 
been difficult to implement, and run into many of the same problems as would a 
traditional military approach to coercively transforming the politics of other states.  
 The second phase of the war against terrorism, although achieving some 
victories, such as an environment safe enough for democratic elections and the 
beginnings of democratic government in Afghanistan and Iraq, nevertheless 
failed to achieve lasting security or elimination of the fundamentalist enemy in 
either case. The current preference of the policy community informs U.S. foreign 
policy to prosecute the war on terrorism perhaps how it should have begun: 
partnership with any available local actors and targeted strikes from the air and 
Special Forces. This is how the “drone wars” have been fought in Pakistan,                                                         
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Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere. As Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 
Michael Vickers put it, “I just want to kill those guys.”504 While targeted killings will 
never adequately address the root causes of Islamist terrorism, and in fact may 
exacerbate them, they do act as a stopgap against existential terrorist 
formations.  
 At the same time, not all are satisfied with this approach. Senators such 
as John McCain and Lindsey Graham, critical of the withdrawal of troops from 
Iraq, now advocate sending brigade-level troops back into Iraq to coordinate the 
war against Islamic State, which the American public has little appetite for. We 
now appear to be entering—perhaps re-entering is a more appropriate term—the 
pursuit of multilateralism in foreign policy and the avoidance of becoming 
militarily extended by fighting large-scale wars against states or de-facto states 
like the Taliban (ISIS can hardly be considered even a de-facto state, despite its 
inclination to describe itself as such). Just as the United States waxed and 
waned through fits of unilateral expansion and starts of self-absorbed 
isolationism, the current trend may be no more than that—a trend. The 
precarious situation in the Middle East now seems a far cry from the aspirations 
the region and its onlookers held at the outset of the Arab Spring, an apparently 
ephemeral movement many media outlets now characterize as an “Arab Fall” or 
the even more melancholy “Arab Winter.”  
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 Global terrorism is a new problem, and along with nuclear proliferation and 
environmental destruction, the most important national-security threat of our 
times. It must be viewed as a modern threat and modern tools must be employed 
against it. The war machines of the Third Reich and Imperial Japan required 
decades of underlying bureaucratic, political, ideational, material and nationalistic 
underpinnings. When they were smashed by the “arsenal of democracy,” the Red 
Army, and allied forces, an infinite amount of time and effort would never have 
put those humpty-dumpties back together. In contrast, terror networks can be 
created and morphed on a whim within hours. The circumstances of the Second 
World War were unique to those nations and conditions. To fight wars in 
Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan with the mindset that defeated those bureaucratic 
machines is to fail at the task. Terror networks likewise cannot be understood in 
the same terms; the analysis and tools required to fight them are distinct from 
anything else. The same is true of drug trafficking organizations, environmental 
problems, and any of the multitude of 21st-century national-security concerns. 
This is not to say that emerging great-power threats or balance-of-power 
considerations should be absent the policymaker's mind, but resources must be 
directed at "hot" threats, even if preparation for "cold" threats never disappears 
from the foreign-policy landscape. 
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Possibilities for future research 
 
 Analysis of the case studies has helped to answer some questions while 
feeding further curiosity in others. Some of these questions follow: These 
historical case studies address two events that have come and gone. What 
further predictions about the future of IR can be made from their study? How 
would the OPM relate to a non-blunder case study or a foreign policy that ended 
in success? How do the pursuit of preponderance and the estimation of power to 
transform the politics of other states relate to non-military interventions, or large-
scale efforts at political coercion, such as the war against drugs in the Americas?  
 The United States is in many ways an exceptional nation, not just in how it 
defines itself but also from an objective point of view. To what extent is U.S. 
foreign policy simply based on its power endowment, and in what ways does it 
behave differently than other states irrespective of power endowment? 
 Do other states look to the United States as an example, or do they just 
fall in line (or not) with international liberal regimes and institutions because they 
believe it is in their own best interests to do so? Can attacking hostile states and 
nonstate actors serve as a lesson, a form of deterrent terrorism perhaps, to 
thwart other hostile actors?  
 How are changing norms going to affect the future of international 
relations? To what extent will the world become globalized, cultures infused, 
languages forgotten, and how will this affect the future of international relations?  
 To what extent are the OPM Indicators active in today's conflicts? For 
example, how does Indicator I relate to the overestimation of Syrian rebels to 
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challenge Bashar al-Assad, an effort that has been a complete failure by the 
United States?  
 What is the role of the American public in the pursuit of preponderance? 
How can we estimate the distinction between support and complacence, for any 
policy or ideology?  
 How hard will the United States attempt to cling to preponderance as 
power becomes more globally diffused, and will the world retain the relative 
great-power peace it has achieved since 1945 without a global hegemon?   
 Chapters 1-6 describe a world in which the most powerful state in the 
international system fails at its most ambitious foreign-policy projects. What 
happens if/when a slightly less powerful United States either becomes more 
successful at intervention or abandons intervention altogether? 
 How will the international community resolve the issues of nuclear 
proliferation and environmental destruction, and will these new threats force 
states to achieve an unprecedented level of cooperation?  
 How can this research be utilized to understand other foreign-policy 
blunders?  
 Has there been any major U.S. military intervention in the last seven 
decades that can be considered a clear success? How is the stalemate in 
Afghanistan to be assessed?  
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Concluding reflections and qualifications  
 This research has implications beyond U.S. foreign policy. While the 
domestic social conditions and foreign-policy traditions of the United States 
display a multitude of unique behavioral patterns, many of which are unpacked in 
the OPM, it also entails lessons for would-be superpowers and foreign 
policymaking in general. The OPM asks a fundamental question about the extent 
to which one state can affect the politics of another through intervention. 
Although it focuses on the most powerful state in the international system 
intervening in relatively weak states, it is likely that the conclusion that affecting 
the politics of other states in this outlier relationship holds even truer in any other 
type of relationship, all of which descend down the power ladder. The ability of an 
equal state to control another would likely be even more difficult, and a weaker 
state to control a stronger state more difficult still.  
 From a god's-eye view of the conflict (or a realist view, for that matter), it is 
perhaps fortunate that the Vietnam War and Iraq War did not succeed. It would 
have set a precedent that one state with a handful of token allies can and should 
invade other states that are deemed undesirable by some faction of the 
international community. Although this dissertation approached the research 
question with the assumption that the American self-image and U.S. foreign 
policy are in many ways unique, the finding that power cannot and does not 
always translate into the ability to control the politics of other states is relevant to 
any state seeking to affect the politics of other states. At the same time, 
advocating a narrower definition of the national-security elements of the national 
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interest does not preclude substantial diplomacy, cooperation, and progressive 
relations between states.   
 The case studies reveal many findings, some overlapping others, and 
some contradicting others. Despite the fact that the grand strategy of 
preponderance takes strides to make Americanism ubiquitous, it itself is not 
ubiquitous within U.S. grand strategy. Chapter 3, while contending that the 
presence of preponderance since 1945 has been unmistakable, also 
acknowledged the more pragmatic and isolationist tendencies in the history of 
U.S. foreign relations. Neither preponderance nor isolationism has ever been 
completely absent from the American way of foreign relations or the FDPM of 
elected leaders. And it must be noted that after the interventions of Chapter 5 
and Chapter 6, there was in fact an attitude unsympathetic toward intervention. 
"Vietnam Syndrome" prevented any such intervention again on that scale, at 
least for a time, and even informed the FPDM of the 1991 Gulf War as well as 
the Iraq War.  
 In 2003, U.S. leaders tried to convince themselves and the public that the 
fierce indigenous resistance (buoyed by foreign support) of Vietnam would not be 
re-experienced in Iraq a generation later. But for many of the same reasons, 
many of the same problems were encountered. It is too early to tell whether an 
"Iraq Syndrome" will emerge and what form it will take. The nature of the terrorist 
threat, which is very real even though it was invented with the case of Saddam 
Hussein, makes solutions to it highly complex and entirely unsavory. But Barack 
Obama did ascend to the presidency in part based on his opposition to that 
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intervention. Even after smaller episodes, such as Mogadishu, there has been an 
isolationist, or at least non-interventionist, response. Characterizing U.S. grand 
strategy as one of preponderance must therefore be qualified by the post-
intervention instances in which the pendulum auto-corrected back to a more 
pragmatic stance.  
 A second important point is that in both Vietnam and Iraq, U.S. foreign 
policymakers generally viewed themselves and their actions as a cause for good. 
This is not technically a qualification to the OPM, because the OPM does not 
contend the opposite. It is, however, a viewpoint common among scholars and 
public intellectuals with which there is some overlap with the OPM. This 
dissertation has intentionally avoided discussion of oil, imperialism, empire, neo-
colonialism, and Marxist and critical perspectives because the arguments made 
using these parameters and approaches are not compelling. The evidence does 
not point in these directions. While the dissertation has contended that the 
occurrence of U.S. foreign policymakers (as well as leaders of other states) 
pursuing policies contrary to the national interest, even when there is substantial 
evidence to make that known to them, is far more prevalent than many observers 
would claim, or than the tenets of rational-choice theory would have us believe, it 
does not contend that there is some inherently pernicious conspiracy to harm the 
national interest or even to profit from cronyism or the military-industrial complex, 
at least not in the case of the United States.  
 While the factors of class, the military-industrial complex, and economic 
considerations are of course not entirely absent, these are not core components 
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of the grand strategy of preponderance and they were not core components of 
the interventions in question. Preponderance is about ideas, security, fear, and 
capitalizing on the victories of the Second World War more than it is markets, 
empire, and avarice. It is ideational first and material second; indeed, the 
previous chapters have referred to it both as a grand strategy and as an 
ideology, perhaps the former as the conscious pursuit of the subconscious latter. 
The FPDM of the leaders examined herein was imprudent, not nefarious. Certain 
aspects of their reign were nefarious, just as certain actions of CEOs, craftsmen, 
artists, professors, or any other ordinary citizens are. Selfishness, laziness, and 
simple general fallibility are inherent aspects of human nature. To expect our 
leaders to never exhibit any of these characteristics is to make a Lego train out of 
a 500-ton locomotive—these are no rational-choice models, they are human 
beings.  
 But just as a craftsman would be held accountable if the house he built 
were to fall over, so too should the leaders propagating faulty logic and sending 
citizen-soldiers into harm's way to endanger the citizens of other states be held 
accountable when their FPDM fallacy leads the nation into blunder. And yet, in 
spite of this imprudence, these have been truly national blunders, with the full 
knowledge, compliance, and support of the American public. A majority of the 
American people supported the Vietnam War and the Iraq War years into the 
conflicts. Therefore, we cannot attribute these tragedies to imprudent FPDM 
alone. This is what George Kennan meant when he said, "People are not always 
more reasonable than governments."   
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 The leader-populace consensus is a sword with two edges: people must 
be held accountable for who they elect, just as leaders must be held accountable 
to the same standards of success as would anyone of any ordinary trade. 
Nevertheless, these were in some ways tragedies with villains, contrary to what 
Schlesinger would have us believe. U.S. foreign policymakers time and time 
again looked disconfirming evidence in the face and continued down the plank 
because they refused to accept the severe truth their preconceived cognitive and 
policy-preference biases would not incorporate. They subsequently lied to the 
American people about every aspect of the conflicts, even if that public was 
being told what it wanted to hear. Absent in all of this madness was leadership of 
thought and direction of purpose.  Preponderance is an underlying social 
condition as much as it is a grand strategy or ideology; it is not a paradigm or 
doctrine or prescription or policy per se and it is not necessary. The nation could 
wake up tomorrow and absolve itself of it because it is not only unnecessary for 
the survival of the state, but also harming the evolutionary fitness of the state. 
Some scholars of the critical persuasion would have us believe that the whole 
pursuit of preponderance is an “elite” exercise to sequester resources from 
foreigners and from poor Americans. But it is not in the national interest, not even 
when viewed from an extremely objective (self-interested) perspective. That 
some corporate interest-groups profit from it is not evidence that those groups 
control the American way of foreign policy.  
 The United States is not going anywhere as a great power in this century. 
But other great powers are forming, they will expect and demand their fair share 
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of world power, and they do not all mean us harm. In fact, as the world becomes 
increasingly globalized, interests are becoming increasingly co-determined 
across states. Realism informs the basic premise of the contention of this 
dissertation that takes aim at the assumption that power can transform the 
politics of other states. But realism is a paradigm of the past. It cannot 
adequately explain the intricacies of interdependence because it is based on the 
empirical evidence of history, and there is no empirical evidence for what has yet 
to happen. If the dictations of positivists demand that scholarship remain 
confined within the objective world, they can claim no objection to the contents of 
this dissertation, but for its penultimate line: this chapter here closes with an 
entreaty for scholars, policymakers, and average citizens alike to look to the 
better angels of our realist, liberalist, and Constructivist assertions in theory and 
praxis in order to promote a pragmatic vision of global good that begins with the 
exemplar of a benevolent United States strong enough to defend its values but 
smart enough to apply them wisely. If we are to avoid a life that is solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short, we must imagine that life in ontology, understand it in 
epistemology, and create it through the regenerative phronesis of method. 
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